Background of the 2005 Mayoral Election

The context for the 2005 Los Angeles mayoral election was the breakdown of the interracial (mostly Democratic) liberal coalition led by Mayor Tom Bradley that held power at city hall from 1973 to 1993 (Sonenshein 1993). Following Bradley's departure, Republican businessman Richard Riordan won the mayoralty in 1993. Re-elected in 1997, Riordan represented a last hurrah of White Republicans in Los Angeles (Sonenshein 2004).

Los Angeles emerged as an important site in shifting demographics and new coalition opportunities. Immigration was radically changing the city's electorate. In 1994, California voters approved Proposition 187 to deny public services to undocumented residents. Prop. 187 and limits on benefits for legal immigrants set by the Republican Congress in 1996 led to a massive upsurge of Latino citizenship and voter registration. In the 1990s, more than one million Latinos registered to vote in California for the first time (Field Poll 2000). As a result, a new ethnic cleavage in urban politics emerged, overlapping with the prevalent race-based divide.

Latino participation powered the Democrats to a commanding majority in the California Legislature. Los Angeles politics were rapidly becoming less White, less Republican, more liberal, and more diverse (Table 1).

The share of White voter participation in Los Angeles decreased significantly from 68% of the 1993 primary vote to just over half in the 2001 and 2005 races. The Republican share of the vote fell from about a third in 1993 to a fifth in 2005. Among White voters, Jews remained a consistent bloc of between 14–19% of the vote. More liberal and much more Democratic than Whites as whole, Jews now represent a larger share of the overall White vote than before. As the White electorate becomes both smaller and more Jewish, it trends more Democratic and more liberal.

In the 2001 mayoral election, a new pattern of Los Angeles politics emerged. For the first time in modern Los Angeles, the two runoff candidates were both Democrats. James K. Hahn, a White politician whose family had deep roots in the African-American community, defeated former Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa. Hahn ran a harsh law-and-order campaign against Villaraigosa, marked by a television commercial showing drug paraphernalia and attacking the Latino candidate for having written a letter to President Bill Clinton seeking a pardon for a convicted drug dealer.

The 2001 election not only revealed no evidence of a coalition of color, but suggested the possibility of a competitive relationship among African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002). A majority of Asian Americans opposed the Latino candidate. Meanwhile, Villaraigosa built a liberal coalition that joined Latinos to White liberals. Hahn, on the other hand, put together an odd alliance of African Americans and White Republicans, perhaps united by a fear of unsettling change in the demography of Los Angeles.

The divide along color lines also played out in the world of organized labor. With the decline of the downtown business establishment, organized labor emerged as the best organized electoral force in the city. But labor was divided between the city employee unions, with strong African-American representation, and the County Federation of Labor, which was organizing immigrant, mostly Latino, private-sector unions. In 2001, the city employee unions backed Hahn, while the County Federation, led by Miguel Contreras, supported Villaraigosa. After Hahn's election, Contreras made amends with Hahn and brought his union forces to Hahn's side in 2005.

Even though Villaraigosa suffered a devastating defeat in 2001, Latino electoral success in Los Angeles continued apace. Rocky Delgadillo was elected by the same citywide electorate on the same ballot to the position of city attorney. Alex Padilla became City Council president. Latinos held one-third of the City Council's 15 seats. But the highest executive office, the center of the city's leadership, remained out of reach.

The 2001 election revealed how eclectic the coalitions behind Latino political success might be in comparison to the stable alliances that emerged around the electoral rise of African Americans. Delgadillo, a moderate Democrat, was elected city attorney by gaining the votes of most Latinos and a majority of African Americans (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002; Abrajano, Nagler, and Alvarez 2005). In other words, any fixed assertions about African-American attitudes toward Latino candidates would obviously have to be tested over several elections. The electoral context, such as the fact that Delgadillo's opponent was a White liberal, might easily restructure the coalition lines that would develop in the electorate.

How, then, did Villaraigosa go from a too-narrow liberal base in 2001 to a broad majority far beyond his own supporters; expectations in 2005?

The Collapse of the Hahn Coalition

The coalition of African Americans and White Republicans that Hahn rode to victory in 2001 had little history and precious little trust behind it. Trust is a critical element of coalition formation and stability (Hinckley 1981). As voters in city, state, and national elections, Blacks and White Republicans are far apart. Immigration issues did, however, close some of the distance between them (Meyerson 2001; Ramirez 2002; Tolbert and Hero 1996).

In 2002, Hahn made two decisions that drastically weakened his re-election coalition. First, Hahn took steps to deny reappointment to African-American Police Chief Bernard Parks, citing Parks's resistance to civilian oversight and poor relations with rank-and-file officers. The rejection of Parks generated a firestorm of protest from Black leaders, who believed that Hahn had indicated during the campaign that he would at least consider rehiring Parks. According to a Times poll taken in early 2002, Hahn's support among Black voters had dropped dramatically, to 29% approval. Once his firmest base, Blacks had suddenly become his severest critics, although he had recovered some of this support by 2005 (Table 2).

Second, and also in 2002, Hahn fought a formidable secession movement in the San Fernando Valley. The principal support for Valley secession came from the same White conservatives and moderates in the Valley who had been central to Hahn's 2001 victory. Many of these voters were angered at Hahn's aggressive stance against secession and turned against him.

As if these blows were not enough, Hahn confronted allegations of improper influence in his administration: charges of over billing of the city by a private public relations firm closely tied to the mayor, and of “pay to play” preferences in the awarding of city contracts. In 2003, elected City Controller Laura Chick issued a blistering report charging malfeasance, then transmitted her findings to the L.A. County district attorney for possible prosecution. In a May 2005 Times poll, a quarter of likely voters said that these allegations would make them less likely to vote for the mayor. Among them, three out of four supported Villaraigosa.

Thus, by the end of the first half of his term, Hahn was bleeding in two key constituencies and facing serious ethics charges. Yet he could still argue that he had been a solid mayor who had made tough choices that had turned around the police department and kept the city together. Hahn remained the incumbent with a record of winning citywide elections. In his own words, he was “underrated and undefeated.”

Having fired Parks, Hahn recruited New York City's former chief William Bratton for the Los Angeles position. Using the same approach that had worked in New York City, Bratton made a major dent in local crime, giving Hahn a powerful re-election issue. Sixty-five percent of voters in an early 2005 Times poll, including 45% of Black voters, approved of the way Bratton was doing his job. Credit for the drop in crime, however, did not transfer to Hahn, whose edge on the crime issue over Villaraigosa was actually smaller in 2005 than it had been in 2001.

Villaraigosa ran in 2003 for a seat on the City Council and beat the incumbent. In the same year, Bernard Parks won an open Council seat. Two of Hahn's leading rivals were now in positions to challenge him.

Hahn's job approval ratings throughout 2005 were anemic, never exceeding 50% (Table 2). Ironically, his highest approval came from Latinos until late in the campaign. Times polls showed that large majorities in all groups thought the city was going in the wrong direction. A similar sentiment had driven California voters in 2003 to recall another stolid, competent, but uninspiring Democrat, Governor Gray Davis, and to replace him with a more exciting leader, Arnold Schwarzenegger.

The 2005 Mayoral Primary

Richard Alarcón, a state senator and former city councilmember from the San Fernando Valley, was the first major candidate to enter the race. Former Assembly Speaker Bob Hertzberg came next, and was soon joined by Parks. Finally, Villaraigosa joined the fray, immediately emerging as the front-runner to challenge Hahn.

Hertzberg represented a serious threat both to Hahn and Villaraigosa. Popular in the San Fernando Valley and among Republicans and Jewish voters, Hertzberg had made a name as a government reformer while speaker of the state assembly. He effectively focused on the weaknesses in Hahn's lackluster leadership style in clever television commercials that showed him striding across Los Angeles like a giant. Hertzberg, a Democrat, had helped organize a Mod Squad of centrist legislators, and later became Schwarzenegger's friend and ally. For many White voters, Hertzberg provided a comfortable alternative both to Hahn and Villaraigosa in the primary.

The field had much in common with the 2001 primary: two Latinos (then it was Xavier Becerra instead of Alarcón); a Jewish candidate with Valley appeal (then it was Steven Soboroff, now Hertzberg), Hahn, and Villaraigosa. The difference was Parks, a Black candidate who could strike at the heart of Hahn's electoral strength. Some even wondered if Hahn would make the two-person runoff, as pre-election polls showed him in jeopardy of finishing third behind Hertzberg. But, near the end of the primary campaign, Hahn unleashed a barrage of negative commercials against Hertzberg that he was not well known enough to surmount.

Villaraigosa was an exceptionally strong candidate, popular with a wide range of voters even including sizeable pluralities of moderate Republicans. When he was speaker of the assembly, he was an effective bridge-builder. Despite his liberal ideology and close ties to organized labor, he worked effectively across party and ideological lines. In Los Angeles, he was known as a Latino leader who did not play the “ethnic card” in local disputes (such as during conflicts over the removal of a Latino school superintendent) that could have easily polarized the community. Finally, his energetic and engaging personality attracted great interest and enthusiasm.

The 2005 primary results were remarkably similar to those of the 2001 primary. Villaraigosa finished first, with 33% of the vote. Hahn managed to edge out Hertzberg for the second spot, 24% to 22%. Parks finished with 13%. The composition of the vote, however, showed that Parks had badly hurt Hahn in the Black community (Table 3). Parks carried 54% of the Black vote to Hahn's 23%.

Hahn was in a much weaker position in 2005 than he had been in 2001, despite having received a similar share of the vote in both primary elections. The Times asked voters which candidate would be their second choice. The answers favored Villaraigosa, especially among voters whose first choice was the most conservative candidate. In 2001, only 9% of Soboroff voters had picked Villaraigosa as their second choice. In 2005, 44% of Hertzberg voters picked Villaraigosa as their backup.

The Runoff Election

In the campaign for the runoff election set for May 17^th, things went from bad to worse for Hahn. Hahn already had the major labor endorsements, although with Villaraigosa in the runoff there was considerable question whether labor would enthusiastically back the incumbent. Miguel Contreras; sudden death near the end of the campaign deprived Hahn of one of his few leading endorsers and one of the most popular and influential labor leaders in California. Three out of five rank and file union members ultimately voted for Villaraigosa.

Villaraigosa ran the endorsement table. He gained the backing of both major newspapers, the Times and the Daily News, which are normally at odds with each other. He was backed by the three leading African-American political voices: Congresswoman Maxine Waters and businessman Earvin “Magic” Johnson (each of whom had backed Hahn in 2001), and then by Bernard Parks. Virtually all Latino elected officials supported Villaraigosa, including City Council President Alex Padilla, who had backed Hahn in 2001. Hertzberg endorsed Villaraigosa, as did a number of Valley activists from the secession movement and former Mayor Richard Riordan. Controller Laura Chick announced her endorsement as well.

The three issues uppermost in the voters; minds were, in order of importance, education, crime, and traffic congestion. On education, half of all voters said that Villaraigosa would do a better job of improving the city's public schools, while only 22% thought that about the mayor. Villaraigosa also led on dealing with traffic congestion, a major issue in the largely White Westside and in the San Fernando Valley. Voters believed that Hahn would do a better job on crime, but not nearly by the margin Hahn had enjoyed over his challenger four years earlier.

Villaraigosa also enjoyed a major financial edge over the mayor. By the end of the campaign he had more than twice as much money on hand as Hahn, and it was difficult for the incumbent mayor to get the air time to campaign effectively (Rabin and McGreevey 2005).

All through the primary and runoff campaigns, the charismatic and energetic Villaraigosa had very high favorability ratings compared to Hahn, 71% favorable in the primary and 64% in the runoff. Hahn was just below 50% favorable in both elections.

On Election Day, Villaraigosa swamped Hahn, winning by 18 percentage points. He won 84% of Latinos, 50% of Whites, 55% of Jews, and 48% of African Americans; he took 67% of Democrats, 59% of independents, and 27% of Republicans (compared to 21% of Republicans in 2001). Hahn won a majority of conservatives (58%), Republicans (73%), Asian Americans (56%), and conservative Republicans (80%). More than four out of five Latinos supported the challenger, and they made up a record 25% of the vote. In 2001, union members had supported Hahn (52% to 48%), but in 2005 they shifted their vote 12 points, to 60% for Villaraigosa.

Clearly, the Parks firing had a devastating effect on Hahn's support among African-American voters. In 2001, Hahn won the vast majority of Black voters. The small slice of African-American votes that went to Villaraigosa included a disproportionate share of younger voters. In 2005, Blacks split their vote between the two candidates. The core of Hahn's Black support came from older Black women compared to Villaraigosa's strong showing among younger Black men. Young Black men were a startling 22 percentage points more likely to support Villaraigosa than older Black women.

In 2001, Hahn had won 59% of White voters. In 2005, Whites split their vote evenly between the two candidates. Liberal White voters were solidly behind the challenger, while similar shares of moderate and conservative White voters stood behind Hahn.

Jewish voters, a distinctive subset of White voters, moved decisively toward Villaraigosa. In 2001, a majority of Jews had backed Hahn, especially in the San Fernando Valley. Hertzberg had won the most Jewish votes in the 2005 primary, especially among the plurality of Jews who live in the more moderate San Fernando Valley rather than on the liberal Westside. In 2005, a clear majority of Jews went for Villaraigosa, with the challenger winning this group in both the Valley and on the Westside. A Latino-Jewish coalition, quietly cultivated for several years at the leadership level, and sustained by Villaraigosa's long history of coalition building (Sonenshein 2001), seemed to be a real possibility.

Ethnic Factors in the Voting

Students of racial voting have long struggled with how to measure racial and ethnic factors in voting. Voters are reluctant to admit to attitudes that might appear racist. As a result, indirect questions often elicit information much more relevant to voting behavior. For example, voters who report that they believe that the government does too much for minorities are likely to vote against a minority candidate.

In modern urban politics, attitudes toward immigration may be useful not only on the issue of immigration but also on the likelihood of voting for a Latino candidate. Of course, attitudes may be correlated with ideology and also with racial attitudes in the first place. A study by Sears et al. (1995) found a close correlation between attitudes about race and immigration.

Times polls have occasionally used questions that can help plumb voter attitudes regarding race and ethnicity. In the 2001 election, the Times poll of likely voters just before the primary election included a question about whether immigration had been good or bad for the city. In a 2005 pre-election poll and in the 2005 exit poll, voters were asked whether Villaraigosa would be likely to favor Latinos or would be fair to all communities. On the first question, in 2001, the poll found that two out of five voters believed that immigration was bad for the city, while almost two out of five thought it was good. The differences among White, Latino, and African-American voters on this question were small. Social class and White divisions by ideology were more pronounced. Since this question was not asked in the 2001 Election Day exit poll, we cannot make reliable observations from the small sample about the connection to voting behavior, but the question shows how ideology and class affect attitudes that might underlie some aspects of voting behavior.

Nearly half of Republicans thought immigration was bad for Los Angeles. White liberals were nearly twice as likely as White conservatives to see immigration as a positive for the city. Voters in the highest socioeconomic group believed that the immigrant population was good for the city, while those in the lowest socioeconomic group believed the opposite.

In an April 2005 Times poll, 58% of likely voters thought that if Villaraigosa were elected mayor, he would give equal attention to all racial and ethnic groups, while 30% thought that he would pay more attention to Latinos than any other racial or ethnic group. Among voters who thought Villaraigosa would pay more attention to Latinos, 62% said they would vote for Hahn, Among the nearly three-fifths of voters who said Villaraigosa would pay equal attention to all groups, 73% said they would vote for the challenger, while 19% would support Hahn. In the 2005 Election Day exit poll, the Times asked the same question. The answers were only moderately useful in determining voting behavior when applied to the overall vote. The results became more illuminating when the survey answers and voting choice of White and Black voters were examined.

Among those African-American voters who believed that Villaraigosa would favor Latinos, 80% voted for Hahn. Among those who thought he would be fair to all groups, 78% voted for Villaraigosa. Of course, these relationships do not prove causation. Those who had decided for other reasons to support their candidate might have attached positive or negative perceptions to the candidates. But the results do suggest that a soft spot in Villaraigosa's support in the African-American community exists on the issue of potential ethnic favoritism.

Among White voters, Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to believe that Villaraigosa would play ethnic favorites, and they were much more likely to vote for Hahn. Nearly half of Republicans, 41% of conservatives, and 45% of conservative Republican voters believed that Villaraigosa would pay more attention to Latinos than to other racial or ethnic groups. In the case of White voters, this connection appears, on the surface at least, to be mediated by ideology. While there was abundant celebration in Los Angeles over the breadth of Villaraigosa's electoral victory, these numbers suggest some caution and point to obstacles for the new mayor to overcome.

Further research and detailed statistical analysis will help reveal whether this preliminary evidence about a connection between attitudes about immigration and ethnic preference and vote for Villaraigosa is significant (Sonenshein and Drayse 2005). Clearly there were numerous other issues that had a major impact on the result.

In 2001, the Los Angeles mayoral election came down to a struggle among two new coalitions: a Latino-White liberal alliance behind Villaraigosa and a Black-White conservative bloc behind Hahn. Had Hahn enjoyed a more successful first term as mayor those coalition lines might have solidified, with important consequences for the long-term relationship between communities of color in Los Angeles. Villaraigosa might have won a very narrow victory with his original coalition, much as Tom Bradley did against Sam Yorty in his 1973 rematch, or narrowly lost. Instead, it was a blowout. Yet even blowouts have patterns. The core of Villaraigosa's winning coalition was the liberal alliance between Latinos and White liberals. He extended his support among Jewish voters from 2001, and dominated among white liberals. He enjoyed a larger proportional turnout of Latinos than in 2001, and won the overwhelming majority of their votes. He also was able to pull a fairly sizeable share of union members away from Hahn.

The evidence suggests that if immigration and ethnicity supplement race as mobilizing issues, ideology among White voters will continue to play an important role. In attitudes about immigration, and in voting for the Latino candidate, White liberals may continue to differ substantially from White conservatives. Writing about race more than two decades ago, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 248), could be writing about the rise of Latinos in today's era of immigration: “Liberals on race issues are very different from conservatives, and ideology has an important influence on the nature and outcome of the minority struggle for access to local government.” The difference between a narrow victory (or loss) and the landslide Villaraigosa enjoyed, however, was the widening support he received from African Americans and from non-liberal Whites.

Half of African-American voters (led by younger men) placed themselves in the Latino candidate's column in 2005. This shift from 2001 and the overall popularity of Villaraigosa open the door to the possibility of a coalition of color in Los Angeles. But the causes of the shift in Black support mark these prospects as tentative. One Hahn decision—to not rehire Police Chief Parks—likely accounted for much of the movement in African-American voting preferences and certainly explained the shift of the Black leadership to Villaraigosa. Tensions remain between African Americans and Latinos, particularly in the public schools.

Thus far, the Black-Brown relationship is more marked by political interest than durable ideology, and interests can change (Sonenshein 1993; Austin, Wright, and Middleton 2004). Black leaders wanted to punish Hahn for his apostasy on Parks, and they succeeded in doing so. African Americans managed to stay in a game that has been moving away from them demographically, first by backing Hahn in 2001, and then by edging toward Villaraigosa in 2005. If the African-American relationship with Latinos can be enhanced by a coalition-oriented mayor like Villaraigosa, then the prospects for a class coalition across racial lines (one that did not occur during the era of Black mobilization) might brighten. Latinos already comprise the bulk of Los Angeles; working class, and are increasingly becoming the majority of the working class in a number of other cities. With Villaraigosa's victory, the divided local labor movement is now united. Allied with Blacks, both in politics and in the union movement, Latinos might well put working-class economic issues back on the urban agenda. Yet conflicts of political and economic interest between African Americans and Latinos will continue to pull in the other direction.

Hahn had greater success keeping his White Republican base together than he had with his long-standing Black constituency. Many Republicans saw the city's politics moving in an ideological and demographic direction that they could not easily embrace. Yet key Republicans like Richard Riordan enthusiastically backed Villaraigosa, giving him the opportunity to maintain the beachhead he established with these voters. While Riordan was roundly disliked in the African-American community, he was popular among Latinos. Latino candidates are more likely than African Americans to have the option of forming alliances with some White conservatives.

Villaraigosa's victory could be seen as a triumph of the city's progressive forces. But an ideological win would have been much narrower than what actually occurred. A landslide requires more than unified, coherent ideology; it must be both broader and less coherent. Villaraigosa remained vague about specific solutions in the campaign, presented few ideological rough edges, and focused on the need for change. He emphasized not ethnic assertion, but broad coalitions.

Villaraigosa now has the opportunity to ride the winds of change and the expectations that go with them. Those who supported him because of specific decisions made by Hahn may complain unless different decisions are made. Competition between African-American and Latino political aspirations may yet derail an emerging coalition of color. Meeting the expectations of liberal Whites and cautious but interested White moderates, Republicans, and even some conservatives creates prospects for broad support but may also muddy the ideological waters.

Implications

Latino activists and political strategists in both parties have tried to learn from the Villaraigosa election. Symbolic of this interest, Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City, and one of his potential Democratic challengers, Fernando Ferrer, joined the throng at Villaraigosa's inauguration. The presence of New York City''s Republican incumbent and his major Democratic rival at this event testified to a critical difference between the politics of African-American empowerment and the emerging experience of Latinos. In today's highly competitive partisan politics, Latinos are “in play” in a way that Black voters have not been for many decades. Latino political participation will be a central factor not only in urban politics, but also on the national scene. The relationship between the Latino rise and ideology is still evolving. Unlike the politics of race, there is a nascent competition between the parties for Latino support.

Villaraigosa had great success in both mobilizing Latino voters and in avoiding a backlash against Latino assertion from White conservative and African-American voters. These political strengths were immeasurably aided by the severe political problems of the incumbent mayor. As ethnicity in an age of immigration continues to emerge as a political factor, Latino candidates will undoubtedly face the challenge of meeting the aspirations of Latinos for upward economic and political mobility and unpredictable public attitudes on issues involving growing and more participatory communities.

Author Bios

Raphael J. Sonenshein is professor of political science at California State University, Fullerton, where he has taught since 1982. He has written two books on the politics of Los Angeles, and is currently studying the relationship between immigration and urban electoral behavior. He served as Election Day political consultant to the Los Angeles Times exit poll in the 1997, 2001, and 2005 city elections. He can be contacted at rsonenshein@fullerton.edu.

Susan H. Pinkus has been the director of the Los Angeles Times Poll since 1997. She has written articles on the 2001 mayoral race, multilingual populations, presidential elections, and current social issues. She is on the Executive Council of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), a trustee of the National Council on Public Polls (NCPP), and a board member of the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. She can be contacted at susan.pinkus@latimes.com.