The first thing that draws one's attention to this latest offering by Michael Banner is the title. It jumps out at the reader because it dominates the front cover. The casual observer in a bookshop might mistake this book for a popular work of moral philosophy, designed to promote philosophy as a way of living. However, the smaller print giving the subtitle show that this is something quite different.

The nature of the project of this book becomes clear in the first chapter. In it, Banner sets out his case for ‘reconceiving the practice of moral theology’ (p. 7), a discipline which he views as having lost its way. This shows itself in the fact that it so often seen as a theology of hard cases, instead of an overall vision of the Christian life which speaks to the everyday situations of life, rather than simply to the moments of crisis. We should note here than the claim is not full blown anti-casuistry, but rather an attempt to put forward a moral theology which has more to say about some aspects of our lives which escape the interest of the casuists. When reading this section of the book, I could not help thinking of the Dominican moral theologian Servais Pinckaers, and his work The Sources of Christian Ethics. However, Pinckaers and Banner diverge significantly when it comes to proposing a solution to this crisis. For Pinckaers, the solution given is to recover the moral themes in the Scriptures, Fathers and the Western philosophical tradition; a synthesis found in the work of Aquinas. Banner does not seem much of an Aquinas fan (see phrases such as ‘peeping Thomism’ and ‘wistful epistemological Pelagianism’ p. 15). Banner is pessimistic about the ability of any kind of moral philosophy to be of help at all in reviving moral theology and bioethics, largely because it fails to have anything coherent to say in real life situations to people outside the academy. We see an example of this in his scathing critique of John Harris's writings on the Alder Hey tissue retention scandal (p. 22). The suggested interlocutor then, is social anthropology. What follows is a text which mines the Scriptures, various theologians, (especially Augustine), and works of social anthropology in search of a more positive way of looking at the ethics of conception and kinship, suffering, dying and death, burial, mourning and memory. These chapters focus on the wider context and understanding of these issues, and not simply the ‘hot topic’ issues.

In the chapters on conception and birth, Banner examines the way that conception is viewed in the Christian tradition, and in society in general. He goes on to show how the influential notion of biological or genetic kinship has strengthened with the availability of IVF and other reproductive technologies. By contrast, he suggests that the Christian tradition has a broader vision of kinship, fostered through wider notions of spiritual kinship found in relations with godparents, and the notion of spiritual kinship. He goes on to suggest that Christianity might provide something of an antidote to the very real suffering brought about by the inability to have children of one's own.

In treating death, Banner looks at the nature of Christ's death, and how it has been imagined through the centuries. He then goes on to examine how this illuminates the Christian understanding of ars moriendi; both in terms of hospice palliative care and the movement promoting euthanasia. The sources for the understanding of ars moriendi are many and varied, coming from different points in history, and from a wide range of denominations, and Banner is upbeat about the usefulness of certain treatises which were so readily dismissed by Reformers such as Luther. Interestingly, he identifies a common factor present in the development both of the hospice movement and the pro-euthanasia movement; namely, a technology-overloaded process of dying, which can be closed to the necessary conversations about the reality of death and dying, and the desire for ‘self expression’ and ‘preservation of identity’ during the dying process (p. 115). They are two different ways of preserving self expression and autonomy, which ‘battle death on different fronts’ (ibid.). Banner cites the demographic niche from which euthanasia supporters tend to come; namely those who are better educated. He notes that such a privileged position is not necessarily socially representative.

Banner moves on to note that it is a relatively small proportion of people who will die a hospice death or even have the kind of terminal suffering which pro-euthanasia lobbies would cite as requiring the option of euthanasia. It is increasingly the case that a great number of people will experience a prolonged decline and a significant period of dependency, often accompanied by dementia (p. 118), a fact which the standard approach to bioethics has little to say about. Banner cites this as both a failure of moral philosophy and an opportunity for engagement with social anthropology. He advocates bringing the philosophy of the hospice movement to bear on those who live with conditions such as Alzheimer, so that efforts might be made to ensure social inclusion, solidarity and fellowship for such people.

The Alder Hey scandal is treated win the context of Christ's burial, and an extended exposition of Augustine's theology of burial and mourning. Here he finds much evidence for the importance of reverential treatment of the dead, and of proper mourning, too often dismissed as superstitious and irrational. Rather, Banner notes, they have great moral significance. He finds an often unsympathetic social anthropology of burial and mourning in some ethnographic studies, but also elements of a practice of mourning which are ‘deep, articulate, coherent, and morally serious’ (p. 173). This leads to a very sympathetic treatment of the reaction of the Alder Hay relatives to the retention of tissues of their children. As with the case of decline associated with old age, which is the fate of many, Banner here treats a topic that has been given little attention in mainstream bioethics; at least, little attention that is not simply dismissive of the lived reality of those who were affected by the scandal.

This book is thought provoking and beautifully written. It deserves to be read and taken seriously by the bioethical community, as it successfully argues for using social anthropology in bioethics, and then executes the project successfully. Banner is not the first to make a case for the use of social anthropology in moral theology. However, many others have used it as a hatchet to demolish what Christ has revealed and what the tradition has taught about the moral life. The resulting theology is simply an apologia for the prevailing moral currents in society, and is of little use or interest. Banner's approach treats the theological tradition with due reverence, and then uses social anthropology as a powerful aid in developing an ethics which responds to the reality of people's lives. Both theology and social anthropology gain from such a treatment. It is sad, however, that moral philosophy is the loser. Banner's highly negative view of moral philosophy will rightly be seen as a weakness by the mainstream bioethical community, and also by many of those who work within Christian bioethics. A more positive view would have further strengthened this project, and given it wider appeal.