Daniel Kapust's book is a valuable contribution that is of obvious interest to political theorists who work on Roman political thought and rhetoric and/or deliberation, but is also of interest to political theorists who study Greek, Renaissance, and early-modern political thought. The work has three major goals: first, to study Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus “in their own right” (p. 7); second, to demonstrate that “[t]he Roman historians are thus of continued importance because of their influence on contemporary scholarly developments in political theory” (pp. 7–8); and third, to highlight the theoretical insights that these historians discovered between “the practice of rhetoric [and] liberty and participatory government” (p. 8). Kapust admirably achieves all three of his goals.
Republicanism, Rhetoric and Roman Political Thought does not seek to “solve” the problem of rhetoric/deliberation and their relationship to liberty in contemporary democratic theory. Rather, this book demonstrates that the problem of rhetoric is far from a contemporary one (following Benedetto Fontana, Cary J. Nederman, and Gary Remer in Talking Democracy, 2004, and Bryan Garsten in Saving Persuasion, 2006) and shows how these ancient historians each articulated positions on rhetoric and liberty that are useful to contemporary scholars. However, even if Kapust provided us with nothing other than a close reading of these three historians, this work would still make an important contribution. As the author notes, there has been a renewal of interest in Roman political thought, and this now extends beyond the work of Cicero and Seneca to include, among others, the historians who are the subject of his work. This is not to say that either of those Roman giants is absent; Kapust repeatedly demonstrates how these historians responded to Cicero (and how Tacitus engaged Seneca) in their own work. In providing scholars with a thoughtful reading of these historians, the author does political theorists a great service by freeing the historians from their Renaissance and early-modern commentators, who themselves were bending the historians to their own purposes. The best-known example of this is Niccolo Machiavelli's use of Livy in his Discourses, though Kapust also rightly points out that Thomas Hobbes has colored our understanding of Sallust and republicanism (pp. 32–38).
Indeed, Machiavelli's argument about proper conflict as the engine of liberty in a republic is so closely identified with Livy that most political theorists would be surprised to learn, as they do in this text, that it was Sallust who more vigorously embraced proper conflict as a path to republican liberty. By freeing these historians from their earlier commentators and presenting them as original thinkers making valuable points about rhetoric and liberty, Kapust demonstrates the important contributions that the historians could make to the development of political ideas. While texts like these histories are difficult to work with, as their theoretical ideas can be difficult to draw out, it is my hope that others who study the history of political thought will follow Kapust's example and provide readings of the political thought of classical, Renaissance, and early-modern historians.
In his three historians, the author finds three separate approaches to navigating the relationship between rhetoric and republican liberty. He argues that Sallust believed that republican liberty necessitated conflict, and so “[c]onflict, then, is not necessarily a problem for Sallust; the problem is unchecked conflict not rooted in the desire to benefit the community” (p. 44). Rhetoric was important in this free republic because it was “a manifestation of competition and also a way for managing and publicizing competition” (p. 52). To demonstrate his claim, Kapust provides an engrossing reading of the Cato–Caesar exchange in Sallust's War with Catiline, arguing that this exchange is a prime illustration of Sallust's main contention that republican liberty requires vigorous rhetorical exchange to create “a productive tension” because “neither Cato and his virtues, nor Caesar and his virtues—nor the warlike virtues or peaceful virtues of ancient Rome—are sufficient in themselves” (p. 79) to secure that liberty.
Kapust argues that Livy developed an opposite approach, one that focused on rhetoric as a consensus-creating tool that secured the liberty of the republic through the maintenance of order. Livy saw rhetoric as creating “a relationship of persuasion and accommodation that can … lead to harmony” (p. 84). He argued that rhetoric allowed the Roman nobility to “win benevolentia” (p. 87) with the plebs, which allowed the republic to function properly. Without this goodwill, the ruler(s) could govern only with fear, and that was not a reasonable foundation for liberty. Kapust argues that Livy presents us with an aristocratic republicanism that requires “mutually constructed” (p. 109) authority and “the rhetoricization of leadership” (p. 110) to secure its freedom and order.
On Kapust's reading, Tacitus, who was further removed from the Roman Republic than Sallust or Livy, adopted a third position: that rhetoric fostered prudence that could allow some to enjoy a measure of liberty in an imperial setting. The author takes great pains to demonstrate that readings of Tacitus's Dialogue on Orators that see the dialogue as proclaiming the death of rhetoric are incomplete. Instead, Kapust reads the Dialogue with the Agricola and argues that Tacitus believed that “great men can live—and thrive—even under bad rulers” (p. 134) so long as they are prudent. This reading casts history writing as a type of rhetoric that could “continue to perform the functions of oratory” (p. 140; emphasis in original). History writing allowed the historian to contribute to instruction in prudence—which allowed individuals to maximize their liberty—by “provid[ing] insight into the character of the ruler in particular, just as the masses and aristocracy were studied in the [republican] past” (p. 151). Although there was no longer a republic, Tacitus's rhetoric-as-history could still help secure some individual liberty akin to the old republican liberty through the use of historical examples to illustrate the need to prudently adapt oneself to particular rulers and circumstances.
All of these historians argued that avarice threatened republican liberty, and I wish that Kapust had incorporated this point more prominently in his argument, as I think it would have allowed him to emphasize additional relevant connections between the Roman historians and contemporary political thought. The historians' worry about avarice and luxury helps explain why they were drawn to the public theory of republicanism and the equally public practice of rhetoric. Placing citizens in plain view was the best way to root out those whose ambition and avarice would destroy republican liberty. Importantly, this demand for openness was not seen as an affront to that liberty. Of course, our contemporary conceptions of freedom include the freedom to choose to be private. It seems to me that one of the most important lessons we can draw from these three historians is that if we want aspects of a republican, rhetorical culture, we have to seriously examine whether or not that culture is compatible with modern conceptions of freedom that accommodate privacy.
Although this is an interesting question, Kapust is not to be faulted for not making it a key focus of his rich work. His book increases our understanding of specific authors, makes an important case for considering the classical, Renaissance, and early-modern historians more seriously as political theorists, and provides us with models for making sense of the relationship between rhetoric and liberty. For these reasons (and more), it is worth our attention.
