This study's immediate purpose is to explore the role of factions in enhancing or undermining governing parties in single dominant party systems. In particular, how does the voting system affect the challenge of managing factionalism, and how do party organisational arrangements sustain or undermine this particular governmental form? Its wider aim is to augment the literature on governmental forms. The analysis is based on detailed case studies of four political systems, which experienced single party dominance for lengthy periods: in one case (Canada), 81 years; in two others (Japan and Italy), around 50 years; and in a third (Britain), 18 years.
These are also states with significantly differing institutional features: Canada is a federation but the rest are unitary states. All are bicameral. Italy and Japan have relatively strong upper houses whereas Britain and Canada relatively weak ones. Britain and Canada use single member plurality voting systems and Japan and Italy proportional voting systems, although in the case of the latter states these took a different form after political earthquakes in the early 1990s. Their political cultures, democratic histories, and social dynamics are naturally also widely varying. I recite these other elements of the jigsaw to underline the complexity of comparative political analysis. A bounded systemic domain is essential to frame analysis, but is this ever unproblematic? What then of explanation? I return later to the issue of systemic boundaries, causality, and explanation.
The book is organised into nine chapters. The first two summarise the theory of one party dominance and define factionalism. They also tell a story about the inevitability of the factionalism in the former context. The third discusses the structural incentives that are associated with single member plurality voting systems and the fourth and fifth illustrate their unfolding in the British and Canadian cases. The sixth chapter discusses the incentive arrangements associated with non-majoritarian multi-party systems and the seventh and eighth chapters cover the Italian and Japanese case studies. The relatively brief conclusion summarises the findings.
Boucek suggests existing theories of single party dominance are inadequate. Definitions that look to length of tenure are effectively tautological. Equally, attempts to categorise the features of single dominant parties are confounded by intractable conceptual and definitional issues.
So the alternative pursued here is to seek to better understand dynamics. This is pursued through a study of the rise and fall of such parties. This inevitably involves attention to party groups or factions. In what circumstances do party sub-groups coalesce to sustain such systems? They may do this either through cooperation or through constructive internal competition. But factions can also destroy their host parties. What are the circumstances in which this occurs?
In managing the analysis, Boucek first looks at electoral system effects. Majoritarian systems need party discipline, while multi-party systems encourage pluralisation and dissent. In both contexts, organisational incentives need to preserve loyalty and discourage defection. Another set of challenges are internal. These involve the reconciliation of electoral, policy, and career aspirations. To preserve power, parties must reconcile the vote seeking, policy seeking, and office seeking ambitions of their component sub-groups. These structural and organisational challenges can be countered through arrangements covering leader selection, policy determination, and candidate selection.
The subsequent discussion of British and Canadian leadership processes illustrates the problems in designing constructive organisational processes. The intent of the designers was undone by the perennial logic of unintended consequences. Neither ultimately worked as planned and both ultimately had perverse outcomes. Similarly, the Japanese Liberal-Democrats (LDP) and the Italian Christian Democrat Party (DC) gave factional leaders control of campaign benefits and career preferment, which ultimately encouraged factional not party loyalty. Both Japan and Italy also had leader selection processes which pushed the factions to build grass roots strength and ultimately resulted in the selection of party leaders without clear mandates.
The nuanced conclusion merits full statement: ‘Factionalism can become destabilising and dangerous if factions wield a veto but it can also prolong office tenure by containing conflict to prevent exit. In the long run though using factions to regulate the division of spoils has perverse consequences that lead to bad governance and brand devaluation. Failing to manage factional conflict creates intra-party disequilibrium, prompting insurgencies and collective action by dissidents who mobilise against the leadership to bring about change and, in a worst case scenario, trading off voice for exit’ (p. 206).
Overall this study is an informative descriptive and explanatory addition to the discussion of single dominant parties. I have two qualifying comments. First, what is a faction? Boucek suggests that any party grouping qualifies. She deliberately seeks to strengthen analysis by moving beyond static categories. This dynamic perspective certainly allows more extended analysis. But whereas the discussion of the Japanese LDP and Italian DC includes quite specific details about the incidence and strength of the component factions, in the case of the Canadian Liberal Party and the British Conservative Party, similar details are sparse. In neither case do we find discussion of the constructive role of factions. Both deal only with the destructive phase. For example, in the Canadian case we seem to be dealing with a party built up from local notables. Are the 11 ‘fairly autonomous provincial and territorial organisations’ that composed the Liberal party the equivalent of Japanese and Italian factions? This surely deserves more discussion. Moreover, later factional activity in Canada is largely inferred from leadership contests – but there is scant discussion of detail. Analogous comments might be made about the British case.
The other issue concerns the boundaries of the analysis. This study convincingly traces the use and varying efficacy of the organisational features identified above. It establishes their contribution to each party's continued success and then to its downfall. Of course, this is not prediction. But the implication seems to be that these tensions are at least potentially manageable.
But could deeper systemic dynamics also be involved? The perspectives which frame this study occlude this consideration. Yet single party dominance may also express such dynamics. Constructive, competitive or destructive factionalism might then be symptomatic of the unfolding tensions of a wider game – and hence less open to ‘management’. Of course, the study did not seek to engage this question. But take the cases reviewed here. First Canada. The underlying Canadian scene is characterised by a number of seemingly distinctive features. Its national and provincial party systems are largely decoupled. Its single member plurality voting system creates representation for regional parties. Moreover, this same voting system has delivered both majority and minority governments – as well as periodic landslide elections. Single party dominance has persisted because the regional parties have mostly lacked incentives to bring down incumbent (minority) governments. More generally, critical electoral and policy pressures concerning the nature of the Canadian federation have been absorbed through the structure of the party system. The Meech Lake Accord of 1987 undermined this particular settlement and the associated party configuration. It stimulated a realignment – one that is seemingly still in progress.
Was this Accord a systemic game changer in the same way that Europe may prove for Britain? The on-going travail in these two systems could be taken as an expression of this struggle. In the case of Britain, Europe does not exhaust the cross-pressures (e.g. Scottish independence). It seems too pallid to contain these conflicts in the category ‘policy seeking’. They touch identity in a fundamental way and thus open up possibilities of quite different, cross-cutting systemic alignments.
Similarly, in the case of Japan and Italy, the implosion of the Communist world undermined the older alignment of leftist parties in systems whose basic logic derived from an earlier cleavage. End that cleavage and the search for a new systemic logic emerges. This can develop as ambitious faction and party leaders sense new opportunities to pursue their goals through new appeals to emergent social cleavgaes. They may see opportunity in new electoral alignments.
Conflict over identity is arguably the ultimate source of these political dynamics (as all these case studies would seem to affirm). This vector unfolds unpredictably but inexorably, like a geological fault-line. In such contexts, instrumental rationality as a way of modelling choice may have only limited explanatory power. Such models can also distort political analysis (e.g. Blyth, Reference Blyth, Beland and Cox2010)?
None of this qualifies the immediate merits of this study. It had another purpose and dealt with another set of questions. In that frame, Boucek presents a probing and comprehensive evaluation. She gives us a nuanced account of the dynamics of factionalism and in the process enhances understanding of the life-cycle of single dominant parties.
