The ECHR

3 Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR, entitled ‘Right not to be tried or punished twice’, provides:

European Union law

4 Article 2(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) determines the transactions subject to VAT.

5 According to Article 273 of that directive:

Italian law

6 Article 13(1) of the decreto legislativo n. 471 — Riforma delle sanzioni tributarie non penali in materia di imposte dirette, di imposta sul valore aggiunto e di riscossione dei tributi, a norma dell'articolo 3, comma 133, lettera q), della legge 23 dicembre 1996, n. 662 (Legislative Decree No 471 on the reform of non-criminal tax penalties in the field of direct taxation, value added tax and tax collection, in accordance with Article 3(133)(q) of Law No 662 of 23 December 1996) of 18 December 1997 (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 5 of 8 January 1998), in the version in force on the date of the facts in the main proceedings (‘Legislative Decree No 471/97’), was worded as follows:

7 Article 10a(1) of the Decreto legislativo n. 74 — Nuova disciplina dei reati in materia di imposte sui redditi e sul valore aggiunto, a norma dell'articolo 9 della legge 25 giugno 1999, n. 205 (Legislative Decree No 74 adopting new rules on offences relating to direct taxes and value added tax, pursuant to Article 9 of Law No 205 of 25 June 1999) of 10 March 2000 (GURI No 76 of 31 March 2000, p. 4), in its version in force on the date of the facts in the main proceedings (‘Legislative Decree No 74/2000’), provided:

8 Article 10b(1) of that legislative decree, entitled ‘Failure to pay VAT’, in the version in force on the date of the facts in the main proceedings, stated:

9 Article 20 of that legislative decree, entitled ‘Relationships between the criminal and tax proceedings’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:

10 Article 21 of that legislative decree, entitled ‘Administrative penalties for the offences regarded as falling within the scope of criminal law’, states, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof:

The criminal nature of the proceedings and penalties

26 As regards assessing whether proceedings and penalties, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are criminal in nature, it must be noted that, according to the Court's case-law, three criteria are relevant. The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the intrinsicnature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 2012, Bonda, C-489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 37, and of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 35).

27 Although it is for the referring court to assess, in the light of those criteria, whether the criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties at issue in the main proceedings are criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may nevertheless provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Mahdi, C-146/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:1320, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

28 In this case, it should be noted at the outset that the classification as criminal, in the light of the criteria noted in paragraph 26 of the present judgment, of the criminal proceedings at issue in the main proceedings and the penalties that are liable to result therefrom, is not at issue. The question arises, on the other hand, whether the administrative procedure involving Mr Menci and the final administrative penalty imposed on him following that procedure are criminal in nature, for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter.

29 In that regard, concerning the first criterion referred to in paragraph 26 of the present judgment, it is apparent from the case file before the Court that national law classifies the procedure giving rise to the imposition of that penalty as an administrative procedure.

30 Nevertheless, the application of Article 50 of the Charter is not limited to proceedings and penalties which are classified as ‘criminal’ by national law, but extends regardless of such a classification to proceedings and penalties which must be considered to have a criminal nature on the basis of the two other criteria referred to in paragraph 26 of the present judgment.

31 As regards the second criterion, relating to the intrinsicnature of the offence, it must be ascertained whether the purpose of the penalty at issue is punitive (see judgment of 5 June 2012, Bonda, C-489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 39). It follows therefrom that a penalty with a punitive purpose is criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, and that the mere fact that it also pursues a deterrence purpose does not mean that it cannot be characterised as a criminal penalty. As the Advocate General stated in point 113 of his Opinion, it is of the intrinsicnature of criminal penalties that they seek both to punish and to deter unlawful conduct. By contrast, a measure which merely repairs the damage caused by the offence at issue is not criminal in nature.

32 In this case, Article 13(1) of Legislative Decree No 471/97 provides, in the event of a failure to pay VAT due, for an administrative penalty which is added to the amount of VAT to be paid by the taxable person. Although that penalty is, as is contended by the Italian Government in its written observations, reduced where the tax is actually paid within a certain time limit after the failure to pay, the fact remains that the late payment of VAT due is punished by that penalty. It thus appears, which moreover corresponds with the referring court's assessment, that that penalty has a punitive purpose, which is the hallmark of a penalty of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter.

33 As regards the third criterion, it should be noted that the administrative penalty at issue in the main proceedings consists, in accordance with Article 13(1) of Legislative Decree No 471/97, of a fine of 30% of the VAT due which is added to the payment of that tax, and, without that being contested by the parties to the main proceedings, has a high degree of severity which is liable to support the view that that penalty is of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, which it is however for the referring court to determine.

The existence of the same offence

34 It follows from the very wording of Article 50 of the Charter that it prohibits prosecuting or imposing criminal sanctions on the same person more than once for the same offence (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2017, Orsi and Baldetti, C-217/15 and C-350/15, EU:C:2017:264, paragraph 18). As is stated by the referring court in its order for reference, the different proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature at issue in the main proceedings are directed against the same person, namely Mr Menci.

35 According to the Court's case-law, the relevant criterion for the purposes of assessing the existence of the same offence is identity of the material facts, understood as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together which resulted in the final acquittal or conviction of the person concerned (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 July 2007, Kraaijenbrink, C-367/05, EU:C:2007:444, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited, and of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C-261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraphs 39 and 40). Therefore, Article 50 of the Charter prohibits the imposition, with respect to identical facts, of several criminal penalties as a result of different proceedings brought for those purposes.

36 Moreover, the legal classification, under national law, of the facts and the legal interest protected are not relevant for the purposes of establishing the existence of the same offence, in so far as the scope of the protection conferred by Article 50 of the Charter cannot vary from one Member State to another.

37 In this case, it is apparent from the information in the order for reference that Mr Menci was made subject to a final administrative penalty of a criminal nature for having failed to pay, within the time limit stipulated by law, the VAT resulting from the annual tax return for the tax year 2011 and that the criminal proceedings at issue in the main proceedings relate to that omission.

38 Although, as the Italian Government contends in its written observations, the imposition of a criminal penalty following criminal proceedings, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, requires, unlike that pecuniary administrative penalty of a criminal nature, a subjective element, it must nevertheless be noted that the fact that the imposition of that criminal penalty depends on an additional constituent element in relation to the pecuniary administrative penalty of a criminal nature is not, in itself, capable of calling into question the identity of the material facts at issue. Subject to verification by the referring court, the pecuniary administrative penalty of a criminal nature and the criminal proceedings at issue in the main proceedings appear therefore to relate to the same offence.

39 In those circumstances, it appears that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings allows criminal proceedings to be brought against a person, such as Mr Menci, in respect of an offence consisting in the failure to pay VAT due on the basis of the tax return for a tax year, after the imposition on that person, in respect of the same acts, of a final administrative penalty of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter. Such a duplication of proceedings and penalties constitutes a limitation of the fundamental right guaranteed by that article.

The justification for the limitation of the right guaranteed in Article 50 of the Charter

40 It should be noted that, in its judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic (C-129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraphs 55 and 56), the Court ruled that a limitation to the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter may be justified on the basis of Article 52(1) thereof.

41 In accordance with the first sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by that Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. According to the second sentence of Article 52(1) thereof, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations to those rights and freedoms may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

42 In this case, it is not disputed that the possibility of duplicating criminal proceedings and penalties and administrative proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature is provided for by the law.

43 Moreover, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, respects the essential content of Article 50 of the Charter, since, according to the information in the case file before the Court, it allows such a duplication of proceedings and penalties only under conditions which are exhaustivelydefined, thereby ensuring that the right guaranteed by Article 50 is not called into question as such.

44 As regards the question whether the limitation of the ne bis in idem principle resulting from national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, meets an objective of general interest, it is apparent from the case file before the Court that that legislation seeks to ensure the collection of all the VAT due. In the light of the importance that is givenin the Court's case-law, for the purposes of achieving that objective, to combating VAT offences (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C-42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited), a duplication of criminal proceedings and penalties may be justified where those proceedings and penalties pursue, for the purpose of achieving such an objective, complementary aims relating, as the case may be, to different aspects of the same unlawful conduct at issue, which it is for the referring court to determine.

45 In that regard, in relation to VAT offences, it appears legitimate for a Member State to seek, first, to deter and punish any violation, whether intentional or not, of the rules relating to VAT returns and collection by imposing fixed administrative penalties, where appropriate, on a flat-rate basis and, secondly, to deter and punish serious violations of those rules, which are particularly damaging for society and which justify the adoption of more severe criminal penalties.

46 As regards compliance with the principle of proportionality, it requires that the duplication of proceedings and penalties provided for by national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not exceed what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by that legislation, it being understood that, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 2010, Müller Fleisch, C-562/08, EU:C:2010:93, paragraph 43; of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C-379/08 and C-380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 86; and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C-501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

47 In that regard, it must be noted that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 20 of the present judgment, Member States are free to choose the applicable penalties in order to ensure that all VAT revenue is collected. In the absence of harmonisation of EU law in the matter, the Member States have therefore the right to provide eitherfor a system in which VAT offences may be subject to proceedings and penalties only once, or fora system authorising the duplication of proceedings and penalties. In those circumstances, the proportionality of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, cannot be called into question by the mere fact that the Member State concerned made the choice to provide for the possibility of such a duplication, as otherwise that Member State would be deprived of that freedom of choice.

48 That having been clarified, it must be noted that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for such a possibility of duplication is capable of achieving the objective referred to in paragraph 44 of the present judgment.

49 With regard to its strict necessity, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must, first of all, provide for clear and precise rules allowing individuals to predict which acts or omissions are liable to be subject to such a duplication of proceedings and penalties.

50 In this case, as is apparent from the information in the case file before the Court, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in particular Article 13(1) of Legislative Decree No 471/97, provides for the conditions according to which the failure to pay VAT due within the time limits prescribed by law may give rise to the imposition of an administrative penalty of a criminal nature. In accordance with Article 13(1), and underthe conditions referred to in Article 10a(1) and Article 10b(1) of Legislative Decree No 74/2000, such a failure may also, if it relates to an annual tax return covering an amount of VAT greater than EUR 50 000, be subject to a term of imprisonment of between six months and two years.

51 It thus appears, subject to verification by the referring court, that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings clearly and precisely lays down the circumstances in which the failure to pay VAT due may be subject to a duplication of proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature.

52 Next, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must ensure that the disadvantages resulting, for the persons concerned, from such a duplication are limited to what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 44 of the present judgment.

53 As regards, first, the duplication of proceedings of a criminal nature which, as is apparent from the information in the case file, the requirement noted in the above paragraph implies the existence of rules ensuring coordination so as to reduce to what is strictly necessary the additional disadvantage associated with such a duplication for the persons concerned.

54 In this case, although the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings allows criminal proceedings to be brought even after the imposition of an administrative penalty of a criminal nature finally concluding the administrative proceedings, it is apparent from the information in the case file and summarised in paragraph 50 of the present judgment that that legislation appears to limit criminal penalties to offences which are particularly serious, namely offences relating to an amount of unpaid VAT which exceeds EUR 50 000, in relation to which the national legislature has provided for a term of imprisonment, the severity of which appears to justify the need to initiate, in order to impose such a sentence, infringement proceedings which are independent of the administrative proceedings of a criminal nature.

55 Secondly, the duplication of penalties of a criminal nature requires rules allowing it to be guaranteed that the severity of all of the penalties imposed corresponds with the seriousness of the offence concerned, that requirement resulting not only from Article 52(1) of the Charter, but also from the principle of proportionality of penalties set out in Article 49(3) thereof. Those rules must provide for the obligation for the competent authorities, in the event of the imposition of a second penalty, to ensure that the severity of all of the penalties imposed does not exceed the seriousness of the offence identified.

56 In this case, it appears to follow from Article 21 of Legislative Decree No 74/2000 that the latter is not limited to providing for the suspension of the enforcement of administrative penalties of a criminal nature during the criminal proceedings, but that it definitively prevents that enforcement after the criminal conviction of the person concerned. Moreover, according to the information in the order for reference, the voluntary payment of the tax debt, in so far as it covers also the administrative penalty imposed on the person concerned, constitutes a special mitigating factor to be taken into account in the context of the criminal proceedings. It thus appears that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings provides for the conditions appropriate for ensuring that the competent authorities limit the severity of all of the penalties imposed to what is strictly necessary in relation to the seriousness of the offence committed.

57 Therefore, it appears, subject to verification by the referring court, that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, makes it possible to ensure that the duplication of proceedings and penalties which it authorises does not exceed what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 44 of the present judgment.

58 It should again be noted that, although national legislation complying with the requirements set out in paragraphs 44, 49, 53 and 55 of the present judgment appear, in principle, capable of ensuring the necessary balance between the different interests at issue, it must also be applied by the national authorities and national courts so that the disadvantage resulting, in the case at hand and for the person concerned, from the duplication of proceedings and penalties, is not excessive in relation to the seriousness of the offence committed.

59 It is, ultimately, for the referring court to assess the proportionality of the practical application of that legislation in the context of the main proceedings, by balancing, on the one hand, the seriousness of the tax offence at issue and, on the other hand, the actual disadvantage resulting for the person concerned from the duplication of proceedings and penalties at issue in the main proceedings.

60 Finally, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that their meaning and scope are the same as those laid down by that convention. It is therefore necessary to take account of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 50 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2016, N., C-601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 77, and of 5 April 2017, Orsi and Baldetti, C-217/15 and C-350/15, EU:C:2017:264, paragraph 24).

61 In that regard, the European Court of Human Rights has held that a duplication of tax and criminal proceedings and penalties punishing the same violation of the tax law does not infringe the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, where the tax and criminal proceedings at issue have a sufficiently close connection in substance and time (ECtHR, 15 November 2016, A and B v Norway, CE:ECHR:2016:1115JUD002413011, § 132).

62 Therefore, the conditions to which Article 50 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof, subjects a possible duplication of criminal proceedings and penalties and of administrative proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature, as is apparent from paragraphs 44, 49, 53, 55 and 58 of the present judgment, ensure a level of protection of the ne bis in idem principle which is not in conflict with that guaranteed by Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.

63 In the light of all of the above considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation in accordance with which criminal proceedings may be brought against a person for failing to pay VAT due within the time limits stipulated by law, although that person has already been made subject, in relation to the same acts, to a final administrative penalty of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, on condition that that legislation

• – pursues an objective of general interest which is such as to justify such a duplication of proceedings and penalties, namely combating VAT offences, it being necessary for those proceedings and penalties to pursue additional objectives,

• – contains rules ensuring coordination which limits to what is strictly necessary the additional disadvantage which results, for the persons concerned, from a duplication of proceedings, and

• – provides for rules making it possible to ensure that the severity of all of the penalties imposed is limited to what is strictly necessary in relation to the seriousness of the offence concerned.

64 It is for the national court to ensure, taking into account all of the circumstances in the main proceedings, that the actual disadvantage resulting for the person concerned from the application of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings and from the duplication of the proceedings and penalties that that legislation authorises is not excessive in relation to the seriousness of the offence committed.

The ECHR

3 Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR, entitled ‘Right not to be tried or punished twice’, provides:

European Union law

4 In accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16), Member States are to prohibit any person from engaging in market manipulation. The meaning of market manipulation is stated in Article 1(2) of that directive.

5 Under Article 14(1) of that directive:

Italian law

6 Article 185 of the Decreto legislativo n. 58 — Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria, ai sensi degli articoli 8 e 21 della legge 6 febbraio 1996, n. 52 (Legislative Decree No 58, consolidating all provisions in the field of financial intermediation, within the meaning of Articles 8 and 21 of Law No 52 of 6 February 1996), of 24 February 1998 (ordinary supplement to GURI No 71, of 26 March 1998), as amended by the legge n. 62 — Disposizioni per l'adempimento di obblighi derivanti dall'appartenenza dell'Italia alle Comunità europee. Legge comunitaria 2004 (Law No 62 laying down provisions to implement obligations resulting from Italy's membership of the European Communities. Community Law 2004), of 18 April 2005 (ordinary supplement to GURI No 76, of 27 April 2005) (‘the TUF’), entitled ‘Market manipulation’, provides:

7 Article 187b of the TUF, entitled ‘Market manipulation’, is worded as follows:

8 Article 187i of the TUF, entitled ‘Relations with the judiciary’, states:

9 Article 187k(1) of the TUF, entitled ‘Relationship between the criminal proceedings and the administrative and opposition proceedings’, provides:

10 Under Article 187l of the TUF, entitled ‘Enforcement of pecuniary penalties and pecuniary sanctions in criminal proceedings’:

The first question

21 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 50 of the Charter, read in the light of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits the possibility of bringing administrative proceedings against a person in respect of unlawful conduct consisting in market manipulation for which the same person has already been finally convicted.

22 First of all, it should be noted that, under Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, Member States are to impose, without prejudice to their right to impose criminal penalties, effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative measures or sanctions against the persons responsible for market manipulation.

23 According to the information in the order for reference, Article 187b of the TUF was adopted in order to transpose into Italian law those provisions of Directive 2003/6. Therefore, the administrative procedure at issue in the main proceedings and the administrative fine provided for in Article 187b imposed on Mr Ricucci amount to an implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. As a result, they must inter alia respect the fundamental right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence, guaranteed by Article 50 thereof.

24 Moreover, whilst, as Article 6(3) TEU confirms, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and whilst Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, for as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 44, and of 15 February 2016, N., C-601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

25 According to the explanations relating to Article 52 of the Charter, Article 52(3) thereof is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR, ‘without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and … that of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (judgments of 15 February 2016, N., C-601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 47, and of 14 September 2017, K., C-18/16, EU:C:2017:680, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

26 Therefore, the examination of the question referred must be undertaken in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter and, in particular, of Article 50 thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2017, Orsi and Baldetti, C-217/15 and C-350/15, EU:C:2017:264, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

27 Article 50 of the Charter provides that ‘no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law’. Therefore, the ne bis in idem principle prohibits a duplication both of proceedings and of penalties which are criminal in nature for the purposes of that article in respect of the same acts and against the same person (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 34).

The criminal nature of the proceedings and penalties

28 As regards the assessment as towhether proceedings and penalties, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are criminal in nature, it must be noted that, according to the Court's case-law, three criteria are relevant. The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the intrinsic nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 2012, Bonda, C-489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 37, and of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 35).

29 Although it is for the referring court to assess, in the light of those criteria, whether the criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties at issue in the main proceedings are criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may nevertheless provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Mahdi, C-146/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:1320, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

30 In this case, it should be noted at the outset that the classification as criminal, in the light of the criteria noted in paragraph 28 of the present judgment, of the criminal proceedings and the term of imprisonment, referred to in paragraph 14 of the present judgment, imposed on Mr Ricucci, is not at issue. The question arises, on the other hand, whether the administrative fine and the administrative proceedings at issue in the main proceedings are criminal in nature, for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter.

31 In that regard, concerning the first criterion referred to in paragraph 28 of the present judgment, it is apparent from the case file before the Court that national law classifies the procedure giving rise to the imposition of that penalty as administrative proceedings.

32 Nevertheless, the application of Article 50 of the Charter is not limited to proceedings and penalties which are classified as ‘criminal’ by national law, but extends regardless of such a classification to proceedings and penalties which must be considered to have a criminal nature on the basis of the two other criteria referred to in paragraph 28 of the present judgment.

33 As regards the second criterion, relating to the very nature of the offence, it must be ascertained whether the purpose of the penalty at issue is punitive (see judgment of 5 June 2012, Bonda, C-489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 39). It follows therefrom that a penalty with a punitive purpose is criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, and that the mere fact that it also pursues a deterrence purpose does not mean that it cannot be characterised as a criminal penalty. As the Advocate General stated in point 64 of his Opinion, it is of the very nature of criminal penalties that they seek both to punish and to deter unlawful conduct. By contrast, a measure which merely repairs the damage caused by the offence at issue is not criminal in nature.

34 In this case, Article 187b of the TUF provides that any person who has committed market manipulation is liable to an administrative fine of between EUR 20 000 and 5 000 000, and that penalty may, in certain circumstances, as follows from paragraph 5 of that article, be increased by up to 3 times its amount or up to an amount 10 times greater than the proceeds or profit obtained from the offence. Moreover, the Italian Government stated, in its observations submitted to the Court, that the application of that penalty always involves the confiscation of the product or the profit gained as a result of the offence and the goods used for the commission thereof. It appears therefore that that penalty is not only intended to repair the harm caused by the offence, but that it also pursues a punitive purpose, which moreover corresponds to the referring court's assessment and that it is therefore criminal in nature.

35 As regards the third criterion, it should be noted that an administrative fine which can be of an amount up to 10 times greater than the proceeds or profit obtained from the market manipulation has a high degree of severity which is liable to support the view that that penalty is criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, which it is, however, for the referring court to determine.

The existence of the same offence

36 It follows from the very wording of Article 50 of the Charter that it prohibits the prosecution or the imposition of criminal penalties on the same person more than once for the same offence (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2017, Orsi and Baldetti, C-217/15 and C-350/15, EU:C:2017:264, paragraph 18). As is stated by the referring court in its order for reference, the different proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature at issue in the main proceedings are directed against the same person, namely Mr Ricucci.

37 According to the Court's case-law, the relevant criterion for the purposes of assessing the existence of the same offence is identity of the material facts, understood as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together and which resulted in the final acquittal or conviction of the person concerned (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 July 2007, Kraaijenbrink, C-367/05, EU:C:2007:444, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited, and of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C-261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraphs 39 and 40). Therefore, Article 50 of the Charter prohibits the imposition, with respect to identical facts, of several criminal penalties at the conclusionof different proceedings brought for those purposes.

38 Moreover, the legal classification, under national law, of the facts and the legal interest protected are not relevant for the purposes of establishing the existence of the same offence, in so far as the scope of the protection conferred by Article 50 of the Charter cannot vary from one Member State to another.

39 In this case, the referring court states that it is the same conduct, consisting in market manipulation intended to draw attention to the securities of RCS MediaGroup, which Mr Ricucci is alleged to have committed both in the criminal proceedings which led to his final criminal conviction and in the proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature at issue in the main proceedings.

40 Although, as Consob contends in its written observations, the imposition of a criminal penalty following criminal proceedings, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, requires, unlike that administrative fine of a criminal nature, a subjective element, it must be noted that the fact that the imposition of that criminal penalty depends on an additional constituent element in relation to the administrative fine of a criminal nature is not, in itself, capable of calling into question the identity of the material facts at issue. Subject to verification by the referring court, the administrative fine of a criminal nature and the criminal proceedings at issue in the main proceedings appear therefore to relate to the same offence.

41 In those circumstances, it appears that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings permits the possibility of bringing administrative proceedings of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter against a person, such as Mr Ricucci, in respect of unlawful conduct consisting in market manipulation for which the same person has already been finally convicted. However, such a duplication of proceedings and penalties constitutes a limitation of the right guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter.

The justification for the limitation of the right guaranteed in Article 50 of the Charter

42 It should be noted that, in its judgment of 27 May 2014, Spasic (C-129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraphs 55 and 56), the Court ruled that a limitation to the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter may be justified on the basis of Article 52(1) thereof.

43 In accordance with the first sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by that Charter must be provided for by law and must respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. According to the second sentence of Article 52(1) thereof, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations to those rights and freedoms may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet other objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

44 In this case, it is not disputed that the possibility of duplicating criminal proceedings and penalties and administrative proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature is provided for by the law.

45 Moreover, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, respects the essential content of Article 50 of the Charter, since it allows such a duplication of proceedings and penalties only under certain conditions which are exhaustively defined, thereby ensuring that the right guaranteed by Article 50 is not called into question as such.

46 As regards the question whether the limitation of the ne bis in idem principle resulting from national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, meets an objective of general interest, it is apparent from the case file before the Court that that legislation seeks to protect the integrity of the financial markets of the European Union and public confidence in financial instruments. In the light of the importance that is givenin the Court's case-law, for the purposes of achieving that objective, to combating infringements of the prohibition on market manipulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck, C-45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraphs 37 and 42), a duplication of criminal proceedings and penalties may be justified where those proceedings and penalties pursue, for the purpose of achieving such an objective, complementary aims relating, as the case may be, to different aspects of the same unlawful conduct at issue, which it is for the referring court to determine.

47 In that regard, concerning offences relating to market manipulation, it seems legitimate that a Member State mightwish, first, to dissuade and punish any infringement, whether intentional or not, of the prohibition of market manipulation by imposing administrative penalties set, as the case may be, on a flat-rate basis and, secondly, to dissuade and punish serious infringements of such a prohibition, which have particularly negative effects on society and which justify the adoption of the most severe criminal penalties.

48 As regards compliance with the principle of proportionality, it requires that the duplication of proceedings and penalties provided for by national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not exceed what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by that legislation, it being understood that, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 2010, Müller Fleisch, C-562/08, EU:C:2010:93, paragraph 43; of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C-379/08 and C-380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 86; and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C-501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

49 In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, Member States are free to choose the penalties applicable to persons responsible for market manipulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck, C-45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraphs 71 and 72). In the absence of harmonisation of EU law in the matter, Member States therefore have the right to provide either for a system in which infringements of the prohibition of market manipulation may be subject to proceedings and penalties only once, or fora system allowing a duplication of proceedings and penalties. In those circumstances, the proportionality of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, cannot be called into question by the mere fact that the Member State concerned chose to provide for the possibility of such a duplication, without which that Member State would be deprived of that freedom of choice.

50 That having been clarified, it must be noted that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for such a possibility of duplication is capable of achieving the objective referred to in paragraph 46 of the present judgment.

51 With regard to its strict necessity, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must, first of all, provide for clear and precise rules allowing individuals to predict which acts or omissions are liable to be subject to such a duplication of proceedings and penalties.

52 In this case, as is apparent from the information in the case file before the Court, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in particular Article 187b of the TUF, provides for the conditions in accordance with which the dissemination of untrue statements and the employment of fictitious devices, capable of giving false or misleading information about financial instruments, can give rise to the imposition of an administrative fine of a criminal nature. In accordance with Article 187b of the TUF, and in the circumstances referred to in Article 185 thereof, such conduct can also, where it is liable to affect significantly the value of financial instruments, be subject to a term of imprisonment and a criminal fine.

53 It therefore appears, subject to verification by the referring court, that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings clearly and precisely sets out the circumstances in which market manipulation can be subject to a duplication of proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature.

54 Next, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must ensure that the disadvantages resulting, for the persons concerned, from such a duplication are limited to what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 46 of the present judgment.

55 As regards, first, the duplication of proceedings of a criminal nature which, as is apparent from the information in the case file, the requirement noted in the above paragraph implies the existence of rules ensuring coordination so as to reduce to what is strictly necessary the additional disadvantage associated with such a duplication for the persons concerned.

56 Secondly, the duplication of penalties of a criminal nature requires rules allowing it to be guaranteed that the severity of the sum of all of the penalties imposed corresponds with the seriousness of the offence concerned, that requirement resulting not only from Article 52(1) of the Charter, but also from the principle of proportionality of penalties set out in Article 49(3) thereof. Those rules must provide for the obligation for the competent authorities, in the event of the imposition of a second penalty, to ensure that the severity of the sum of all of the penalties imposed does not exceed the seriousness of the offence identified.

57 In this case, admittedly, the obligation for cooperation and coordination between the prosecution service and Consob provided for in Article 187i of the TUF is liable to reduce the disadvantage resulting, for the person concerned, from the duplication of an administrative fine of a criminal nature and criminal proceedings due to unlawful conduct constituting market manipulation. However, it should be noted that, in the event of a criminal conviction under Article 185 of the TUF following criminal proceedings, the bringing of the proceedings relating to an administrative fine of a criminal nature exceeds what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, in so far as that criminal conviction is such as to punish the offence committed in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner.

58 In that regard, it is apparent from the information in the case file before the Court and which is summarised in paragraph 52 of the present judgment, that market manipulation liable to be subject to a criminal conviction under Article 185 of the TUF must be of a certain seriousness and that the penalties liable to be imposed under that provision include a prison sentence and a criminal fine in a range which corresponds to that provided for in respect of the administrative fine of a criminal nature referred to in Article 187b of the TUF.

59 In those circumstances, it seems that the act of bringing proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature under Article 187b of the TUF exceeds what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, in so far as the final criminal conviction is, given the harm caused to the company by the offence committed, such as to punish that offence in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner, which it is for the referring court to determine.

60 It should be added, as regards the duplication of penalties authorised by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, that the latter seems merely to provide in Article 187l of the TUF that, where, with respect to the same acts, a criminal fine and an administrative fine of a criminal nature have been imposed, recovery of the former is limited to the part exceeding the amount of the second. In so far as Article 187l of the TUF appears solely to apply to the duplication of pecuniary penalties and not to the duplication of an administrative fine of a criminal nature and a term of imprisonment, it appears that that article does not guarantee that the severity of all of the penalties imposed are limited to what is strictly necessary in relation to the seriousness of the offence concerned.

61 Therefore, it appears that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which authorises, after a final criminal conviction, under the conditions identified in the paragraph above, the bringing of proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature, goes beyond what is strictly necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, which it is however for the referring court to determine.

62 That conclusion is not called into question by the fact that the final sentence pronounced in accordance with Article 185 of the TUF can, where appropriate, subsequently be extinguished as a result of a pardon, as seems to have happened in the case in the main proceedings. It follows from Article 50 of the Charter that the protection conferred by the ne bis in idem principle must benefit persons who have already been finally acquitted or convicted, including, consequently, those who have been made subject, by such a conviction, to a criminal penalty which was subsequently extinguished as a result of a pardon. Therefore, such a circumstance is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is strictly necessary.

63 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits the possibility of bringing administrative proceedings against a person in respect of unlawful conduct consisting in market manipulation for which the same person has already been finally convicted, in so far as that conviction is, given the harm caused to the company by the offence committed, such as to punish that offence in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner.

The second question

64 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the ne bis in idem principle provided for in Article 50 of the Charter confers on individuals a directly applicable right in the context of a dispute such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

65 In accordance with settled case-law, the provisions of primary law which impose precise and unconditional obligations, not requiring, for their application, any further action on the part of the EU or national authorities, create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 July 1969, Brachfeld and Chougol Diamond, 2/69 and 3/69, EU:C:1969:30, paragraphs 22 and 23, and of 20 September 2001, Banks, C-390/98, EU:C:2001:456, paragraph 91).

66 The right that Article 50 of the Charter confers on individuals is not subject, according to the very wording of that provision, to any conditions and is therefore directly applicable in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings.

67 In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has already recognised the direct effect of Article 50 of the Charter by concluding, in paragraph 45 of the judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105), that, in the course of the assessment of the compatibility of provisions of domestic law with the rights guaranteed by the Charter, the national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.

68 Therefore, the answer to the second question is that the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter confers on individuals a right which is directly applicable in the context of a dispute such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

The ECHR

3 Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’), entitled ‘Right not to be tried or punished twice’, provides:

EU law

4 Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16), is worded as follows:

5 Article 3 of that directive provides:

6 Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 provides:

Italian law

7 Article 184 of the Decreto legislativo n. 58 — Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria, ai sensi degli articoli 8 e 21 della legge 6 febbraio 1996, n. 52 (Legislative Decree No 58, consolidating all provisions in the field of financial intermediation, within the meaning of Articles 8 and 21 of Law No 52 of 6 February 1996), of 24 February 1998 (ordinary supplement to GURI No 71, of 26 March 1998), as amended by the legge n. 62 — Disposizioni per l'adempimento di obblighi derivanti dall'appartenenza dell'Italia alle Comunità europee. Legge comunitaria 2004 (Law No 62 laying down provisions to implement obligations resulting from Italy's membership of the European Communities. Community Law 2004), of 18 April 2005 (ordinary supplement to GURI No 76, of 27 April 2005) (‘the TUF’), entitled ‘Misuses of inside information’, provides:

8 Article 187a of the TUF, inserted into that law by the Law of 18 April 2005 referred to in the above paragraph, is entitled ‘Misuses of insider information’. It is worded as follows:

9 The connections between criminal proceedings and administrative and opposition proceedings are governed by Articles 187i to 187l of the TUF. Article 187i, entitled ‘Relations with the judiciary’, states:

10 Under Article 187j of the TUF, entitled ‘Powers of [Consob] in criminal proceedings’:

11 Article 187k(1) of the TUF provides:

12 Article 654 of the Codice di procedura penale (Code of Criminal Procedure) (‘the CPP’) provides:

The first question

24 First of all, it should be noted that, although the first question concerns the interpretation of Article 50 of the Charter, the referring court asks, in particular, about the compatibility of Article 654 of the CPP with Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 and the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter. According to that court, an interpretation according to which Article 14(1) of that directive requires, irrespective of the ne bis in idem principle, proceedings for an administrative fine to be brought even following a final criminal conviction which has res judicata effect, would be liable to call into question the principle of res judicata, contrary to what is provided for by Article 654 of the CPP.

25 In those circumstances, it is necessary to understand that, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in the light of Article 50 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation in accordance with which proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature may not be brought following a final criminal judgment of acquittal ruling that the acts capable of constituting a violation of the legislation relating to insider dealing, on the basis of which those proceedings had also been initiated, were not established.

26 In that regard, it must be noted that Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 thereof, requires Member States to have rules on effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for violations of the prohibition on insider dealing. Although the Court has held that Article 14(1) of that directive merely requires Member States to provide administrative penalties presenting those characteristics, without requiring Member States also to lay down criminal sanctions against authors of insider dealing (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck, C-45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 42), the fact remains that Member States are also entitled to provide for a duplication of criminal and administrative sanctions, complying, however, with the limits imposed by EU law and, in particular, those resulting from the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter, the latter applying, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof, when implementing that law.

27 However, the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties provided for by Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 in the event of violations of the prohibition on insider dealing, assumes that the competent national authorities identify the facts establishing the existence, in the case concerned, of such dealing capable of justifying the imposition of an administrative penalty.

28 As is apparent from the order for reference, in the context of the disputes in the main proceedings, it was held, following adversarial criminal proceedings, by a final criminal judgment which has res judicata effect, that the factors constituting insider dealing were not established.

29 The question therefore arises, in that context, whether Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 precludes national legislation, such as Article 654 of the CPP, which extends to the proceedings for an administrative fine the res judicata effects of those factual conclusions, made in the context of the criminal proceedings.

30 In that regard, it should be noted that neither Article 14(1) nor any other provision of Directive 2003/6 states the effects of a final criminal judgment on proceedings for an administrative fine.

31 Moreover, in light of the importance of the principle of res judicata both in the legal order of the EU and in national legal orders, the Court has held that EU law does not preclude the application of national procedural rules conferring res judicata effects on a judicial decision (see, to that effect, as regards the principle of effectiveness, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraphs 58 and 59, and of 6 October 2015, Târşia, C-69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 28 and 29).

32 In this case, no particular circumstances of the cases in the main proceedings, as described in the case file before the Court, justify an approach different from that taken by the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph. In that regard, it should be noted that, although Article 654 of the CPP extends res judicata effects of criminal proceedings to proceedings for an administrative fine, it is apparent from the wording of that provision, as set out in the order for reference, that res judicata effects are limited to the factual conclusions reached by a criminal judgment delivered following adversarial proceedings.

33 According to Article 187j of the TUF, Consob is free to participate in criminal proceedings, in particular as a civil party, and is moreover required, under Article 187i of the TUF, to send to the judicial authorities the documents collected during the exercise of its supervision. In light of those rules, it appears that Consob can effectively ensure that a criminal conviction or, as in the case in the main proceedings, an acquittal is delivered taking into account all of the evidence at the disposal of those authorities for the purposes of imposing an administrative fine under Article 187a of the TUF.

34 Therefore, the res judicata effects which a national provision confers on the factual conclusions of such a criminal judgment in relation to proceedings for an administrative fine do not prevent the finding of violations of the legislation on insider dealing and that they be effectively punished, where, according to the terms of that judgment, the facts at issue are established.

35 Otherwise, the obligation, imposed on Member States by Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties cannot, in view of what was noted in paragraph 31 of the present judgment, result in disregarding the force of res judicata which a final criminal judgment of acquittal has, in accordance with a national provision such as Article 654 of the CPP, in relation to proceedings for an administrative penalty relating to the same facts as those which were held by the judgment not to be established. Such an assessment is without prejudice to the possibility, provided for in Article 4(2) of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, to reopen, where appropriate, criminal proceedings where there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the criminal judgment.

36 In those circumstances, Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 does not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

37 That interpretation is confirmed by Article 50 of the Charter.

38 In that regard, it is apparent from the order for reference that the acts of which Mr Di Puma and Mr Zecca are accused in the context of the proceedings for an administrative fine at issue in the main proceedings are the same as those on the basis of which criminal proceedings were brought against them before the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan). Moreover, the administrative fines at issue in the main proceedings can, according to the information in the case file before the Court, reach, in accordance with Article 187a of the TUF, an amount 10 times greater than the proceeds or profit derived from the offence. It thus appears that they are punitive in character and present a high degree of severity and, therefore, are criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C-537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraphs 34 and 35), which it is however for the referring court to determine.

39 It must be added that, according to the wording itself of Article 50 of the Charter, the protection conferred by the ne bis in idem principle is not limited to situations in which the person concerned has been subject to a criminal conviction, but extends also to those in which that person is finally acquitted.

40 It appears therefore that the bringing of proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature, based on the same facts, constitutes a limitation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgments of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 39, and of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C-537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 41).

41 Such a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle may however be justified on the basis of Article 52(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C-129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraphs 55 and 56; of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 40, and of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C-537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 42).

42 In that regard, it should be pointed out that the objective of protecting the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in financial instruments is such as to justify a duplication of proceedings and penalties of a criminal nature such as that provided for by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, where those proceedings and penalties have, for the purpose of achieving such an objective, additional complementary objectives covering, as the case may be, different aspects of the same unlawful conduct at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C-537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 46).

43 However, the bringing of proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, following the final conclusion of criminal proceedings, is subject to strict compliance with the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C-537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 48). In that regard, it should be noted that, unlike the situation leading to the judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105), in which the criminal proceedings had been brought after the imposition of a tax penalty, the cases in the main proceedings raise the question whether proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature may be brought where a final criminal judgment of acquittal has concluded that the acts capable of constituting a violation of the legislation on insider dealing, on the basis of which those proceedings had also been initiated, were not established.

44 In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the bringing of proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature clearly exceeds what is necessary in order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 42 of the present judgment, since there exists a judgment of acquittal holding that there are no factors constituting an offence which Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6 seeks to punish.

45 In light of such a conclusion, which has res judicata effect also in relation to such proceedings, the bringing of those proceedings seems to be devoid of any basis. Article 50 of the Charter thus precludes, in such a situation, the bringing of proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, without prejudice to the possibility, referred to in paragraph 35 of the present judgment, of reopening, where appropriate, criminal proceedings where there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the criminal judgment.

46 In view the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in the light of Article 50 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation in accordance with which proceedings for an administrative fine of a criminal nature may not be brought following a final criminal judgment of acquittal ruling that the acts capable of constituting a violation of the legislation relating to insider dealing, on the basis of which those proceedings had also been initiated, were not established.

The second question

47 In the light of the answer to the first question, there is no need to answer the second question.