1 Introduction
Like a great boxed set thriller, just before the end of this book there is such a massive twist in the argument that you need to go back to the beginning and see the plot in a completely new light. So, spoiler alert.
Kevin Yuill seeks to set out a liberal humanist case against assisted suicide. As he notes, in the media the debates over assisted dying are often presented as ‘the liberals’ vs. ‘a small group of conservative Christian zealots’ (p. 3). These opponents of assisted suicide are also typically anti-abortion, linking the issues with a strong pro-life rhetoric. In this book he seeks to explain why one can oppose assisted suicide while holding on to one's liberal and humanist credentials, and while being avowedly pro-choice in the abortion debate.
Before moving on to his argument, it is notable that he emphasises its non-religious nature. That is made clear in his title, and by the fourth page he is outing himself as an atheist. It is, perhaps, revealing that someone wanting to make an argument which is linked with a religious perspective in the popular imagination feels the need to make it so clear they are not of faith. Further, it is interesting that despite his protestations, his arguments are full of what might be thought of as religious language: ‘sanctity of life’ (pp. 33ff.); ‘sin’ (p. 83); ‘the importance of judgement’ (p. 108); ‘the need for forgiveness’ (p. 108); and ‘the significance of soul’ (p. 128). I am not for a moment suggesting that Yuill has deceived us about his beliefs, but perhaps that religious arguments are not necessarily as utterly divorced from non-religious arguments as is sometimes proposed. That raises much bigger questions than can be entered into here.
Yuill explains that there are two key parts to his argument. First, he believes that the arguments made in favour of allowing assisted suicide are ‘deeply flawed’ (p. 6); second, that legalising assisted suicide would ‘undermine our common moral assumption and responsibilities’ (p. 6).
2 The weakness of the case in favour of reform
As to the first strand, he has several complaints about the arguments relied upon by those who support assisted suicide.
First, Yuill is critical of the weight placed on autonomy by supporters of reform. He argues that once we accept the autonomy argument in favour of assisted suicide we should allow anyone that right, and not just those who are terminally ill. Autonomy supporters, he suggests, should allow that right to the 907 followers of Jim Jones who killed themselves in Jonestown Guyana. He summarises his lengthy discussion on autonomy:
‘The most important undermining factor of the autonomy argument for assisted suicide is inconsistency. Not one genuine justification for providing autonomy for some and not for others has or can be made. … If assisted suicide was really a right, it should surely be accorded to all. If we reject laws against assisted suicide as paternalistic, we should also reject laws preventing assisted suicide for all as paternalistic.’ (p. 57)
This is an extraordinary passage. The argument he is making is well known and has been made many times before, perhaps most powerfully by John Keown (Reference Keown2002). To claim that no justification ‘has’ been made for why restrictions on exercises of autonomy in this context might be appropriate seems clearly wrong. The arguments that might be made are explored over several pages in my textbook Medical Law and Ethics (2012, pp. 515–517) and discussed in many articles (see, e.g., Lillehammer, Reference Lillehammer2002). It may be that these attempts do not persuade Yuill, but it would be better to explain why, rather than suggesting they have not been made.
There is a broader point, and that is that Yuill, who is an academic historian, refers to very little of the academic legal commentary. Why no Hazel Biggs, Emily Jackson, Richard Huxtable, David Price, etc.? There are many issues raised in this book that could have benefited from the academic analysis that these and other academic lawyers have written. This is not a complaint about the footnotes being too short; it is that the analysis in this book would be deeper and more considered if it dealt with the sophisticated analysis others have offered on these issues. To take another example, Yuill's argument that autonomy supporters would allow the Jim Jones followers the right to commit suicide rests on a, to put it politely, particular view of autonomy. His analysis would have greatly benefited from discussion of the literature on what autonomy means.
Second, Yuill argues that the current law is not really problematic. He claims ‘there has not been one successful prosecution of an assisted suicide since the Suicide Act of 1961 was passed’ (p. 6). That is simply untrue.Footnote 1 But, let us accept that the number of instances of assisted suicide which are prosecuted is small. This is where the liberal side of Yuill's argument comes in. If we legalise assisted suicide, then a practice which is currently carried out informally will come under the scrutiny of the state. He writes:
‘Whereas much of the assisted suicide lobby sees itself as liberatory, ridding citizens of pointless laws based on outmoded moral systems that prevent individuals from doing what they wish, they in reality for government assistance … and further regulation of a sphere formerly administered privately’ (p. 53).
Legalising assisted suicide allows doctors to ‘colonize our most intimate thoughts and influence what should be the most personal decision ever made’ (p. 129). I do not see that. Legalising assisted suicide would not prevent people committing suicide on their own or with their families, if they so wished and were able. The ‘colonisation’ only works in the very few cases where a person seeks the assistance of a professional. He is greatly exaggerating the potential impact of legalising assisted suicide.
He has a further concern with the arguments for legalisation, and that is that ‘legalizing assisted suicide would undermine the important freedom to refuse medical treatment’ (p. 129). The argument is that if we accept the idea that we must vet the decisions of those who seek assistance in suicide before permitting them assisted dying, we will start to do the same for people who refuse treatment. He refers to Local Authority v. E,Footnote 2 in which Jackson J concluded that a woman suffering from anorexia lacked capacity to refuse treatment. On this case Yuill writes: ‘Inviting the courts to judge the reasons for wishing to die is an intolerable intrusion into what should be a private affair.’ While the case is problematic, it seems extraordinary to suggest a judge should not assess the capacity of a person who wishes to die. Should we really respect the wishes of those who say they wish to die, without any investigation of whether they have the capacity and understanding necessary to make such a decision? Yuill does not really believe that. Indeed, he later supports intervention to stop the person ‘teetering on the bridge’ from jumping off (p. 144), because he may not really want to die (‘Why otherwise does he teeter?’ (p. 144)). If that is legitimate, why must we accept the statement from E that she wishes to die, without some exploration and assessment of it?
Third, he relies on a ‘secular’ understanding of sanctity of life to complain that if assisted suicide is only permitted for those suffering certain conditions then the law will be deeming them to be suffering ‘inferior lives’ (p. 39). Again this is an issue much discussed in the legal literature, but Yuill does not address it in any depth.
Finally, he makes the point that very few people actually take up the option of assisted suicide, even where it is legally available. Indeed, he suggests that support of assisted suicide involves ‘a projection of fears and anxieties of the living onto the dying’ (p. 6). I am not sure there is much in this point. Even if only a few people actually use assisted suicide, that is not itself a reason against its being lawful. Few people want to run an Ironman Race, but that does not mean they should not be allowed to do so. What it does, however, suggest is that talk of people wanting to control the manner and time of their death as a central aspect of their life story may not be entirely accurate.
3 The undermining of common moral assumptions and responsibilities
Yuill believes that legalising assisted suicide challenges the moral connections, assumptions and meanings on which we base our relationships with others and our world (p. 6). How so? His argument rests on a remarkable suggestion:
‘Should assisted suicide be institutionalized, we are asked not simply to tolerate the actions of a few unfortunate individuals but to affirm them. This is what legalization means.’ (p. 20)
‘Either we approve of the act of suicide on the basis that the individual's wishes automatically confer moral approval on the act, or we are neutral and the life and death of another individual means nothing to us.’ (p. 84)
At first, this looks like a suggestion that if the law permits something, it therefore approves of it. That is such a basic error (adultery is lawful but not approved of by the law, etc.) he cannot mean that. He is making a more subtle argument: that by legalising assisted suicide it is put ‘beyond moral judgement’ (p. 20). But why should that be? The fact that abortion is lawful hardly puts that beyond moral judgment. Placing his argument in the context of the voluminous literature on the links between morality and law would have clarified the point he is making.
Yuill is adamant that suicide is a moral issue: indeed he thinks it is ‘best viewed as a sin, as a breach of the moral norm’ (p. 83). As it is a ‘deliberate, dramatic action of the highest import’, it is ‘something we must judge as either right or wrong’ (p. 83). He explains that he views some suicides as ‘right and even noble’. Then, in a key passage, he elaborates: ‘Legalizing assisted suicide is wrong because suicide should be an individual decision in order to assign responsibility, because it robs the purposeful ending of a life of its dramatic power and shields such an act from judgement’ (p. 83). I agree completely that suicide is a moral issue (does anyone not?), but cannot see how legalising it robs people of the power to exercise moral judgement. Ferocious debates can be found in the media on the morality of abortion; tax avoidance; same-sex sexual behaviour. The legality of this behaviour has hardly stifled the debate.
It may be that it is the expressive meaning of suicide which concerns Yuill. For he argues: ‘Legalising assisted suicide reduces suicide to a medical choice. What should be profound and meaningful, the most human of human actions, loses its meaning. The question of whether “to be or not to be” becomes a medical rather than a moral question’ (p. 84). Yet legalising assisted suicide does not prevent someone from making ‘the dramatic gesture’ of suicide, should they so wish. He is keen to allow suicide to be ‘inspirational, transcendent and the most beautiful and awe-inspiring act’ (p. 110). I see no reason that legalising suicide would prevent people from killing themselves in dramatic gestures, nor any way in which it would rob those gestures of any meaning.
4 The shocking proposal
So now we move to the twist in the tale, and maybe you have seen it coming. Rather than legalising assisted suicide, we should ‘make deadly drugs available to the public, albeit with warnings about what ingesting them will do and perhaps even a waiting period’ (p. 142). People would be free to pass these drugs on to those who want them without fear of prosecution. People will then be free to make their ‘dramatic choices’ for themselves, without state intrusion and leaving room for moral judgement, Yuill believes.
This suggestion reveals what is, to me, the major failure in this book. That is the complete failure to put suicide in its context. Surely key questions for anyone writing on this area must be: Who are the people who attempt suicide? As far as we can tell, what is motivating them? Yuill does describe three suicides in some detail: Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire as a protest against government action; Thich Quang Du, a Buddhist monk who in 1963 gained international recognition after setting himself on fire in a political protest; and Arthur Friedman, who committed suicide in prison so that his son would not face humiliation at his trial. While these are examples of the kind of dramatic statements which Yuill is clearly keen to enable people to express, they are hardly representative of those who seek suicide.
Rarely is suicide the ‘deliberate, dramatic action of the highest import’ (p. 110) that Yuill writes about. There are substantial data available on suicide. Take one example. According to a leading research team at the University of Washington (Mental Health Reporting, 2013), 90 per cent of those who die from suicide have a diagnosable mental disorder. Surveying data from around the world they suggest that 2–15 per cent of those diagnosed with a major depression die by suicide; 3–20 per cent of those with bipolar disorder do; and 6–15 per cent of those with schizophrenia. Those are the statistics for suicide; the ones for attempted suicide would no doubt be higher. Certainly, the links between mental illness and suicide are complex and there is no room to explore them here. There is further a substantial literature on bullying, abuse and suicide which would need to be looked at. None of this is mentioned by Yuill (save a most casual reference to depression at p. 111). Suicide is only exceptionally some grand moral statement: most often it is marked by despair, loneliness or exhaustion.
How can anyone write a book on suicide in which the index includes no reference to depression, schizophrenia or mental illness, no reference to teenage suicide and bullying, no discussion of gender and suicide? The answer lies in how the issue is presented in the media and, sadly, much of the legal literature. The cases of suicide that make the headlines and grab the attention of lawyers are the very rare cases of those with terminal illness. They are not and must not be presented as the normal typical case of a person assisting suicide. No one looking at the actual context of real cases involving suicidal wishes would start with the language of autonomy, self-determination and rights to die of the kind that dominate so much of the academic discourse. Yuill's suggestion that suicides need to be left to have their ‘inner dialogue undisturbed’ (p. 150) is chilling for those familiar with the impact of mental disorder. The links between understandings of autonomy and mental illness are complex, but they must at least be discussed.
Even more extraordinary is Yuill's utter failure to consider whether making deadly drugs more available would impact on the suicide rate and use by those lacking capacity. There is a brief reference to one 2001 study, which does not focus particularly on the availability of drugs. There is a huge amount of information available on the impact of increasing the availability of drugs (see, e.g., Ajdacic-Gross et al., Reference Ajdacic-Gross, Weiss, Ring, Hepp, Bopp, Gutzwiller and Rossler2008). But it is not mentioned in this book. I have never read a book which demonstrates more powerfully how absolutely essential it is to put legal and philosophical arguments in context.
5 Conclusion
There is an excellent book to be written presenting a liberal humanist objection to assisted suicide. Sadly this is not it. Chapter 3 on the origins of the right to die movement is outstanding, and a valuable addition to the debates. The shocking proposal in the book provides a different route into this dilemma. When someone wants to commit suicide what should we do? Give them the equipment, Yuill suggests. Like Jonathan Swift's solution to the potato famine, his Modest Proposal points in a better direction.
