An East Wind is coming, gently swaying the foundations of the international order with increasing intensity—much to the apprehension of Washington and its allies. China's unprecedented rise has seen the economic powerhouse enjoy growing regional and global clout, with which it has the potential to reshape the institutions, norms, and power structures upon which our world order rests. In China and the International Order, Mazarr and his colleagues seek to understand these implications by analyzing China's global aspirations and behavior, and how they inform its engagement with the multilateral order, deriving from this inquiry certain policy implications and recommendations for the United States vis-à-vis its own role and operation. From this extensive analysis, the authors argue that China will not assume an extreme position with regard to the international order (China's interdependence with actors within the order preventing a confrontational stance and its ambitions being too strong for total acquiescence) and will settle for some kind of middle ground (107). The book makes its case across seven chapters, through which it highlights China's interests and ambitions, its view of and behavior towards the international order, and the future of its interaction with the international order; proposes three trajectories for China and the international order; and finally, presents conclusions and recommendations.
China's national interests, its leader's approach to achieving them, and the extent to which the current international environment is conducive to pursuing those interests, dictate its stance on the international order (13). The authors identify China's three core national interests—security, sovereignty and development (14)—from which they tease out five broad themes pertaining to China's views on the international order. First, support for international institutions that facilitate Chinese influence (the UN and the WTO), and desire for redistribution of decision-making power in institutions where China lacks influence (27). Second, the appreciation for “rules-based, multilateral decision-making mechanisms” (29) in which the credibility and stability of the international order are grounded. Third, apprehension toward the international order's deep-rooted liberal democratic norms and American exceptionalism/exploitation of the principle of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) to exert military power in defense of those norms (30). Fourth, criticism of American willingness to disobey the order's rules and processes where it sees fit (contravention of UNSC resolutions, for example). Fifth, the denunciation of unmandated military action by the West in the name of freedom and democracy (31).
With regard to China's behavior toward the international order, the authors observe a substantial increase in Chinese participation in international regimes, attempts to increase its power, flout rules and norms where deemed to serve its interests, and use its growing influence to push for reforms in its favor (38). However, China's engagement with the international order is contradictory: on the one hand, China has displayed willingness to adopt rules and norms governing the international order, working with them to expand its influence and image as a global leader. On the other hand, China's participation is considerably self-serving, with only selective adherence to rules (103). Three major findings are delivered regarding Chinese engagement and the international order. First, Chinese support of the international system is expected to be conditional as a means to demand more influence (xi). However, it is unlikely these demands will upset the nature of the international system. Second, stronger multilateralism will allow the United States to contain China. Third, a certain degree of compromise to accommodate Chinese preferences is more conducive toward system stability than China's alienation (xii).
Finally, the book proposes three likely trajectories. The first, “adversarial displacement” (109), envisions a scenario where China supplants America as global hegemon, shaping a multilateral order that operates in a manner primarily serving China's interests; the second, “multilateral power-flexing” (111), echoes the first (China replacing America), but lacks any direct confrontation with the US or direct attempts to weaken American power; the third, “uncoordinated shirking” (112), presents an inward-looking, domestic policy-focused China less concerned with participation in international politics (inconsistent engagement).
China and the International Order is the kind of rigorous, heavily empirical-based work to be expected from a source like the RAND Corporation. The analysis is insightful and objective, reading more like a research report than a book and detailing a strict methodology at the beginning: a “qualitative analysis of several forms of data: historical analysis, statements of Chinese officials and official documents, empirical evidence of China's behavior, and … expert studies of China's attitude toward the postwar order” (9). Acknowledging the limitations of quantitative analysis in understanding Chinese posture on the international order, Mazarr and colleagues present their conclusions as “informed qualitative inferential interpretation of existing data.” The book draws heavily from authoritative sources (some originating from the subject itself). For example, the authors consult directives from the 19th Party Congress report to understand the priorities of China's top leadership, finding that China will “continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order” (18) and seeks to “become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence.” When reviewing Chinese support for institutions that give it influence, the authors refer to an IMF survey: “in 2016 … the renminbi became the first currency added to the SDR list in 15 years” (27).
China and the International Order falls short, however, on two notable counts. The book's evaluation is objective and sufficient insofar as its analysis of China's ambitions, the status quo, and what is likely to happen in terms of China's engagement with the international order are concerned—the ‘what’ factors. However, the book doesn't adequately consider the underlying factors—historical traumas and ambitions—that influence China's global views and behavior: China's national psyche, the ‘why’ factors. Disregarding these factors may yield inaccurate assessments of China's motives, risking erroneous prognoses. For example, the values and social, cultural, and historical characteristics underpinning China's political motives differ from those of the West (Western predominance of the individual's civil liberties versus the Chinese maxim of community over individual). Secondly, the grand statements made by certain state sources are largely propaganda statements geared more toward maintaining the CCP's legitimacy, than to providing an accurate representation of what China is really capable of. Therefore, caution must be exercised when incorporating such ostentatious remarks into analysis, as they may compromise the integrity of the book's otherwise precise, qualitative research.
China isn't the only force to be reckoned with. Geopolitical tensions, technological advancements, populism in the West, and shifting global power dynamics all raise a burning question: what does the future of multilateralism look like? China and the International Order provides us with an important piece of the puzzle in attempting to answer this question, by way of a solid exploration of the possible ways in which one of the key players—China—will engage the international order, and the subsequent implications. Observations of Chinese operation within the international order—from China's own brand of liberal institutionalism, the RMB's internationalization, to territorial expansion in the South China Sea—give good reason to believe that, whatever form the future multilateral order may take, it is certain to have a strong Chinese influence. The East Wind is here to stay.
