When someone says, “I’m good thank you!” usually in response to a polite “How are you?” but often as a way of refusing some request—“Would you like some more food?” or “Can I help you?” and the like—I am tempted to, and often do, reply, “That’s an interesting claim or hypothesis—how are we going to test it?”
A similar thought occurred to Amartya Sen. In his book The Idea of Justice he writes,
I am, of course, aware that modern transatlantic usage has drowned the distinction between “being good” as a moral quality and “being well” as a comment on a person’s health (no aches and pains, fine blood pressure, and so on), and I have long ceased worrying about the manifest immodesty of those of my friends who, when asked how they are reply with apparent self-praise, “I am very good.”Footnote 1
This article is about testing that hypothesis, taken literally: the hypothesis that someone is good, how such a claim might be tested, and what thinking about the exercise tells us about goodness and hence of course about how to increase goodness in the world and in people. In short, this article examines how to answer the question, what is moral enhancement?
Now we might try to test the hypothesis by asking the individual making the claim exactly what she had done that was so good and maybe, more sophisticatedly, how she knew she was good or that what she had done or achieved was good, and what entitled her to be so sure. She might of course claim to be existentially good, good in herself, perhaps because she was full of good intentions, replete with virtues or whatever. Why this is a less plausible or perhaps less testable sort of claim is a point to which we shall return. For the moment let us concentrate on good deeds.
The list of good things she might have done would probably be uncontroversial because there is significant consensus about the generic nature of good and bad deeds (preventing harm, ameliorating pain or suffering, saving lives, and curing the sick or their opposites), but just as “good reasons must of force give place to better,”Footnote 2 so likewise with good deeds. Even a good deed done might displace a better deed that might have been done. So even deeds that might seem good in themselves might not be good all things considered, might not be moral, because something better might have been (should have been) considered and done instead.
This is one important reason why strategies for moral enhancement of the sort proposed by Tom Douglas, Julian Savulescu, and Ingmar PerrsonFootnote 3, Footnote 4, Footnote 5 or, for example and from a rather different perspective, such as those proposed by Molly Crockett and othersFootnote 6, Footnote 7, Footnote 8 may be missing an important point. These strategies propose operating directly on the mainsprings of action, on emotions or other dispositions, and in particular they operate by cutting out or bypassing what they perceive as a dangerously paralyzing or dilatory process that might somehow get between an impulse and the moral action it impels. This sometimes, but not necessarily, dilatory process is thought or reflection.
I have suggested previously that in order to be as confident as we can be of the moral success of our deeds, we need to know, or rather believe, more than that these actions are well motivated. We need to know they are for the best, all things considered.
A philosopher notorious for trying to do away with moral philosophy and rely directly on feelings is Leon Kass, who, talking about cloning, says, “We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear.”Footnote 9 The problem that confronts Kass—and anyone who wishes to cut to the chase of morality so to speak by finding ways to decide or to act “immediately and without argument”—is to have a way of knowing when one’s sense of outrage, or one’s “feelings” or whatever, are evidence of something morally disturbing and when they are simply an expression of bare prejudice or simply an induced emotional response. George Orwell,Footnote 10 as I fondly recall, referred to this reliance on intuition or emotion as the use of “moral nose,” as if one could simply sniff a situation and smell or feel the rightness or wrongness. The problem is that nasal reasoning is notoriously unreliable and difficult to assess objectively, and olfactory ethics, despite being widely practiced, has never really taken off as an academic discipline.Footnote 11 Notwithstanding this lack of a theoretical base, olfactory moral philosophy has many contemporary adherents.
Kass, for example, in disarmingly admitting that revulsion “is not an argument,” seems to be implying the existence of some other way of determining that the revulsion is “rightfully” felt.Footnote 12 But how can he know this without having either evidence or argument to explain how the feelings are somehow “rightful”? The term “rightfully” implies a judgment or some other supporting evidence that confirms the veracity of the claim he is making. If it is simply one feeling confirming another, then we really are in the situation Wittgenstein lampooned as being like buying a second copy of the same newspaper to confirm the truth of what we read in the first.Footnote 13 As Wittgenstein, albeit emphasizing the obvious, insisted, “justification consists in appealing to something independent.”Footnote 14
Why Do We Need to Appeal to Something Independent?
As I have argued elsewhere,Footnote 15 someone who cares about doing the right thing, someone for whom the difference between right and wrong is important, will always want to ask him or herself if what feels right is right. They will want to assure themselves that insofar as it is in their power, they really are acting well or for the best all things considered, that what seems right is right. They will, in short, be interested in the crucial distinction emphasized by no less a reflective thinking being than Hamlet himself, in this famous riposte to his mother: “Seems, madam? Nay it is. I know not ‘seems.’”Footnote 16 The difference between what seems and what is in ethics can only be delivered by reasoning. In John Locke’s famous characterization of the proper use of the term “person” we see why.
We must consider what person stands for; which I think is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to me essential to it; it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.Footnote 17
What Do We Stand For?
When Locke speaks here of what “person stands for” he is talking, as he says, “forensically”; he is offering a considered description or definition. However, “person” stands for something in a different sense. We persons stand for a type of being that probably exists nowhere else in the universe, a being capable of reason and reflection and hence also capable of considering the nature and quality of his or her acts, motives, and emotions with the ability to choose whether or not to act on the results of that deliberative process, and a being capable therefore of developing a moral outlook. We persons stand for something important. First, we stand up to be counted as beings with free will and hence as beings with a choice and hence with responsibility for the choices we make and for their consequences. We are the sorts of beings that can and do determine not only our own fate but the fate of others, other persons and other creatures and the state of the world we inhabit. With this power comes responsibility, and with the ability to reason and reflect comes the opportunity and the imperative to act on the results of that reasoning and reflective process.
Our capacities thus enable us to distinguish between good and bad, and with the capacity to recognize these qualities come opportunities and responsibilities, to act to enhance the good and diminish the bad. Because of this we stand for decency and goodness; or rather we stand out as the only creatures so far identified who have any sense at all of decency and goodness, in short who have a morality properly so called.
These powers and capacities enable us to consider the differences between ourselves and other creatures and to ask ourselves about the extent to which such differences as we perceive them justify or necessitate differences in the concern, respect, and protection we accord to those others and demand for ourselves.
The results of this highly deliberative process have been the emergence, and constant reevaluation and refinement, of moral and political principles, including principles of human rights and of justice, and the development of social and political institutions embodying these. This long process of evolution and development has resulted in the emergence and flourishing of a system of personal and public morality. This system, whatever its evolutionary origins, is essentially and inherently deliberative and indeed depends, and has always depended, on a constant process of reason and reflection for its development, on adjustment and modification or reform for its continuation, and on all of these for whatever confidence people repose in it.Footnote 18
Nothing that today can pass for morality or moral principles or precepts can be isolated from reason and reflection on their adequacy, success, and effect. Moreover, as I have argued in brief previously, no one who claims to be acting morally or out of moral conviction or principle can resist accountability for what they claim to believe or do in the name of morality. And this means they must always be prepared to offer a reasoned defense and justification of their morality or elements of it. It would never be enough or indeed even respectable for the reply to be “I just felt like it.”Footnote 19
What Do We Need, or Need to Be Like, All Things Considered, to Consider All Things?
I suggested earlier that because even deeds acknowledged to be good, deeds that might seem good in themselves, might not be good all things considered, it will always be necessary for moral impulses to be subjected to reason and reflection (time and opportunity of course permitting). A moral agent will always want to consider all things, or at least (as the phrase implicitly means) all things that can reasonably be considered in the time and with the resources available. Moreover, in proportion to the importance of the decision, moral agents will also want to think retrospectively about how well they have responded to moral imperatives, or confronted moral dilemmas, not least so that they can refine, improve, and better understand what they value and believe.
The philosopher Tom Douglas, for example, says, “The distinctive feature of emotional moral enhancement is that, once the enhancement has been initiated, there is no further need for cognition: emotions are modified directly.”Footnote 20, Footnote 21 This so-called distinctive feature, so far from being an advantage of emotional moral enhancement, as conceived by Douglas, shows that this concept cannot be moral enhancement properly so called at all. What Douglas is saying is that once the enhancement has been initiated, it will produce consequences that are beyond moral review. Because the intervention that might have this automatic effect might be a long-lasting drug or an even more permanent intervention, it might well take the conduct of the affected individual beyond moral review and certainly out of the realm of things that might be right all things considered, because the intervention prevents consideration of any things, let alone of all things. I would submit that this is hardly an enhancement and certainly not one that has much to do with morality.
A related attempt to bypass reflection and judgment in pursuit of moral enhancement has been made by Molly J. Crockett and colleagues (hereafter Crockett) in two papers published recently.Footnote 22, Footnote 23 The second of these papers was a reply to a response by the present author and Sarah Chan.Footnote 24 Crockett’s paper raises some very important issues. Crockett says,
Unfortunately, their argument [Harris and Chan’s] is based on a narrow definition of moral judgment, one that is out of touch with empirical research. Harris and Chan seem to subscribe to a rationalist view of moral judgment that defines moral judgment as the exclusive preserve of a conscious, deliberative reasoning process. However, an overwhelming amount of evidence shows that intuitive and emotional processes play significant roles in moral judgment.
Now this is disingenuous. Judgment is normally distinguished from, for example, prejudice, gut reaction, emotional response, or other sorts of opinions or reactions that do not require some element of appraisal or indeed judging. The etymological root of the term “judgment” is in the process of the trying of a legal cause by a judge—in short, in a judicial process, a process that involves weighing evidence, hearing argument, and coming to a conclusion on the basis of all of these features and more. Now I do not want to be pedantic about this; arguments about definitions are usually sterile. What I think is clear, analytically and logically as well as in terms of normal English usage, is that judgment is essentially “considered,” as well as being, well . . . judgmental! Of course there are such things as snap judgments and the like, but terms like this are used to make clear that the usual processes of coming to a judgment, a reasoned and informed conclusion, have been bypassed.
“Judgment” is an ambiguous term, like almost any significant word in a natural language.Footnote 25 Its root and most comfortable meaning are in terms that signal the completion of a process of coming to judgment. However, there is another common usage that characterizes a judgment simply as a judgmental conclusion—approving or disapproving of conduct—without specifying the means by which this conclusion has been arrived at.
However all this may be, it seems clear that Crockett is confusing actions or decisions that have moral significance with moral judgments. That this is clear is evidenced by the last sentence quoted previously: “However, an overwhelming amount of evidence shows that intuitive and emotional processes play significant roles in moral judgment.” Maybe, but there is a huge difference between emotional processes playing even a “significant role” in moral judgment and their constituting or amounting to moral judgment. Prejudice may play a significant role in moral judgment, in that if one has strong prejudices, it may take a lot of will power to overcome them and come to the right conclusion all things considered, but this does not make it moral in the evaluative sense.
The mistake being made by Crockett is clearer in a later passage:
Considering whether serotonin affects moral behavior Harris and Chan claim “it does so adversely by impairing moral judgment, subjugating it to emotional instinct.” This statement falsely assumes that behavior guided by reason is morally superior to behavior motivated by emotional instincts. Emotions like empathy strongly predict helping behavior.
There are two distinct senses of moral superiority operating here. One means that behavior is morally superior if it leads to better outcomes in all the circumstances of the case. The other says that behavior is morally superior if it results from a moral judgment properly so called. Because what leads to the best outcome in all the circumstances of the case is often a matter of chance and in any event can only be established by the consideration of all things, moral enhancement can only consist in making the best moral judgment we can all things considered. It is not the case, then, that consideration guarantees the best outcome, nor that behavior guided by reason is necessarily “morally superior to behavior motivated by emotional instincts.” Rather it is the case that only behavior guided by reason can be best calculated, best judged, to have that effect.
Moral Agents and Moral Actions
There is a related distinction that can help here, and that is the distinction between doing good and acting morally, between judgments about things that are ethically significant and ethical judgments. Not all judgments about things that are ethically important are ethical judgments. To be an ethical judgment rather than simply a judgment about something of ethical importance, that judgment first has to be actually a judgment, not simply a pronouncement. A judgment moreover is a conclusion arrived at by a deliberative process, a process that involves the exercise of judgment. To count as a moral judgment, the deliberative process of which it is part has to include weighing alternatives from some justifiably moral perspective. For example the process has to involve consideration of alternatives from the perspective of the amount and quality of the good that might thereby be achieved, the rights that might thereby be protected, the justice that might thereby be done, or the suffering that might be mitigated or avoided or by the number of lives saved or lost.
Just as a moral judgment is more than a statement that has some moral relevance, an argument is more than a series of contradictory statements. I am reminded of the famous Monty Python argument sketch about whether an argument consists of more than just contradiction, and I am arguing with Crockett about whether a judgment consists of more that just a statement and a moral act more than just an act with good consequences. Here is a fragment of the Python argument about argument. In this sketch, a man responds to a notice offering arguments at a price:
Man: I came here for a good argument!
Arguer: Ah no you didn’t, you came here for an argument.
M: An argument isn’t just contradiction.
A: Well! It CAN be!
M: No it can’t.
M: An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition.
A: No it isn’t.
M: Yes it is! ’Tisn’t just contradiction.
A: Look if I “argue” with you, I must take up a contrary position!
M: Yes but it isn’t just saying “No it isn’t.”
A: Yes it is!
M: No it isn’t!Footnote 26
I think the consensus is that the man who paid for an argument in the Python sketch was being shortchanged (although the audience, of course, was not) and that just as an argument is more than just contradiction, a moral judgment is more than just a statement about something of moral relevance.
One Can Do Good Accidentally, but One Cannot Be Moral Accidentally
One can accidentally discover something of scientific importance, but one cannot be scientific, one cannot do science, accidentally. Doing science is a deliberative and disciplined process. It involves, for example, doing things like formulating and testing a hypothesis and looking for disconfirmatory evidence as well as for confirmatory evidence; it is not simply finding white swans but looking for black ones, and looking for black ones for the purpose of testing the hypothesis. Simply finding a black swan is not scientific behavior any more than finding a black swan necessarily tests the hypothesis that all swans are white, it is not necessarily even protoscientific behavior. The same goes analogously for moral behavior.
Being moral is like being scientific. Thus when Crockett says that it is false to assume “that behavior guided by reason is morally superior to behavior motivated by emotional instincts. Emotions like empathy strongly predict helping behavior,” the notion of moral behavior has been attenuated to a vanishing point. Indeed the idea that, tout court, behavior motivated by emotional instincts (even nice ones—I won’t say moral ones—like helping) has anything to do with moral behavior is simply not credible. Nor is even helping behavior necessarily moral either. We can help people to, and to do, many things, including into an early grave. Hamlet again:
Polonius [aside]: Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.—Will you walk out of the air, my lord?
Hamlet: Into my grave?
Polonius: Indeed, that’s out of the air.Footnote 27
Whether inviting someone to “walk out of the air” is remotely moral depends on the reasons and justifications for so doing, the rational calculation of the probable results and the context in which it is done.
So what does so-called prosocial behavior or emotional moral enhancement as characterized by, for example, Douglas and Savulescu and Perrson, have to do with morality?
It should now be clear that not all behavior, and not even all behavior that affects moral outcomes, is moral behavior, any more than all behavior that affects political outcomes is political behavior. The recent riots and looting in British cities clearly exhibits behavior with profound moral and political consequences, but to call it moral or political behavior is quite another thing. It could be both, but only if a particular, and a particularly complex and interesting, story accompanies the claim.
Let me be as clear as possible. I admire the science in Crockett; it is both interesting and significant. There are many important things to be learned from the effect of serotonin on behavior, on how people act and on what they do, and it may well also provide insights into the evolutionary origins of morality.Footnote 28 However, two claims in the Crockett account are unwarranted by the scientific evidence. The first is that their research has any relevance to moral behavior, moral conduct, moral agency, or moral enhancement, except negatively. By that I mean that if there is an effect on moral behavior due to the impact of serotonin, it is more likely to be negative rather than positive. It seems likely to affect moral behavior for the worse rather than for the better. The title of the Crockett original paper tells the story.Footnote 29 The second unsustained claim is that so-called prosocial behavior has necessarily a “pro” or favorable or good effect on social life or on respectful, benevolent, or moral relations between people. Certainly the engineering of such behavior cannot be trusted to have such effects and therefore is unlikely ever to be part of a rational program of moral enhancement.
What Is Harm?
In commenting that Sarah Chan and IFootnote 30 have misunderstood some fundamental points, they say, “Here, they misunderstand the definition of harm, which refers to personally and directly hurting others as opposed to general loss of lives. Although choosing the utilitarian option reduces overall lives lost, it nonetheless leaves the actor with greater personal responsibility for harming another.”Footnote 31 I respectfully suggest that there is no misunderstanding here. Sarah Chan and I were assuming harm is . . . well, what it is—harmful! It is difficult to believe that Crockett is seriously suggesting that “general loss of lives” is not harm. In what universe is the premature, avoidable, and unnecessary death of innocent individuals with valuable lives not a harm? Does anyone want a government, for example, that doesn’t care about preventable harm? Does anyone want legislators who are reckless about “general loss of lives” and who are only concerned with the personal and direct harm? Does Crockett believe that the NHS or any other pubic healthcare system is not concerned with preventing harm when it concerns itself with minimizing lives unnecessarily lost or foreshortened and tries to maximize overall benefit? And would Crockett not want to be defended by efficient defense forces? Do they really think that we want defense forces with reduced ability to do quite a lot of personal and direct hurting, or that such forces would be acting morally if they do so in order to protect lives and maximize good all things considered? These, admittedly somewhat rhetorical, questions I hope show why a narrow definition of harm is simply untenable. It is not a question even of different conceptions of harm; rather, what we find in the Crockett account is a partial conception of harm that is only coherent as a small part of the normal conception, which insists that to act morally is to weigh up the effects of one’s actions, all things being considered.
Prosocial Is Antisocial
Crockett most recently insists that “we deliberately avoided claiming that serotonin enhances or impairs moral judgment or that it makes people’s behavior more or less moral. Rather, we suggested that serotonin modulates prosocial sentiments, which, in turn, bias moral judgment and behavior in complex ways.”Footnote 32 I am not sure I understand what is now being claimed; it sounds a very modest and undirected hypothesis indeed. What is clear is that both the title and the substance of their earlier paper tell a clear story. The title is, it will be recalled, “Serotonin Selectively Influences Moral Judgment and Behavior through Effects on Harm Aversion,” and the clear implication of both the title and the substance of the paper is that serotonin increases harm aversion where the term “harm” “refers to personally and directly hurting others as opposed to general loss of lives.”
The previous rhetorical questions should be sufficient to show that even this claim is false for three unequivocal reasons:
1) The personal and direct hurting of others can, in a significant proportion of cases, be the only, or the most effective, way of saving lives and reducing suffering and harm overall. Sometimes the infliction of such “harm” on people (as in the case of emergency surgery, for example, which is sometimes carried out by amateurs without anesthetic) can save people’s lives and is the only morally and practically effective option. Thus reducing people’s ability to inflict such “harm,” separated from reflection and analysis of all the circumstances of the case, is not reliably either prosocial or moral in any way at all.
2) “General loss of lives” and the opposite, life saving and prevention of suffering, happen to real people (often but not always identifiable people) and cannot be relevantly distinguished from “personally and directly hurting others.” The distinction between personal and direct harm and “general loss of lives” or general suffering is at best unstable and normally totally illusory.Footnote 33
3) All developed societies have elaborate social institutions—healthcare systems, rescue services, social welfare services, defense forces, and other organizations—that depend in part on the ability of people to trade off direct personal harm to some, either for future benefits to those same peopleFootnote 34 or for simultaneous or future, greater benefits to others. Morality does not walk only one side of this street.
For all or any of these three reasons, there is no obviously reliable moral benefit in reducing the ability of humans to sometimes inflict personal and direct harm. Because such inhibition of the ability to harm where necessary can be disastrous, no sane person would adopt it as a method of moral enhancement.
This is why morality is rightly concerned with preventing or reducing harm all things considered and why any definition of harm must be concerned, inter alia, with general loss of life. Thus moral judgment is not about whether or not there is personal and direct hurting of others, which, as we have seen, is often not only not immoral but in fact morally required. Thus, far from utilizing a mistaken definition of harm, I am (and Sarah Chan and I were) using “harm” as a word in the English language. I hope that deploying words according to normal usage has not somehow become a mistake; if so I have missed the news, and I have certainly not seen any cogent argument to this effect.
But perhaps this may seem to be going too far. Some such reduction of willingness to inflict harm may well be of social benefit and may lead to moral benefit. John Coggon rightly pointed out to me that an analogy may be drawn with the legal system and the institution of laws: sometimes we place some fetters on people’s freedom to harm others (reduce their ability to harm) in order that a maximum of liberty can be enjoyed, thus overall maximizing people’s moral (and other) freedom—a clear moral benefit. If legally structured social systems are conducive to greater good, then it might seem that one should, ex ante, object no more to chemical or biological limits than to other limits to the causing of harm. Moreover, because I am on recordFootnote 35, Footnote 36 as arguing that chemical cognitive enhancement is no more problematic than education, I might also be guilty of inconsistency here.
Education, of course, because it is compulsory for children, is also problematic as far as freedom is concerned, but only if its liberating effects in terms of expanding horizons and widening choice are ignored. Most people rightly regard education as liberating, all things considered.
However, while providing powerful disincentives to conduct of particular sorts, laws (notoriously perhaps) do not usually prevent such conduct, although they may (we may hope) radically reduce its incidence. It is similar, in a way, with chemical cognitive enhancers. They are elective; we can take them if we want the assistance that they deliver, assistance with concentration, memory, alertness, and the like. But even then, once we have taken them, they leave us free to choose the mental tasks we undertake and hence free to employ them as we choose. This will of course also be true for chemical moral enhancers if and when they exist. However, here we are concerned with trying to influence whether they become available (or indeed mandatory) and whether, if available, it might be a good (literally) idea to take them.
Of course the law—broadly conceived to include police officers on street corners inhibiting conduct and “sleeping policemen” lying in the road, preventing excessive vehicle speed—and many other dimensions of legal control certainly do limit freedom. Drugs that operate on the emotions or more radical biological interventions that might change our emotional responses, as I have argued elsewhere,Footnote 37 do, once taken or implemented, potentially have dramatic implications for freedom of action, whereas chemical cognitive enhancers leave us free to choose the problems we wish to use them to consider. Emotional modulation is unlikely to leave us free to do what our intellect tells us is right if feelings of repugnance or emotional aversion are too strong to be routinely overridden. Indeed it is this freedom-limiting effect that is often regarded as a virtue by those advocating its use.Footnote 38 Of course titration of dose and other strategies may leave wiggle room, and we may have to wait and see what develops.
Here I am setting out some concerns that I believe need to be addressed before we contemplate radical interventions to achieve chemical or biological moral enhancement, and I am arguing that because morality is essentially deliberative, radical blocks or inhibiters to deliberation are inimical to moral agency. I am not of course against improving morality if possible. Most of my professional life has been aimed at least in part at this.
However, the freedom issues, if not beside the main point at issue here, are not central to it, important as they are. It's not so much that laws limit or do not limit freedom; rather it is that they target (mostly) the behavior we want to stop, unjustified violence for example, and, for the most part, where there is a good justification (self-defense, necessity, force majeure, etc.), the law is reasonably good at accommodating exceptions, justifications, or excuses. People still defend themselves against violent attack despite uncertainty, for example, about how the legal requirement of using only “reasonable force” will be interpreted. But if peoples’ emotions are modulated to the extent that they inevitably prioritize helping the people they can see and emotionally respond to, as opposed to those they can’t, those who are beyond the pale of their moral vision, or, if people are inhibited from using violence when to do so would prevent greater suffering, then so-called moral enhancement will cause immoral (or possibly amoral) rather than moral behavior.
When Crockett says, “Although choosing the utilitarian option reduces overall lives lost, it nonetheless leaves the actor with greater personal responsibility for harming another,” the implication seems to be both that this emphasis on personal responsibility is somehow a disadvantage of the so-called utilitarian option and that greater personal responsibility is somehow less prosocial than the alternative. For what it’s worth, the opposite is obviously the case.
As noted earlier, so-called prosocial behavior may be part of the evolutionary history of behavior that, in a considerably altered state, we now call “moral.” However it is massively unlikely that studying the evolutionary antecedents of complex conceptual and social institutions such as morality throws any light at all on these institutions’ current use and meanings, let alone on how to influence their further development. It would be like studying the swimming patterns of our aquatic forebears to see what we could learn about improving performance on bicycles.Footnote 39 Be that as it may, it would require much more evidence and argument than has, as yet, been produced by anyone.
Moral Behavior and Good People
There is a long-standing distinction in moral philosophy between judging persons and judging actions. This is necessary, not least because good people can do bad things and bad people can do good things. This distinction has even penetrated to the UK secret intelligence service. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, former director general of M15, said in her 2011 Reith Lecture, “Not all terrorists are evil though—their acts are.”Footnote 40
We thus need a moral sensibility capable of evaluating both the goodness of deeds and of their effects, in short of outcomes (consequentialism), and the goodness of people and their states of mind and dispositions (virtue ethics). If we are interested in the individual biography, we are interested, morally speaking, primarily in his or her virtues and vices. If we are interested in making the world a better place, we are interested in outcomes—consequences. Because most of us are more interested in what happens to us than the state of the soul of those who influence what happens to us, we tend to be for all practical purposes consequentialists. This is because even if we are not consequentialists and are interested in virtues and our state of mind (or of grace), we need to be confident we will have the freedom to develop our virtues according to our own values, and this requires that others leave us that free space. Hence whatever the state of their souls, we need others to leave us free to cultivate our own in ways that we find virtuous.
To put this point another way, it is easier and safer (for what both want) for consequentialists to neglect virtues than for virtue ethicists to neglect consequences. This is why moral behavior cannot simply be a matter of moral emotions or states of mind or intentions. Good intentions or emotions without the careful and realistic calculation of consequence—without, in short, considering if not all things at least as many possible consequences of conduct as time allows and as appear relevant—are a recipe not only for disaster but for the triumph of evil. To be good, “thank you very much!” is then to act for the best of all things considered. To prioritize the avoidance of so-called direct harms is the action neither of a good conscience nor of a good consequentialist.
The Huxlean or the Orwellian Road to TotalitarianismFootnote 41
I have been an advocate of human enhancement for more than thirty years, and to avoid any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that I see nothing wrong in principle with adding moral enhancement to all the other forms of human enhancement. If it could be achieved, it would clearly be a very good thing! This is one important reason why I am in favor of cognitive enhancement, including chemical and biological methods of cognitive enhancement, because it enhances the thinking and reflection that makes moral judgment and moral behavior possible. The fact that the forms of moral enhancement per se advocated thus far in the literature involve chemical and biological interventions, and that I am dubious about their effects, I hope does not make me a “bioconservative”; although doubtless those who disagree with me will have great fun in suggesting the contrary. I strongly endorse the only methods of moral enhancement so far proven effective, namely cognitive enhancement, by all means, including education, parental example and peer pressure, an effective and fair legal system, responsible policing, social welfare provision, good diet, exercise, and many others. I am even open to chemical and biological moral enhancement when and if it can be achieved without the deleterious effects noted here and without compromising freedom.Footnote 42
My point is that enhancements that make us better thinkers (more able to reason) are welcome, but ones that would make us better doers yet worse thinkers (less able to reason, for example, by foreclosing access to thoughts about using violence) are not strictly moral enhancements in the first place; rather, they are incapacitators, disabling strategies that give the appearance of morally enhancing while destroying or inhibiting both an understanding of good and bad and more importantly the ability to choose to do good over bad.
In this sense, although the debate has not been cast in these terms, the advocates of moral enhancement via emotional or behavioral modification are in effect guilty of a classic category mistake: what they describe as moral enhancement would more accurately be categorized as morally disabling, producing an inability or reduced ability to reason as to whether what feels (or seems) right is in fact right. I fear that inhibiting the power to think, the power to reason, and the ability to ask oneself whether what feels or seems right actually is right is well on the road to a totalitarian agenda. Whether that agenda is realized by what might be thought of as Huxlean methods—manipulating feelings and motives through drugs or other “direct” methodsFootnote 43—or by OrwellianFootnote 44 total observation and intimidation, the watching and bullying of Big Brother, is a minor consideration compared with the effect on the ability of perhaps whole populations to question, to reason, and ultimately to resist.
