There are few characters in George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871–72) whose lives turn out as they initially desired or hoped. Whether it be Casaubon's Key to All Mythologies or the marital choices of women like Rosamond Vincy, Middlemarch is dominated by characters who, like Lydgate, look back with regret over a life in which they “had not done what [they] once meant to do.”Footnote 1 This sense of disappointed ambitions and regret poses particular relevance for the novel's chief protagonist, Dorothea Brooke—a latter-day St. Theresa whose failure to realize an “epic life” is foreshadowed in the novel's “Prelude.”Footnote 2 Yet Dorothea's regret differs substantially from others in the novel. Her regret, I argue, represents a distinct case because it discloses an ethical dilemma at the heart of Enlightenment accounts of autonomy and individual responsibility. We can understand the nature of this dilemma, most simply, as concerning whether our actions can be judged blameworthy (and thus susceptible to feelings of regret and responsibility) even if those actions are subject to elements outside the control of our individual wills. As Bernard Williams observes in his landmark essay on regret and moral luck, our “history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the product of the will is surrounded and held up and partly formed by things that are not.”Footnote 3 No stranger to the web of agency, Eliot observes at the conclusion of Middlemarch that the effects of any life's events and choices remain “incalculably diffusive” (785). Eliot's use of the web metaphor in Middlemarch becomes overdetermined in part because the connections between intentions, actions, and effects are endless, each intentional and unintentional act vibrating into the past and future and “held up,” as Williams puts it, by things beyond our control.
The indeterminacy of actions posed a particular challenge to Enlightenment conceptions of autonomy and subjectivity. Charles Taylor argues that the post-Cartesian split between inner and outer worlds paved the way for philosophers such as Locke, Hume, and Kant to posit a model of subjectivity in which the self is conceived as an “extensionless” and “punctual” experience of consciousness that objectifies the external world through reason and thus stands “disengaged” from any “constitutive concerns.”Footnote 4 This concept of the “unsituated” actor,Footnote 5 Thomas Pfau states, was crucial to Kantian autonomy even though the latter ideal “implies commitments concerning ‘ends’ that lie necessarily beyond what can be specified.”Footnote 6 In a similar vein, Vivasvan Soni notes that both Kantian, deontological ethics and utilitarian, consequentialist ethics cannot adequately respond to “the infinitude of responsibility” because their model of agency abstracts agents away from the context in which their actions unfold and thus sacrifices the contingency and totality of a life as it develops.Footnote 7 It is for this reason that the status of “ends”—the telos of an action—becomes such a problem in theories of autonomy: our actions reverberate endlessly.Footnote 8
In this essay I understand regret as an emotion that responds, though not exclusively, to the constraints posed by Enlightenment models of individual responsibility, autonomy, and freedom. These constraints are such that one feels regret, not only toward the immediate consequences of one's voluntary acts, but potentially also toward the incalculable ripple effects of benign, everyday acts, both voluntary and involuntary. Regret thus affectively registers the problem of limitless ethical responsibility that agents face no matter how they act or even if they retreat from acting altogether. To frame it in these terms is to suggest that regret not only constitutes an occasional emotion of “retrospective assessment” in which agents undergo emotional pain regarding something in the past they wish had been otherwise,Footnote 9 but also, to borrow a Heideggerian formulation, the ontico-ontological orientation of a subject whose experience of being in the world with others is disclosed through feelings of regret. Regret expresses affectively the recognition that agent autonomy does not indemnify us from feeling responsible for events that we nevertheless cannot control.
In illustrating how Middlemarch casts Dorothea's regret as a response to problems of agency and individual responsibility, I pay particular attention to a series of scenes that take place in her bedroom at Rome and Lowick. Attention to these scenes reveals another distinctive aspect of how the novel stages Dorothea's regret. Eliot includes numerous Romantic intertexts both within and outside the bedroom scenes. These intertextual references, I argue, frame the problematic of regret and responsibility as a Romantic inheritance and encourage the reader to interpret Dorothea's mental state and actions as an embedded dialogue with Romanticism. The latter, seemingly idiosyncratic, framework becomes comprehensible if we read both the portrayal of Dorothea's regret and Romantic poetics as informed by Enlightenment conceptions of human freedom. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, I contend that Middlemarch offers an Arendtian critique of sovereignty as a model of freedom that falsely valorizes the independent, self-authorizing will of an agent for whom dependence in a world made up of others is felt to be burdensome and whose response to the latter burden is to withdraw from the realm of action.Footnote 10 By situating the latter experience within the framework of Romanticism, Middlemarch suggests that the erroneous equation of freedom with sovereignty and the fraught response to human dependence that it generates is replicated in Romantic poetics, particularly its generic opposition of lyric and narrative. The bedroom scenes synchronize Dorothea's efforts to move from an interiorized state of regret and inaction to autonomous, practical agency with a generic movement from lyric interiority to narrative praxis. That these efforts repeatedly fail in the novel testifies to the problematic conception of freedom and subjectivity that supplies the mutual ground, as it were, between Dorothea's conflicted agency and Romantic/post-Romantic genre theory. The novelistic example of Dorothea Casaubon thus invites us not only to rethink the relationship between regret and responsibility but also to consider how theories of lyric and narrative may be conditioned by questions of human freedom.
1. Regret, Moral Luck, and the Curse of Freedom
I have thus far characterized regret as a “backward-looking” emotion that involves pain regarding something in the past that we wish had been otherwise, yet regret can also constitute a “forward-looking” emotion that imaginatively explores counterfactual possibilities in the future.Footnote 11 Wishing things had been otherwise in the past may entail considering how things might have turned out otherwise in the future had events unfolded differently or we had made different choices. Stuart Hampshire states, for example, that regret can express itself in a retrospective assessment of possibilities that one missed due to bad “fortune” or “decisions”; or regret can express an “optative attitude” that references a wish in the form of a conditional or hypothetical possibility in the past or future.Footnote 12 Drawing on Hampshire's account of regret, Andrew Miller gives a ready example of the optative in Middlemarch, where the narrator invites readers in the novel's “Finale” to consider alternate, counterfactual possibilities and imagine the possible world that “might have been” if women like Dorothea had not lived.Footnote 13
While I agree with Miller's observation with respect to the reader, it is important to distinguish the reader's experience of the optative from the regret that Dorothea feels over her unfulfilled desires. The novel enjoins readers to imagine possible worlds even as it denies the possibility of choosing from possible worlds for Dorothea. As she asserts to Celia at the novel's conclusion regarding her marriage to Will, the substance of her regret is not that “past possibilities live within [her],”Footnote 14 but that the possible world is constrained to the regrettable choices that she makes: “I might have done something better, if I had been better. But this is what I am going to do” (771). Dorothea's remark here gestures obliquely toward the optative through the use of the conditional past tense but recoils from positing any counterfactual possibility. Eliot's narrator extends Dorothea's observation of absent possibilities to others within the novel and to us, her readers, as we bemoan alike her end as wife and mother. “But no one stated exactly what else that was in her power she ought rather to have done” (783). Eliot negates the retrospective duty denoted in the modal “ought” and casts Dorothea's regret as the recognition of her limited powers and inability to imagine an alternate path.
Eliot's elision of counterfactual possibility situates Dorothea's regret within broader questions of human freedom and determinism. The very concept of the counterfactual, typically credited to Hume, emerges in the context of debates on causality and determinism. Alongside the standard, mechanistic account of cause and effect, Hume presented a second, conflicting account of causality in which events or states of affairs could have been otherwise had something else occurred.Footnote 15 Thus, rather than a Newtonian universe of fixed causal laws that grants human action only “singular possibilities,” Hume opened the door to plural, “unrealised possibilities” that agents might consider alongside the record of events that took place.Footnote 16 In this context, insofar as regret entails the counterfactual, it assumes that actions unfold in a nondeterministic universe in which events and actions could have turned out otherwise.
This notion of things being “otherwise”—so central to counterfactual possibility and philosophic understandings of regret—also poses long-standing importance to theories of autonomy since the Enlightenment.Footnote 17 As Joseph Raz states, autonomy consists in being “aware” of “choices” and in the “knowledge that one's actions amount to charting a course which could have been otherwise.”Footnote 18 Determinism seems incompatible with models of individual responsibility and autonomy because it voids the possibility that we could do otherwise than we did.Footnote 19 The important role that counterfactual possibility plays in both conceptions of regret and autonomy indicates, I argue, an intimate philosophical connection between the two: to regret that one had not done otherwise is contingent on a theory of freedom in which we could do otherwise. Middlemarch’s insistence on a deterministic framework disrupts the relationship between autonomy, counterfactual possibility, and regret. By depriving Dorothea of alternate possibilities, Eliot crafts a character whose autonomy has been rendered suspect yet who, throughout the novel, feels deep responsibility and regret for actions and effects that unfold in a deterministic universe she neither controls nor can imagine being otherwise. This alternate model of regret and freedom, however, highlights a general ethical condition that the ideal of autonomy seeks to delimit: while we may exercise our freedom through acts of willing, both our freedom and our actions remain subject to a variety of external conditions whose effects are uncontrollable and irreversible, yet for which we may nevertheless be held accountable.
To encounter the specter of determinism in Eliot's work, particularly as it relates to questions of moral responsibility, is unsurprising. George Levine observes that Eliot embraced the pressures of a Newtonian worldview but considered free will to be compatible with determinism since agents can alter their character and, hence, future choices.Footnote 20 Eliot, he writes, viewed “morality and responsibility . . . [to be] bound up in determinism” because they emerge in a world where all actions and effects are deeply connected and “past and future are both implicit in the present.”Footnote 21 Levine's description of Eliotic determinism is consequential for the argument at hand. Insofar as determinism embeds actions within a vast network that mutually implicates the past, present, and future, it renders any act's discreteness ambiguous: determinism and the indeterminacy of actions emerge as constitutive, interrelated phenomena. In relation to Middlemarch, for example, we can read the initial paradox with which the “Finale” begins (“Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending” [779]) as intimately tied to the concluding remark that “there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside it” (784–85).
Eliot's twining of determinism with action's indeterminacy is exemplified in her use of the web metaphor. As Gillian Beer notes, the latter metaphor synthesizes Victorian conceptions of web as fabric with related associations to spiderwebs and weaving as well as Darwinian notions of an interconnected ecosystem whose developmental patterns are nonhierarchical and nonlinear.Footnote 22 On one hand, the web represents “fixed patterns and achieved limits”; on the other hand, within the discrete, spatio-temporal structure of the web, “[n]othing is end stopped.”Footnote 23 Yet I want to emphasize that Eliot's yoking of determinism and the indeterminacy of actions is not exceptional. Instead, I argue that it evidences a problematic consequence of seventeenth-century mechanist philosophy. D. M. Balme states that in contrast to Aristotelian theories of action, in which effects simply die out over time, seventeenth-century theories of causality posited “[a]n orderly nexus of automatic causes and effects” within a closed universe in which an act's effects ripple without end.Footnote 24 In this context, I understand the indeterminacy of acts and the burden of endless responsibility that they pose as a specifically post-Enlightenment problem that emerges as a result of changing theories of causality.
Eliot's response to this post-Enlightenment problem conjoins a set of seemingly unrelated theoretical issues; in her hands, determinism, indeterminate ends, responsibility, and regret form a single knot that then challenges traditional conceptions of voluntary action and autonomy. Middlemarch begins tethering this problem in its opening chapters by describing how various deterministic forces and egoistic desires compromise elements crucial to notions of voluntarism and autonomy and jeopardize the basis of individual responsibility. With respect to Dorothea, it is very clear early in the novel how the interplay of inward disposition, misguided desires, ignorance, and the “imperfect social state” shape the “determining acts of her life” (784). Dorothea's “religious disposition, the coercion it exercised over her life” fills her with a “soul-hunger” that she, as a woman, has nowhere else to direct but in marriage as the sole vehicle that could “deliver her from her girlish subjection to her own ignorance” and lead her onto the “grandest path” (26–27). Dorothea's “childlike ideas about marriage” are abetted by the lax guardianship of her uncle Mr. Brooke, the gendered expectations of Casaubon, and an education that was “narrow and promiscuous” (8, 10). Eliot's attention to the “coercive” force of Dorothea's disposition and passions, as well as her “ignorance” regarding the marital state and Casaubon's character, puts pressure on the very issues of compulsion and ignorance that have been central to accounts of voluntary action and individual responsibility. In a classic formulation, Aristotle distinguishes between involuntary acts performed “under compulsion or through ignorance” from voluntary acts in which actions begin with the knowledge and initiative of agents who deliberate and make choices regarding the means (rather than ends) of their actions.Footnote 25 My point here is not to enter into the thorny debate on what counts as ignorance or compulsion in Aristotle, but merely to highlight how Eliot makes the question of voluntary/involuntary action problematic along these typical lines.
The pressure of internal and external conditions on Dorothea is so great that it not only renders voluntary action ambiguous but also skews the exercise of choice. Hence, the narrator renders the process of choosing between Casaubon and Sir James Chettam as potential suitors to be ambiguous: “It is difficult to say whether there was or was not a little willfulness in her continuing blind to the possibility that another sort of choice was in question in relation to her” (32). If, as Raz states, an awareness of choices is integral to autonomy, the narrator describes Dorothea as entirely blind to the possibility of other choices even as she leaves the question of her culpability for such blindness uncertain. Given “the hereditary strain of Puritan energy” that undergirds her religious disposition (8), Dorothea directs her “enthusiasm about the ends of life” to Reverend Casaubon, whose intellectual and religious stature, she believes, will help channel “her desire to make life greatly effective” and answer the questions that her “active conscience” poses: “What should she do, what ought she to do?” (26). This translation of marriage and erotic life into a moral imperative and religious duty explains why she never experiences her regret as the consequence of choosing poorly between alternate paths: she only perceives one viable choice. Thus, even as Dorothea feels herself to be making a choice, the narrator alerts readers to the limits of her free will. Eliot's decision to begin the novel with a regrettable marital choice, in this regard, is significant. If “romantic love” and the “interval between marriageability and marriage” enabled Jane Austen's female protagonists “to exercise fantasies of autonomy,” Middlemarch revisits this interval as the period where the psychological and sociological conditions that delimit Dorothea's autonomy eventuate the loss of legal autonomy.Footnote 26
These uncertainties regarding voluntarism and autonomy pose strategic importance to regret in ways that are not present in other emotions of retrospective assessment such as remorse or repentance. Regret occupies an ambiguous territory since it can apply to both voluntary and involuntary actions and can carry either moral or nonmoral dimensions. As a result, scholars have traditionally defined it as something that a “spectator” feels that bears no relation to one's actions and thus stands distinguished from remorse, which is something that an agent feels toward her voluntary actions (Williams, Moral Luck, 30).Footnote 27 Gabrielle Taylor states that remorse is usually felt about a “moral wrong” in which guilt, individual responsibility, and the expectation of compensatory action constitute core features, whereas regret is something “undesirable, but not particularly morally so.”Footnote 28 One can feel regret over an event one is not responsible for (e.g., a close friend moving away) or for an action that was nevertheless right to do and which one would do again (e.g., firing someone).Footnote 29
Yet the very possibility that we could regret something we did not voluntarily do, could regret events that are either moral or nonmoral, or could regret without necessarily entertaining a counterfactual possibility raises substantive ethical ambiguities regarding questions of guilt, voluntarism, and responsibility that are not typically present in accounts of remorse. For Williams, these ambiguities are relevant because they expose an aporia in Kantian accounts of autonomy. Kantian autonomy emerged as a response to the pressures of seventeenth-century scientific determinism and sought to distinguish the domain of human freedom from both the deterministic laws that govern nature and the external exigencies of luck. For Kant, the Aristotelian notion of the voluntary is articulated in his concept of the rational, self-legislating will: only a rational will that acts according to a categorical imperative whose maxim represents “a universal law” is a “free will.”Footnote 30 The moral value of an act and the moral character of the person who acts do not derive from the consequences of an act, since these are conditioned by “good fortune,”Footnote 31 but from the rational agent's deliberation and willing of an act whose maxim conforms to the universal moral law expressed in the categorical imperative; and this constitutes not only the moral value of the act and person but also the intrinsic nature of the rational agent's autonomy and qualifies her membership to the “kingdom of ends.”Footnote 32
Through a consideration of regret and moral luck, Williams demonstrates how Kant's theory of autonomy and responsibility remains subject to a variety of external contingencies—whether they be the forces of determinism or luck and chance—that it was designed to evade. Williams's notion of “agent-regret” combines traditional accounts of regret and remorse: “agent-regret” expresses what an actor feels specifically toward her actions and, much like remorse, entails a desire to make reparations, yet, unlike remorse, regret pertains to both our voluntary and involuntary actions (Moral Luck, 27–28). Through such examples as the lorry driver who hits a child running onto the street to Paul Gauguin's abandonment of his family to pursue art, Williams demonstrates that the internal reasoning of the agent does not represent the sole grounds by which we accord praise/blame to persons and actions as Kant prescribed. In the case of the lorry driver, it was chance that the child ran onto the road in front of the driver, who was otherwise in no way directly culpable for the action, but who nevertheless experiences regret, desires to make reparations to the family, and wishes that he “might have acted otherwise.”Footnote 33
Thomas Nagel notes that Williams's case of the driver becomes specifically a case of moral luck if the driver was even slightly negligent and had not, for example, recently inspected his brakes; he is now not only subject to agent-regret but also to blame and responsibility for what happened. The latter is a case of moral luck because had the child not run onto the street, the driver's negligence would have been the same, but he would not be subject to blame and responsibility: it is an event outside of his control that causes the shift in our moral judgment.Footnote 34 This example represents an instance of “voluntary agency” but “share[s] something with the involuntary” because “the ‘luck’ of the agents relates to those elements which are essential to the outcome but lie outside their control,” and these external elements alter “agents’ judgments on their decisions” (Williams, Moral Luck, 30). Both Williams and Nagel outline various types of luck in which our retrospective assessment of a decision or action hinges on elements that are not in our control: how our actions and life-plans unfold over time; our natural abilities and character; the effect of past or present events and circumstances; what relevant information we possess or are ignorant of at the moment we make a decision (Moral Luck, 25–26).Footnote 35 We can see here how the various forms of luck that Nagel and Williams outline overlap with determinism and thus render, as Nagel summarizes, “freedom of the will” to be a “type of moral luck.”Footnote 36 It is precisely these types of moral luck that Kant's model of a free will “unconditioned by luck” refused (Moral Luck, 21). The moral value of one's acts and character can possibly be judged by what was nevertheless not in one's control, which Kant would have seen as “incoherent.”Footnote 37
It may be objected that in the case of Dorothea, unlike that of the lorry driver or Gauguin, the decision retrospectively judged is not a moral problem even if her decision was subject to the various forms of luck Williams and Nagel mention (e.g., her marital choice was made without relevant information that she later possesses; the determining effects of disposition and education on her free will, etc.). People like Mrs. Cadwallader may judge her as “stupid” (47), but they do not see her choice as morally culpable. Yet it must be remembered, as discussed earlier, that from Dorothea's point of view marriage represents a moral ought since she sees marriage as an avenue for developing religious, intellectual, and moral virtues and, most importantly, a means to engage in ethically meaningful action. Moreover, even if we regard her marriage as nonmoral, Eliot's attention to the interdependent web of human action presents even the choice of marriage as possessing moral consequences for which one could feel responsible and regret.
Here Eliot's embedding of regret, responsibility, and indeterminate ends within a quasideterministic framework anticipates the very problem of infinite responsibility that Williams's account of moral luck and regret identifies in plainer terms. Williams writes that regret is not limited to instances of “voluntary agency” but “extends[s] far beyond what one intentionally did to almost anything for which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one intentionally did” (Moral Luck, 27–28, emphasis original). Hence, although Williams's conception of agent-regret retains the distinction (found in accounts of remorse) between the regret and responsibility that we feel for our own actions versus that which we feel as spectators, the expansive scope of responsibility that he ascribes to regret makes it difficult to detect a clear boundary between those acts that we voluntarily author and those acts that bear no relation to our will and regard as spectators. Because our acts are, as both Eliot and Williams observe, part of a web that is formed by things that are not produced by our will, there is no way in which we can say with assurance like Oedipus: “I did not do it” (Moral Luck, 30 n.2). Either the condition of infinite responsibility means that the moral life is meaningless or that this condition cannot be “purified” (29). Regret captures this condition of moral impurity because it responds to the unclear boundary between voluntary and involuntary actions and because, as a temporally layered emotion, it discloses how the present is intimately tied to the past and anticipates the future: the temporality of regret registers the specific relationship between indeterminate ends and boundless responsibility.
For R. Jay Wallace, this relationship between regret, the (in)voluntary, and infinite responsibility has broader political/ethical consequences for the world-historical subject. Wallace observes that in experiencing regret, agents can judge a past action as “objectionable” and that they ought rather not to have done even as they feel compelled to “affirm” this past action because of other valuable benefits it has brought them (11, 79). Gauguin's moral bind, he suggests, parallels the “bourgeois predicament” of the Western subject (Wallace 186, passim). Just as Gauguin can neither experience complete regret for his past without invalidating his artistic career nor can avoid feeling “residual sorrow” toward the family he abandoned, so economically privileged subjects in the West cannot affirm their “life projects” without tacitly affirming the political/historical conditions that entail the suffering of others (Wallace 175, 250). Such “nihilism” in which we cannot “affirm” anything we do or value without affirming our imbrication in regrettable historical events where our precise role remains uncertain is not an occasional emotional assessment but a persistent condition of being in the world (Wallace 253, 257).
We can understand the implications of such endless responsibility by returning to the question of readerly regret in Middlemarch. The concluding words of the novel are an envoi that fills readers with an infirm sense of responsibility: “that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs” (785). We are left with a vague sense that our bettered historical position owes itself to the suffering of innumerable Dorotheas, and we cannot live out our present desires and ambitions without a regrettable awareness that our freedom has been built on past unfreedom. Our implication in regrettable historical realities and events in the past persists despite the fact that we are unable to delineate a clear causal chain as to how the past is connected to our intentional acts in the present. Moreover, our ability to imagine an alternative trajectory for Dorothea is a further reminder of an imaginative outlet that was not available to her and yet which we possess as capacity because of women like her.
The reader's mixed sense of responsibility and regret for a historical past that is not even under her direct control parallels the experience of Dorothea. Dorothea represents a modern bourgeois subject who sees her wealth and position of privilege as implicating her in the suffering of others, both past and present. What Wallace terms the “bourgeois predicament,” Eliot names the “gentlewoman's oppressive liberty” (257). As Dorothea explains to Will, she would like “to make life beautiful . . . everybody's life” and cannot appreciate the “immense expense of art” found in Rome since it is not available to those whose lives are filled with suffering and ugliness (205–6). While Will may criticize Dorothea's attitude as a “fanaticism of sympathy” (205), such sympathy expresses nothing less than her limitless responsibility toward “everybody.” The sympathy at work here resembles a Humean model that names less a particular emotion than “a disposition or ‘principle’ that communicates emotions from person to person,” influencing moral judgment and reflections on just action.Footnote 38 In Dorothea's case, sympathy names her overall disposition since “[h]er immediate consciousness was one of immense sympathy without check” (750).
Eliot's decision to make a woman the vehicle of unchecked sympathy and responsibility brings greater attention to an accompanying sense of paralysis since Dorothea's ability to act on behalf of others remains hindered by her position as a “dependent creature.” Such paralysis in Middlemarch represents a discrete case, but it describes a general state of the will that results from the very relationship that Williams and Wallace theorize between regret, indeterminate ends, and responsibility. Hannah Arendt pointedly summarizes this nexus of relations in The Human Condition:
The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of any action is simply that action has no end. That deeds possess such an enormous capacity for endurance . . . could be a matter of pride if men were able to bear its burden, the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability. . . . [Men] have known that he who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he always becomes “guilty” of consequences he never intended or even foresaw. . . . All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by producing the web of human relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the victim and sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done. . . . The only salvation from this kind of freedom seems to lie in non-acting, in abstention from the whole realm of human affairs as the only means to safeguard one's sovereignty and integrity as a person. If we leave aside the disastrous consequences of these recommendations . . . , their basic error seems to lie in that identification of sovereignty with freedom.Footnote 39
Arendt delineates how the endless nature of our actions renders models of “sovereignty” untenable and its related model of individual responsibility burdensome. Her claims, moreover, resonate with Williams's assertion that the will is entangled in a “web” that both is and is not the product of its exertion, a web of relations that Wallace extends to the world-historical subject. The feeling of “agent-regret” registers a contradiction within Kantian models of autonomy that we experience, following Arendt, either as the incapacity to act or as a form of suffering in which we feel that no matter what we do, our acts enchain us in regrettable consequences. Yet, as Arendt underscores, paralysis and insuperable guilt constitute an apt response if and only if we equate freedom with autonomy.
2. Lyric and Narrative as Theories of Action
Middlemarch offers a similar Arendtian critique of sovereignty and links this critique to notions of regret. The novel depicts Dorothea absorbed in feelings of regret, impotence, and responsibility as she withdraws into an isolated experience of her autonomy and subjectivity. The latter experience of regret and inaction spurs an alternate desire to act on her responsibility, but such acts either result in other regrettable consequences beyond her control or are obstructed by external contingencies that delimit her agency. This pattern unfolds most forcefully in the scenes that take place in Dorothea's bedroom at Rome and Lowick subsequent to her marriage. While the bedroom scenes echo Arendt in the ways I have described, they also contain a unique feature insofar as the critique of sovereignty unfolds within a Romantic, intertextual framework. Questions of human freedom, regret, and responsibility are repeatedly mediated by an encounter with Romantic poetics.
This juxtaposition is not incidental and invites us to read Romantic poetics as a historically conditioned response to the burdens of autonomy and Enlightenment subjectivity. Nancy Yousef has demonstrated that the traditional conception of Romantic interiority and subjectivity is indebted to the Lockean and Cartesian notion of the “self-sufficient inward subject,” who retreats into meditative solitude and achieves complete independence.Footnote 40 Yet this Romantic ideal of the isolated, autonomous mind and will, she claims, is predicated upon the worrisome reality of dependence and helplessness.Footnote 41 Yousef thus shows how the pressures of relatedness and responsibility, which Arendt so pointedly diagnoses, underlie Romantic rearticulations of Enlightenment subjectivity and autonomy.
The latter tension between intersubjective dependence and autonomy, I contend, also structures a strand of Romantic and post-Romantic theorizations of lyric and narrative. Critics often associate lyric with interiority, subjectivity, brevity, a rhetoric of presence, and “suppression of temporality” while narrative denotes “a temporal and historical world . . . populated by other people and no longer defined purely by the subject,” progressive time and actions, and the episodic retelling of circumstantial events as they take place in the objective world.Footnote 42 A literary history of this dichotomous understanding will likely cite Hegel's statement in the Aesthetics that the “mood” and “mentality” of the lyric is to “withdraw into itself from all external connection whatever and take its starting-point from the inwardness of its states and feelings” or John Stuart Mill's observation that the poet focuses on inner “states of feeling” to produce “soliloquy” whereas the writer of fiction depicts the outer world of “actions and events” via “narrative or incident.”Footnote 43 This formulation of lyric and narrative, and its respective opposition of synchronic and diachronic temporalities, continues to have critical purchase. Sharon Cameron's paradigmatic argument on lyric temporality, for example, states that the lyric poem presents us with a speaker “taken out of the flux of history” and arrests time into a singular “moment” in contrast to the stories found in novels and narrative, which rely on temporal sequence and the portrayal of multiple actors within a wider “social context.”Footnote 44 Similarly, Monique Morgan and Jonathan Culler differentiate narrative's identification with story (i.e., temporal sequentiality of events, progress, causality) from lyric, which constitutes “a suspended moment that stops the time of narrative” and concentrates on “the iterative and iterable performance of an event in the lyric present.”Footnote 45
The model of lyric at stake here has its roots in Romanticism but achieved its most forceful articulation in modernism and the methodology of the New Critics.Footnote 46 Virginia Jackson argues that the latter method of “lyric reading” came to represent a general way of reading all poetry across historical periods as lyrics despite the fact that lyric references a historically unstable generic category, and its identification with a solitary and expressive first-person speaker removed from any historical/social context constitutes a nineteenth-century development.Footnote 47 While Jackson historicizes lyric expressivity, other critics complicate notions of lyric interiority by reading the Romantic lyric itself as an intersubjective (not solitary) voicing,Footnote 48 or trace lyric interiority's debt to novelists like Samuel Richardson and Jane Austen.Footnote 49 These revisions to the lyric/narrative binary find precedent in Romantics such as Coleridge, Hazlitt, and Shelley, who spoke confusedly on the mutual relatedness of poetry and prose.Footnote 50 Shelley's Defence, for example, distinguishes poetry's Neoplatonic concern for the universal and ideal forms from story's focus on incident, causality, and sequence even as it identifies the “poetical” in the works of Plato and Francis Bacon or simply “a single word.”Footnote 51
In this essay, I am not concerned as to whether the line of Hegelian and Millian thinking on lyric and narrative that came to dominate modernist and new critical reading practices accurately captures the generic essence of lyric or narrative. I take it as a given, for example, that elements of interiority or temporality traverse texts that one might label lyric or narrative. The question this essay poses is not what is or is not intrinsic to lyric or narrative, but how theorizations of lyric and narrative, particularly those that espouse the dichotomy outlined above, hold suasive power because they articulate a response to problems in human freedom. I thus attend to a recurrent binarism in Romantic/post-Romantic conceptualizations of genre—performing and deconstructing the method of “lyric reading” that Jackson critiques—in order to illustrate how we might understand the contrast between, for example, isolated interiority (lyric) and teleological action (narrative) as a coded response to the constraints of autonomy.
That philosophical questions of agency should arrive in the envelope of genre is understandable given the history of Romantic genre theory. Gérard Genette reminds us that one of the distinguishing features of Romantic genre theory is that it is not primarily defined, as in Plato and Aristotle, in relation to the problem of mimesis (e.g., the imitation of human action) or mode (e.g., whether the writer speaks in his own person or speaks through numerous characters).Footnote 52 Instead, the tripartite division of lyric, epic, and dramatic, which achieves most notable articulation in the eighteenth century with Friedrich Schlegel, defines genre along the axis of subjectivity and objectivity: “Epic = Subjective-Objective. Drama = Objective. Lyric = Subjective.”Footnote 53 As he reiterates in “Zur Poesie und Litteratur” (1808), “Epic poetry is then the root of the whole and precisely the middle between the wholly inward lyrical and the wholly outward dramatic poetry.”Footnote 54 René Wellek comments that this tripartite division unfolds against the backdrop of Kant's and Fichte's dialectics and hence “[g]enre theory was resolutely connected with a theory of knowledge” for Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, and F. W. J Schelling.Footnote 55 The conception of genre as mediating a dialectical synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity is particularly apparent in Schelling's Philosophy of Art (1803), where lyric subjectivity (i.e., inward reflection) and epic's portrayal of “action” as what is “objective” are fused together in drama as it represents the relationship between the finite and the infinite, freedom and necessity.Footnote 56
We see here that Romantic genre theory was implicitly concerned with questions of agency, and in approaching lyric and narrative as theories of action, I am in part returning to the philosophical context of their initial conception. To read the categories of lyric and narrative as theories of action thus requires that we interpret them as something more than distinct literary genres. Following Tilottama Rajan, we can understand them “as epistemologies and practices” that “exist in a diacritical relation” and operate in tandem within a given text.Footnote 57 Such an approach disembeds lyric and narrative from genre, treating them as modes whose cross-generic manifestations pose relevance for the attitudinal values or suppositions that they disclose. What these generic modes disclose, I contend, is a worry over the ethical situation of endless responsibility. In the previous section I characterized this problem as a general aspect of our moral condition that agent autonomy cannot remedy and that expresses itself in feelings of regret. With respect to eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century literature and philosophy, this problem of “global moral responsibility” was something that thinkers such as Hume and Smith acknowledged in their theories of sympathy yet sought to delimit.Footnote 58 I interpret the generic dichotomy between lyric and narrative that emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as shaped by similar ethical concerns. In this context, Arendt's assessment that the identification of freedom with autonomy either results in abstention from acting or feeling guilt for a world that enmeshes us in regrettable consequences offers a schema for understanding the generic binary of lyric and narrative as well. I thus read the Romantic lyric subject's withdrawal from the social world into inner privacy as connoting, via form, the withdrawal from the endlessness of our actions and responsibility. Romantic and post-Romantic conceptions of lyric register an anxiety about the ends of action through a generic strategy in which poetry is defined as what avoids events, causal sequence, and the teleology typically associated with narrative. The lyric subject retreats from the social world of narrative action and mutual dependence because its model of subjectivity is incommensurate with the political and ethical demands of the world to which s/he belongs. It is this modern agent who experiences ethical responsibility toward others as frightfully unbounded and who responds by retreating inward with feelings of regret.
The nexus of relations that I have drawn between genre, agency, and responsibility represents another iteration of what Jerome McGann famously termed “the Romantic ideology” and persists even in recent critical arguments that seek to avoid its pitfalls. Jacques Khalip argues, for example, that Romantic subjectivity is defined not by interiority but by “its fascination with anonymity as an ethics of engaged withdrawal or strategic reticence,” an ethics in which both the self and its acts remain “unfinished” and unfold “without any teleological purpose” precisely “because we cannot claim to control or be in full possession of our actions toward others.”Footnote 59 While Khalip resists Enlightenment ideals of a fixed, autonomous self and teleological action, his argument nevertheless retains traces of what Arendt characterizes as the “disastrous” response to ideals of sovereignty: anonymous agency responds ethically to the alterity of the other through a “withdrawal from the stages of the world” because nonaction poses the only remaining form of political “intervention” when the ideal of sovereign political action fails.Footnote 60
That such acts of “engaged withdrawal” or “strategic reticence” bear a relation to the ideology of the isolated, Romantic lyric poet is particularly evident in Anne-Lise François's theory of “recessive action” or “desistance,” where nonaction becomes allied explicitly to lyric. François's inclination to read moments of inaction as the sanguine expression of a lyric consciousness that resists narrative teleology recapitulates the very alignment of genre, agency, and subjectivity that the Romantics themselves had explored.Footnote 61 The theory of “recessive action” attends to those moments in Romantic literature that cannot be recuperated either by Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and teleological improvement or traditional Aristotelian models of narrative action. Instead, they constitute moments of “lyric inconsequence” that “[permit] a release from the ethical imperative to act upon knowledge.”Footnote 62 Such nonaction, or “passivity,” expresses the “ethical value of doing nothing.”Footnote 63 Both Khalip and François thus read modes of nonaction as offering an alternate model of sociality and agency in which the experience of “helplessness” before the suffering of others expresses ethical relatedness.Footnote 64
While I share Khalip's and François's intuition that moments of nonaction in Romantic literature express anxieties about moral responsibility, I do not conceive such moments as a rejection of Enlightenment ideals. Following Arendt's insight on “non-acting” and “abstention,” I instead interpret instances of “withdrawal” or “recessive action” in Romantic literature as a response to the conditions of autonomy. This response, as I have been arguing, translates the affective experience of regret in the face of limitless ethical responsibility into the generic bifurcation of lyric and narrative, where lyric interiority and inaction secures itself against narrative's enchainment to the social world of boundless actions and consequences. In this context, helplessness accompanies moments of inaction not because it signals an alternate ethics but an enervated will. If helplessness, as Miller pithily states, conveys a “powerlessness” to “help” others,Footnote 65 it not only references an ethical condition of relatedness and dependence but also an attendant state of possible impotence and inaction. The connection that I am positing between impotence, inaction, and regret has a long philosophic legacy; from Plato and Aristotle to modern philosophers such as Descartes and Spinoza, regret constitutes a particular pain or sadness regarding the past that manifests itself in agents with an irresolute or weak will (akrasia).Footnote 66 I thus understand helplessness as a condition of the will that accompanies the regret experienced by an agent who no longer feels confident in asserting her autonomy precisely because the ends of actions are inconclusive and the parameters of individual responsibility diffuse in the ways that Arendt describes.
3. Dorothea's Regret
Middlemarch thematizes these connections between regret, freedom, and Romantic poetics. I stated earlier that the novel challenges conceptions of voluntarism and autonomy by twining into a single knot concepts that otherwise seem unrelated: determinism/luck, indeterminate ends, responsibility, and regret. To this we can now add Romantic poetics and the generic bifurcation of lyric and narrative. Eliot purposely colors Dorothea with allusions to the Romantic lyric, rendering Dorothea's failures to actualize her desires as consonant with the failures of lyric itself. In the opening chapters of the novel, Eliot links Dorothea's “ardent” (10 and passim) nature to the lyricism of her voice whose “musical intonation . . . in moments of deep but quiet feeling made her speech like a fine bit of recitative” (43). On hearing Dorothea's musical speech, Will Ladislaw exclaims: “It was like the voice of a soul that had once lived in an Aeolian harp” (74). Although Will's comment privileges the “phenomenalization of the poetic voice” so central to understandings of the Romantic lyric,Footnote 67 his use of the pluperfect tense (“had once lived”) suggests that Dorothea's voice no longer finds its home in Coleridgean harps. Displacing her in the “Prelude” from the epic and here from lyric, Eliot imbues Dorothea with the “transcendental homelessness” that Lukács would attribute to the genre of the novel as a whole.Footnote 68
Dorothea emerges as a “foster-child” of Romanticism, and she suffers from all the conflicts bequeathed by her erstwhile parents. Like the lyric speaker of Matthew Arnold's “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse,” who complains that the “powers” of the Romantics are not his and retreats to the temporal and spatial stasis of a “shadow'd nave,”Footnote 69 Eliot infuses Dorothea with a sense of impotence, melancholic regret, and paralysis.Footnote 70 Alone in her bedroom at Lowick, she feels incapable of acting and inhabits this failure as a problem of genre, that is, as the lyric subject's retreat and subsequent isolation from the social world of praxis. Dorothea experiences her relatedness to others through a detached, interiorized subjectivity: “the sense of connexion with a manifold pregnant existence had to be kept up painfully as an inward vision, instead of coming from without in claims that would have shaped her energies” (257). Her conflicted sense of privilege and responsibility stirs her with the question, “What shall I do?” (257), but results in no effectual response. The association of regret with impotence and helplessness can be traced, as I noted earlier, to ancient and modern philosophy. Having translated Spinoza's Ethics, Eliot was familiar with Spinoza's definition of regret as a “desire” for something in the past that induces “pain” because our memory “exclude[s]” it from the present.Footnote 71 Regret in Spinoza constitutes a negative and “passive” affective response that causes “suffering” and “melancholy” in agents because their power to act in a deterministic world is “infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes,” making them susceptible to the pain that arises from an impotence or “weakness of mind.”Footnote 72 By casting Dorothea as an heir to the problems of Romantic poetics, Eliot transposes these philosophical connections between regret, impotence, and freedom in a deterministic world onto the isolated, lyric subject.
The Romantic intertexts that subtend Eliot's characterization of Dorothea intensify in the scenes that take place in her boudoir in Rome and Lowick, where Eliot most acutely describes her regret. The scenes at Lowick overlook an avenue of lime trees and frame Dorothea's experience of marital imprisonment in distinctly Coleridgean terms.Footnote 73 Yet if Dorothea, like Coleridge, suffers as a prisoner within a bower of lime trees, she does not overcome her imprisonment through an imaginative act of transcendence. Rather, as D. A. Miller once argued, Middlemarch idealizes “romantic projects of transcendence” only to disassemble them and subject them to repeated substitution, first through her marriage with Casaubon and then with Will.Footnote 74 Given this sublimation into the erotic, it is no surprise that the example such critics as Neil Hertz cite when discussing Dorothea's inability to comprehend the sublime occurs during her honeymoon in Rome.Footnote 75 This displacement of erotic energies is strategic: the honeymoon in Rome tacitly links the failed project of Romantic transcendence to Dorothea's failed assertion of autonomy in marital choice, for it is in Rome that she begins to realize she made a regrettable choice. By rerouting Romantic transcendence into the marriage plot, Eliot suggests that chimerical notions of an autonomous subject acting on desire not only underpin women's marital choices but also articulations of Romantic subjectivity.
This critique of Romanticism takes a more specific turn in the Vatican, where Eliot explicitly links Dorothea's regret over her marriage to Romantic conceptions of lyric interiority and stasis. Eliot gives the scene in the Vatican to us in two ways—from the perspective of Naumann and Will and then Dorothea. As characters who represent Europe's burgeoning “Romanticism” (176), Will and Naumann interpret Dorothea standing before the sculpture of Ariadne in ways that resonate with lyric, an association that Will later reiterates when he tells Dorothea baldly, “You are a poem” (209). As Abigail Rischin notes, the comparison of Dorothea to the stasis of the Ariadne sculpture represents an instance of “ekphrastic lyric,” in which the “frozen moment” of visual art is presented in writing.Footnote 76 Naumann and Will's perception of Dorothea standing “arrested” before the Ariadne and “fixed dreamily on a streak of sunlight which fell across the floor” performs a type of “lyric reading” that lifts Dorothea's reverie out of the narrative in which her mental states unfold, rendering her a monument to the temporal stasis and inwardness that critics like Cameron and Morgan associate with lyric (177).
This association between reverie and lyric is echoed in recent criticism. Nicholas Dames suggests that reverie's tendency to concentrate its attention in one direction while screening out all other experience from its purview disconnects it from “narrativized knowledge” as well as the causal sequence and temporal enchainment associated with plot.Footnote 77 Synthesizing Dames's reading of reverie with François's notion of “lyric inconsequence,” Elisha Cohn interprets instances of reverie as “lyrical moments” of “heightened feeling” that interrupt the novel's insistence on teleological progression and draw attention to affective states of “diminished agency” in which “nothing happens” as such.Footnote 78 The latter arguments on lyric and reverie can be traced to Romantics like Rousseau and Shelley, for whom reverie exemplified an interpenetration of inner and outer worlds.Footnote 79 Reverie resembles Hegel's description of the lyric subject as one who “absorbs into himself the entire world of objects and circumstances, and stamps them with his own inner consciousness.”Footnote 80 Yet Eliot's depiction of Dorothea's reverie resists the opposition between reverie/lyric and narrative and tacitly critiques the “lyric reading” of Dorothea (a living poem) that Will and Naumann offer, as well as its Romantic touchstones. Eliot, who was familiar with Rousseauian reverie,Footnote 81 references the temporal stasis associated with reverie in order to exploit and then dismantle the traditional opposition of lyric and narrative, rendering a synthesis of these modes instrumental to staging Dorothea's regret.
In the subsequent chapter, Eliot revisits the lyric moment in the Vatican through a narrative that describes how it was the product of events that unfolded over time, that is, was rooted in the very world of consequence, causal action, and teleological progress that the iterative “lyric present” supposedly escapes.Footnote 82 The chapter begins by rooting the reader in real time: “Two hours later, Dorothea was seated in an inner room or boudoir of a handsome apartment in the Via Sistina” (180). Eliot's use of “or” in the opening sentence between “inner room” and “boudoir” metonymically links the boudoir in Rome to that in Lowick, which will serve repeatedly as an inner room for Dorothea, both literal and metaphoric, to experience her regret and enlarging selfhood. In this inner room we see Dorothea “sobbing bitterly” over what she cannot name but what any thoughtful reader already suspects as cause: “She had married the man of her choice . . .” (180). Yet rather than dilate on the emotional impact of a regrettable choice, the chapter immediately shifts from narrative time (“two hours later”) to Dorothea's entry into a state of “inward amazement” where she reflects on the day's images of Rome. It is through this shift that Dorothea experiences the substance of regret—what the narrator describes as “the new real future which replaces the imaginary” (182).
By overlaying images of Rome onto a reverie in which she contemplates her regrettable marriage, Eliot implicitly conjoins Dorothea's failed marriage with her failure at Romantic transcendence—a conjunction that resonates in subsequent scenes in her Lowick bedroom where Eliot describes Dorothea ensconced in moods of regret. The images in Rome
fixed themselves in her memory even when she was not thinking of them, preparing strange associations which remained through her after-years. Our moods are apt to bring with them images which succeed each other like the magic-lantern pictures of a doze; and in certain states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St Peter's. (181–82)
The sublime images of Rome and its incomprehensible “vastness” run like a silent film each time Dorothea experiences regret for the real future that was replacing the imaginary. Eliot's decision to overlay images of Rome's sublimity onto her marital disappointments introduces another temporal dimension to Dorothea's regret. Here reverie not only signals Dorothea's contemplation of her immediate, personal past but also her entry into a form of historical consciousness. Barbara Hardy argues that Middlemarch represents the first English novel to examine “the psychology of historical consciousness” by imbricating the public in the private world and depicting the intricate web that connects the present moment with the past and future.Footnote 83 This intersection of personal and historical time occurs at a moment in the novel when Dorothea struggles to comprehend the relationship between her subjectivity and the broader forces of art and politics.Footnote 84
It is not incidental that Dorothea experiences these conflicts in Rome. Rome provided both Romantics and Victorians with a crucible for experiencing their historical relatedness to the antique, republican past—a relatedness explored in the German historiographies by Niebuhr and Mommsen with which Eliot was familiar.Footnote 85 Yet it is precisely how the actions of the past resonate in the present that leaves Dorothea stupefied. She does not, like Will, experience a “vital connexion” between Roman art, its historical ruins, and the “poor people in Rome” (198–99). Instead, she sees a “stupendous fragmentariness” and fails to “unite” the “gigantic broken revelations” of Rome and the “tumultuous preoccupation with her personal lot” (180–81). As David Kurnick notes, the episode in Rome represents “the desire to articulate individual experience to a larger frame of reference, and the difficulty of doing so.”Footnote 86 Here we must remember that Will's critique of her “fanaticism of sympathy” occurs in Rome. While Dorothea's sympathetic nature prompts her to feel an unbounded responsibility toward “everybody,” the relationship between her own life's actions and the vital, open-ended history produced by countless actors proves to be, like Rome itself, “unintelligible” (181).
We might understand Dorothea's schismatic experience of Rome by returning to the problem that Williams and Wallace pose: the exact boundary between the regret we feel over our voluntary actions and the regret we feel as spectators remains undecidable because our histories as agents participate in a preexisting web of collective acts that extend into the past and open toward the future. We may thus feel responsible for states of affairs where our exact role in producing those conditions may be uncertain. Dorothea's experience in Rome can be understood as an attempt to comprehend how the voluntary (her regrettable marriage) lies embedded in the involuntary (the interconnected web of past acts expressed in Rome's history and art). This confused experience of regret and responsibility is framed as a literary inheritance. By linking Dorothea to the failed legacies of Romanticism and nesting her marital regret within an alienated experience of Roman history and art, Eliot casts Dorothea's dissonant and fragmentary experience of Rome as the Romantic lyric subject's alienation from the dynamic, open-ended historical narrative in which our life's many actions, as well as their inconclusive ends, reverberate.
The persistence of a lyric subjectivity within a widening historical consciousness recalls Lukács's statements on the “inner form of the novel” (80). For Lukács, the novel (as modern epic) captures the fundamental “disharmony” between a highly individualized “interiority” and “the outside world [which] cannot be represented” except as the subjective “mood” of the individual (79). The representation of the outside world as mood, for Lukács, is achieved through the novel's internalization of “pure lyric poetry” (79). Here Lukács's argument, as he notes, is indebted to Romantic genre theory and the notion that the novel contains within itself other genres. In Friedrich Schlegel, the dialectical synthesis of subjectivity (lyric) and objectivity (dramatic) is achieved in the subjective-objective (epic) form of the novel as the expression of all that is romantic and poetic.Footnote 87 Hence the famous line from “Letter about the Novel” (1799), “A novel is a romantic book.”Footnote 88 Yet in contrast to Schlegel's idealist synthesis, the protagonist of Lukács's novel can only experience the outside world as the alienated mood of lyric because the novel, aligned with the bildungsroman, remains wedded to an “autonomous” subject whose “[i]ndividuality” constitutes “an aim unto itself” (78).Footnote 89 Yet my point is not simply that the conflict between Dorothea's lyric subjectivity and the outside world of Roman art and history echoes a Lukácian conflict. Middlemarch illuminates something more. In examining the relationship between regret, responsibility, and collective history through Romantic poetics, Eliot reveals the extent to which agency is reticulated within the limits of genre. The multifarious and constraining web in which our actions unfold can only be represented through the layered, yet limiting, web of textual procedure.
Working within these textual limits, Eliot's narrative establishes a contrast between Dorothea's experience of Rome and that of the reader, staging for the reader the interconnected temporality of personal and historical experience that Dorothea's subjectivity could only perceive as fractured. In so doing, Eliot employs a technique frequently ascribed to narrative: the chronological manipulation of events within narration as it shuttles back and forth in time (i.e., the relationship between story and discourse).Footnote 90 Eliot's formal strategies move the reader between past, present, and future such that lyric inwardness and narrative together participate in an expanding, whorled totality. This is of great importance since Eliot's synthesis of modes in depicting Dorothea's regret anticipates subsequent scenes in the Lowick boudoir. The scenes in Lowick contain an embedded narrative insofar as they refer back to the experience in Rome and her regretful response to personal and historical forces “even when she was not thinking of them” (181). Each lyric moment of reverie is thus always a tunneling into a past narrative. Hence the narrator teaches readers to interpret reverie as temporally layered.
The reader forcibly experiences Dorothea's regret as temporal affect by moving backward in time so that we shift from what is unfolding in the time of narrative (“two hours later”) to the compressed temporality of reverie, in which she reflects on images of Rome. As Dorothea weeps in vague despondency, the narrator explains her current state of regret by describing all the various instances over the first six weeks of their marriage in which Casaubon has failed to be the Miltonic father of Dorothea's misguided hopes. The chapter then ends by circling back to the moment in the Vatican when Naumann and Will see Dorothea in her reverie and where we learn that Dorothea is seeing not the sunlight on the floor at all but “inwardly seeing the light of years to come in her own home and over the English fields and elms and hedge-bordered highroads” (190). Eliot's prospective spatialization of Dorothea's regret here resembles what Heather Dubrow describes as “anticipatory amalgams,” wherein the admixture of lyric and narrative modes creates “optatives located both in the mind in the present and in a physical space that may exist in the future.”Footnote 91 In the Vatican, Dorothea inwardly sees the future that will not be as she had hoped or wished even as she inhabits a present in the mind that slides into the past—a regret that is spatialized across the landscape of Lowick that she will gaze at from her bedroom window upon her return.
4. A Life in Miniature
By spatializing her regret in the Vatican and linking it to future scenes of regret in her bedroom at Lowick, Eliot marks off the bedroom scenes as a thematic unit that dramatizes Dorothea's regret during moments of reverie. While these moments of absorptive reverie are signaled through free indirect discourse, Eliot encourages readers to interpret them as specifically linked to the structure of the Romantic lyric through the repeated allusions to the Coleridgean landscape and prior comparisons between Dorothea's voice and lyric enunciation. These associations with lyric are heightened in the Lowick bedroom through the presence of the miniatures and the temporality that they reference. This temporality, according to Susan Stewart, breaks from the “lived historical time” of narrative, metonymic realism and instead “create[s] an interior temporality of the subject” and “the infinite time of reverie” associated with lyric.Footnote 92
Middlemarch, however, complicates any neat segregation of lyric and narrative modes. While moments of reverie seemingly instantiate the temporal stasis associated with lyric, it is a stasis that Eliot punctures through the precedent in Rome and its layered temporal narrative on regret, responsibility, and history. The chapters in Rome provide a critical counterpoint to those in Lowick, where Eliot stages Dorothea's movement from lyric absorption in feelings of regret and impotence to narrative progress and action. These efforts to break from lyric self-enclosure and act on her regret and responsibility, however, are repeatedly thwarted: the lyric/narrative dichotomy entraps Dorothea in a double bind since it instantiates a model of subjectivity and agency rooted in autonomy.
When Dorothea returns from her honeymoon to Lowick, the furniture, landscape, and even her prior idealizations of marriage appear “shrunken” (258). These descriptions of shrunken size mark her entry into the space and temporality of the miniature and her withdrawal into an interiority lined with regret. As she lays the cameos she bought for Celia on the table by the bow-window, “she unconsciously kept her hands on them, immediately absorbed in looking out on the still, white enclosure which made her visible world” (257). This description of Dorothea “absorbed” in the act of looking out at the landscape marks a shift in tone as Eliot's free indirect discourse transitions to Dorothea's interior thoughts on her marriage which, “great beforehand,” now “seemed to be shrinking with the furniture.”Footnote 93 Casaubon woke early and is now in his library, Celia and other visitors would soon come to greet Dorothea as “Mrs. Casaubon.” The humdrum events of just-married life counter her earlier idealizations of marriage—it's “a dream which the dreamer begins to suspect” (257).
Eliot directs the attitude of suspicion not only to Dorothea's bridal dreams but also to the model of lyric privacy performed through the reverie itself. In this context, Dorothea's reveries differ from the novelistic scenes of reverie that Cohn examines, wherein the metaleptic “tonal shift” marked by free indirect discourse inaugurates a “lyric mood” that forestalls narrative teleology.Footnote 94 The scenes at Lowick, by contrast, thematize such generic oppositions in order to critique its Romantic foundations. The use of free indirect discourse pivots from the Coleridgean landscape of imprisoning lime trees to the interior experience of “moral imprisonment which made itself one with the . . . landscape, with the shrunken furniture” (258). The reverie's fusion of interior and exterior represents an aspect of Dorothea's suffocating condition rather than a vehicle of resolution since “communion” with Casaubon among the lime trees is, in direct contrast to the speaker of Coleridge's lyric, not available to her even in her “imagination” (258). Both embowered woman and isolated lyric speaker at once, Dorothea sees in “[e]ach remembered thing in the room” the marriage that had promised “worthy and imperative occupation” yet yielded this shrunken, regrettable outcome (257–58).
The narrator then briefly breaks the interior monologue to remind the reader that (much as in meditative Romantic lyrics) only “minutes” have actually passed during her absorptive state before returning again to her interior thoughts (258).Footnote 95 Turning away from the bow-window, Dorothea surveys the room for the connectedness she lacks with Casaubon and finds it momentarily in the miniature of Aunt Julia. Attention to the miniature inaugurates another contemplative recession signaled through free indirect discourse. In looking at the miniature, Dorothea experiences a moment of sympathetic identification with someone who also made a regrettable choice in marriage: “Was it only her friends who thought her marriage unfortunate?”Footnote 96 Eliot describes this experience of “companionship” in dialogic terms—the miniature “had an ear for her,” and after gazing at it she “looked up as if she were again talking to a figure in front of her” (258).
Reading this scene as an instance of lyric clarifies the encounter with the miniature. Much like Northrop Frye's characterization of the lyric poet as someone who “turns his back on his listeners” and John Stuart Mill's definition of poetry as “feeling confessing itself to itself,”Footnote 97 Dorothea's meditation on the miniature facilitates an imagined dialogue with another that is also the means by which she acknowledges her feelings to herself. This inward dialogue results in her speaking aloud an apostrophic utterance: “Oh, it was cruel to speak so! How sad—how dreadful!” (259). To describe the latter line as a lyric apostrophe is to reread the entire scene with the miniature as a complex encounter with the voicing and hearing of the first-person Romantic lyric. Ever since Culler's analysis of apostrophe, critics following his lead have read the apostrophic utterance as the very embodiment of lyric. The apostrophe constitutes a moment of “radical interiorization”—an outburst of intense feeling that instantiates poetic speech and thus “works against narrative . . . sequentiality, causality, linear time, teleological meaning.”Footnote 98 For Culler, apostrophe represents a moment of self-constitution in which the Hegelian lyric speaker assimilates the outer world into the self.Footnote 99 Dorothea constitutes her subjectivity through her encounter with the miniature that she regards as possessing, to use Eliot's language, “an equivalent centre of self” (198), and this exchange results in a lyric exclamation in which Dorothea confesses her feelings about Casaubon to herself, to an imagined addressee, and, of course, to her readers.
The exclamatory utterance marks the end of the reverie and returns Dorothea to the world of others. Hence, immediately after the apostrophe, Eliot writes that “She rose quickly and went out of the room . . . with the irresistible impulse to go to see her husband and inquire if she could do anything for him” (259). Frye once stated that the lyric's suspension of everyday time and space often emerges in response to an inner “block” such as “frustrated love.”Footnote 100 Building on Frye, Dubrow adds that lyric's “heightening” of feeling can incite a turn to narrative action that resolves this initial blockage.Footnote 101 In Middlemarch’s movement from meditative reverie to narrative sequence and action, we anticipate a resolution to the conflict that guided Dorothea's inner meditation as she seeks out her husband, but such efforts are foiled. “But when [Dorothea] reached the head of the dark oak staircase, there was Celia coming up, and below there was Mr Brooke” (259). The result of an initial block, the lyric moment in the novel incites the return to narrative only then, quite literally, to block Dorothea again.
Subsequent window scenes in Dorothea's bedroom revisit this pattern of failure in a manner that thematizes and critiques the lyric/narrative binary. Here we must remember that the bedroom scenes in Lowick refer back to the scenes in Rome and the particular relationship they posit between Dorothea's regret, individual responsibility, and the legacies of Romanticism. In Lowick, Dorothea encounters this problem, quite literally, in miniature. Her companionship with the miniature “[helps] to concentrate her feelings” not only about her own marriage but also the disinheritance of Aunt Julia (349).Footnote 102 The question of “inheritance” is for Dorothea a matter “of responsibility—the fulfilment of claims founded on our own deeds, such as marriage and parentage” (349). In contrast to the discontinuity experienced in Rome between her marital regret, art, history, and responsibility, the contemplation of the miniature allows Dorothea to connect her subjective feelings of sympathy and regret with an aesthetic object. The miniature carries within it the history of innumerable, discrete acts (both voluntary and involuntary) whose unforeseen effects ripple into the present and in which Dorothea's agency poses practical immediacy. The regret that she feels over her marriage is now neither cut off from the totality of history nor merely mirrored in another woman's bad marriage, but participates in the structure of “inheritance” as the ever-evolving web of past and present actions from whose debts none are exempted.
While the bedroom and miniature of Aunt Julia catalyze Dorothea's evolving interiority, her meditation on responsibility and inheritance appears to unfold in a manner that is (much like her reveries) cut off from those around her. The narrator informs us that while “Dorothea's mind was innocently at work” thinking about these matters (348), Casaubon was writing a letter to Will instructing him not to stay in Middlemarch. The sense of responsibility toward Aunt Julia's disinheritance and Dorothea's intervention on Will's behalf only intensifies Casaubon's jealousy and, as his codicil later makes evident, introduces yet another act into the world with regrettable consequences. Just as the earlier scene transitions from reverie to narrative action only to be blocked, contemplation of the miniature fails to mediate the movement between personal history (her regrettable marriage) and public history (inheritance). This failure, I would argue, calls into question the very strategy that Kant himself pursued in the Critique of Judgment, where aesthetic judgment plays a mediating role between the realms of freedom and nature in order to explain how the autonomy of reason “actualize[s]” itself in the sensible world.Footnote 103
The penultimate window scene at Lowick makes the critique of this Kantian resolution more explicit. After Casaubon hears of his fatal heart ailment and behaves coldly, Dorothea retreats to her boudoir and sits looking but not seeing the avenue of lime trees through the open window. Whereas the earlier scene of lyric self-confession describes the apostrophic utterance as spoken aloud by Dorothea, in this passage Eliot uses indirect discourse in order to substitute speech with what Adela Pinch describes as “a non-voicing that gets cast as thinking.”Footnote 104
“What have I done—what am I—that he should treat me so? He never knows what is in my mind—he never cares. What is the use of anything that I do? He wishes he had never married me.” She began to hear herself, and was checked into stillness. (399)
Unlike the first scene with the miniature, Dorothea here announces to herself the exact substance of her regret. And it is not a miniature or imagined other who overhears her now but herself. Dorothea comes to self-knowledge through her encounter with the miniature that she initially found “difficult to interpret”—an aesthetic object that became an interpretable sign of her regret. Whereas in the initial scene with the miniature she looks out onto the landscape and finds the paths where she expected to walk in “communion” with Casaubon “difficult to see” (257), she now clearly “saw as in one glance all the paths of her young hope which she should never find again” (399). Much as in the previous scene with the miniature, the moment of accelerated self-awareness yields to narrative sequence and propulsive action in which Dorothea's “shadowy monitor” disrupts her regretful reverie with “sad remonstrance,” thus impelling her to subdue her pain and walk out of her room looking for Casaubon (400).
Yet if the miniature mediates Dorothea's self-knowledge, it also instantiates the classic paradox associated with Romantic lyric subjectivity, both catalyzing a desire to act in the world and yet foreclosing the capacity to actuate such desire. Eliot repeatedly uses the phrase “turning to marble” or “changing to marble” as a way to link the ekphrastic lyric moment in the Vatican to moments of separation between Will and Dorothea (511, 729). These associations find further purchase in the failure of the miniature to carry meaning outside of Dorothea's private contemplation of it. When Dorothea offers Will the miniature of his grandmother, he rejects it and fails to read her gesture as a token of herself, his rightful inheritance, and her connectedness and responsibility to him. “It is not very consoling to have one's own likeness. It would be more consoling if others wanted to have it” (511). Indeed, for Dorothea his likeness has been consoling—both because it mediates her hearing herself and her love for him. Yet as an emblem of lyric interiority, of a thinking to herself that is also a thinking of him, the miniature remains a thing “difficult to interpret” insofar as it yields no shared meaning. This failure of the miniature to communicate to Will her feelings on his inheritance is rendered a problem of genre—lyric interiority remains self-enclosed, producing signs of feeling that, if read by others, are misread. “Something was keeping their minds aloof, and each was left to conjecture what was in the other.” To understand her feelings on the history of his inheritance, the narrator notes, “would have required a narrative” (512). The shift from lyric interiority to narrative represents a pattern whose end result is to incite its repetition.
The final bedroom scene at Lowick, however, breaks from this pattern. Feeling betrayed by Will, Dorothea utters aloud yet another apostrophe: “Oh, I did love him!” (739). Unlike previous instances, this apostrophe is followed by a renunciation of Will as a “lost belief which she had planted and kept alive from a very little seed since the days in Rome.” Dorothea's lost belief represents more than romantic promise since erotic desire in Rome was articulated within a broader framework regarding the relationship between private experience, history, and moral duty. The final bedroom scene casts this fraught relationship as a Kantian inheritance, which Eliot signals to readers through the chapter's epigraph from Wordsworth's “Ode to Duty.” Adam Potkay notes that Wordsworth's ethical reflections in the poem were partly informed by Kant's theory of moral duty and freedom as ruled by reason rather than desire or sentiment. The speaker of Wordsworth's ode laments the force of “chance desires” and asks duty, that “Stern lawgiver” (737), to train their force.Footnote 105 Invoking Wordsworth's stern lawgiver in the epigraph, Eliot revisits the Kantian antinomy between desire and moral duty only to rebuke its model of autonomy and give preference to the moral theory that Kant opposed: Humean sympathy. Disillusionment with Will and the “belief” planted in Rome inaugurates “a new condition” in which Dorothea “felt as if her soul had been liberated from its terrible conflict, she was no longer wrestling with her grief, but could sit down with it as a lasting companion” (740). In her new condition, Dorothea no longer greets her experience of sympathy and endless responsibility toward others as a burden but as a “companion” in a moral life wherein none, as Williams states, is purified of blame.
This shift in ethical attitude also introduces a break from the lyric/narrative dichotomy seen in previous scenes and jettisons any reference to the Coleridgean landscape. Dorothea does not “sit in the narrow cell of her calamity,” like Mill's lyric poet; instead, her contemplation of Will and Rosamond orients her consciousness outward. “Was she alone in that scene? Was it her event only? She forced herself to think of it as bound up with another woman's life” (740). Her “vivid sympathetic experience” is not the source of paralyzing impotence but “a power” that, “instead of driving her back from effort,” propels her to be “more helpful” (741). “What should I do—how should I act . . . ?” The latter model of deliberative, voluntarist agency embraces the involuntary. When she opens the curtains and observes a man, woman, and baby on the road, Dorothea recognizes her participation in “that involuntary, palpitating life” and does not regard her role in its interconnected web as “a mere spectator” (741). This web is not what entangles the self-sufficient, autonomous agent in limitless regret for the uncontrollable consequences of her acts, whether voluntary or involuntary, but what Arendt terms “the very condition of plurality”—a plurality grounded in intersubjective relations and built on the twin faculties of promising and forgiveness.Footnote 106 Similarly, Dorothea's acceptance of plurality signals a shift in her ethical response as Eliot charts her progress from anger toward Will and Rosamond to an experience of sympathy that later results in a visit to Rosamond in which she encourages her to “forgive” Lydgate just as she forgives them (746). Rather than retreating with impotence and regret into an Arnoldian shade, she embraces the uncertain experience of belonging to a world in which “promises may not be kept” yet wherein she can extend forgiveness to others and perform the nearest good (779).
Given the foregoing reading, it is tempting to conclude that the final bedroom scene somehow resolves the problem of regret and responsibility, but that is not entirely the case. As I have argued in this essay, regret affectively registers a post-Enlightenment problem in which agent autonomy cannot delimit responsibility in a causal world wherein any act's ends are indeterminate and irreversible. Insofar as the final bedroom scene retreats from ideals of autonomy (and the generic conflict through which it is expressed), it casts limitless responsibility as an aspect of freedom and our general moral condition rather than something that incites impotence and passive forms of suffering. Hence, the “luck” that produced the determining circumstances of Dorothea's life, like that of others, constitutes the limit and the condition of possibility of her freedom. Her agency and actions are bound up in a web of relations beyond her control, yet this absence of control does not shield her either from responsibility or from the judgment of other characters and readers. Such embeddedness and unpredictability mark the substance of ethical experience rather than an impurity whose stain agents could ever escape. As in a proto-Hegelian, “expressivist” model of agency, Eliot takes as a given that freedom unfolds in a “pre-volitional context,” and a concept of freedom that excludes elements that exceed agential causation or in which agents are not required to account for their actions would be incoherent.Footnote 107 Individual acts of willing, intersubjective dependence, and elements of determinism (whether biological, social, or ideological) need not be pitted against one another.
Middlemarch’s reappraisal of freedom as something other than autonomy also does not mean that feelings of regret disappear from Dorothea's life, though its tenor alters. Readers of Middlemarch anticipate from its outset that Dorothea's desire for an “epic life” will be “ill-matched with the meanness of opportunity” (3), that her life will end in disappointment, if not regret. Such a prediction seems confirmed by her marriage to Will. But while the role of “wifely help” in Will's social activism represents the only and limited path that combines Dorothea's fervent “emotion” with “beneficent activity,” it is a path that she “never repented” even though she never stops “feeling that there was always something better which she might have done, if she had been better and known better” (782–83). Dorothea accepts, without repenting her choices and wishing she had done otherwise, a life that she regrettably feels may have included “better” choices were it not for the exigent forces of the involuntary—the luck of ignorance, history, and disposition. Leibniz's God may be able to compare and then choose “the best of all possible worlds,”Footnote 108 but for Dorothea and the rest of us there is only one possible world—the one into which we are thrown. Yet if the novel ends with its principal protagonist embracing, on one hand, an open-ended responsibility and, on the other hand, acceding to the limits imposed on her will by various forms of luck, such assent is the basis of another reward. Insofar as epic represents the “constant unfolding of far-resonant action” (3), a world in which all acts (even our regrettable mistakes) reverberate grants Dorothea what she always wanted: an epic life.
