This fine volume is the first comprehensive philosophical engagement with what may be the most understudied authentic piece of the Corpus Aristotelicum. The nine interpretative essays work jointly as an unfailingly insightful vademecum to this difficult but fascinating treatise, and they thoroughly exploit its potential for providing fruitful case studies of larger topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy and theory of science. The essays are preceded by a critical edition of the Greek text with a collective translation. Two introductory chapters by Falcon do an excellent job in providing a basic orientation concerning both the treatise and the essays.
Falcon first sets the stage by introducing us to the explanatory agenda of De incessu animalium (IA). He offers a preliminary account of the key notions, including points of motion, feet and limb-bending, and canvasses Aristotle's intricate strategy, involving some familiar principles (such as the explanatory priority of blooded over bloodless animals), but also exhibiting features less prominent elsewhere, such as unceasing attention to exceptions as a way of comprising as fully as possible the complexity of phenomena.
Then Falcon takes us on a tour through some modern attempts at locating IA within the corpus, directly connected to the larger question of the overall structure of Aristotle's natural philosophy. A. Bekker's order (DA, PN, … PA, MA, IA), followed by most modern translations, seems inspired by (a) the foundational role of DA with respect to the study of life; (b) indications suggesting that IA further develops the inquiry offered in PA; and (c) the thematic proximity between IA and MA (although the opening of MA would suggest the reverse order). Yet, what is overlooked here (unlike in earlier orderings) is (d) the proximity of MA to the treatises of PN. Although the present volume does not solve this old riddle, it does offer valuable, fresh insights into it.
The Greek text of IA established by P. Golitsis brings no discoveries comparable to that of Berolinensis Philips 1507, which recently helped scholars achieve a more reliable reconstruction of MA and is likely to play a similar role with respect to a considerable part of PN (when it comes to IA, the manuscript is virtually identical to Vaticanus gr. 1339). Nevertheless, drawing on previous work by F. Berger, Golitsis provides a new critical edition that not only considers more manuscripts than Bekker and W. Jaeger did, but, more importantly, claims to have found in Vaticanus gr. 261 and 1339 traces of the archetype, independent from both established families; that leads to dozens of (mostly minor) divergences from Jaeger. Golitsis's edition should no doubt be taken from now on as the text of IA.
In his concise essay on IA 1–3 Falcon helpfully identifies one rationale behind the uncertain position of IA within the corpus: it is a study of the locomotive parts of animals (and so a kind of appendix to PA), but it is a study of these parts exactly in so far as they are useful for locomotion, and so locomotion, and especially different kinds of it (which fall outside the scope of MA), need to be treated, too; hence the external references to IA as an inquiry into the progression of animals. Moreover, Falcon demonstrates the potential for IA to become a case study of Aristotle's explanatory commitments that have been intensively studied by scholars for decades: explanatory principles (most prominently the teleological principle ‘nature does nothing in vain’) are not only formulated here: Aristotle systematically draws on them when offering explanations.
P. Dimas tackles the relation between Aristotle's two, seemingly incompatible, accounts of dimensions (up–down, right–left, front–back): the ‘positional’ account ascribing dimensions to all bodies qua positioned in the universe, and the ‘functional’ account, prominent in IA 4, ascribing dimensions exclusively to living bodies and from within; the latter makes the investigation of dimensions, surprisingly, a task of (philosophical) biology. Dimas convincingly brings out the priority of the functional approach in Aristotle's thought. He could have made his case even stronger, I think, by discussing (as others have done) Aristotle's ascription of the functional dimensions to the heavens in DC 2.2 285a27 and 2.5 288a3–12. I found particularly insightful Dimas's remarks, helping to justify Aristotle's sweeping identification of the right as the universal functional principle of breadth (as if he were ignorant of left-handedness).
K. Corcilius's meticulous and rich analysis of IA 5–6 is one of the volume's highlights, providing a novel perspective on the structure of IA and its place within the corpus. Aristotle's endeavour in IA 6 to establish the existence of a ‘common origin/principle’ of all animal locomotion has often been understood as referring to the soul, which would bring IA into line with PN (as in some early editions). Corcilius shows why this is unlikely (and why the heart is probably not on Aristotle's mind, either). In IA Aristotle is involved in a very different kind of inquiry (albeit relying on MA), aiming at a teleological explanation (foreign to PN and MA) of why various locomotive parts of animal bodies serve well their purposes as integral parts of an intelligible structural design – an architecture. Corcilius, moreover, brings out clearly the central position of chapters 5–6. By a further elaboration on the functional account of dimensions from IA 4 – grounding axiological statements about how well the three dimensions are articulated in different kinds of animals – Aristotle succeeds in providing, on the appropriate level of universality, the reason why every animal self-mover must possess (at least) four points of motion. Hereby he lays the groundwork for the functional explanations of locomotive parts in IA 7–19.
In a very fine paper Stavrianeas sheds fresh light on what is probably the best-known passage from IA, namely Aristotle's teleological explanation of the footlessness of snakes (as the most familiar example of blooded footless animals), which provides a prima facie counterexample against Aristotle's claim that all blooded animals move by means of four points. In IA 8 Aristotle argues, roughly, that since (1) a disproportionally long body is a part of the essence of snakes, (2) snakes, as blooded animals, could have at most four feet, (3) with four feet snakes could only move poorly, and (4) nature does nothing in vain: nature creates no feet for snakes. But clearly, if there were no other way of moving available to snakes than by feet, not creating any feet for them would be a real botch-up. Thus, the argument (a) stands or falls with the fuller version of the teleological principle in (4) – nature does nothing in vain and realises the best of available possibilities – and (b) presupposes the claim (established in IA 7) that footless animals can move by means of four points, and effectively so. Stavrianeas offers a convincing account of why Aristotle divides the explanatory work between IA 7 and 8 as he does – pertaining to the principle of commensurate universality –, and he makes a strong case for taking the two parts of (4) as constituting a single unified principle (rather than two independent principles, as is sometimes thought).
In another highlight of the collection C. Frey provides a crisp analysis of Aristotle's geometrical arguments in IA 9, rich in consequences for our understanding of the role applied mathematics can play in Aristotle's biological inquiry. This is a welcome addition to existing scholarly work on Aristotle's understanding and use of applied mathematics (most notoriously in meteorology). Aristotle establishes the necessity of bending in locomotion by means of the Pythagorean theorem. Frey emphasises how unique this procedure is within Aristotle's biological corpus, where mathematical theorems, although used fairly often, never have the role of ineliminable premises. He persuasively explains the striking gap between the implied geometrical model of walking (involving an unnatural squatting over one's trail leg) and the actual phenomenon: the aim of Aristotle's ‘mathematical kinesiology’ is not to capture truthfully how walking must be realised, but only to place constraints on any possible realisation of it.
T. Clarke offers a concise and insightful close reading of IA 10–11 on (a) flight (and swimming) and how general principles of locomotion (four points of motion, bending and straightening) apply to it and (b) two-footedness of humans and birds as an apparent exception to the architecture of locomotive bodies from IA 5–6 and its teleological explanation. Clarke ends the essay with a helpful reflection on the specific use of the teleological principle in IA 11: ‘nature does nothing contrary to nature’ – that is, nothing which would impede the animal from engaging in its natural activities; this is not a new principle but an implication of the standard teleological principle.
The somewhat longer chapter by S. Rangos consists of a close reading of IA 12–13 (providing teleological explanations of various ways in which animals bend their limbs), interspersed with learned excursuses on larger topics of Aristotle's biology and their scholarly discussions. In particular, Rangos goes out of his way to summarise at length the status quaestionis of natural teleology in Aristotle (pp. 235–8, 241–51). This is certainly not fruitless, but one wonders whether such a summary could have been incorporated into the introductory part of the book (especially since Stavrianeas's essay already contains an insightful contribution to this discussion).
S.R. Jansen provides an acute critical analysis of Aristotle's cross-kind teleological explanations of limb-bending and limb-attachment in IA 14–15. She pinpoints the potential pitfalls of Aristotle's way of inferring from partial functional equivalency to structural isomorphism: this procedure risks downplaying the importance of functional differences and different habitats, which in fact call for substantially different teleological explanations of similar structural features. Jansen also throws into question the current majority view according to which ‘nature’ in Aristotle's teleological principle quantifies over specific formal natures of animal kinds. More work would be needed, however, to show that Aristotle's cross-kind teleological explanations support (any more so than the generic ones) a more ‘global’ account of teleology.
Following the order of IA, the volume closes with a discussion of various apparent exceptions and oddities dealt with in IA 16–19. Golitsis does a great job in showing how the teleological principle is also at work in Aristotle's treatment of animal kinds that move in a less natural or unnatural way: they exhibit the best possible structure granted their essence (which includes their specific way of life). In discussing the closing lines of IA (announcing a study of the soul), Golitsis brings out the challenge contained therein (together with the closing of MA) for the idea of De anima being foundational for the study of animals (including PA).
This outstanding collection contributes more to our understanding of IA than all preceding scholarly work combined. It is an absolute must-read for anyone who wants to engage with this fascinating treatise. The book is also highly recommended to any serious student of Aristotle's biology and natural philosophy more generally.
