I am grateful to my critics for the time and attention they have devoted to my study. Because each commentary is so rich in possible lines of inquiry, I am compelled to leave aside our several agreements in order to respond to a handful of those disagreements that, as I hope, will be of interest also to others. First, a “methodological” concern. Ryan Balot charges me with being “in thrall to Plato's own categories of analysis.” To this charge I plead guilty but refuse to beg the court for mercy. My book is intended to set forth Plato's intention in presenting Protagoras, and this, it seems to me, requires grasping the questions Plato wished to teach us in the terms he thought best. Balot contends that Plato shows Protagoras in a “distorting and uncharitable light.” This judgment presupposes not only access to the undistorted Protagoras but also a clear-eyed view of Plato's “light,” such that it can be judged correctly for what it is. But does not this latter have as its prerequisite understanding precisely Plato's intention—and hence our being, at least to begin with, “in thrall to Plato's own categories of analysis”? Those categories may finally be inadequate, of course, in which case we would be entitled to describe Plato's Socrates as, say, an “intellectualist” and “psychological monist”—but this would be to turn away from Plato to something we would then know to be better. I am not in a position to do so.
The Protagoras most obviously concerns the question of the identity of virtue, its parts or kinds, and whether these are teachable. Roslyn Weiss and I agree about the division of the virtues as Protagoras presents them: first justice, piety, and moderation, and then, after his long speech, wisdom and courage, too. Yet Weiss suggests that the sophist is not aware of this division or that he “seems to be merely careless.” I contend that Protagoras is aware of this division in his presentation of virtue and in fact regards it as crucial to his purpose: the city with its laws, backed up by myths of divine sanction, “teaches” us against our natural bent to serve the good of others, in the name of justice and piety and moderation, what Protagoras dubs “political virtue.” He, by contrast, teaches what he regards as wisdom, “the greatest” of the virtues, especially to those equipped with a certain courage (330a2). Not to put too fine a point on it, Protagoras is a teacher of injustice and prides himself on the fact. Hence the need for “clever speaking.” We do not get to the heart of the matter by speaking of “civilization” or of the ability to read and write: as Protagoras says in a moment of remarkable candor, only a madman would admit to being unjust—to having open contempt for the city's laws and gods. Veiled contempt, Protagoras implies, is sanity itself.
Both Weiss and Balot raise questions concerning the hedonism of Protagoras. I am of the view, which I cannot here prove, that Protagoras does indeed understand himself to be a hedonist but that he declines to admit as much to a Socrates revealed by that point in the conversation to be no ally (consider the caginess of his three-part response at 351c1–2, c7–d7, and e3–7). That in the end Protagoras misunderstands himself on this score is indicated by his inability to accept Socrates's analysis of courage on the basis of hedonism or by his inability to stick to his careful separation hitherto of what is “noble” (kalon) from what is “good” (agathon) understood as the advantageous. Here Balot objects that “dissociating what is noble or just from what is advantageous to the ethical agent is characteristic of modern moral philosophy, particularly in its Kantian guise.” I cannot agree. Such “dissociation” is characteristic of a moral decency that is, to say the least, not peculiarly modern:
Both those who praise and those who blame others do not examine whether someone acted advantageously or harmfully, but they often praise him because, in slighting what was profitable for himself, he acted because it was noble to do so—for example, they praise Achilles because he came to the aid of his comrade Patroclus, knowing that he himself must die, when it was otherwise possible for him to live. To him, then, such a death was nobler, whereas continuing to live was advantageous. (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1358b38–1359a6)
It may well be true that Plato and Aristotle are “eudaimonists,” but this is to state a puzzle rather than to solve one. Aristotle, for example, begins and ends the Nicomachean Ethics with an inquiry into happiness, and yet he is all but silent concerning it in his lengthy analysis of moral virtue, which is said to be “for the sake of what is noble” (e.g., 1115b12–13). To separate nobility from what is good or advantageous need not be to treat virtue “dismissively” at all: it is rather to bring out the specific beauty (to kalon) attending many acts of selfless devotion: “Death and wounds will be painful to the courageous man and he will endure them involuntarily, but he will endure them because it is noble to do so. … To this sort of person, living is especially worthwhile, and he is deprived of the greatest goods knowingly—and this is a painful thing” (1117b7–13). It took a Kant to call or recall this simple (yet not so simple) fact to the attention of those moderns who had accepted too easily the equation of happiness with the demands of duty or right. That equation, or hope, is surely among the highest themes of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and their treatment of it cannot be reduced to a formula. As for Protagoras, he believes himself to be a “eudaimonist” indeed, but in this too he lacks self-knowledge: he is moved, despite himself, by precisely the noble understood as what may come at great cost to oneself.
The distinction between philosopher and sophist is more difficult to pin down than one might think. Roslyn Weiss suggests that a genuine concern for the state of the souls of others is present in Socrates but altogether absent from Protagoras. I am inclined to put it somewhat differently. The desire to understand things as they are, or the intense hatred of the “lie in the soul” (Republic 382a4–b9), is dominant in the philosopher but lacking or deficient in the sophist. Socrates's first concern, then, is with the health of his own soul; Socrates holds it to be a greater good to be refuted than to refute another “inasmuch as it is a greater good to be rid of the greatest ill oneself than to rid another of it” (Gorgias 458a3–7). This is not to deny for a moment that Socrates, in his health, had a genuine concern for others. The action of the Protagoras makes this plain. There Socrates does all he can to save young Hippocrates from the clutches of the sophist: far from being a “corrupter of the young,” Socrates saves them from corruption. But this laudable service is accomplished no later than, say, 333d, after which point Socrates will investigate a question of concern to him himself (consider 348c5–6). Thus the whole of the dialogue before us cannot be explained solely by recourse to Socrates's concern for the fate of Hippocrates (335b2–3).
My book examines not only the Protagoras but also the portion of the Theaetetus that is devoted to the sophist's answer to the question “what is knowledge (epistēmē)?” and both Paul Stern and Waller Newell speak chiefly to my treatment of the latter dialogue. As Stern powerfully indicates, knowledge or science—the correct grasp of the world on the part of the unassisted human mind in its health—is possible only if we have access to the way things must of necessity and always be, or to an intelligible nature. But “nature” is controversial. The Theaetetus brings out two challenges to knowledge or science. First, and more obviously, it portrays the intraphilosophic quarrel, so to speak, between the Heracliteans and the Parmenideans, the principal division between the philosophic schools as Socrates encountered them (Tht. 152e1–3; 183e3–184a1 and context). Protagoras, for his part, belongs squarely among the Heracliteans. What does this mean in his case? According to Protagoras, knowledge is nothing other than perception, of which each human being proves to be the measure, “of the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they are not.” Protagoras puts his own stamp on this ambiguous statement by arguing that we have no reliable access to a stable world ready and waiting to be measured by “the” human mind. All things are in constant motion, that is, constantly changing, not just the things perceived but the perceiver, too. And Protagoras attempts to think through this instability to its end: he sketches a most thoroughgoing “relativism” that includes not only the noble and the just, as thinkers before him too had suggested, but evidently also the good. (This is roughly the opposite of today's relativism, by the way, which posits the relativity of the good—e.g., the goodness of every lifestyle—while claiming certain knowledge of justice or right.)
Why then was Protagoras tempted or more than tempted to include even the good in the flux? Here we encounter the second, but less manifest, challenge to knowledge or science, as Paul Stern brings out beautifully, for at key places in the Theaetetus Plato points to the challenge external to any rational orientation: the challenge of the prophets or diviners who as such claim special access to the most fundamental truth or truths (e.g., 158b1–3; 161c8; 162c2–163a1; 170a10–b1; 171c1–3; 178e9–179a3). (The dramatic sequel to the Theaetetus is the Euthyphro, which means that the inquiry into the question “What is knowledge?” is followed immediately by that into the question “What is piety?”) If, to repeat, Protagoras maintained that “(a) human being is the measure of all things,” he knew full well that there are those who insist that not any human being but god alone is the measure (Laws 716c4–6; consider Tht. 161c4–6). The two assertions cannot both be true. As it seems to me, Protagoras was in his way impressed by those who claim to speak in the name of gods, however reluctant he was to address that claim openly (162d5–e2; 152c8–10). Being without a refutation of such claims, but also being altogether disinclined to accept them, he retreated to a radical relativism that includes even the good, for such a relativism destroys the possibility of a common world known to be such. Protagoras, then, may not be able to refute the claims of the prophets, but neither need he bow to them: if you perceive that you are a god (158b2–3) then that is what you are; that is “true for you.” But unless or until Protagoras has the same perception, he need not and even cannot accede to it.
From this vantage point I turn to Roslyn Weiss's question concerning the relation between the Protagoras and the Theaetetus, for the two portraits of the sophist we receive are not simply identical. In the Protagoras, the confusions of the sophist mean that there is finally something dogmatic about him in general and about his stance toward the gods in particular; Protagoras has not earned the right, if I may put it that way, to the atheism he all but proclaims there. In the Theaetetus we observe the response Protagoras made, or would have made, to that very problem. For this reason, the Protagoras we meet in the Theaetetus is a more impressive thinker than the one in the dialogue named after him, a suggestion compatible with these facts: in the dramatically earlier dialogue, Plato presents Protagoras to us before our eyes, whereas in the later one Protagoras is dead, and Socrates bears full responsibility for conjuring him up, for formulating his arguments. Plato there presents a deeper version of the sophist's theoretical position than the fellow himself might have given, in order to pose the greatest possible challenge to philosophy or science from within the camp of the Heracliteans.
As for the change in philosophy for which Socrates is evidently responsible, such that we now speak of all that came before him as “pre-Socratic,” I cannot agree with Waller Newell that Socrates's distinctive “turn” to the examination of human or political affairs was prompted by “a dawning awareness of the importance of piety in human life.” I cannot agree in part because the fact that piety is important in human life is not so hard to see. Socrates's “turn” was instead meant to be the solution to grave difficulties, from within philosophy and from without, that Socrates had been aware of or possessed by for some time, including the challenge to philosophy posed from without by those who claim to know that the truest cause of things is not impersonal nature, but a living god or gods. If gods are the fundamental cause of the world, then nature is not that cause; and if nature is not such a cause, then there can be no philosophical science. It is insufficient for a philosopher simply to assert that “the gods are subordinate to a higher and reasonable reality.” If, as Newell suggests, Socrates's quest for “forms” makes it “impossible for Socrates to understand piety and the holy as revelatory and unfathomable”—then one could well reply: the very search for “forms” is misguided, not to say wicked. To suggest that gods are somehow “subordinate to a higher and reasonable reality” amounts to saying that they are not as they are claimed to be, that is, that they are not. But by what possible arguments or inquiries could Socrates hope to demonstrate or otherwise establish the truth of such a contention? And without some such argument, philosophy, the life of reason, evidently rests on a dogmatic and hence unreasonable foundation. It was chiefly this problem, as distinguished from any possible solution to it, that my book was meant to investigate, by way of “Protagoras.”
Plato does no more in these two dialogues, it seems to me, than point to the path Socrates followed that led away from the Heracliteans and hence also from Protagoras. For example, in the Protagoras Socrates presses the question of the relation of the virtues to one another, not least that of justice to piety, a question in which Protagoras does not have the slightest interest (“what difference does this make?” at 331c3). Socrates but not Protagoras has a great interest in such opinions held by others, including “the many,” and if the Protagorean doctrine of the measure is correct, then Socratic dialectics is impossible (Tht. 161d2–e6). Moreover, in the “digression” in the Theaetetus (177b8), launched in the wake of the question whether there is something just and pious by nature, Socrates offers a complex and strange description of the philosopher, a pre-Socratic philosopher, in the law court of the city. There Socrates only points in the direction of the questions of peculiar interest to him, especially in the “hymn” he sings in praise of “the true life of gods and happy men” (176a1–2). That hymn or praise implies the importance to him of the inquiry into our concern for justice, our longing to possess a good unadulterated by anything bad, and, perhaps above all else, our longing to possess the good that is life without the evil that is death.
