Daniel Schwartz has written an elegant and instructive monograph treating the ethical and political thought of Thomas Aquinas from the vantage point of friendship. As Schwartz notes (1; cf. 162), Aquinas himself wrote no treatise De Amicitia, On Friendship. The scholar who would understand Aquinas's theory of friendship must reconstruct it from many and diverse discussions of friendship in other contexts, most notably Aquinas's writings on charity (caritas, love as a theological virtue) and his commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy. Schwartz undertakes such a work of recovery and reconstruction, drawing especially from Aquinas's mature masterwork the Summa Theologiae and his much earlier Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (the rough equivalent of a doctoral dissertation in theology in Aquinas's time). Schwartz is a political theorist and so is keen to grasp and convey to his readers any special social and civic significance Aquinas's view of friendship may hold for us today. Without attempting to mold Aquinas into a contemporary partisan of liberal democracy, Schwartz holds that Aquinas's view of friendship, precisely as it is broadened from Aristotle's foundational theory to become capacious enough to include the theological friendship of caritas, also becomes broad enough to encompass within a meaningful model of social and political friendship much of the diversity inherent in today's Western polities (163–64).
Schwartz's book begins with an overview of Aquinas's understanding of friendship in relation to Aristotle's, Seneca's, and other classical sources of Aquinas's reflections. Schwartz devotes special attention in his first chapter to the three kinds of acts (internal as well as external to the person) most proper to friendship according to Aquinas: concord, benevolence, and beneficence (6–21). While all three are important, Schwartz chooses to focus his study chiefly on Aquinas's theory of concord and its implications. Schwartz is clear from the outset that his book is meant as an initial exploration of or “journey into” its subject rather than a comprehensive treatment. “The purpose of the book is to acquaint the reader with some of Aquinas's views on friendship. . . . This is more a terrestrial expedition than a reconnaissance flight” (vii–viii). To follow this metaphor further, the region of Thomistic friendship that captures Schwartz's interest and attention most is clearly that of concord, understood by Aquinas as fundamentally “a union of wills, not of opinions” (22 and n. 1; cf. inter alia Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II 29, 1 and 37, 1).
In chapters 2 and 3, Schwartz delves more deeply into this Thomistic dictum, arguing that Aquinas considers love's ability to reach further than knowledge in this life to unite persons in friendship, and that love's proper effect is a friendly union that makes generous allowance for “blameless diversity of opinions” due in turn to diversity of personal circumstances and/or degree of knowledge (41, 44–45). Mere disagreement, thus, should not suffice to undermine friendship on Aquinas's account. Friends and founders John Adams and Thomas Jefferson (my example) can remain or return to being friends even while strongly advocating incompatible policy alternatives for the nascent United States, just as (Aquinas's and Schwartz's examples) friends and doctors of the Church Augustine and Jerome can reach conflicting judgments concerning some matters of Christian teaching (matters either of little importance or not yet defined by the universal Church). Friends and apostles Paul and Barnabas can argue over the suitability of Mark as a companion in the work of evangelization (32–35 and nn.39–40, citing Summa Theologiae II–II 11, 2 and 29, 3). Such disputes may lead to a parting of ways, even physically, as they did in the case of Paul and Barnabas; they need not and, if Aquinas is correct, indeed should not undermine friendship founded on concord as “a union of wills.” Such friends may still will the good they seek in common and the proper goods of each other, even as they sharply differ in opinion as to how best to advance or secure these goods. So Aquinas writes that “if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not” (Summa Theologiae II–II 29, 3, and 2).
In chapter 4 Schwartz locates Aquinas's view of the deepest and most dangerous obstacles to friendship in the vices of vainglory (inanis gloria) and pride (superbia), thereby “establishing how pride prevents us from entering constructive social and political ties with others” (69). This chapter is especially insightful, emphasizing how the “desire to stand out” often distorts one's self-understanding and self-appraisal; leads prematurely or unjustly to discord with and “the dismissal of others”; and impedes one's ability to learn from others (72–83). Through a brief consideration of the potential of law and authority to confront the proud person with (some relevant, humbling aspect of) the truth about him or herself, Schwartz moves on to examine the wisdom and rectitude (rightness) of trusting others sufficiently to preserve friendships in the face of uncertainty (chapter 5), and the possible need of one friend to have recourse to justice against another (chapter 6). Schwartz's last substantive chapter, chapter 7, reflects on the potential of justice to assist in restoring damaged or even destroyed friendships, where the injustice of one of the parties has occasioned this damage or destruction. Chapter 8 comprises Schwartz's brief concluding reflections, summing up the previous arguments and relating them to debates about friendship within contemporary ethics and political thought. One wishes Schwartz had been able to develop these thoughts at greater length and in detail, to relate his understanding of Aquinas's theory of friendship to a wider range of contemporary scholarly literature and to elaborate more its potential helpfulness for specific social and civic challenges of our generation.
In Aquinas on Friendship Schwartz combines his chiefly analytical philosophic methodology with efforts at close readings of some important passages from Aquinas's works. He also offers unusually (for a political scientist) and refreshingly thoughtful considerations of some chiefly theological motives and methods in Aquinas's writings and their import for the philosophical and political aspects of Aquinas's thought. Schwartz's book thus deserves to be read with interest by readers of diverse analytical and historical-interpretive schools of political theory and philosophy, as well as by historians of ideas, theologians, and scholars of other disciplines interested in the deeply human phenomenon of friendship and its social and civic instantiations. Schwartz notes in his preface that he had to overcome “[his] own prejudices about theology and scholastic philosophy . . . to appreciate the beauty of Aquinas's thought, its breadth, rigour, and depth” (viii). From this book one can only conclude that Schwartz has succeeded admirably in doing so. Schwartz's arguments are detailed textually as well as analytically and so are not easy to convey, much less to assess, in a brief review.
One of this book's chief merits is that it will send interested readers back to ponder the original texts of Aquinas that are at the base of Schwartz's analysis, to reflect upon them further in their own right, to evaluate their persuasiveness and also that of Schwartz's interpretations and analyses. Schwartz himself seems to suggest that readers may rightly wonder whether his focus on one aspect of Aquinas's theory of friendship, namely on concord as a union of wills, might have the unintended effect of distorting or obfuscating “other equally (if not more important) requirements of friendship [according to Aquinas], such as good-willing mutual love” (164; cf. Schwartz's similar comment on 79, n. 36, regarding his choice to focus on pride as deception of self and others, rather than as desire to be an-other and greater sort of being than one actually is). And while Schwartz on occasion laments Aquinas's lack of philosophical clarity and rigor, Schwartz's own analyses in chapters 3 (together with the appendix) and 5 could have benefitted from clearer and more consistently followed distinctions between the will as a power or faculty of the soul (in this “essential” sense, for Aquinas there is only one human will) and the diverse acts of the will (in itself and as participated in by human sense appetites or desires; see Summa Theologiae I 82, I–II 19, and especially III 18), and between hope as a passion and hope as a theological virtue (see Summa Theologiae I–II 40, and II–II 17, 1 and 5). It is interesting that according to Aquinas there is no ethical or moral virtue of “hope” properly so called although magnanimity and related moral virtues in Aquinas's classification do fill this apparent gap.
Whatever its weaknesses may be, Aquinas on Friendship is an impressive achievement, a valuable addition to the scholarly literature on Aquinas's thought and on friendship's role in ethical, social, and civic life today. As such it deserves wide readership and the author our gratitude.
