Zoltan Barany has written a pathbreaking book on the behavior of armed forces in times of popular revolutions. Iron laws in the social sciences are scarce, but the following axiom may qualify as such: No transition to democracy is possible if the armed forces remain cohesive and loyal to the powers that be. Put differently, popular uprisings can only trigger autocratic breakdowns when militaries refrain from repressing on behalf of their masters. As Barany makes clear in How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, when uprisings challenge the authoritarian status quo, a military can defect by supporting the revolution, remain faithful to the powers that be and repress on behalf of its masters, or splinter as some parts of it rebel while others uphold the status quo. What follows next could be transition to democracy, authoritarian consolidation, or civil war. What explains the variation in military behavior?
To answer this question, Barany investigates four spheres that structure the reactions of armed forces to uprisings: the military institution itself, the state, societal dynamics at large, and the external environment. He then extrapolates six factors that contribute directly to top-brass decision making when protestors take to the streets clamoring for regime change (p. 40): 1) the military’s internal cohesion, 2) the volunteer or conscript composition of the army, 3) the regime’s treatment of the military, 4) the generals’ view of the regime’s legitimacy, 5) the size, composition, and nature of protests, and 6) the potential for foreign intervention. Having laid out his argument, Barany then embarks on an empirical investigation to assess the extent to which the variables he highlights indeed matter. His meticulously researched case studies include Iran, 1979; Burma, 1988 and 2007; China and Romania, 1989; and the 2011 Arab upheavals.
Barany finds that the military’s internal cohesion is of particular importance because the top brass prioritize the need to keep the army cohesive as they consider potential courses of action. Intramilitary tension could break along tribal, sectarian, or regional lines, or when officers cannot control noncommissioned officers/conscripts. Generals need to take these cleavages into consideration as they ponder whether to answer, or ignore, calls to repression. Generational splits matter as well, though sociopolitical divisions less so. That the armed forces should not be approached as a unified actor is widely accepted in the literature, but Barany does more than just corroborate the received wisdom. He fleshes out the complexity of intramilitary politics and dynamics when revolutions unfold, and process-traces how they structure armed forces behavior and, by extension, the fate of revolutionary movements. The composition of the demonstrations also matter: All else being equal, cross-sectional uprisings are more likely than demonstrations with narrow social bases (e.g., student or worker movements) to mount a successful challenge to authoritarianism. By contrast, the state’s treatment of the military proves less influential, whereas the importance of external variables fluctuates—though the variables are generally less important than military and societal factors in shaping military behavior.
The case studies do not reveal hitherto unknown information; Barany’s sources are secondary. What he does, however, is organize a rather diffuse field and rigorously test ideas that had mainly been speculations so far. His results are likely to inform the debate on military behavior in times of civilian uprisings for years to come.
Whereas Barany studies military politics in times of nonviolent revolutions, Jasen J. Castillo is interested in comparative battle performance. Some countries create cohesive armed forces that fight to the bitter end even when facing defeat. The German armed forces in the final stage of World War II is a case in point: Though by 1944 the correlation of force had tilted heavily in favor of the allies, the Wehrmacht avoided collapse and kept inflicting heavy blows on its enemies all the way till surrender in 1945. Four years earlier, the Soviet armed forces had suffered colossal losses in the wake of Operation Barbarossa—that is, the German invasion of the Soviet Union—and yet the Red Army too maintained its discipline and will to fight. By contrast, other countries fail to create cohesive war machines. Though their armed forces may be equipped with advanced weaponry, they lack the will to fight and collapse quickly when they encounter adversity. The lackluster performance of the French military in 1941 is a classic example in that regard. The author uses “cohesion theory” to explain the variation.
Castillo contends that there is a positive correlation between norms of unconditional individual loyalty to large groups and the latter’s ability to remain cohesive. The armed forces are no exception. What, then, could instill in soldiers unqualified attachment to the military and readiness to fight even when the circumstances are challenging? The answer, according to the author, is twofold. On the one hand, greater degrees of regime control over the population through ideological indoctrination create a hard core of true believers ready to fight and to coerce others to do the same. Communism filled its adherents with fervor, as did Nazism and similar totalitarian ideologies. Absolute commitment to the cause translated itself into battle zeal undaunted by adverse conditions. On the other hand, autonomous armed forces with leeway to train without political interference have also been successful in creating norms of trust among soldiers. Autonomy enhances professionalism, and the latter fosters a favorable environment to create bonds of camaraderie that make soldiers loyal to one another—and by extension, to the military institution. A regime, then, can exert ideological control over the population at large, give its military autonomy to train, do both, or do neither. Different combinations of the two explanatory variables account for divergence in degrees of cohesiveness and battle performance.
Castillo’s theoretical framework is convincing and parsimonious. His five case studies—Germany, 1944–45; France, 1940; the Soviet Union, 1941; North Vietnam, 1965–73, and the United States, 1968–72—are meticulously researched. His argument can serve policymakers as they assess the state of a nation’s armed forces and battlefield potential, as well as that of militaries of friends and foes alike. And while Castillo’s case studies are restricted to the armed forces, the overall logic of his argument can just as well be applied to other groups, for instance, terrorist organizations. Endurance and War is well written, relevant, and highly readable.
