Sandler’s timely book provides an excellent foundation for students interested in this emerging field of species ethics. He clearly and concisely describes long-standing and more recent approaches to species conservation, evaluating them not only in terms of their robustness and efficacy, but also in terms of their potential for continued value in light of global climate change. By clearly defining and delimiting his use of key terms at the outset, and by providing a clear framework of ethical considerations to guide the reader’s analysis, Sandler provides a terrific introduction to thinking critically (and ethically) about the many tensions inherent in proposed approaches to modern species management.
In Chapter 1, Sandler introduces the primary themes of the book and outlines his thesis and main arguments. He clearly and concisely defines and outlines his use of key terms such as “species” – highlighting, in the process, fundamental tensions underlying work in the field, given that even such integral terms can have disparate, and sometimes even competing, meanings. This attentiveness to exposing implicit difficulties is significantly self-reflexive, as well; even in outlining his own definition of species (as a collection of biologically-related organisms that share a similar form of life) Sandler is clear to note the limitations and challenges of this conception.
The second chapter lays the philosophical framework for the analysis that follows. Here, Sandler provides a clear description of various forms of value (instrumental vs. final, present vs. option, objective vs. subjective, natural, inherent worth, individual vs. collective), with particular attention to the ways in which value judgments and assessments can be challenging, especially given the frequent overlap between different conceptions of value. He again highlights the ways in which these tensions can be especially problematic in a field wherein determining the best course(s) of action depends, in large part, on weighing competing accounts of (potential or actual) value.
Chapter 3 assesses and evaluates two of the main approaches to in situ species conservation—place-based preservation and ecological restoration—in light of the new and increasingly significant challenges posed by global climate change. Sandler argues that both approaches are becoming increasingly ineffective and inappropriate, since neither is able to adequately address the core problem of unprecedentedly rapid ecological change, focusing, as they do instead, on attempts to restore an increasingly distant and irrecoverable past.
In Chapter 4, Sandler assesses the value of assisted colonization as a conservation strategy. He outlines oft-cited justifications for species translocation, and evaluates the suitability and robustness of these claims, especially in light of the challenges posed by global climate change. He examines, as a case study, the Pleistocene re-wilding proposal—an ambitious and substantial translocation project—to evaluate the extent to which assisted colonization can be a valuable and worthwhile enterprise. Again, he concludes that this approach to species conservation is problematic or ineffective, at best (pernicious, at worst), and that the associated potential and actual costs (including diversion of resources away from other, perhaps more inclusive, initiatives) outweigh potential benefits in all but rare cases.
In the fifth chapter, Sandler argues in support of an alternative approach to species conservation—one that acknowledges and considers the difficulties presented by climate change, which he argues require us to revise not only our strategies for species management, but also our goals. By examining two extreme forms of ecosystems—relatively intact, untouched systems, and highly-impacted systems—and with references to the different types of values listed in Chapter 1, he evaluates the merits and problems of approaches such as the establishment of parks and protected reserves, assisted colonization, etc. Sandler also distinguishes between four responses to climate change—prevention, mitigation, adaptation and compensation—and discusses the ways in which different accounts of species’ values can have an affect on the types of strategies or policies we choose to implement. The chapter concludes with a look at geoengineering, and a discussion of its potential value relative to species conservation.
Chapter 6 examines species boundaries and the extent to which they could be understood as having normative force in ethical considerations. On the basis of the definition of species operative in the book (as a shared “form of life”), Sandler argues that transgenic organisms do not violate species boundaries, because they do not challenge or undermine established species boundaries. Rather, they represent or establish a new, particular form of life that is unique from those of the organisms from whom they get their genetic makeup. In this chapter, he presents and evaluates some of the more prominent arguments for and against the notion that the intentional creation of transgenic organisms is intrinsically problematic: arguments from nature, from incremental change, from species nominalism or species fluidity, from repugnance, from the integrity of the organism, from reductionism, from concerns about consequences, from a virtue-ethics perspective, and from subjective final value of species boundaries.
From this discussion, Sandler moves on, in Chapter 7, to examine the extent to which Homo sapien species boundaries may be exceptional in possessing normative significance. He addresses the claim that this species boundary designates individual organisms with unique moral status, relative to individuals of other species, and then evaluates the extent to which “human nature” can be understood to have normative force, such that human modification could be taken to be intrinsically good or problematic. He also examines issues related to technologically-enabled human enhancements—including cases of transhumans (part-humans) and posthumans (individuals so transformed that they are no longer considered properly human).
The discussion in Chapter 8 follows similar lines, but with regard to artifactual organisms—individuals designed and engineered by humans. Again, Sandler asks whether their artifactualness could be considered grounds for ethical consideration or normative claims. He lists a number of examples of such organisms—protocells, synthetic organisms, etc.—and discusses the ways in which such organisms may be posited to be valuable or considered to be pernicious. By examining claims of natural historical value, inherent worth, and subjective value, Sandler argues that the artifactualness of such organisms, while perhaps relevant to determining the individual’s value in each case, does not provide sufficient grounds for normative ethical claims about the place of such organisms in general.
Sandler’s conclusions are helpfully summarized in the final section of the book, providing readers with a quick review of the material covered—a thoughtful inclusion that seems entirely consistent with the author’s clear and straightforward writing style. This clarity, coupled with the unambiguous way in which Sandler distinguishes between argument and discussion, will undoubtedly prove useful to students. Of particular value to all readers will be Sandler’s extensive footnotes, which provide in-depth explanations of related concepts and ideas, as well as valuable resources for further reading. The Ethics of Species provides excellent resources for critical engagement with the core ideas of species management and for consideration and evaluation of the place and value of species in ethical and political considerations. Its value in opening up a discussion on these issues, and in providing readers with the tools they need to think meaningfully about them, cannot be overstated.
