Rationality, Rules, and Ideals is a collection of essays by fifteen renowned philosophers that examine elements of Bernard Gert's moral theory, a theory that he began developing in his 1970 The Moral Rules and which finds its most recent expression in his Morality: Its Nature and Justification (1998). The philosophical aim of Gert's theory is to describe, explain, and justify what he calls common morality, which he understands as ‘an informal public system of applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and includes what are commonly known as the moral rules, ideals, and virtues that has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal’ (1998, p. 26). Describing and explaining common morality involves the investigation of the concepts of rationality, impartiality, and morality while, ‘the close relationship between these three concepts constitutes a justification for morality’ (2002, p. 5).

The essays in this volume are organized into five major groups (each corresponding to a major aspect of Gert's moral theory) and are preceded by a short editors' introduction and by a very useful précis of Morality by Gert. The essays are then followed by a substantial set of replies by Gert, one for each essay in the volume.

In order to give the reader a rough sense of the essays and also for some of Gert's views, I will proceed to say a few words about each essay, taking them in order.

In part I, Justification and Method, Ernest Tugendhat, Matthias Kettner and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord explore aspects of Gert's theory of moral justification. Tugendhat reveals a tension in Gert's account of the justification of moral rules, usefully comparing Gert's earlier views on this matter with his current position, while Kettner discusses apparent gaps in Gert's theory of moral justification pertaining to the role of consensus in moral reasoning and how ‘discourse ethics’ may help fill these gaps. On Gert's view, a moral system is justified if and only if it is acceptable to all rational agents, where part of the specification of such agents is that the only beliefs they rely upon are ‘rationally required’. This, as Sayre-McCord explains, imposes a heavy ignorance constraint on the agents of rational acceptance, a constraint motivated by Gert's claim that to be a moral system, a set of rules must constitute an ‘informal public system applicable to all rational agents’. Sayre-McCord argues that in some cases the ignorance constraint will undermine the idea that moral rules are acceptable to all rational agents, and he criticizes Gert's various arguments for claiming that a moral system must, qua moral, be an informal public system applicable to all.

The basic normative notion for Gert is that of irrationality which, as applied to actions, is identified by a list of basic irrational action types rather than in terms of some abstract formula. Moreover, Gert defends a ‘hybrid’ conception of rationality according to which (roughly) the notion of an irrational action is egocentric, while that of a reason for action is not. Gert's account of irrationality and the related notions of rationality and reason, which provide a ground for morality, are explored in part II of the collection (Reasons and Rationality) in essays by Robert Audi, David Copp and Michael Smith. All three authors are critical of some of the details of Gert's theory of rationality, but they all make proposals for improving or replacing that theory which would apparently preserve the overall philosophical integrity of Gert's attempt to provide a rational basis for morality. Audi usefully and sympathetically explores some interpretative details of Gert's theory of rationality, raising certain problems as Gert has formulated it including its partially egocentric character, whether it can allow for degrees of rationality, and potential worries about relativism. In light of such worries, Audi helpfully proposes certain modifications of Gert's theory of rationality that would nevertheless preserve many of its central ideas. Copp critically examines some of the main elements of Gert's theory of rationality including Gert's list account of the fundamental notion of irrationality, his hybrid conception of rationality, the asymmetry within his theory of reason between harms and goods, and the relation between reasons, values and desires. Copp proposes what he calls a ‘self-governance’ account of practical rationality that attempts to improve upon Gert's theory while accommodating what is most plausible about that theory. Smith argues that a version of what Gert calls the ‘cool desire’ theory of practical rationality can, pace Gert, accommodate the plausible aspects of Gert's own theory and additionally offer a more unified and systematic account of irrational and rational action.

Some of the connections between Gert's moral theory and consequentialism are explored by Shelly Kagan, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Susan Wolf in their contributions comprising part III, Consequence and Rules. On Gert's view, one is neither rationally nor morally required to aid others even if doing so would not violate other moral constraints and one could do so at little or no cost to oneself. Kagan calls these ‘striking claims’ – at odds, he thinks, with common-sense judgments about such matters, and in his essay he examines Gert's various arguments for these claims and concludes that Gert has not given us good reason for accepting the claims in question. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that despite Gert's rejection of at least some forms of consequentialism, there are strong consequentialist elements present in both Gert's theory of reasons and in his moral theory. Specifically, Sinnott-Armstrong interprets Gert's moral theory as at bottom a sophisticated version of rule-consequentialism and he proceeds to compare its relative merits with analogous forms of sophisticated act-consequentialism. One of the conclusions Sinnott-Armstrong reaches is that in light of the philosophical aims of her theory, the act-consequentialist can avoid Gert's objections to it. Finally, Wolf helpfully explores the role of rules in consequentialism, Kantian moral theory and Gert's theory, arguing that rules in Gert's theory are more properly central and of more significance to morality than they are on the two competing theories.

Central to Gert's normative moral theory is his distinction between moral rules and moral ideals. Items of both sorts are precepts, yet rules specify moral requirements while ideals reflect those ends which are not themselves morally required, though they are good and advisable to adopt. The place of moral ideals and goods in Gert's theory is featured in part IV, Ideals and Goods. John Deigh is critical of Gert's basis for drawing the rules/ideals distinction in the way he does and goes on to propose what he calls a ‘model’ characterization of moral ideals that contrasts importantly with Gert's precept characterization. The content of both rules and ideals in Gert's theory is essentially negative – requiring us to avoid causing harm and advising us to reduce harm respectively. Douglas MacLean explores the bases for this emphasis on the negative and although he largely agrees with Gert on the greater importance of morality's negative thrust, he argues for the inclusion within morality's scope of promotion of the good. In her contribution, F. M. Kamm distinguishes harming and aiding from evils and goods and argues that despite Gert's claim that morality is concerned with lessening evils, Gert's view and common-sense morality are more concerned with respect for the ‘separateness’ of persons, a concern which requires that we have a strong duty to avoid harming others. Like Deigh and MacLean, E. J. Bond argues that Gert's restriction of morality to the goal of lessening evils and harms is too narrow; that as commonly conceived, it can more properly (and more positively) be understood as concerned primarily with the necessary conditions for and constituents in leading a good life in a social context.

For Gert, moral virtue includes only those traits of character that correspond to certain moral rules and ideals that share with them the features of universality and publicity. In part V, Virtue and Character, Julia Driver argues that not all moral virtues have these features and that Gert goes wrong in his account of moral virtue by supposing that they (like moral precepts) must be action-guiding. In the final contribution, Marcia Baron rejects some of Gert's fundamental ideas about morality including the fact that it gives primacy to the morality of actions over character and that it conceptually ties wrong actions to what is rationally punishable. In contrast, Baron makes a case for a more decidedly Kantian view (properly understood) which, she claims, allows for a more unified account of moral rules, ideals and virtues.

This is a very impressive set of critical articles, some pressing hard against various arguments and major claims of Gert's theory. But Gert is up to the challenge. In his set of replies he vigorously defends his overall theory, admitting, in the face of certain objections, certain modifications of his views, but mainly he clarifies and elaborates his view. Those not familiar with the details of Gert's moral theory will find especially helpful his précis and the fact most authors begin their contribution by summarizing those aspects of Gert's view under discussion.

Bernard Gert's Morality is a significant work in moral philosophy – certainly must-reading for specialists though, given its exceptional clarity, it does not require a specialist's expertise to understand. Rules, Rationality, and Ideals covers fundamental issues in moral theory and theory of rationality and highlights the importance and subtlety of Gert's views. This volume, together with Morality, makes a perfect pair for an upper-level undergraduate or graduate course in moral theory.