Locke has left us with a puzzling array of texts, produced in different contexts for different purposes. It is notoriously hard to give an interpretation that brings these disparate parts together, and scholars too often focus on a single aspect of Locke's thought to the exclusion of others or dismiss his arguments as contradictory. Steven Forde's Locke, Science, and Politics offers a reading of Locke that promises to help reconcile some of the apparently incompatible elements.
After an introductory exploration of the transition from ancient to modern science, Forde addresses the question of how Locke can adopt a modern perspective, on which nature is blind matter in motion and thus “morally vacuous” (101), and yet still construct a political theory grounded on natural law. Locke finds a new foundation for morality in the idea of mixed modes, concepts that do not emerge from empirical reality but are imposed by reason, when we combine separate ideas in ways we find useful in particular contexts. The defining character of the moral mode is the combination of the description of an action with a law that requires or forbids it, which means moral rules “can be objectively valid or binding only if they come ultimately from a will empowered to impose law universally” (105). Locke's reliance on god as the foundation of morality is thus neither a rhetorical ploy nor the result of his inability to question received opinion but instead the logical consequence of his science. While Forde is not the first to see the connection between Locke's epistemology and his morality, he presents a particularly clear and cogent outline of the relevant arguments and does so in the context of an unusually substantive history of the relevant controversies.
An understanding of the morality of mixed modes allows Forde to reexamine a number of issues that have vexed scholars, but his primary concern is the conflict between individualist and communal elements in Locke's thought. In the context of politics, the essential question is how to reconcile Locke's emphasis on individual rights with a natural law that commands us to preserve humanity. Rather than simply adding his own voice to the ongoing debate about the relative priority of these principles, Forde explains why Locke might choose to emphasize natural right despite understanding it as derivative from natural law. Property serves as the central locus of the tension between individual and community and as the key to resolving it. Forde argues that Locke grounds private property in the communal principle of general prosperity, and that he also considers it the “sole, divinely mandated” means to this end (175). If god dictates that the right to property is the only appropriate way to preserve humanity, that right cannot be abrogated by any appeal to the common good. The character of this defense of property also helps explain the conspicuous absence of any mention of charity in the Second Treatise, since “promulgating a strong duty to charity could even stigmatize the acquisitive drive upon which the machinery of the general good depends” (177).
Locke's silence on charity in the Second Treatise is compatible with an advocacy of a moral obligation to charity, on the basis of a “two-tiered morality” borrowed from Grotius and Pufendorf (173). The proper concern of politics is the limited obligation to avoid harming others, an obligation that can be based simply in self-interest. We are subject as well, however, to “a part of morality rooted in sociability,” which entails more significant obligations (173). The conflict between individual and community reappears on this higher level of morality, as the question of how to reconcile a moral obligation to one's community with a Lockean account of motivation on which obedience to law must serve one's own interest. Forde argues Locke resolves the tension through an education that instills civility and “good breeding,” genuinely sociable feelings that allow virtue to become its own reward (203, 211, 217). This concluding picture of morality is remarkably Aristotelian, and while Forde defends Locke against the charge that such virtue is mercenary, the proper question might be whether it is mercenary enough to support a morality based on the external imposition of a rule rather than the inner fulfillment of our nature.
Forde's reading is shaped by an awareness that “Locke was responding to controversies with very long histories” (71), and he locates Locke's positions within a careful consideration of those histories, identifying what Locke owes to his predecessors and his unique contributions to these conversations. What results is a compelling interpretation of the structure of Locke's political thought and of that thought's relationship to both Lockean science and Lockean morality. Forde also aims to show why Locke thought mixed modes offer “a solid grounding for morality” (7). On this point, unfortunately, he leaves the thorniest problem unresolved: the solidity of this ground depends on the moral demonstration Locke famously promises but never delivers. Locke does not seem to have abandoned the project altogether, and his works contain “numerous hints” and “outlines of parts of the demonstration” (109). Even if we accept Forde's reconstruction of Locke's arguments for the existence of god, however, “we may not be able to prove with certainty that this god is providential in the sense required for the support of moral law” (115). Objective morality requires a lawgiver, but whether god possesses the attributes required for such law to be legitimate may be beyond our knowledge. Forde assures us that “Locke proceeds with his philosophical project as though it has foundation enough to support it,” but he never makes clear whether he thinks Locke's foundation is sufficient, much less offer reasons why we should do so (116).
The implications of the shakiness of Locke's ground become clear in Forde's discussion of property. Even if private property naturally serves the end of general prosperity, this cannot, on Locke's own argument, entail a right to property unless god dictates that we pursue general prosperity. Without evidence that god has the necessary authority to determine our end, and that he has commanded us to establish private property as the proper means to that end, anyone who believes that our obligation to charity trumps the right to property has no reason to accept Locke's conclusions. We are, in fact, left to wonder whether the economic calculation of the benefits of private property is Locke's rather than god's, and thus whether the mixed mode of private property might also be Locke's own creation rather than divinely sanctioned. Forde raises the possibility of a Lockean project of moral construction, one aimed at creating mixed modes that would support the political and moral order he desires (see 89–90, 197). Given the significance of this objection for the solidity of Locke's thought, it deserves the same careful consideration Forde affords to other objections.
The unanswered questions raised by Forde's book do not negate its many strengths. The clarity with which he has framed the fundamental issues with which Locke is grappling makes the work a valuable addition to the ongoing debates in Lockean scholarship.
