Peretti begins her book with a thorough exposition of the state of legal scholarship on the Court, especially with regard to the undemocratic nature of judicial review and the legitimacy costs involved in such Court behavior. Indeed, the breadth of the review is remarkable. She discusses and defines neutralist approaches to judicial review, critical legal studies analyses, and reviews conducted by so-called skeptics. She finds fault with all of these interpretive models. First, the neutralists are “simply wrong” (p. 35) in thinking that an objective theory of constitutional interpretation exists that justices can apply neutrally, which allows them to maintain legitimacy and thus reconciles judicial review with democracy by allowing the Court to play a “special” apolitical role. The critical legal studies folks are right about the indeterminacy of the Constitution, but their responses to this reality (utopian speculation and judicial restraint) “are of no practical value” (p. 54). Indeed, according to Peretti, a Court that subjugates its preferences by restraining its power actually detracts from democracy and is more apt to hurt its legitimacy than a raging ideological Court would. Finally, the skeptics are misguided because, while they recognize the indeterminacy of the Constitution and recognize the potential for judicial mistakes, they still regard the Court as special, arguing that sometimes its decisions should be final because they are philosopher kings or prophets of some kind. They see the Court as superior to Congress in making certain types of decisions, yet argue that the Court should be subject to this inferior branch. Peretti deems this accommodation of judicial review and democracy “nonsensical” (p. 70).

In Part II, she attempts to defend her central claim that “there is nothing wrong with a political Court or with political motive in constitutional adjudication” (p. 73). Indeed, she argues that there are democratic benefits to such behavior by the Court. Value-voting on the Court promotes political representation (since judges are selected for and then decide in accordance with their political values), engages political checks on the Court (since policy-minded justices will care more about the policies they are espousing and as such be sure that they are implemented), and leads justices to consensus-building activities (since justices need to accommodate abhorrent views in order to install their policy preferences). The constitutional scholars are also wrong in their assumption that a political court begets legitimacy crises (since the public knows little about the Court, cares little about the Court, and is not adversely affected by politically driven decision making). Peretti systematically discusses each and defends each via reference to a huge body of empirical political science research.

Additionally, all of these theorists are fundamentally wrong, according to Peretti, because they totally misunderstand the U.S. brand of democracy. She argues that, because it is based on pluralism and not majoritarianism, complaints about the Court's lack of electoral accountability lose their bite. Indeed, in a pluralist democracy, in which emphasis is placed upon multiple means of influence for multiple groups, the Court's behavior is perfectly normal. The Court is merely one of several coequal branches of government, each offering different sorts of responsiveness and different levels of attention to certain types of groups. The Court is a unique entry point, first, because it may be better suited to hearing claims of the otherwise disenfranchised (although I am not altogether impressed by her justification of this point) and, second, because of its ability to review laws once they are in action and applied to a given controversy. In this way, the Court sees the unintended consequences of legislation, which the legislature is unable to see. Neither the Court nor the constitution is mythical in Peretti's analysis. They are merely additional checks in a pluralist nation. And this, in itself, is worthwhile.

However, there are a few things that I think Peretti could have done better or made stronger arguments for. For example, she discusses in detail the various external checks on the Court, concluding that even though they are not often used, they may still constrain the Court. I think, given her focus on quantifiable arguments and her criticism of the constitutional theorists who make remarks that are not quantitatively justifiable, that she should avoid making a strong argument for the efficacy of external checks. Indeed, little quantitative evidence of such an influence exists and the studies she cites are not convincing in that they are overwhelmingly case studies of peculiar instances where such an effect is identifiable. Not just neutralist legal scholars argue that political checks on the Court are ineffective; many attitudinal scholars also do so. Additionally, it is not clear why only policy-motivated justices would behave in this manner. Surely those judges who are motivated by legal policy, a particular reading of the constitution, or the intent of the framers also care greatly about the policy being made? Too strong a case is made for the influence of public opinion and for the nonfinality of Supreme Court decisions given the empirical evidence on this point.

Peretti could strengthen her argument that Congress is as countermajoritarian an institution as the Supreme Court (if we use constitutional theorists' definitions which center on electoral accountability) because of the incumbency advantage that exists. Surely, electoral sanctions are not perfect in that most-representative body and so that institution may also make decisions that are not strictly accountable to the public.

In short, this is a good, worthwhile book for both legal and judicial scholars. Political scientists can learn much from Peretti's review of constitutional theory, and constitutional theorists much from her review of empirical political science. Perhaps we all need to critically analyze our opinions about the Supreme Court. Is it really all that special?