Late eighteenth-century Americans drew upon a remarkably diverse set of contentious repertoires to express their dissent from public authority. These included the circulation of opposition newspapers and political pamphlets, the petitioning of governors and acts of jury nullification, and the collective resistance of mobbing and armed regulation. While these repertoires were widely accepted as legitimate, and were essential to the popular mobilizations culminating in the Revolution of 1776, they came under increasing scrutiny from elites during the postrevolutionary years. By the time of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, and in the wake of Shays’s Rebellion, many elites were arguing that some of these repertoires, especially those focused on the enactment and enforcement of the law by the people acting “out of doors”—the phrase eighteenth-century Americans used to designate people acting collectively outside of formal political institutions—were wholly illegitimate in the newly republican context of representative political institutions based in popular consent. Benjamin Rush clearly expressed this elite position when he argued that the idea that “the sovereign and all other power is seated in the people” should be replaced by the more accurate idea that “all power is derived from the people.” “They possess it,” Rush explained, “only on the days of their elections. After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they exercise or resume it, unless it is abused.” (Address to the People of the United States).
Disputes over the boundaries of legitimate political action, and the appropriate means of expressing popular dissent, were not definitively resolved by the ratification of the United States Constitution; they remained central points of conflict during the first decade of the Early Republic and continue to animate democratic politics up to the present day. Indeed, one could argue that accepting the legitimacy of ongoing political contention around these issues is a defining aspect of democratic thought, properly understood, not to mention “radical democratic thought.” Historical investigation can help clarify the theoretical dilemmas underlying these conflicts, while also helping to explain their persistence in contemporary politics. This is one of the tasks of a historically situated democratic theory.
Robert Martin offers a good example of this kind of scholarship in Government by Dissent. Dissatisfied with contemporary democratic theory’s common preoccupation—some might say obsession—with abstract normative theories of legitimacy and right, Martin sets out to redirect readers’ attention to the often-overlooked importance of popular dissent to democratic politics. He does so by recovering early American understandings of the productive and praiseworthy aspects of political dissent, and tentatively exploring how these understandings might contribute to contemporary debates in democratic theory. Examining a wide range of historical sources, and engaging with the work of contemporary historians and democratic theorists, Martin develops a positive argument on behalf of “dissentient democracy”: democratic thought that values ongoing popular dissent as an essential element of politics, not a means but as an end in itself. While religious dissenters might actively dissent, he explains, their thought cannot usually be described as dissentient because they do not affirm dissent in principle and often struggle to bring about a political world where dissent would be unnecessary or illegitimate. The author sees dissent as an ongoing and necessary part of any democratic politics.
Martin’s concept of dissentient democracy, and of dissent more broadly, is somewhat vaguely articulated in this study, and perhaps overly capacious. It seems at times to obscure tensions that might have been more directly confronted, especially tensions between radical democratic thought and liberal constitutionalism (about which, more later). For example, sometimes his dissentient view seems to endorse an extra- or quasi-legal politics of collective resistance or democratic self-creation—it courts boundary questions of “separation” and “exit,” and even probes the legitimate use of force—while at other times, and more often, dissentient democracy merely affirms more uncontroversial liberal commitments to freedom of the press or the legitimacy of a loyal opposition. One of the strengths of Martin’s study of early American dissent is his effort to distinguish the popular dissentient view he endorses, centered in a superordinate commitment to popular sovereignty and ongoing contestation of institutions that claim to govern in the people’s name, from the more common focus on the legitimacy of individual acts of civil disobedience, with its typical appeal to individual rights or conscience. This contrast between collective dissent and resistance and individual disobedience might have been developed further in the study—both historically and conceptually—to more directly address the tensions that animate it, and also to more precisely articulate the author’s own theoretical commitments. The brief surveys of contemporary democratic theory he offers in the book’s introduction and conclusion do not clarify these issues; indeed, they risk muddying them further as they work to absorb potentially conflicting theoretical perspectives within the vast breadth of the dissentient view for which he argues.
Martin’s account of dissentient democratic thought is developed in each of the book’s eight chapters, which begin with debates over the legitimacy of popular regulation in the 1780s and 1790s and end with the largely forgotten work of Thomas Cooper, a friend of the prominent British radical Joseph Priestley, whom Martin celebrates as a key figure in the development of a “dissentient democratic theory” (even though in his later years, as he notes, Cooper became a proponent of censorship and an outspoken apologist for states' rights and southern slavery). In between, Martin offers interesting revisionist readings of familiar Founding figures, and insightful interpretations of important political episodes of the Early Republic.
In one of the book’s best chapters, for example, Martin argues that James Madison is a much more “democratically minded” theorist of public opinion than is usually believed, even in contemporary “popular constitutionalist” interpretations of his thought (p. 126). Similarly, in his chapter on the ratification debates, the Anti-Federalists are presented not as backward looking “conservatives” (Herbert Storing) or “men of little faith” (Celia Kenyon) but, because of their emphasis on the fallibility of political knowledge and the importance of ongoing dissent and revision in politics, as the unrecognized conceptual innovators. “Whereas Federalists hewed to the fear that political verities would be sullied by wrestling with the ‘chimney sweep’ of dissenting voices,” Martin writes, “Anti-Federalists … saw instead a more democratic result, burnished and productive” (p. 74).
The most important contribution of Martin’s study to contemporary scholarship in American political thought, however, may be his recovery of the political thought of several relatively obscure figures from the period, not only such known radicals as William Manning and Tunis Wortman but also the many anonymous and pseudonymous writers who made a case in the 1790s for an increasingly egalitarian and agonistic democratic politics: “Tom the Tinker,” “A Farmer,” “Numa,” and many others. Martin places great emphasis on the argumentative innovations of these obscure figures, and details how they worked to incrementally overcome the considerable cultural obstacles of the dominant “antidissent tradition” of political thought. This tradition, whether manifest in the covenant theology of Puritanism or the virtue-centered politics of elite republicanism, affirmed the unquestioned good of consensus and political harmony and denigrated the unquestioned harm of dissent as a symptom of corruption, faction, and social disorder.
Occasionally, Martin’s historical claims concerning the conceptual innovations of his chosen figures could be better established, or perhaps qualified. In part, this is because he offers no sustained account of the intellectual history behind the dissenting views he most admires. Had he situated the dissenting arguments of these late eighteenth-century radicals against the background of a more popular and populist republicanism, for example, the tradition best associated with Machiavelli—with its celebration of collective vigilance, jealousy of power, nondomination, and the productivity of political conflicts–some of his central figures’ arguments might have ended up seeming less unprecedented than he sometimes seems to claim.
Within the historical parameters that bound the study, however, roughly 1776 to 1800, there are two separate narratives that give shape to Martin’s overall argument; one is dominant and the other minor. The dominant narrative is primarily progressive. It traces the incremental emergence of the expansively dissentient conception of democracy that Martin affirms and, especially, the deepening of the theoretical arguments invoked to justify this dissentient view: from the Anti-Federalist innovations in practical dissent, to the more theoretically articulate accounts of Madison and members of the Democratic-Republican societies in the 1790s, and on to the most fully articulated “dissentient democratic theory” of Wortman, Manning, and Cooper, which alongside a common commitment to popular sovereignty affirms the “fallibility of all and the need for everyone to think for himself” (p. 64). The minor narrative is more about losses than about gains, and it parallels the transformation I discussed in my opening paragraph. It is elaborated in the second chapter’s account of the dissenting language of legitimate popular “regulation” and how it is eventually replaced by the language of illegitimate “rebellion” in the elite response to the Massachusetts Regulation/Shays’s Rebellion, the Pennsylvania Regulation of 1794/Whiskey Rebellion, and the Pennsylvania Regulation of 1799/Fries’s Rebellion. “In one generation,” Martin writes, “the ruling majority of a country founded by justifying popular disorder as a legitimate expression of popular will had accepted the notion that political change must go through established channels spread over a vast country, with election cycles up to six years long and an unelected Supreme Court as the final arbiter of what the people had said [in their Constitution]” (p. 52).
While these two narratives interweave at points, Martin never clarifies precisely how they are related to each other, and this too seems to speak to the tensions already mentioned, because the dominant narrative is much more compatible with liberal constitutional politics, representative government, and established political parties than is the minor narrative, which is much more extrainstitutional and radically democratic. Is the decline of the legitimacy of collective resistance by the “people out-of-doors” somehow related to the emerging “culture of democratic dissent and disorder” that Martin affirms (p. 18)? He rightly notes that mobbing and regulation were importantly delegitimized by “the emergence of new representative, republican state governments” (p. 26) and that the peaceful transfer of presidential power between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans during the election of 1800 was a particularly important step in this regard. But he also emphasizes that elections represented a narrowing of the dissentient view he endorses, an institutional enclosure of the more expansive collective politics he otherwise celebrates.
Martin makes a somewhat hesitant effort to address the relationship between these two narratives, I think, in the contrast he draws between the “popular disorder” of forceful collective regulations (Shays’s Rebellion) versus the “democratic disorder” that does not rely on the threat or use of force even when calling for collective disobedience to illegitimate laws (“Fries’s Rebellion”). However, here too this distinction is only briefly stated and undeveloped; the reader is left to wonder, again, what “radical democratic” form of politics the dissentient view ultimately sanctions.
It may be that the tensions that animate Government by Dissent are too quickly passed over in part because of Martin’s dogged pursuit of a larger goal. The telos of the study, and of the development in dissentient political thought that it traces, is succinctly captured, I think, in a term the author uses several times in the book: “proto-Millian.” The dissentient democratic theory he develops seems to point to John Stuart Mill as a kind of apotheosis, albeit with important egalitarian qualifications and commitments to popular politics beyond Mill’s own: Mill, Martin writes, is a proponent of “dissentient society,” not “dissentient democracy” (p. 5). Still, Martin seems intent on demonstrating how familiar Millian arguments—that “truth, knowledge, and human improvement generally are advanced by dissent, even when the dissenting view is false”—were articulated (first?) in the surprising context of late eighteenth-century America. While Mill made such “arguments famous,” Martin claims, early Americans had developed them half a century earlier as they sought new theoretical grounds to justify their political culture of democratic disorder and dissent. Beginning with the chapter on Anti-Federalism, Martin seems to evaluate the pro-dissenting arguments of all of his chosen figures, using Mill’s familiar argument in On Liberty as criteria.
As is always the case with such retrospective framing, there is the risk of historical distortion here, but there is also the risk of neglecting to fully engage other important controversies from the period relevant to the questions of dissent this study has done so much to illuminate. One important area of contention that is relatively overlooked because of the central focus on the developing theoretical justifications for the dissentient view, and the focus on the legitimacy of dissenting opinions, concerns which political means may be legitimately pursued in expressing dissent. It is not that Martin neglects this question entirely—it is an important part of the book’s minor narrative, and largely confined to the second chapter—but it is sidetracked to the study’s dominant goal. Giving equal weight to the contentious debates around the legitimate means of popular politics may have moved Martin to delve more deeply into some of the provocative issues he raises about radical political action that occurs “at the margins of democratic activity” (p. 12), especially those repertoires of the people acting collectively “out of doors,” and to question whether or not “radical democratic thought” can be as easily accommodated to constitutional liberalism as his study suggests.
