Republicanism is a theory of both freedom and government.Footnote 1 Previous chapters focused primarily on the republican theory of freedom as nondomination. These chapters explained why the State has more power to regulate and police unhoused persons than people with access to housing. They demonstrated why laws that govern public property subject unhoused persons to unique forms of domination. The republican theory of government, on the other hand, is a political theory that is more concerned with vertical domination.Footnote 2 It offers an account of when political authority is increasingly legitimate because individuals are free from domination by the State. The republican theory of government also justifies the State’s duties to neutralize domination.
Unifying republican theories of freedom and government, this chapter shows why the State and the people are in a fiduciary relationship, which results in certain fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property.Footnote 3 A fiduciary relationship arises where one party – the fiduciary (or trustee) – unilaterally wields power over the other party – the beneficiary.Footnote 4 Although the fiduciary is empowered to act on the beneficiary’s behalf, the fiduciary can exercise that power abusively or exploitatively.Footnote 5 To counteract this form of domination, the law imposes fiduciary duties on the trustee; they owe a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary and must act in their best interests.Footnote 6
This chapter explains why the State has three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property – duties that flow from the State’s overarching fiduciary obligation to counteract domination. First, the State has a fiduciary duty to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal concern and respect. As part of this fiduciary obligation, the State must address the underlying factors that contribute to homelessness and ensure access to housing. Second, the State has a fiduciary obligation to protect public property’s shared value and secure freedom in the public sphere. Third, the State must legitimize the coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property.
These fiduciary duties counteract domination that stems from two systems of mutual coercion that the State creates and enforces to secure liberty: the private property system and laws that govern public property. But the State’s failure to accommodate unhoused persons within these systems of mutual coercion results in domination. The State’s fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property aim to neutralize this domination. The concluding parts of this chapter highlight the interrelationship between these duties. Namely, the State must fulfil its fiduciary duty to end homelessness to counteract private domination, safeguard public property’s shared value to neutralize public domination, and legitimize laws that govern public property to impose coercion and punishment in a justifiable manner.
7.1 Fiduciary Relationships and Fiduciary Duties
The State’s duties related to homelessness and public property stem from its fiduciary relationship with individuals – a unique relationship that results in distinct duties that aim to counteract domination. To illustrate this point, it is necessary to first explain the nature of fiduciary relationships, their sources, and their application to public law.
Fiduciary relationships involve two parties: the fiduciary (or the trustee) and the beneficiary.Footnote 7 The fiduciary is authorized to act on the beneficiary’s behalf and unilaterally wields power over them.Footnote 8 Typically, fiduciaries have powers, expertise, or capacities that beneficiaries lack.Footnote 9 Conversely, beneficiaries are dependent on fiduciaries and their above-mentioned qualities.Footnote 10 For instance, in a fiduciary relationship between attorney and client, the attorney has legal expertise that the client does not. In a fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient, the physician has medical expertise and knowledge that the patient lacks.
Fiduciary relationships are characterized by an asymmetric power dynamic between the parties.Footnote 11 Beneficiaries are vulnerable to domination because the fiduciary can unilaterally interfere with their interests.Footnote 12 The fiduciary can exploit the beneficiary for private gain or for other opportunistic reasons.Footnote 13 Given disparities in information and expertise, beneficiaries may also lack the requisite knowledge or abilities to monitor or control the fiduciary’s conduct.Footnote 14 To mitigate these risks and prevent domination, the law imposes a duty of loyalty on the fiduciary and requires them to act in the beneficiary’s best interests.Footnote 15
Fiduciary relationships notably arise in private law, such as in the law of trusts, property law, and corporate law.Footnote 16 Various relationships are fiduciary in nature, such as the relationship between parent and child, attorney and client, and doctor and patient.Footnote 17 Parents have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their children. And a doctor has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their patient.
A fiduciary relationship can form through consent. In some cases, the beneficiary and trustee expressly consent to a fiduciary relationship, and the former authorizes the latter to act on their behalf.Footnote 18 For instance, a client may mandate a lawyer to represent them in legal proceedings, and a patient may consent to care by their physician.
But consent is not necessary to form a fiduciary relationship.Footnote 19 A parent can consent to a contract on a child’s behalf, and a doctor can treat an unconscious patient.Footnote 20 A parent exercises fiduciary authority over their child, even though the child neither consented to being born nor authorized the parent to act for them.Footnote 21 A doctor has the authority to administer treatments to an unconscious patient who did not – and could not – expressly consent to care.Footnote 22
7.2 Fiduciary Relationships in Public Law
Fiduciary relationships also exist within public law – an important consideration that underpins the fiduciary relationship between the State and individuals.Footnote 23 Three examples illustrate the State’s fiduciary duties in public law contexts: the fiduciary relationship between the State and Indigenous peoples in Canada, the public trust doctrine in natural resource law in the United States, and the State’s fiduciary guardianship over public property in both countries.
First, the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes a sui generis fiduciary relationship between the State and Indigenous peoples.Footnote 24 This relationship stems from Canada’s colonialist legacy, and how the State unilaterally asserted sovereignty over Indigenous persons’ rights, interests, and land.Footnote 25 These acts deprived Indigenous individuals and communities of the power of self-government, and the protection of their rights and interests became dependent on the Government’s decision-making.Footnote 26 The relationship between Indigenous persons and the State exemplifies vertical domination.Footnote 27 The Government’s fiduciary duties towards Indigenous persons aim to mitigate that domination.Footnote 28
Various Supreme Court of Canada decisions elucidate this point. In Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue, the majority of the Court explained: “The common law status of aboriginal rights rendered them vulnerable to unilateral extinguishment, and thus they were ‘dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign’.”Footnote 29 Similarly, in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, Justice Binnie alluded to how the State’s discretionary power over Indigenous persons results in domination and remarked: “The fiduciary duty, where it exists, is called into existence to facilitate supervision of the high degree of discretionary control gradually assumed by the Crown over the lives of aboriginal peoples.”Footnote 30 This fiduciary relationship imposes a duty on the State to act in the best interests of Indigenous peoples when it makes discretionary decisions that affect their interests.Footnote 31 As part of this fiduciary duty, the State must consult Indigenous persons and accommodate them.Footnote 32
Second, in certain US jurisdictions, the State has fiduciary duties related to natural resource law. Courts affirm that the State is a trustee over certain types of common property – such as navigable waters, shorelines, and public lands – and must maintain them.Footnote 33 Scholars such as Joseph Sax and Richard Lazarus observe that the public trust doctrine in natural resource law has deep historical roots that date to the Roman empire.Footnote 34
The US Supreme Court case Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois remains one of the most notable decisions in this regard.Footnote 35 The State had statutorily granted certain land to the Illinois Central Railroad Company – land that was located adjacent to the Chicago River and beneath the waterbed of Lake Michigan.Footnote 36 When the State subsequently repealed the statute, the corporation continued to construct railway tracks on the land that the State had previously granted.Footnote 37 The Attorney General brought a suit so that the corporation would halt construction and remove the structures and infrastructure that it had built.Footnote 38 The issue was whether the state of Illinois or the railway corporation owned the contested land.Footnote 39
The Court concluded that the land in question could not be lawfully alienated because it belonged to the State and was held in trust for the public.Footnote 40 In particular, the Court observed that the trustee relationship required the State to protect that common property against interference from private parties.Footnote 41 Similar to how the State cannot abdicate its police power, it cannot, in principle, “abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested.”Footnote 42
William Araiza notes that since 1970, nearly half of all US state courts have accepted the public trust doctrine in some form or another and it has been employed in various contexts.Footnote 43 The public trust doctrine helps ensure that individuals cannot acquire certain common property because others would become dependent on the rightsholder to access and use it.Footnote 44 In this way, the public trust doctrine prevents horizontal domination between persons.
Third, US and Canadian law acknowledge that the State holds certain types of public property – such as streets, public parks, and public squares – in trust for the public.Footnote 45 As part of its fiduciary duty, the State is responsible for safeguarding public property’s shared value. For instance, in the 1939 US Supreme Court decision Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, Jersey City’s mayor Frank Hague attempted to use a city ordinance to prevent a labor union from holding public meetings in any hall without acquiring a permit.Footnote 46 The mayor also sought to prohibit individuals from distributing pamphlets on public property.Footnote 47 The ordinance was enforced to suppress the activities of labor unions that the city alleged were Communist or tied to communist ideology.Footnote 48 The Court decided that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of association.Footnote 49 In a passage that has been cited in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,Footnote 50 the justices explained that the State held certain public spaces in trust for the public:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.Footnote 51
Supreme Court of Canada justices have also recognized that the State holds public property in trust for the public.Footnote 52 In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, the claimants challenged the constitutionality of a regulation that prohibited individuals from distributing flyers in an airport.Footnote 53 A police officer who was patrolling the airport saw that the claimants were distributing pamphlets.Footnote 54 The officer ordered them to stop and took them to the airport’s assistant manager, who confirmed that a regulation prohibited their activities.Footnote 55 The claimants challenged the regulation’s constitutionality and argued that it violated their constitutional right to freedom of expression.Footnote 56
The majority of the Court agreed and decided that the constitutional violation could not be justified in a free and democratic society.Footnote 57 Citing the US Supreme Court’s decision in Hague, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained that the Government has an ownership right of public property that is “quasi-fiduciary in nature” and that the State holds this property for the public’s benefit.Footnote 58 In other judicial decisions, such as Abbottsford v. Shantz discussed in previous chapters, the British Columbia Supreme Court observed that “Although public property is held in trust for the public, the right to access and use public spaces is not absolute.”Footnote 59
Notice two important features of the Government’s fiduciary status in these public law contexts – features that also characterize the fiduciary bond between the State and the people as discussed in the next section. First, each of these fiduciary relationships – the fiduciary relationship between the State and Indigenous peoples in Canada, the public trust doctrine in the United States, and the State’s fiduciary guardianship of public property in both countries – arises without consent. The Government’s relationship with Indigenous people does not stem from actual or hypothetical consent.Footnote 60 Rather, it arises sui generis because Indigenous persons are uniquely vulnerable to State power due to colonialism and its legacy.Footnote 61 The public trust doctrine acknowledges that the State holds certain natural resources in trust for the people and must manage them for the common good – a fiduciary relationship to which the parties did not consent.Footnote 62 The duty exists to protect some individuals from appropriating land and depriving others from its use and resources – a form of horizontal domination that the State’s fiduciary duty mitigates.Footnote 63 The State’s duty to maintain public property’s role and value arises without consent for similar reasons.Footnote 64
Second, the State’s fiduciary duties exist to rectify both vertical and horizontal forms of domination. Its fiduciary duty towards Indigenous peoples aims primarily to counteract vertical domination that stems from colonialism and the Government’s deprivation of Indigenous persons’ sovereignty and power of self-government.Footnote 65 And the State’s fiduciary duties related to natural resource law and the regulation of public space both aim to protect individuals against horizontal domination by others.Footnote 66
7.3 Republicanism and the State’s Fiduciary Duties
The State’s three fiduciary relationships discussed in Section 7.2 may appear to be distinct and unrelated. But they flow from a single overarching fiduciary bond between the State and individuals that underpins the republican theory of government. Furthermore, this overarching fiduciary relationship bears the same three characteristics that support its existence. First, the fiduciary relationship between the Government and the people involves an asymmetric power dynamic that results in domination. Second, this fiduciary relationship arises without express or implied consent between the parties. Third, like other fiduciary obligations in public law, the State’s fiduciary duties towards the people aim to counteract horizontal and vertical forms of domination.
The republican theory of government construes the State as a trustee and the people as its beneficiaries.Footnote 67 The fiduciary relationship arises from individuals’ unilateral vulnerability to governmental power.Footnote 68 Public officials can exercise public powers that individuals lack, such as powers of criminalization, punishment, legislation, adjudication, taxation, expropriation, and more.Footnote 69 Individuals’ vulnerability to public power – and their lack of reciprocal powers against the State – grounds the fiduciary relationship between the State and individuals.Footnote 70 Evan Fox-Decent notes that the State’s fiduciary relationship arises without consent much like a parent’s fiduciary relationship with their children; it is formed without express or implicit agreement due the asymmetric power dynamic between the parties.Footnote 71
The fiduciary relationship between the State and the people aims to counteract domination.Footnote 72 Lawmakers can abuse their authority. Power can corrupt them. They may place their personal interests or aspirations above the long-term interests of the community.Footnote 73 They may exercise their discretion inappropriately or arbitrarily.Footnote 74 Democratically elected lawmakers can still produce a tyranny of the majority and violate marginalized individuals and groups’ interests.Footnote 75 The State’s fiduciary duty to act in the people’s best interests aims to neutralize domination by the State and control its discretionary power over individuals.Footnote 76
Republicanism also justifies this fiduciary relationship on the ground that the State derives its power from the people.Footnote 77 Individuals delegate power to the State and its public officials through the democratic process.Footnote 78 The conferral of power further explains why the State and its public officials are trustees who must act in the best interests of their beneficiaries: the people.Footnote 79
For instance, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison describes how State authority derives from the people and must be exercised on their behalf and for the common good.Footnote 80 He explained that “The genius of Republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived from the people but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”Footnote 81 Madison remarked that political constitutions aim to ensure that public officials exercise their powers “for the common good of society” and that they hold this power in the public trust.Footnote 82
Drawing on the work of republican theorists such as Cicero, John Locke, and the Federalists, Theodore Rave observes that the fiduciary conception of State authority is embedded within republican theory.Footnote 83 Republicanism construes the State as a fiduciary that has a duty to act in the people’s best interests.Footnote 84 Like other republican theorists, he suggests that the fiduciary duty’s source is that individuals confer power to the State through the democratic process.Footnote 85 Individuals suffer domination when they lack a power of self-government and are ruled by an external will.Footnote 86 This also explains why Indigenous peoples suffer a unique form of domination that arises from colonialism.Footnote 87
The overarching fiduciary relationship between the State and individuals gives rise to the State’s overarching fiduciary duty to counteract vertical and horizontal domination that flow from that relationship.Footnote 88 The fulfilment of this duty aims to ensure that individuals can enjoy freedom vis-à-vis the State and vis-à-vis others.Footnote 89 Since individuals are both vulnerable to State authority and confer power to the State through the democratic process, the State’s duty of loyalty requires it to act in individuals’ best interests and protect them against vertical domination.Footnote 90
But the State also has a fiduciary duty to protect individuals against horizontal domination that stems from its laws, policies, and conduct. Public institutions and their officials are necessary to secure freedom against private domination.Footnote 91 Individuals lack the public powers to legislate, regulate, govern, and adjudicate because they would unilaterally limit others’ freedom without authority.Footnote 92 The State and its public institutions prevent that form of private domination.Footnote 93 Yet this very justification for creating public institutions – preventing private domination – is undermined when the State’s laws, policies, or inaction permit some individuals to dominate others. Furthermore, the State does not act in individuals’ best interests when it permits private domination because nondomination is a shared interest.
The State must also fulfil its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination to secure political equality.Footnote 94 Individuals lack the status of free and equal persons if they are subject to uncontrolled unilateral threats of interference by the State or by others.Footnote 95 Rather than be their own masters, dominated individuals remain subjugated to an external will. Freedom from horizontal and vertical domination promotes political equality because individuals are mutually constrained by a system of rights and a system of laws that bind them reciprocally.Footnote 96 In a society where individuals enjoy nondomination, they possess similar power and antipower, such that they can interact with one another from a position of equal strength.Footnote 97
The political ideal of expressive egalitarianism exemplifies the State’s fulfilment of its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract both forms of domination.Footnote 98 The term “expressive egalitarianism” connotes laws, policies, and decisions that express equal respect and consideration for individuals.Footnote 99 Expressively egalitarian laws and policies track individuals’ interests and strive to treat each person as though they matter equally, such that they are protected against domination by the State and by others.Footnote 100
The State’s laws, policies, and actions are increasingly expressively egalitarian when they respect two requirements that counteract domination and safeguard political equality: political legitimacy and social justice.Footnote 101 While political legitimacy implies that the State counteracts vertical domination optimally, social justice connotes that the State counteracts horizontal domination optimally.Footnote 102
To be clear, the State’s laws, policies, and actions may satisfy political legitimacy and social justice to greater or lesser extents. Furthermore, in some contexts, the State may increasingly respect the first requirement of political legitimacy but not the second requirement of social justice, or vice versa.Footnote 103 Yet the State increasingly respects its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination where its laws, policies, and decisions are increasingly expressively egalitarian, such that individuals can enjoy nondomination and political equality on a par with others.
The State’s fiduciary duties described previously – in the contexts of Crown and Indigenous relations, the public trust doctrine, and the regulation of public property – are distinct fiduciary duties that flow from the State’s overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination. But the State’s specific fiduciary duties are not confined to these public law contexts exclusively. As discussed in Section 7.4, the State also has three specific fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property.
These fiduciary duties exist because the State fails to accommodate unhoused persons within two systems of mutual coercion that the State creates to secure freedom: the private property system and laws that govern public property. The State’s fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property aim to counteract this domination.
7.4 Property, Homelessness, and the State’s Three Fiduciary Duties
Together, republicanism and fiduciary theories of legal authority demonstrate why the State has three interrelated fiduciary duties pertaining to homelessness and public property, each of which are discussed in Sections 7.4.1, 7.4.2, and 7.4.3. First, the State has a fiduciary duty to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal concern and respect. Second, as public property’s trustee, the State has a fiduciary duty to protect its shared value and safeguard liberty in the public sphere. Third, the State has a fiduciary duty to legitimize coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property. Laws that govern public property are increasingly expressively egalitarian when the State increasingly fulfils these three fiduciary duties.
7.4.1 The Duty to End Homelessness
First, the State has a fiduciary duty to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal concern and respect. The justification for this duty can be summarized as follows. Previous chapters showed why the State creates a system of private property rights to protect individuals against horizontal domination.Footnote 104 Yet unhoused persons suffer domination because the State fails to accommodate them within that system, and prohibits them from resorting to self-help to secure their liberty.Footnote 105 For this reason, people experiencing homelessness are exposed to unilateral and uncontrolled interference by others and are uniquely vulnerable to laws that govern public property.Footnote 106 The State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness aims to neutralize the vertical and horizontal domination to which unhoused persons are subject.
To illustrate this point, consider first why the State creates a system of private property rights to reduce horizontal domination. Private property rights safeguard individuals against domination for two interrelated reasons.Footnote 107 First, rightsholders can exercise their power of exclusion to protect themselves against the threat of interference by others – a power that is backed by the State.Footnote 108 Second, private property rights insulate rightsholders against others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 109 Without a system of private property rights, individuals would face horizontal domination because they would lack legal protection against potential interference by others.Footnote 110
The State establishes a private property regime that binds all, and that changes individuals’ normative situation vis-à-vis others by creating new rights, powers, duties, and liabilities.Footnote 111 The State exercises a public power when it creates and maintains a private property system and backs it by governmental coercion.Footnote 112 Individuals lack a comparable public power to establish a private property system that binds all because they would unilaterally limit others’ freedom without authority.Footnote 113 To be clear, certain collectivities – such as Indigenous communities, religious groups, or cooperatives – may also establish binding property schemes. However, the State’s creation of a private property system – and its assumption of control over it – represents the exercise of a public power that binds individuals.
Although the State creates a system of private property rights to secure liberty, it fails to accommodate unhoused persons within that system, which results in their domination.Footnote 114 The private property system allocates property rights based primarily on market exchanges rather than individual need.Footnote 115 Unhoused persons are de facto excluded from the private property system when they lack the financial capacities to acquire private property rights that would safeguard their liberty. Furthermore, they cannot lawfully appropriate public or private property based on individual need.Footnote 116 Leaving aside rare cases of adverse possession,Footnote 117 courts reject poverty and homelessness as a justification for such appropriation.Footnote 118 Unhoused persons thus cannot resort to self-help to secure nondomination for themselves.
Unhoused persons’ de facto exclusion from this necessary system of private property rights subjects them to a unique form of double domination that manifests itself in different ways. Chapters 3 and 4 showed why unhoused persons are consistently vulnerable to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 119 Additionally, others exert control over unhoused persons’ opportunities to obey laws that govern public property.Footnote 120 Unlike people with access to housing, people experiencing homelessness must also make nonegalitarian trade-offs to obey laws that govern public property.Footnote 121 And as discussed in Chapter 5, the State has greater power to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing.Footnote 122
The State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness aims to counteract these forms of domination.Footnote 123 The private property system cannot achieve its objective to secure freedom if the State fails to accommodate certain individuals within that system.Footnote 124 But the State cannot abolish its private property system, as it would result in private domination. If the State did so, it would abdicate its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination. The duty to end homelessness rectifies certain individuals’ exclusion from a system of private property rights – a system that is necessary to secure freedom.Footnote 125
This account also explains why the duty to end homelessness falls principally on the State rather than on private individuals. The State is the body that creates and assumes control over a system of private property rights, which aims to secure freedom between persons without constituting a form of private domination. Moreover, the State is responsible for the private property system’s establishment, architecture, and operation. The State’s simultaneous action – establishing a private property system – and inaction – failing to accommodate people experiencing homelessness within that system – results in unhoused persons’ domination. For this reason, the State bears responsibility for creating the conditions that give rise to unhoused persons’ unfreedom.Footnote 126 And for this same reason, the State has a specific fiduciary duty to end that domination; one that flows from its overarching duty to protect liberty.
As part of the fiduciary duty to end homelessness, the State must address the risk factors associated with homelessness – such as poverty, mental illness, and substance use disorder – and ensure that individuals have access to housing. Chapter 9 explores the fulfilment of this duty and analyzes it more in depth. But its content can be summarized as follows. First, the fiduciary duty to end homelessness is primarily ameliorative in nature and seeks to avoid coercion and punishment. The ameliorative nature of this duty allows the State to end homelessness in a manner that does not produce domination, and that treats unhoused persons with greater consideration and respect. Second, this fiduciary obligation gives rise to a correlative right to be protected against homelessness and the domination that flows from it. This second feature explains why the State’s fiduciary obligation to end homelessness is both preventive and reactive in nature. Notably, the State must address the risk factors associated with homelessness so that individuals do not lose access to housing or remain unhoused. And it must provide access to housing, emergency shelters, and other services when individuals lose access to housing that they once enjoyed. Third and interrelatedly, the State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness results in a right to access to housing, which can be fulfilled through several means, such as housing vouchers, public housing, and Housing First programs. More on these points in Chapter 9.
7.4.2 The Duty to Protect Public Property’s Role and Value
The State’s second fiduciary duty related to homelessness is that it must protect public property’s shared value and secure liberty in the public sphere, meaning outside of one’s home.Footnote 127 The State’s second fiduciary duty is justified by two considerations: land’s immovability and public property’s vulnerability to collective action problems. Land’s immovability explains why the State establishes a public property system that helps secure liberty in the public sphere. Public property’s vulnerability to collective action problems, on the other hand, justifies why the State regulates public property to secure nondomination outside of one’s home. Notably, the State must enact and enforce norms that govern public property to protect its role and value.
Consider land’s immovability first. Given that individuals are interdependent, they must leave their private property for various reasons: work, socialization, shopping, and more.Footnote 128 And they must pass through land to do these things. Land, however, is immovable, and individuals must inevitably use it to travel between places.Footnote 129 Recall Essert’s observation that individuals must be granted permission to access private property to lawfully do any act in that space.Footnote 130 If all land was privatized, individuals would constantly have to secure others’ authorization to travel between spaces and engage in certain conduct outside of their homes – they would suffer horizontal domination.Footnote 131
Public property resolves this problem. As an open-access space, public property helps ensure that individuals can freely move and act outside of their homes without the risk of unilateral interference by others.Footnote 132 In theory, without public property, individuals could contract out a series of arrangements with other rightsholders, such that they could move between places without having to constantly secure others’ permission.Footnote 133 Beyond its inefficiency, this type of regime would still undermine liberty and equality. Some rightsholders would exercise their freedom of contract and deny entry to their land.Footnote 134 Others could charge exorbitant prices for such private arrangements. Less affluent individuals would be unable to purchase the permission to travel and would lack the freedom to move between places that others enjoy. This type of contractual scheme would result in horizontal domination. Public property counteracts horizontal domination because it constitutes a space where individuals are free from others’ private power of exclusion and agenda-setting authority.Footnote 135
Together, private property rights and public property foster nondomination. Private property rights protect individuals’ liberty, security, and autonomy within the private sphere.Footnote 136 These rights help secure nondomination because they confer the rightsholder a power to exclude others and insulate the rightsholder from others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 137 Public property, on the other hand, helps secure freedom because it ensures that people can travel and engage in conduct outside of their homes without being subject to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 138 The State thus creates, authorizes, and enforces two systems of mutual coercion – the private property and public property regimes – to secure freedom in a manner that avoids private domination.
The second consideration that justifies the State’s fiduciary duty to protect public property is its vulnerability to collective action problems – problems that undermine public property’s value and limit liberty in the public sphere.Footnote 139 Chapter 5 demonstrated how public property is an open-access space that is susceptible to a tragedy of the commons.Footnote 140 A tragedy of the commons occurs when each person’s rational attempt to maximize public property’s benefits results in collectively irrational outcomes – namely, that public property’s value declines for all.Footnote 141 Unregulated public property can lead to rivalry between persons, overexploitation, congestion, and usages that are inconsistent with public property’s role and worth.Footnote 142 A tragedy of the commons also undermines freedom outside of one’s home. Individuals may engage in conduct that restricts others’ liberty in the public sphere or that constrains others’ freedom to use public property on equal terms. These considerations explain why the State establishes mutually binding norms of conduct that govern public property, and that help secure nondomination between individuals in the public sphere.
Though the State creates a system of public property that prevents some types of horizontal domination, it also enacts mutually binding laws that protect public property’s value and that mitigate collective action problems.Footnote 143 The State exercises a public power when it enacts laws that regulate public property and that mutually bind all.Footnote 144 Private individuals lack a comparable public power because they would limit others’ freedom without authority.Footnote 145
Together, land’s immovability and public property’s vulnerability to collective action problems underpin the State’s fiduciary duty to protect public property’s collective worth and safeguard liberty in the public sphere. And the State fulfils this duty when it enacts and enforces laws that govern public property that promote those ends.
But the State’s attempt to fulfil its fiduciary duty to safeguard public property’s role reduces some forms of domination but produces others. Although laws that govern public property aim to mitigate horizontal domination in the public sphere, these laws subject unhoused persons to vertical domination and nonegalitarian coercion.Footnote 146 Furthermore, unhoused persons cannot appropriate others’ private property to use public property on equal terms with others.Footnote 147 Nor can unhoused persons freely access others’ private property in a manner that decreases their contribution to a tragedy of the urban commons, meaning a tragedy of the commons on public property. Just as the State fails to accommodate unhoused persons within a necessary system of private property rights that helps secure liberty in the private sphere, the State fails to accommodate unhoused persons within its system of laws that govern public property and that safeguard liberty in the public sphere.
7.4.3 The Duty to Legitimize Laws That Govern Public Property
Third, the State has a fiduciary duty to legitimize the coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property. It must fulfil this duty to ensure that it regulates public property – and respects its second fiduciary obligation to safeguard the shared value of public space – in a manner that does not constitute domination and does not entrench individuals in homelessness.
7.4.3.1 The Duty to Legitimize Coercion
There are two main reasons why the coercion associated with laws that govern public property is more legitimate when individuals enjoy the undominated choice to obey them: respect for human agency and political obligation. Consider first the relationship between undominated choice to obey the law, respect for human agency, and coercion.Footnote 148 Building on the work of scholars such as H. L. A. Hart, Chapters 4 and 6 showed how coercion and punishment are justified by choice-based conceptions of culpability.Footnote 149 Recall how Hart conceptualized the law as a choosing system that aims to demonstrate respect for human agency.Footnote 150 According to this conception, the State enacts laws that communicate which conduct is prohibited and the punishments for breaching these laws.Footnote 151 Yet the choice of law-abidingness is left up to the individual.Footnote 152 This system respects human agency because it treats individuals as rational agents who weigh the pros and cons of obeying the law, and punishes them for their rational choice to break it.Footnote 153
The law withholds blame and punishment when individuals lacked a free choice to obey the law.Footnote 154 More specifically, the law excuses an individual’s legal transgression when they either lacked the physical or mental capacity to obey the law, or, did not have a fair opportunity to do so given the circumstances.Footnote 155 In these contexts, it is unfair for the law to blame and punish an actor whose freedom of choice to obey the law was constrained by external factors: threats, compulsion, emergency, or others’ control over the defendant’s opportunity to obey the law.Footnote 156 Coercion demonstrates greater respect for persons when it is imposed on individuals who enjoyed undominated choice to obey the law, rejected available alternatives to violating it, and transgressed it culpably.
Consider next how undominated choice to obey the law promotes political obligation, meaning individuals’ moral duty to obey the law.Footnote 157 Some contend that the principle of fair play justifies political obligation.Footnote 158 The fair play conception of political obligation construes the law as a system that protects mutually shared interests through cooperation.Footnote 159 Under this system, an individual can enjoy their fundamental interests only if others abide by laws that safeguard their same interests. Since the individual benefits from others’ cooperation and compliance with the law, the individual is also bound to obey the law and respect others’ shared interests as a matter of fairness or fair play.Footnote 160
The moral duty to obey the law thus ensures that individuals mutually respect each other’s legally protected rights.Footnote 161 An individual’s rights impose legally binding duties of noninterference on others, which others respect when they obey the law.Footnote 162 The individual must also obey the law to fulfil their duty to respect others’ rights.Footnote 163 The duty to obey the law is not simply an impersonal obligation that individuals owe to the State.Footnote 164 It is justified by the interpersonal duties that members of a community owe to one another as a matter of mutual respect, cooperation, and reciprocity.Footnote 165 In these ways, the moral duty to obey the law helps secure nondomination between persons.
Fairness is essential to fair play conceptions of political obligation.Footnote 166 The notion of fairness implies that individuals retain similar benefits and are imposed similar burdens as part of the cooperative scheme.Footnote 167 Fairness is breached when some individuals must either do unreasonably more than others to sustain the cooperative scheme or enjoy the scheme’s benefits unreasonably less than others.Footnote 168 Such unfair schemes fail to treat these individuals as political equals.Footnote 169 Notably, unfair cooperative schemes instrumentalize individuals by using them as a means to secure benefits for others. Furthermore, unjust schemes treat individuals’ shared interests in the scheme’s benefits as less important. The duty to obey the law is imposed less fairly in contexts where its benefits and burdens are allocated disparately.
The principle of fair play explains why the undominated choice to obey laws that govern public property legitimizes them. The benefits and burdens of compliance are distributed relatively evenly amongst persons who control their own law abidingness and need not make egalitarian trade-offs to comply with the law. Under such a scheme, all individuals can maximally enjoy public property and can respect each other’s shared interests in a manner that impacts their freedom similarly.
Since all persons have an interest in enjoying public property on equal terms, it is only fair that they play their part to obey laws that regulate public property. And they do so when comply with laws that govern public space and engage in need-alleviating acts in private. Access to housing, in turn, provides the greatest undominated choice to obey these laws because it affords a default private place where individuals can freely alleviate their needs and obey the law.Footnote 170
Together, unhoused persons’ de facto exclusion from the private property system and their unique vulnerability to laws that govern public property violate the principle of fair play. Chapter 3 demonstrated how the private property regime distributes benefits and burdens disparately, which systematically disadvantages unhoused persons.Footnote 171 Unhoused persons have a legal duty to respect others’ private property rights and can be excluded by them.Footnote 172 But others owe no reciprocal duty of noninterference to unhoused persons because they do not have private property rights.Footnote 173 For this reason, unhoused persons enjoy few benefits from the private property system but are encumbered with its burdens – a disparity that undermines the private property regime’s fairness.Footnote 174
These background disadvantages explain why laws that govern public property violate the principle of fair play for unhoused persons for two interrelated reasons. First, laws that govern public property violate fair play because they impose additional affirmative duties to act on unhoused persons that are subject to others’ control.Footnote 175 Chapter 5 showed how unhoused persons have a supplementary duty to secure access to private property to lawfully alleviate their needs and obey the law.Footnote 176 In contrast, people with access to housing are imposed no comparable duty because they have default access to private property to alleviate their needs.Footnote 177 This disparate allocation of burdens to comply with laws that govern public property undermines fairness. This unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that others exert control over unhoused persons’ fulfilment of their duty to secure access to private property to alleviate their needs and obey the law.
Second, these laws violate the principle of fair play because they impose nonegalitarian trade-offs on unhoused persons, which render their obligation to obey the law more onerous compared to others.Footnote 178 Unhoused persons alone must make nonegalitarian sacrifices to comply with laws that regulate public property to sustain its coordinating function.Footnote 179 They must disproportionately endanger their interests to safeguard public property and help secure liberty in the public sphere.Footnote 180
The duty to obey laws that govern public property is imposed less fairly for unhoused persons because it instrumentalizes them – they suffer domination to secure others’ freedom in the public sphere. Furthermore, by imposing nonegalitarian trade-offs, these laws violate fair play constraints because they treat unhoused persons’ shared interests in security, privacy, and dignity as less important – interests they must sacrifice to obey the law.
7.4.3.2 Legitimizing Punishment
Beyond legitimizing coercion, the State also has a fiduciary duty to legitimize the punishments associated with laws that govern public property. The State must fulfil this duty to ensure that its sanctions do not constitute domination and do not entrench individuals in homelessness. As discussed further in this section, punishments are more legitimate when they are consistent with its two main rationales: retributivism and consequentialism.Footnote 181 Moreover, the State must respect the basic requirements of proportionality and instrumental rationality to ensure that its sanctions are consistent with retributive and consequentialist rationales for punishment.
Retributivism is more legitimate when individuals enjoyed the greatest undominated choice to obey the law. Chapter 6 discussed how retributivism justifies punishment based on defendants’ free and culpable choice to commit an offense.Footnote 182 Individuals do not deserve punishment when they lacked the fair opportunity to comply with the law and thus did not freely choose to break it.Footnote 183 The lack of fair opportunity to obey the law undermines freedom of choice, culpability, and ultimately, punishment’s deservedness.Footnote 184 For this reason, the defendant alone should control their law-abidingness so that coercion and punishment can be fairly attributed to them.Footnote 185 Punishment is more deserved when individuals enjoyed the greatest freedom to comply with the law’s requirements. In such contexts, punishments more closely reflect the fact that individuals exercised their human agency to break the law and rejected available alternatives.
Furthermore, retributive justifications for these punishments are more legitimate when the State considers the defendant’s personal circumstances and avoids entrenching them in homelessness.Footnote 186 Harsh punishments can enmesh individuals in homelessness where they will continue to suffer domination and are more likely to alleviate their needs on public property.Footnote 187 The State abdicates all three of its fiduciary duties – ending homelessness, protecting public property’s value and securing liberty in the public sphere, and legitimizing laws that govern public property – when it imposes excessive sanctions that entrench persons in homelessness. Although individuals may deserve punishment for culpably violating laws that regulate public property, they do not deserve to become enmeshed in a condition that undermines their freedom and political equality.
This book’s final chapter illustrates why day fines (or graduated economic sanctions) better ensure proportionate financial penalties that also consider unhoused persons’ unique personal circumstances.Footnote 188 Day fines impose financial penalties that are calculated according to the gravity of the offense and a portion of the defendant’s daily adjusted income.Footnote 189 They have been implemented successfully in European countries and in some US jurisdictions.Footnote 190 The final chapter demonstrates why graduated economic sanctions are a vital means to ensure that financial penalties do not entrench individuals in homelessness and to respect proportionality in sentencing.
The consequentialist justifications for unhoused persons’ punishments are more legitimate when these sanctions are instrumentally rational. Consequentialist theories of punishment justify sanctions based on their future consequences, such as deterrence.Footnote 191 Similar to retributivism, human agency and free choice are central to consequentialism.Footnote 192 Deterrence is premised on the notion that individuals are rational agents who consider the threat of punishment to guide their conduct.Footnote 193 The law excuses wrongdoing in contexts where the individual either lacked the capacity or fair opportunity to obey the law because the threat of punishment could not deter such conduct.Footnote 194
The principle of instrumental rationality (or means–end proportionality) ensures that punishment is a rational means to achieve its consequentialist end.Footnote 195 Means–end proportionality typically focuses on whether the burdens of punishment outweigh its benefits.Footnote 196 The constraint of instrumental rationality is particularly important for punishments associated with laws that govern public property given their potential to entrench individuals in homelessness.Footnote 197 Since unhoused persons must alleviate their needs but lack free access to a private place to do so, even harsh punishments cannot deter their biologically necessary conduct when they lack reasonable alternatives to alleviating their needs on public property.Footnote 198 Moreover, punitive entrenchment can increase the risk that individuals alleviate their needs on public property rather than in private, which undermines the consequentialist justifications for such sanctions.Footnote 199
Excessive sanctions violate both proportionality and instrumental rationality constraints for laws that govern public property and delegitimize consequentialist justifications for punishment. Disproportionate sanctions that entrench individuals in homelessness invites – rather than deters – recidivism associated with these laws.Footnote 200 Severe financial penalties also limit access to housing, and thus, reduce one’s sphere of undominated choice to obey laws that regulate public property and increase the likelihood of future legal transgressions.Footnote 201 Excessive punishments are not a rational means to prevent unhoused persons from alleviating their needs on public property.
The State legitimizes coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property when it fulfils its other two fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. By fulfilling its first fiduciary duty to end homelessness, the State maximizes individuals’ undominated choice to obey the law, which legitimizes coercion, political obligation, and retributive and consequentialist justifications for punishment.
Furthermore, when the State attempts to end homelessness and regulate public property, the State fulfils its second fiduciary duty to safeguard public property’s shared value and protect liberty in the public sphere. Individuals who have access to housing enjoy the undominated choice to obey the law and can freely alleviate their needs on private property rather than on public property, which maximizes its shared worth. Individuals who have access to housing create fewer negative externalities on public property and can use it on equal terms with others, such that all persons enjoy greater freedom in the public sphere.
Lastly, the State fulfils its first two fiduciary duties more optimally when it legitimizes the coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property. The State can more effectively end homelessness when it ensures that its punishments do not entrench individuals in that condition. By preventing punitive entrenchment, fewer individuals will alleviate their needs on public property, which safeguards its communal value and fosters liberty in the public sphere.
All three of these specific fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property stem from the State’s overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination; a duty that flows from its fiduciary relationship with the people. And the fulfilment of this overarching duty is necessary to secure both liberty and political equality in the private and public spheres.
7.5 Conclusion
Building on the insights of republicanism and fiduciary theories of legal authority, this chapter demonstrated why the State and the people are in a fiduciary relationship with one another – a relationship that has been recognized in other areas of public law. It showed why this relationship justifies the State’s three interrelated fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. Notably, the State has a fiduciary duty to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal concern and respect, protect public property’s shared value to secure liberty in the public sphere, and legitimize the coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property.
The next chapter demonstrates why this book’s overarching theory is preferable to other coercive and ameliorative governmental mechanisms related to homelessness, such as increased shelter spaces, zoning modifications, concentration strategies, and dispersal tactics. It also shows why this book’s fiduciary theory is more desirable and legitimate compared to encampments as a private self-help strategy.
