Stephen Norwood's highly informative account of American academic leadership responses to Nazi Germany in the 1930s makes for depressing reading. The first chapter establishes that those willing to take in the realities of the new Germany soon focussed on its ruthless persecution of German Jews and brutal suppression of any democratic opposition. American journalists “warned about the very real possibility of a large-scale genocide of Germany's Jews” (9) while liberal diplomats reported on the increasing perversion of law and politics in that country. Soon a boycott movement and several large anti-Nazi protests were organized mainly by American Jewish groups, labor activists and New Deal liberals. But Norwood reviews these prescient observations and bold protests only to contrast them with the failure of America's elite universities to recognize the Third Reich for what it was and to respond accordingly. Instead administrators continued exchange programs; hosted high-ranking Nazi officials; and opened their doors, classrooms and newspapers to voices sympathetic to the new Germany and even to Nazi propaganda itself.
The book is an indictment in eight chapters, starting with Harvard and Columbia. Rather than disinterested study of the Third Reich, concern for respectability and decorum prevailed on both campuses, as Harvard hosted its alumnus and Hitler confidant Ernst Hanfstaengl (47–55) and Columbia the German ambassador Hans Luther. Not the visits of leading Nazis but the (Jewish) student and faculty protests against them were embarrassing to American Ivy League administrators. Professors argued that maintaining ties with Nazi German institutions of higher learning was a purely academic, not a political, matter. Throughout the book Norwood mentions in passing the example of colleges which cut their ties with German universities, and professors and students who vigorously protested Nazi politics, laws, and racist scholarship. This was (with one exception, Bryn Mawr) not the case for the Seven Sisters Colleges, where “many administrators, faculty and students … shared a sanguine view of Nazi Germany and enthusiastically participated in academic and cultural exchanges with the Third Reich” (chapter 4, at 105). The significance of this was that it “influenced many college youth toward greater sympathy for the Hitler regime” (117). Chapter 5 documents how revisionist historians and the prestigious Virginia Institute of Public Affairs “contributed to the Hitler regime's efforts to present Germany as a state with legitimate grievances and reasonable objectives” (133). Chapter 6 outs some German Departments, most notably at the New Jersey College for Women (Rutgers), as “Nazi Nests,” and chapter 7 showcases “American Catholic Universities' flirtation with fascism.” The epilogue discusses the role of former Harvard president James Conant as US High Commissioner and subsequently as ambassador to West Germany in the 1950s as an illustration of American clemency policy vis-à-vis Nazis.
The book relies on stark black-and-white accounts of both the realities of Nazi Germany and American reactions to it (appeasing as well as sharply critical ones) – and that makes a lot of sense to us today. But especially central characters like Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler and Harvard's Conant emerge as cardboard cutouts when – with a few more strokes – fuller biographic accounts could have illuminated not only these individuals' motives for pro-German (or pro-Nazi) leniency but also those of other American social and cultural elite members, too. An exploration of the political–cultural context which generated these pro-German as well as anti-Nazi attitudes is missing. But that is an important question: why did some Americans figure out what the Third Reich was all about and oppose it, while others displayed so much sympathetic understanding and even did some special pleading for Nazi Germany?
Political and social historians of Nazi Germany have shown that the overwhelming majority of Germans were thriving and content under Nazi rule up until 1943. The groups inside Germany who were targets of persecution were small in numbers: Jews, socialists, communists, homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses and people deemed handicapped. For Americans – that is, those who had any interest in overseas news – this raised the question of empathy and identification. As late as 1942–43 US government officials bemoaned the fact that many Americans apparently found it easier to relate to Germans than to victims of German aggression: Poles, Russians, Jews or French. Meanwhile, liberal groups in the United States picked up on a strategy first developed by Jewish American groups to portray attacks on Jews as an early warning system for an assault on humanism – Jews as the canaries of civilization. It deserves our closer attention who among America's political and cultural elites was able to understand the antidemocratic, racist and militarist nature of the New Germany and why.
Norwood's account is based on university archives, more specifically on campus newspapers and general newspaper reports of current events. At first this source base appeared somewhat limited to this reviewer. There is much scholarship – on Nazi Germany, on American political culture and public opinion of the 1930s as well as on postwar relations between the US and the Federal Republic – which could have been used to give more explanatory depth to this study of American academic responses to Nazi Germany. The chapter on the Seven Sisters, for example, addresses the status of women in the Third Reich and asks why especially female professors and students were so enthusiastic about this highly discriminatory regime. But the reality of Nazi Germany was complex and evidently seemed attractive to young ambitious undergraduates. Upon further reflection, however, Norwood's strict limitation to contemporary sources has the distinct advantage of showing what the American reading public could have known about various features of the Third Reich and how accurate and critical many American voices were with regard to Nazi Germany.
Finally, Norwood's important research raises questions that go beyond the book's scope: are American academic leaders who were duped by Nazi German propaganda comparable to leftist intellectuals who found Stalin's Russia attractive? Where should university administrators draw the line: at allowing the (Nazi) German ambassador Luther to speak on campus or the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? Norwood's book cannot answer such questions but offers a deeply researched account of the failings of a previous generation of academic administrators. The book ends with a quotation from Saul Bellow's novel Ravelstein, which discusses the former Iron Guardist Mircea Eliade's distinguished postwar career at the University of Chicago. It is a stark reminder how we academics at times fail to ask questions and willfully ignore the human disaster and suffering that powerful regimes inflict.
