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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
According to Kenneth Pollack, the purpose of Arabs at War is twofold: to explain why Arab armed forces so consistently lose—or just barely win—wars, and identifying the central strengths and weakness of these militaries. Pollack notes that the prevailing explanations for the overall limited effectiveness of Arab militaries tend to focus on such explanatory variables as unit cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills, weapons handling, logistics, maintenance, morale, training, and cowardice. Arabs at War seeks to test these prevailing explanations through an examination of twenty-eight post–World War II conflicts involving six Arab militaries (those of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). Pollack argues that four of the commonly cited explanatory variables—poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor employment of weapons, and poor maintenance—are foremost in accounting for the lack of military effectiveness of Arab forces. He asserts that the other factors prove to be either of secondary importance or to have no broad or measurable impact on the effectiveness of Arab militaries.
Pollack's argument is compelling. While such factors as generalship, training, unit cohesion, and morale varied widely over the twenty-eight cases examined, critical failures in tactical leadership, information management, weapons employment, and maintenance were central to all of them. Pollack offers dozens of examples of junior officers’ failing to make independent decisions, seize the initiative, employ maneuver warfare, or execute combined-arms operations. He explains how the unwillingness or inability of these officers to re-orient their forces—even within defensive fortifications—allowed the opposing armies to quickly exploit penetrations by simply turning ninety degrees and “rolling up” Arab units fixed in place and unable to shift fire. After reading just a few cases, the reader begins to recognize that the point at which the opposing forces penetrate Arab defensive lines is the moment at which battle is essentially over. Likewise, the reader soon sees the consistent inability of Arab forces to maintain high-end military equipment, repair even minor breakdowns, or generate sufficient sortie rates to allow Arab air forces to play a decisive role in any campaign. Despite these recurrent shortcomings, Pollack does not make sweeping condemnations of the Arab armed forces. He is willing to give Arab militaries credit where it is due. His flattering depiction of the logistics support of the Iraqi army in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the al-Faw Peninsula campaign, of Egyptian forces during the Yemen war, and of Libyan units in Uganda and Chad is convincing.
Arabs at War is a comprehensive assessment of the performance of Arab ground and air forces in conventional conflicts (the region's few naval battles and the use of military forces to quash domestic dissent are not the focus of this work). Pollack's depictions of battlefield events and command decisions are excellent. His writing style is accessible to non-experts, and the level of detail provided is helpful and appropriate. His depiction of the subtler elements of the battlefield is just detailed enough (e.g., the Egyptian army's inaccurate estimates of whether certain Sinai soil formations would support the passage of Israeli mechanized units during the 1967 war, or the inability of Israeli anti-tank weapons to penetrate the front armor of Jordanian M-47 Patton tanks). When such detail is not central to explaining the outcome of a battle or the effectiveness of armies in the field, it is omitted. There are no Tom Clancy–like explanations of military hardware in this book. The accompanying maps and tables are clear and helpful. While Pollack draws heavily from U.S. and Israeli sources for this book, there is a notable absence of Arab primary sources. The “Arab” perspective on military performance has yet to appear in English.
The primary area in which this book could stand improvement is in the internal organization of the chapters. Each country's modern military history is depicted in a distinct chapter. Chapters are internally divided into historic periods addressing specific conflicts. Each historic period has a “mini-conclusion” that recaps military effectiveness during that period, highlighting the key explanatory elements (e.g., generalship, tactical effectiveness, maintenance, logistics, etc.). Each chapter then has an overall conclusion that summarizes the entire post–World War II period in these same terms. In most cases, the analysis contained in the mini-conclusions is strikingly consistent across historic periods, and the final overall concluding section in the chapter summarizes these same points yet again. In the end, this method generates considerable repetition. This can be all the more frustrating given that Pollack's narrative is sufficiently clear that the reader already appreciates the key issues, trends, and explanatory factors before reaching concluding sections. By the time the reader gets to the eighth reflective summary of Syrian military effectiveness within a single chapter, thoughts turn to whether the book needs 698 pages.
Nevertheless, Arabs at War is a valuable contribution to the literature. It should become a standard reference work for students and scholars of the politics, strategy, and military history of the Middle East. Given the ongoing political and military turmoil in this region, military planners, intelligence specialists, and policy-makers inside and outside the Middle East would benefit from reading this book.