Who is a Turk? In the last decade scholars of various disciplinary backgrounds explored this question by turning their attention to the formative years of the Republic of Turkey. Who decided what a Turk was? How could one become a Turk? Which groups remained outside the boundaries of Turkhood and why? Historians, political scientists, lawyers, anthropologists, and sociologists investigated a variety of primary sources and used multiple theories and comparative perspectives to address this deceivingly simple question whose answer continues to politically divide people in contemporary Turkey and beyond.
With Yeşim Bayar's Formation of the Turkish Nation-State, 1920–1938 we have a new and welcome addition to this emerging subfield. As a sociologist, Bayar is interested in the ways in which “the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic” formulated the main constitutive elements of nationhood and the reasons why they situated different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups within the nation. Bayar is attentive to the shifts that took place over time in the rules of belonging; for concrete political reasons the 1920s were different from the 1930s, especially with regard to the Kurds’ place within the normative construction of Turkishness. Her main historical actors are the political elite—the members of the Turkish Parliament—as well as influential journalists. While parliamentary deliberations compose the majority of her primary sources, she also consults the press and the memoirs of vocal public figures.
In this well-organized book, the author is after an “eventful analysis of nationness and nationalism” (p. 10), a phrase Bayar borrows from Roger Brubaker, which is a concise summary of her emphasis on the process of nation formation. She picks three key domains—language, education, and citizenship, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively—and investigates how cultural elements were picked up, discussed, and politicized as they entered the political domain. From a theoretical point of view, Bayar situates her book within nationalism studies, which she says have long ignored the Turkish case. In the debate between the ethnosymbolist and modernist approaches to nation formation, she is critical of both but remains closer to the former (which pays attention to continuity and selective appropriation of premodern roots) than to the latter which, as Bayar maintains, frequently ignore or underestimate the role of ideas and ideology. Bayar's intervention to the ethnosymbolist strand of nationalism studies is her demonstration of how ethnicity's positioning within the rules of belonging could shift even from one decade to the other, making it impossible to see every nation-building project as an “ethnic project” as such (p. 11).
If there is one thing on which all of us who study the early Turkish Republic agree, it is the fact that Islam was the necessary (though not sufficient) requirement for a group to be considered Turk or Turkifiable. While Ottoman Christians remained outside the contours of proper Turkhood (this, even though they too had been the targets of some formal assimilationist policies), Ottoman Jews occupied a liminal space whereby they were perceived to be more Turkifiable than Armenians and Greeks but not as Turkifiable as any other Muslim group. The field is also in consensus about the sociopolitical legacies that the Ottoman Empire bequeathed to modern Turkey that, more than anything else, strove to be new. It is at this juncture that Bayar's book makes its most important contribution. She shows, in the context of all three key domains on which she concentrates, how not just history as such but the ways in which the political actors interpreted their collective past mattered in the present, as those with decision-making power devised, justified, and implemented policies regarding who deserved to be a Turk, and who did not.
While a number of scholars, including this reviewer, previously noted how the victorious, though vulnerable Turkish political elite's perception of their Ottoman past impacted their policies in the early Turkish Republic, Bayar is the first to systematically explore and comprehensively present this history-aware aspect of Turkish nation formation. Throughout the book, the author shows multiple examples of how homogenizing policies were justified with reference to “not repeating Ottoman mistakes” such as their “reckless tolerance” for language pluralism (p. 60) or minimally supervised minority schools (p. 78). Bayar also brings a new interpretation to the whole debate by highlighting, for the first time in the literature, how there were two largely conflicting narratives about the Ottoman Empire. While a laudatory narrative (of Ottomans having done everything right but then being stabbed in the back by ungrateful non-Turks) was circulated mainly for international audiences, a critical narrative was circulated for the domestic audience. According to this narrative of failure, Ottoman rulers were blamed for all evil, such as unnecessary tolerance, religious conservatism, and susceptibility to external influences, processes that had brought about the demise of the Ottoman order. Unfortunately, this rather shrewd diagnosis of Bayar's comes in the middle of the book (p. 101) and one only wishes that she explored it further and turned it into a larger argument.
With regards to the weakness of the book, the second chapter, which provides a general overview of the Ottoman Empire, stands out. While it is commendable that one full chapter is devoted to this “prehistory,” the summary is outdated, somewhat caricaturized, includes mistakes, and fails to engage not only with the most recent Ottoman historians, but also with the works of historical sociologists of the empire (such as Karen Barkey and Fatma Müge Göçek), who studied the Ottoman government's management of difference which would become such an important point of reference for early Turkish Republican ruling cadres.
Throughout the book Bayar shows or mentions how Armenians were the ultimate others of the Turkhood in the making. But the book does not pay enough attention to the reasons why this was the case. If one is not already fully familiar with what Bayar refers to as “the massacres of 1915” (p. 30) and the transfer of property from Armenians to the Muslim population and state (a fact gone unnoted by Bayar), one cannot fully understand why, despite their negligible numbers, Armenians remained so central to the construction of modern Turkhood. Bayar does seem to think that “wiping out [of] almost entire Armenian community” (p. 30) does constitute genocide (he quotes Ronald Suny's words about the event where he talks about it as genocide, p. 31) but does not elaborate on the reasons why and how this genocidal legacy influenced Turkish political elites’ decisions in the postgenocide era regarding Turkhood and its limits.
Finally, it is unfortunate that Bayar did not engage more directly with the literature on early Turkish Republic. The book would have been even stronger had she made connections with the works of Marc Baer, Başak İnce, Derya Bayır, Alexis Alexandris, Corry Gudstat, and İrini Sarioglu, just to name a few of the significant people in the field whose works are missing in the book.
In the final analysis, however, this is an important work that adds to our understanding of the early Turkish Republic and the Turkish identity as formulated in Ankara in the 1920s and 30s. It will be useful to those studying nation building, nation formation, and nationalism both in the Middle East and outside of it. Each chapter—focusing on language, education, and citizenship—has its own separate literatures to which Bayar's addition of the Turkish case is most effective.
The year 2015 was a heavy year for Ottoman and Turkish studies as we have busied ourselves with intellectually commemorating the centenary of the Armenian genocide. In eight years, when we will mark the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, Yeşim Bayar's voice will be an important one. One hopes that by 2023 our cumulative effort will have paid off, and we will have finally come to more satisfactory answers as to not just the question of who a Turk was (or has been) but also to the question of why s/he had to be a Muslim.
