Eagleton-Pierce, a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, brings postmodernist analysis to WTO studies. His book applies semiotics – the study of signs and symbols, and, in this case, language and meaning – to the nature of discourse at the WTO, where the manipulation of language is used to create ‘symbolic power’. Typically, dominant (hegemonic) actors at the WTO, principally the United States and European Union, wield and reinforce their symbolic power, thereby controlling the trade agenda and negotiations. However, heterodox forces, represented by certain coalitions of developing countries, have at times succeeded in altering the framework of trade debates, and thereby the ‘orthodoxy’ of multilateral trade liberalization. The author illustrates the battle over symbolic power with two examples: the West African ‘Cotton-4’ debate that erupted at the Cancun Ministerial, and the evolution of agricultural ‘special product’ exemptions for developing countries in the Doha negotiations.
The study draws its inspiration from the philosopher Michel Foucauld, who theorized about the pervasiveness of power through processes of socialization and acceptance, and more directly from the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who applied these concepts to power relations in political and social life. In particular, this theory of power regards linguistic constructions as ‘instruments of communications, political domination and, potentially, resistance’ (p. 49). Dominant players gain symbolic power from the way they shape and reinforce the notion of ‘common sense’ that prevails in organizations such as the WTO; for example, the notion that trade liberalization is inherently good. In subtle ways, language imposes methods of classification (through trade rules), defines struggles between orthodox and heterodox opinions (that is, between those who support and those who oppose accepted WTO trade liberalization mantras), and establishes the social valuation of forums and speakers (based on the support the speaker enjoys among WTO members and the institutional platform used to communicate). Symbolic power creates a system of ‘doxic’ relationships between dominant and subjugated players in which everyone – initially, even the subjugated – takes their legitimacy for granted, as a self-evident ‘truth’. It thus also works together with the traditional notion of compulsory power (the ability to coerce or bully others) and institutional power, as represented by the established rules, practices, and processes of the organization. In order for the subjugated players, tentatively identified by Eagleton-Pierce as certain coalitions of developing countries on particular issues, to defend and pursue their own interests within the organization, they must first recognize the current social order for what it is. They must then organize and build a counterforce to the current ‘doxa,’ thereby creating their own symbolic power. One can expect, at the same time, a symbolic power counterattack from the dominant players, who seek to protect the status quo.
Stepping back for a moment from the epic historical struggle implied by this theoretical framework, this reviewer believes that an examination of language and its role in the WTO is a potentially valuable avenue of inquiry, particularly in light of the experience of the Doha Round negotiations. While there are many competing theories regarding the causes of the round's suspension, there appeared to be a notable, and perhaps paralyzing, lack of agreement on basic terminology. For example, the official designation of the Doha ‘development’ agenda (DDA) evidently meant different things to developed, as opposed to developing, countries. At the risk of overgeneralization, one observes the received wisdom among developed countries and most trade economists to be that trade liberalization itself was a valuable and supportive component of development. Many developing countries, in contrast, regarded the DDA as a signal that development priorities, as defined by developing countries themselves, would override trade liberalization proposals. Domestic ‘policy space’ for development, another contentious term, thereby often displaced domestic market opening. Consequently, the development divide led to conflicting expectations regarding ‘reciprocity’ and ‘special and differential treatment’ in bargaining. It was difficult, in particular, for many countries to find common ground on how to bargain over agriculture, due to differing conceptions of the meaning of ‘food security’ to their agricultural sectors and their economies.
Eagleton-Pierce does take up some of these issues, but the limitation of his approach lies in the dialectical nature of his methodology. Symbolic power typically involves a conflict between haves and have-nots, and any progressive reforms require the dominated players to subvert the current ‘doxa’ in order to make way for their own symbolic power. The dominant players in the WTO, for example, have established their own definitions of such terms as ‘reciprocity’ and ‘special and differential’ treatment, shaped by years of diplomatic practice in negotiating environments controlled by the dominant players. In practice, these terms have come, according to the author, to serve the negotiating interests of the dominant players, and have thereby become a supporting component of their symbolic power. The WTO goal of removing trade-distorting subsidies is also suspect in this regard. In the Cotton-4 example, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad introduced a sectoral initiative at the WTO, ‘Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton’ (WTO, 2003), with two main points. First, the claim was that these four African countries were in fact internationally competitive in cotton, and they therefore demanded that the US and other countries eliminate distorting subsidies that unfairly undermined the world price of cotton. In addition, their original claim also asked for financial compensation to offset their lost income caused by rich countries' subsidies (ibid.). Eagleton-Pierce identifies the C-4's international competitiveness argument as ‘orthodox’ and the compensation claim as ‘heterodox’. As an orthodox argument, the C-4 were engaging in what he calls ‘mimicry’ (pp. 78–81), whereby the less privileged agent asserts a rule that is part of the dominant symbolic power. In this case, the C-4 were throwing the WTO's orthodoxy in the face of its privileged masters. The danger, in the context of the larger struggle over symbolic power, is that such a strategy risks creating a contradiction between the goal of undermining such rules and gaining a tactical victory under the same rules. It also drew attention away from the heterodox compensation claim, unacceptable under WTO negotiating practice, which, if successful, would have subverted the current system and shifted symbolic power toward the subjugated countries.
It should not be surprising that the C-4's international competitiveness argument resonated with most WTO members, both developed and developing, and that this was the basis for subsequently including the sub-committee on cotton in the Doha negotiations. What appears in the light of symbolic power analysis to be a dangerous use of orthodox argumentation seemed to most WTO observers to be simply a good, and in fact remarkable, strategy for four least-developed countries (LDCs) to get their issue on the negotiating agenda. This point was reinforced by the C-4's eventual removal of the heterodox compensation claim, which had no chance to enter the negotiations, as they agreed to technical assistance instead. What is most curious in Eagleton-Pierce's analysis of the cotton controversy is his relegation of the Upland Cotton dispute settlement case (WTO, 2004) to the dustbin of orthodoxy. In this case, Brazil successfully challenged a number of US cotton subsidies; evidently, the symbolic power of privileged agents in the WTO does not prevent them from losing DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) cases to developing countries. The best outcome for the C-4 would have been a multilateralized implementation of the remedy: to reduce the global trade-distorting aspects of US cotton subsidies. However, the US came into only partial compliance with the decision, and eventually avoided authorized Brazilian retaliation by offering $147 in annual ‘technical assistance’ payments (bribes) to Brazilian cotton growers. Yet for Eagleton-Pierce, this is merely another example of ineffectual WTO orthodoxy. An alternative to this view is that the full implementation of orthodox WTO rules and DSB rulings, coupled with orthodox multilateral trade liberalization, still holds the most promise for progress in securing gains from cotton trade for the C-4.
Regardless of its tendentious elements, does the analysis of symbolic power bring us any closer to understanding the WTO? Language certainly matters in the WTO, and the success of developing countries in introducing the notion of ‘strategic products’ in the Doha agricultural negotiations, analyzed in chapter 5, shows that new concepts and terms can have real effects in trade negotiations. Yet it is perhaps more accurate to observe that a shift in negotiating power drives the change in language, rather than to claim that the clever introduction of new language changes bargaining power. It is clear that bargaining power has shifted in the WTO, but in a consensus-based organization, a struggle to overthrow the institution's orthodoxy can only lead to gridlock, at least for the foreseeable future. One relevant dimension of power in the WTO that Eagleton-Pierce does not include is BATNA: the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (in the WTO). If WTO players find their orthodoxy undermined, they will take their trade negotiations elsewhere, a suboptimal outcome for both developed and developing countries. The challenge in the WTO is therefore to find common language on which to base future multilateral negotiations, rather than to fight wars of attrition over whose symbols will dominate.
