History and Structure of Azerbaijani Migration to Turkey: Outlines

“Azerbaijanis in Turkey” is a complex and multi-layered concept. The history of Azerbaijani migration to Turkey goes back to almost 200 years ago if not earlier. Salomoni (Reference Salomoni2014, 340) reports the movement of three millions Turks and Muslims, including Azerbaijani Turks, from the Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire between 1829 and 1914. Because of continuing territorial disputes around certain borderline territories lying between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, there were several border changes involving territorial swaps. Kars, Ardahan, and Igdir, where Azerbaijanis lived along with Armenians and Kurds, were eventually returned to the Ottoman Empire while Vedi/Vedibasar, an adjacent territory where Azerbaijanis were in majority, remained in the Soviet Union as part of the Republic of Armenia. The transfer of Kars, Ardahan, and Igdir must have encouraged outflows of Azerbaijanis from the Soviet Union to the Ottoman Empire/Turkey to join their ethnic fellows and live in a culturally close country. Hence, Kars, Ardahan and Igdir are the territories with the largest Azerbaijani communities. In particular Igdir is considered an Azerbaijani land in Turkey. Further, once Soviets came, many founders of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920) left the country to escape Bolshevik repressions. This was followed by the immediate flow of many anti-Bolshevik intellectuals. Later, different other groups, including traders, were able to move from the Soviet Union to Turkey between 1920 and 1930 when the borders had a porous nature (see Salomoni Reference Salomoni2014, 341). There were new waves of migration of Azerbaijanis in later periods both from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan. In general, as Salomoni states, “the Azeris settled in Eastern Anatolia during the 1918-1925, and later a small number of Azeris fleeing Soviet forced collectivization settled in Turkish territory. Moreover Anders reports thousands of Azerbaijanis who settled in Eastern Anatolia in 1938 and then in 1944” (2014, 344).

The economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought along redistribution of resources and socio-economic deprivations for certain groups, triggered new migration waves of Azerbaijanis to Turkey starting from 1990s. These new groups included circular or seasonal migrants, permanent labor migrants (mostly illegal), and intellectual migrants. With border conditions becoming more favorable, the scale of these waves increased. As Allahveranov and Huseynov report, “… if one looks at the international migration database of the OECD, Turkey appears to be becoming an increasingly important destination country for Azerbaijani migrants… . It must be noted that inflows from Azerbaijan to Turkey increased considerably during the second half of the 2000s” (Reference Allahveranov and Huseynov2013, 33). Allahveranov and Huseynov (Reference Allahveranov and Huseynov2013, 33) also report, with reference to OECD International Migration Database, an inflow of 17,123 Azerbaijani citizens to Turkey in 2009, compared to 10,564 in 2000, which accounted for ~1.3% of the entire stock of emigrants to Turkey in 2009Footnote ¹ .

In 2018, Azerbaijan was among the ten top countries with emigration outflow to Turkey preceded by Iraq, Afganistan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Azerbaijani emigrants to Turkey accounted for 6% of the total foreign immigration to the country in 2008–2017 and 5% in 2018 (OECD 2020, 242).

However, as of today, no fully reliable statistics exists. According to the non-official information provided by the Diaspora Committee of Azerbaijan, about 4,500,000 Azerbaijanis live in Turkey.Footnote ² It is not clear however what criteria have been used for the calculation, and how many generations of Azerbaijanis as well as which population categories are included in the statistics. Even OECD data are not always reliable. According to Allahveranov and Huseynov, “OECD figures are based on applications for residence by Azerbaijani citizens. Some of the former Azerbaijan labour migrants from Germany, Russia and Turkey … told us that they had been applying for residence permits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey once every 3 months. Thus they had applied for legal residence permits 4 times a year and as a result each labour migrant could have been noted more than once in the OECD data – … However, apart from SSC and OECD data, there are no alternative sources of emigration information (official and non-official) that we can rely on to assess the exact scale of outflows of people from Azerbaijan” (Reference Allahveranov and Huseynov2013, 33–34).

Linguistic proximity makes it easier for Azerbaijanis to move within, and settle in different parts, of Turkey. However, like migrants from other countries, Azerbaijanis prefer to settle in the Marmara region, particularly in Istanbul.

Labor Migrants

Intellectual Migrants

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought the collapse of the system that had held together separate but well-integrated units of a centralized economy and had been ensuring harmonious operation of various industries throughout the entire country. The sovereign Soviet states were, in many cases, only responsible for partial outputs and complemented one another in overall production processes. Major industrial products were produced by enterprises established in several Soviet states, each of which was responsible for this or another part of the entire production. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, links ensuring the operation of centralized industries were cut off, and, consequently, each ex-Soviet state was caught in economic frustrations. As a result, faced by high unemployment risks, many scientists, engineers, and industry workers were forced to emigrate. Geographical and linguistic proximity, as well as lack of proficiency in Western languages for many, made Turkey a natural destination for early Azerbaijani intellectual migrants (Salahov Reference Salahov2009). Low payment was the greatest reason pushing many professionals also in healthcare, humanities, and liberal arts towards emigration. Besides, emerging new industries required new skills, including English, which put many ex-Soviet professionals under the risk of losing jobs. All these factors together triggered brain drain from Azerbaijan to Turkey in the earliest years of independence.

There were also many musicians, in particular those specialized in Western classical music which was one of the most prestigious spheres in Soviet Azerbaijan, who migrated to Turkey in the early 1990s. Those were the years when nationalization (and consequently, Turkification) became a top priority in every possible sphere, including language and culture. Classical music professionals were face to face with a lack of students and thus employment problems due to the gradually decreasing prestige of classical music education. Musicians had to work with three or four different orchestras to earn their living. Meanwhile, the prominence of popular music was growing, and the tendency in music education was gradually changing. Many renowned musicians left the country simply to avoid seeing the speed with which the prestige of the art they had dedicated their entire life to was falling. In the early years of independence, a significant number of famous Azerbaijani musicians migrated to Turkey where they were invited to take up prestigious positions as orchestra chefs, soloists, and professors. Meanwhile, when the iron curtain collapsed, Azerbaijan immediately became an attractive market for Turkish classical music industry often facing deficit in professionals. Before the borders with ex-Soviet countries opened, the Turkish classical music industry had been heavily recruiting professionals from Europe. When the borders opened in the early 1990’s, Azerbaijan became a natural market of new cadre given the linguistic and cultural proximity and the highly valued experience of Azerbaijani musicians in the Soviet classical music école. Naila Ahmadova, a pianist who was among the earliest migrants to Turkey, states that along with the linguistic proximity, Turks also appreciate the high quality music education that Azerbaijanis received during the Soviet times (Yaman Reference Yaman2015).

Traditional/folk music professionals were also welcomed in Turkey. Azerbaijan’s high-caliber folk musicians, with the knowledge of essentials of Western musicology and thus a diverse profile, are in great demand in Turkish music education industry. Arif Azerturk, a professional tar player who migrated to Turkey in 1993 and became an initiator of the teaching of tar at a number of Turkish conservatories (Müşfiq Reference Müşfiq2018), developed a successful career in Turkey, which would have not been as easy in Azerbaijan.

Political and Social Activism of Azerbaijani Migrants in Turkey

As in almost all ex-Soviet republics, in Azerbaijan, too, the independence movement brought nationalistic groups to power. These groups were predominantly represented by middle class intellectuals, mainly from peripheries, most of whom were dissidents during the Soviet times. In the context of Soviet realities, these people with Azerbaijani as mother tongue and first language did not occupy a place as high in the social hierarchy as that held by Baku’s Russian-speaking elites. They grew as active advocates of romantic nationalism in Azerbaijan starting from later decades of the Soviet era, in particular, from the 1960s. They promoted the ideology of Turkism as a call for the search for ethnic roots of Azerbaijanis, including Azerbaijanis living in Iran, and, as they put it, for the restoration of historic truth. They carried this ideology through their struggle for national independence and made it the core element of their de-Sovietization policy often expressed as de-Russification: Turkism was certainly also a kind of response to their traumatic experience caused by the hegemony of Russian in the Soviet Union. Azerbaijanism was articulated by them in the context of Turkism as a corporate identity and through the consciousness of a divided (between Iran and Russia) motherland. With the post-1993 political power change, the emphasis shifted to Azerbaijanism as a discrete identity. Also, the new political elite, with the rich Soviet ruling experience, came from a different socio-cultural environment where the Russian language and culture were dominant and served as markers of social prestige. These new elites did not have the same sensitivity toward the greater Turkic world. They focused on the Azerbaijanism discourse and reinforced it by establishing the term Azerbaijani language (Azərbaycan Dili), which replaced the term Turkic/Turkish language (Türk Dili) introduced by the Popular Front in the early 1990s, in the Constitution and relevant legislative documents (Garibova and Asgarova Reference Garibova and Asgarova2009, 195). Although Turkism was still an important building element in the construction of historic awareness (this was the main difference from the Soviet-times discourse of Azerbaijanism, which had almost completely excluded the Turkic affiliation of Azerbaijanis), it did not become decisive for the new elite’s identity politics. This, coupled with harsh criticism against the now opposition groups for their failed politics over Karabakh as well as Azerbaijan’s intrenational relations in general, pushed many opposition members, including opposition intellectuals, towards emigration. As the majority of these people did not represent prestigious city elites, many had no or insufficient foreign language skills. Turkey was therefore the natural destination both linguistically and ideologically. Moreover, as Ayça Ergun states, “… the nationalist discourse of the opposition became an integral part of the democratization agenda rather than the nation-building and state-building agendas. ‘Being nationalist’ and ‘being democratic’ became synonymous and were used interchangeably” (Reference Ergun2021, 7). This probably explains the sympathy many Azerbaijani oppositional migrants felt towards the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [MHP]), Turkey’s far-right ultranationalist party. MHP responded well to explicit nationalistic feelings of many oppositional Azerbaijanis. It is no accident that Abulfaz Elchibey, Head of the Popular Front, a Soviet dissident who later initiated national movement in Azerbaijan, is still revered by Turkey’s nationalist circles as a true symbol of national awakening of Azerbaijanis/Azerbaijani Turks. Some of these people or their family members are still politically active. For example, Elchibey’s son-in-law, who currently lives in Turkey, heads the organization named Union of Unified Azerbaijan (Bütöv Azərbaycan Birliyi) established by Elchibey himself in 1997 and known for its Turkism-based Azerbaijani nationalism imbued with a degree of irredentist sentiment. Besides, there is a considerable number of opposition members among migrants from Nakhchivan, and MHP is a natural attraction for them too. According to some respondents, many who left Nakhchivan did not only have economic difficulties but also political disagreements with the ruling elites of the Autonomous Republic. During the interviews, some respondents stated that they did not want to return to Nakhchivan as, given their political views, they did not believe there were opportunities waiting for them under the current leadership of the Autonomous Republic.

Recently, there has been a shift in political priorities among a signifcant number of Azerbaijanis living in Turkey, in particular those representing intellectual migrants. One informant states that coming from a secular society, Azerbaijanis, especially those in intellectual spheres, did not have a strong affinity with the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) with its political Islamism. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]), although ideologically and culturally closer, held reserved attitude towards Azerbaijan and did not actively support the country in regard to the Karabakh issue. MHP with its then milder (and, according to many Azerbaijanis, healthier) nationalistic tendencies embraced Azerbaijanis more than any other party did and was a strong advocate of Azerbaijani interests in Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. However, the growing radicalization of MHP and its alliance with AKP alienated many Azerbaijanis from the party who, according to the above-mention informant, now see Good Party (İyi Party [İP]) as a possible alternative.

Although Turkism is still a salient aspect of the diaspora’s ethno-nationality narrative, a slight shift towards Azerbaijanism is also evident from the profile and activities of some new circles organized by younger generations of Azerbaijanis in Turkey. The new groups also seem to be more open to cooperating with both the Government and opposition circles. For example, the social media profile of the Azerbaijani Culture and Solidarity Community of Istanbul University, one of these new circles, emphasizes Azerbaijanism as well as references to both Government and opposition leaders. Along with discourse over the rights of Turks around the world, they place a strong emphasis on Azerbaijan-related issues—for example, the language and cultural rights of Azerbaijanis living in Iran, the role of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in identity formation of Azerbaijanis, etc. While there may be differences in representations of nationalism or in political priorities, there is a close cooperation among diaspora circles in regard to issues that are considered strategic. When the Second Karabakh War broke out, for example, the Azerbaijani Culture and Solidarity Community of Istanbul University cooperated with the oppositional nationalist union named Unified Azerbaijan Hearths (Bütöv Azərbaycan Ocaqları) to organize mass demonstrations in Istanbul in support of Azerbaijan.

There exist several Azerbaijani diaspora circles in Turkey, many in Istanbul, which engage in disseminating knowledge about Azerbaijan’s history, current politics, and culture. Many of these circles increased their activities espacially in the context of the Second Karabakh War. Their involvement took various forms including the organization of events (in particular, concerts, exhibitions, and lectures), inviting key political or social figures in Turkey to contribute to conflict resolution, engaging heavily in social media campaigns, etc. The diaspora has recently increased cooperation with Azerbaijan’s Government to also deal with social issues of Azerbaijanis living in Turkey (AZƏRTAC, May 21, 2020).

Students

Turkey’s educational links with the post-Soviet Turkic Republics were among the earliest. With Azerbaijan these links were established in the early 1990’s, before the Soviet Union was dissolved. A comprehensive academic and cultural exchange program was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on January 10, 1990. In the 1992–1993 academic year, Turkey launched annual scholarsihps for all Turkic Republics (2000 for each), including Azerbaijan (Hüseynova Reference Hüseynova2007, 87). According to the report from Azerbaijan’s Embassy in Turkey, as of March 2020, about 21,000 Azerbaijani students studied at various Universities in 79 out of 81 regions of Turkey (Ünal Reference Ünal2020). As of 2018, about 15,000 Azerbaijani students studied in Istanbul (Firdevs Reference Firdevs2018).

The survey shows that the priority choice of Azerbaijanis seeking a university education in Turkey is the medical sphere followed by business and economics, humanities, political sciences, and engineering. The number of students studying art, philosophy, and religion is not as high.

I have included students in the survey taking into consideration the following realities. First, although students could be viewed as temporary migrants, most of them represent a specific age category (in this case 17–24) which is more responsive to social stimuli. From this point of view, it is interesting to see how people of a particular age category retain or reject their perceptions when they are plunged into a new cultural and socio-linguistic milieu as well as into an alien and challenging (but also exciting) epistemic environment. Whether or not they will stay in the host country, they will always carry elements of the host culture as part of their identity, which may further be reflected on the identity repertoire of a broader group/society. As Tomei notes, students are “migrants that have left their home country to develop abroad cultural and technical/professional competences and thus have become part of academic and professional networks… . The combination of these characteristics and the specific circumstances facilitate in the present a good integration of foreign university students upon their arrival, and lead to the hypothesis that in the future they will be able to develop an international if not cosmopolitan career” (2008, 7–8). Second, although students are typically considered temporary migrants, not all of them tend to return home after completing their education. The survey, detailed further, shows that some of the students tend to stay in the host country for work or further education, some wish to move to another country, and about 50% want to return home. The responses of older age groups reveal similar results – 50% of older age participants wish to return home at some point in the future. It seems then that there is no definite delimitation between stable and temporary migrants. Also, there are tendencies to categories both student communities and diaspora in general as transnational communities due to various types of ties. For example, Darvin and Norton state that “through more affordable travel costs, mobile communication devices, social media, and online connectivity, migrant learners are increasingly able to navigate more seamlessly between their countries of origin and of settlement, and pursue their lives with a greater sense of transnationalism” (Reference Darvin and Norton2014, 55). Tomei, on the other hand, claims that “diasporas are transnational communities that are dense, close-knit, rich both in social capital and symbolic and identity resources; but above all represent the type of transnational community which more than the others promotes the sense of responsibility of its members towards the community of origin and induces its actors to co-development” (2008, 23). According to Patterson, “transnationalism focuses on “citizens who … manage to construct and nurture social fields that intimately link their respective homelands and their new diasporic locations” (Reference Patterson2006, 1891). Although considered from two different angles, both students and diaspora in its classical sense can be viewed as transnationals due to various types of ties, whether through mobility or other structured transnational practices, they establish with their home countries. As well, if “a transnational community within which members have a high level of exchanges - both instrumental and expressive (transnational ties) - can be defined as a diaspora if there is also a high and shared level of belonging, a strong sense of identification, and a high level of support and help among members” (Tomei Reference Tomei2008, 6), then students fit well within this category.

Ethno-Linguistic Affiliation

In terms of personal ethnic affiliation, the participants’ responses are as follows (table 2).

Table 2.

Expression of Personal Ethnic Identification

Table 3 shows how the participants identify Azerbaijan’s titular group.

Table 3.

Titular Group’s Ethnic Identification by the Participants

As the findings suggest, self-identification and identification of the titular group as Azerbaijani Turk prevails among other paradigms. This can be explained, first of all, by the fact that despite the well-entrenched ideology of Azerbaijanism shaped by Soviet policy-makersFootnote ⁵, the lost or retreated consciousness is at least to some extent brought back when Azerbaijanis find themselves in a larger Turkic-speaking environment. Hence, self-identification as Azerbaijani Turk should to a certain degree be seen as part of self-identification as Turk in that it still reveals the ownership of the name Turk but in/from a different territoryFootnote ⁶.

However, there is still a significant number of participants who affiliate with Azerbaijaniness, which shows that this identity paradigm is quite strong and distinctly expressed. Moreover, the younger the age category, the more pronounced the affiliation with the Azerbaijani identity. This is naturally explained, first of all, by the fact that the younger respondents are predominantly students who have not yet spent sufficient time in Turkey to be influenced by the discourse of Turkism. Instead, in Azerbaijan they were exposed to various channels, including public discourse, social activism, as well as culture promotion and awareness, through which the image of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis as citizens has recently been enhanced and made prominent. Besides, the Karabakh conflict and the related discourse have also certainly contributed to the increased affiliation with Azerbaijaniness among the youth.

It should however be noted that, while not excluding the idea of Turkicness, the term Azerbaijani Turk is still specific and somewhat particularistic by nature. As was noted above, the strong affinity with the grand Turkic world expressed in early years of independence started declining slowly after the Popular Front, the nationalistic government that came to power in 1993, was succeeded by the new political elite. As Soltanov claims, “the process of de-romanticisation probably started as early as when the two countries began to explore each other in the first years of the 1990s” (Reference Soltanov, Ismayilov and Graham2016, 38). Optimism and positive social imaging of Turkey, which replaced early romanticism, and which was powerfully entrenched in, and sustained through, associating Turkey with secular principles of Kemalism, also started declining with increased politicization of Islam (Şirin Reference Şirin2016). This can explain well why many Azerbaijanis favor a discrete identity as Azerbaijani Turk, quite often as a source of pride (Ergun Reference Ergun2021, 7), and avoid the generic definition of Turk. The survey results also reveal this tendency: about 65% of the respondents (including 67% of those who identify themselves as Azerbaijani Turks) think that the self-perception of Azerbaijanis is strong and sufficiently discrete and therefore should not be assimilated within the global Turkic (or the dominating Turkish) identity (table 4).

Table 4.

Attitudes about Belonging

The survey contained a question seeking an evaluation of the role Shah Ismail Khatai (Ismail I), founder of the Safavid dynasty, played in the identity formation of Azerbaijanis. Because Khatai is highly revered in current public discourse as one of the most influential historic personalities who founded a great empire on the territory of Azerbaijan (Nazarli Reference Nazarli2017), and because this discourse is not without controversies, I thought that perceptions of Khatai would also provide insights into the identity constructions of Azerbaijanis in TurkeyFootnote ⁷ . The survey has revealed diverse perspectives. The participants’ opinions are mostly positive: most respondents appreciate him as founder of Azerbaijan’s statehood traditions, a ruler who authorized the use of Azerbaijani in palace affairs, a great personality who shaped the discrete identity of Azerbaijani Turks, the first historic statesman who expanded the territories of the Safavid Empire and who “saved Azerbaijani Turks from being ruled by Persians”, a great poet who contributed to the development of literary Azerbaijani, etc. Seventy four respondents think Khatai was just a historic personality. Twenty three participants who are critical about Khatai’s historic role think that it was due to his wrong policy, aimed at ongoing battles with the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of Shiism as state politics, that most Azerbaijanis lost their identity as Turks. However, even when respondents are critical of Khatai’s anti-Ottoman policy, they still highly value his positive role in promoting the use of Azerbaijani Turkic in certain state affairs.

As tables 5 and 6 show, responses revealing linguistic affiliation support claims of ethnic identity perceptions significantly.

Table 5.

Attitudes towards the Titular Language Name

Table 6.

Attitudes towards Language Per Se

Further, as both the survey and the interviews have revealed, a considerable number of Azerbaijanis believe that the title Turk should be owned rather by Azerbaijani Turks than Turks of Turkey. They claim that historically Azerbaijani Turks did not mix with other ethnicities as much as Turks of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey did, and that Azerbaijani is much purer in terms of containing original Turkic linguistic elements. Some said they were concerned that Turks of Turkey considered themselves more Turk than Turks of Azerbaijan did, and some think that the term Azerbaijani was a political game orchestrated by Stalin and that Azerbaijanis were more Turk than Turks of Turkey. Hence, 69% of participants (including 82% of those who identify themselves as Azerbaijani Turk) support the idea of restoring the historic name Turk of the titular ethnic group (table 7).

Table 7.

Attitudes towards the Historic Name of the Titular Group

To understand how clear and consistent the delimitation between the concept of Azerbaijani and the concept of Turk/Azerbaijani Turk is, I looked at the correspondence of participants’ identification of Azerbaijan’s titular ethnic group with their own self-identification. For this purpose I considered only the participants belonging to the titular ethnic group, and excluded the representatives of minority groups and those who preferred not to express any ethnic affiliation either for themselves, for the titular group, or for both. As a result, I looked at 280 responses which revealed that not always was the term Azerbaijani understood clearly: some think the term Azerbaijani is the name of the titular nation, and some say it implies citizens of Azerbaijan regardless of ethnic belonging. Some, however, suggest that the titular nation of Azerbaijan should be named Azerbaijani as there are other ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan. As I had foreseen the risk of terminological confusionFootnote ⁸ , I had provided an explanation of what the word “titular” meant. Nevertheless, the confusion is obvious: 58 (20.71%) participants’ self-identification differs from their identification of Azerbaijan’s titular nation: 33 (11.78%) participants identify themselves as Azerbaijani Turks while defining Azerbaijan’s titular nation as Azerbaijani; and 25 (8.92%) participants identify themselves as Azerbaijani and think that the titular nation of Azerbaijan should be named Turk or Azerbaijani Turk. Meanwhile, 224 (80%) participants’ identification of Azerbaijan’s titular nation corresponds to their own self-identification: 66 (23.57%) of these participants identify themselves and the titular nation as Azerbaijani; and 158 (56.42%) participants identify both themselves and the nation as either Turk or Azerbaijani Turk.

Further clarification elicited through interviews was also confusing. Some respondents stated that they considered themselves Azerbaijani Turks because they lived in Turkey, and consequently, they were Turks, while the titular nation should be identified as Azerbaijani because they were based in Azerbaijan. One respondent, who identify herself as Azerbaijani Turk, and the titular nation as Azerbaijani, stated that she had spent several hours thinking about it. When she was asked to explain why she had defined her ethnic affiliation differently from how she identified Azerbaijan’s titular population (the original assumption from my side being that there may have been a relevant shift in her identity repertoire), her explanation was as follows: “If I lived in Azerbaijan, I would have identified myself as Azerbaijani - as a citizen of Azerbaijan; but since I live in Turkey, I identify myself as Azerbaijani Turk (a Turk from Azerbaijan).” Another participant who identifies herself as Azerbaijani Turk and the titular nation as Turk explained her position as follows: “We are all Turks as are the peoples of Central Asia. The individual identification should be different from the identification of the nation: I identify myself as Azerbaijani Turk just to refer to my geographical affiliation.”

At certain conceptualization levels, relative consistency between self-identification and ethno-linguistic perceptions is observed. For example, out of 25 respondents who have expressed a negative attitude toward restoring the historic name of the Azerbaijani people, 20 (80%) identify themselves as Azerbaijani. On the other hand, 18 (62%) out of 29 participants who identify themselves as Turk, have expressed a positive attitude towards possible convergence between Azerbaijani and Turkish. Besides, out of 37 participants who support borrowing from Turkish, only four identify themselves as Azerbaijani.

Linguistic Persistence

Only a few respondents who have lived in Turkey for many years and some who married Turkish nationals said they used mixed Azerbaijani-Turkish code at home. All other respondents reported speaking Azerbaijani at home and said they never used Turkish as a language of interaction with Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan. However, while Azerbaijanis favor distinct identification of the native language and ensure its active use and maintenance, many see specific instances of language-mixing as a normal behavior due to linguistic proximity and as a functional tool facilitating communication and efficiency (table 8[a, b, c]). In fact, a significant Turkish influence on the speech of participants, especially those with a long experience of life in Turkey, is observable.

Table 8a.

Attitudes towards Practical Language Behavior (Participants’ Own Behavior)

Table 8b.

Attitudes towards Practical Language Behavior (the Behavior of Others)

Table 8c.

Attitudes towards Practical Language Behavior (Language-Mixing)

This function-oriented approach is also obvious from attitudes towards what/which language should be used in interaction between Azerbaijanis and Turks (table 9).

Table 9.

Attitudes towards the Choice of a Language of Interaction

Nevertheless, the younger participants seem to be more persistent in terms of the mother tongue use: out of 56 participants who have reported insisting on a shift to Azerbaijani if their interlocutor initiated a conversation in Turkish, 46 (82.14%) are younger than 32.

Cultural Persistence

Azerbaijanis stay connected with their home community through maintained, regenerated, and transmitted traditions. Among the survey participants, 192 (64.86%) are active and 62 (20.94%) are moderate Azerbaijani media readers. About 73% of the respondents report celebrating all Azerbaijani public holidays, and 25.5% report celebrating only some of them. This is also true about traditional holidays including Novruz, the most important and favorite holiday of Azerbaijanis, and those inherited during the Soviet times, in particular New Year. Neither Novruz nor New Year is publicly celebrated in Turkey – the former for being associated with the Kurdish political movement, and the second, with Christianity. Nevertheless, the majority of Azerbaijanis do not seem affected by either the public discourse or the social behavior in regard to these holidays. Out of the total of 296 participants, 275 (92.9%) have reported celebrating Novruz. Among these, 221 (74.6%) celebrate it with the traditional Azerbaijani attributes. Only 19 participants (6.4%) have reported not celebrating Novruz, and some say they have stopped celebrating it after having moved to Turkey. Diaspora circles always organize large-scale Novruz celebrations that bring Azerbaijanis together. Some have even recently been able to bring Turkish high-level political figures to these celebrations. Two hundred forty four participants (almost 83.1 %) celebrate New Year; 145 of them decorate a New Year Tree as part of celebration, as is customary in Azerbaijan. Out of the 50 participants who do not celebrate New Year, only 29 state that they have stopped celebrating it after moving to Turkey. A few respondents said they did not want to attract their neighbors’ attention by decorating a New Year Tree, and some reported getting negative (or surprised) comments from their neighbors.

In terms of maintaining the food culture, the survey reveals that more than 77% of the participants have maintained the traditional tea culture typical of Azerbaijan. Also, except for 6% of the respondents, all others cook the traditional Azerbaijani cuisine either exclusively or along with complementing it with the Turkish cuisine.

Religious practices also reveal interesting results. It appears that many Azerbaijanis, while celebrating Novruz and New Year, also celebrate major Muslim holidays such as Ramazan and Gurban and observe Shia traditions. Some have maintained a secular way of life. Out of 296 respondents, 110 (37.9%) observe Ashura, a holy day for Shias, which marks martyrdom of Husain Ibn Ali, grandson of Prophet Mohammad. Sixty participants (23.9%) said they did not celebrate religious holidays (table 10).

Table 10.

Religions Holidays Celebrated by Participants

Socio-Communicative Challenges

The participants have reported the following socio-communicative problems they say they encounter in Azerbaijan: pessimism (35 responses); communication ethics (89 responses); inefficiency and uncertainty (including lack of concreteness in time perception) (46 responses); insistence (9 responses). A few (6) respondents have mentioned other factors including bureaucracy, queuing culture, etc. Five participants have reported experiencing all or several of the cited socio-cultural and socio-psychological communicative challenges. Ninety-two people, or approximately 31% of the respondents, have stated that they have not experienced any socio-cultural or socio-psychological challenges of communication in Azerbaijan. Fourteen participants have not answered this question.

Thus, 190 participants (64.1%) report facing one or several socio-communicative challenges in the home country. This may certainly emerge as a factor potentially affecting perceptions about the home society and consequently hampering reintegration. In fact, according to 53 participants, Turkey was ahead of Azerbaijan, especially in terms of social and communicative culture, and therefore they felt more at home in Turkey. Additionally, 17 participants said they had started feeling alienated from the Azerbaijani society, and two said they felt they did not belong to either Turkey or Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, these challenges seem to be more easily tolerated if (re)connection is exercised through short-term trips and involves concentrated interaction with close family and friends. In the case of Azerbaijanis living in Turkey, the sustainability of such (re)connection is facilitated by a relatively short distance between the two countries, frequent flights, absence of visa requirements, and the new regulation of the possibility of travelling without an international passport. Also, the recent COVID-19-triggered developments in virtual communication must have changed the entire attitude towards reintegration and have probably facilitated participation and time input. A great number of Azerbaijani diaspora members in Turkey have actively been participating in various online cultural and academic events, conferences, and political discussions organized in Azerbaijan. As survey results show, the participants are quite positive about staying connected with Azerbaijan, and being involved in socio-cultural processes taking place in the country. Many report missing close communication, food, music and cultural life in Azerbaijan. Many have noted that they miss their family members and friends. Seventy-four participants say they do not feel estranged from either Azerbaijan or Azerbaijani culture, and that they feel at home in Azerbaijan. One hundred twenty participants feel that they belong both to Turkey and Azerbaijan to the same degree and that there is no great difference between the two societies. Nineteen participants said they had recently been feeling better in Azerbaijan because Turkey was no longer the country they used to know.

Although “dispersed populations do not necessarily expect or desire a diasporic return” (Canagarajah and Silberstein Reference Canagarajah and Silberstein2012, 81), it is common for diasporic communities, at least for the first two generations, to have a sense of “living outside of a territory to which they are historically ‘rooted’” (Kafle Reference Kafle2010, 136). A significant number of survey participants (116 out of the total of 296) think of returning to Baku at some point in the future. Among them, 58 (50%) are younger than 25, and 58 (50%) are older than 25, which accounts for 46.7% and 34.1% of the respective cohorts. This is true that with intensified migration processes, it is not rare for migrants to consider Turkey as a transit country (Kirişci Reference Kirişci2004, 7), and Azerbaijanis are certainly no exception. Some respondents who do not want to stay in Turkey in fact stated a desire to move to a new country. However, the majority of these respondents want to return to Baku, and the motive is emotional. Among major reasons, the participants mostly indicate missing Baku and/or the desire to reunite with the family. Thirteen respondents, among whom seven are younger than 25, four are younger than 32, and two are older than 50, said they would like to return because they wanted to be useful to Azerbaijan and to contribute the knowledge and skills gained in Turkey to the development of their motherland. On the other hand, Karabakh emerges as an important motivator for closer reintegration. Thus, out of 116 respondents, who wish to return to Azerbaijan, 16 (four of whom are younger than 24) link their desire to the Karabakh factor. Also, 22 respondents have reported engaging in the Azerbaijani media more after the Second Karabakh War started.

The desire of repatriation is also triggered, at least for some people, by certain social factors that seem to hold Azerbaijanis back from full integration into the Turkish society. Among major reasons impeding such integration, the respondents have reported the following: (a) Turkey’s values do not coincide with those of Azerbaijan (12 responses); (b) living in Turkey is a mental/psychological challenge (10 responses); (c) living in Turkey is an economic challenge (14 responses); and (d) Turkey has lost its attractiveness (10 responses). A few other respondents complained on being challenged by the Turkish cuisine (two responses), Turkish way of living (one response), religiousness (one response), manners of communication (one response), difficulties in finding employment (one response), and the distance some Turks try to keep with Azerbaijanis (five responses).

However, the participants also indicate serious obstacles of socio-economic character standing in the way of repatriation. Almost all of the labor migrants I interviewed expressed a concern over finding a job in Azerbaijan, and some said they would consider returning if serious social and economic reforms started in Nakhchivan without which finding a decent job would be a challenge. Some are concerned about finding a proper job with sufficient remuneration and prestige. Some musicians I interviewed expressed their desire to return to contribute to the revitalization of classical music in Azerbaijan but said they were not sure whether they would ever be invited and, if they did, whether they would be offered a decent job. One famous musician says he would be honored to return and help restore the classical music traditions of Azerbaijan, and that he is hoping he will be invited to be part of the country’s music education reforms.