The Ming dynasty has long been recognized as a successor to the Yuan, in terms of both its claims to legitimacy and its form of rule. Writers have struggled to interpret the Ming as simultaneously inheriting the Yuan's mandate to rule and marking a return to native control of the Central State (or “China”). Scholars have long noted the Ming inheritance of Yuan territory and institutions, from the structure of the Ming military to the location of its capital. Researchers have also considered the relationships between the Ming and a range of other Mongol-influenced polities, largely through the Sinocentric framework of the “tribute system.” In short, the transition from Yuan to Ming rule has largely been understood as a fundamentally Chinese historical event.

In two new books, In the Shadow of the Mongol Empire: Ming China and Eurasia and Ming China and Its Allies: Imperial Rule in Eurasia, David M. Robinson fundamentally shifts this narrative by framing the Ming as just one of many successors claiming the mantle of the Mongol Empire and its eastern Eurasian component, the Great Yuan. In addition to the Ming, the Koryǒ, Oirat, Moghul, and Timurid states—and the Yuan itself, after its 1368 retreat from Daidu—all derived their claims to legitimacy from some form of Chinggisid inheritance. Furthermore, by considering the role of the Ming in the competition to be the leading patron in eastern Eurasia, Robinson convincingly demonstrates that this was not just a succession between imperial states, but also a succession between imperial courts. “In an age of dynasties,” he writes, foreign relations “was first and foremost a matter of personal relations among lords” (Ming China and Its Allies, p. 198). Finally, Robinson argues that a central aspect of early Ming rule was the desire of emperors to claim the loyalty of the very Mongolian elites that had recently staffed the Yuan government.

In the Shadow of the Mongol Empire follows the diplomatic efforts of Zhu Yuanzhang as he “developed a rhetorical repertoire, including its Chinggisid narrative” (p. 14) for communications with other rulers and used it to help shape arguments judged most likely to obtain their cooperation. Robinson acknowledges that the Ming conducted its diplomacy differently than either the Yuan before it or the Qing after it. However, he argues that this was not a general consequence of a return to “native” rule, but a specific response to the conditions of the Ming's naissance. In Robinson's words, “the early Ming dynasty never took its legitimacy, status, or longevity for granted” (p. 16), as it emerged in a world still dominated by Mongol power.

This book starts with the “Wider Historical Context” in part one. Chapter 1 establishes frameworks for “Eurasia after the Fall.” Chapters 2 and 3 trace the Yuan court's continued claims to imperial legitimacy after retreating from Daidu and the early stages of Ming patronage of Mongolian nobles. Chapter 4, “Black City,” uses the trove of materials discovered at the ruins of Qara-Qoto to trace the continuation of Yuan regional governance after the fall of Daidu.

Part two, “The Chinggisid Narrative at Home,” presents the book's central argument about the Ming's claims to legitimacy. Chapter 5 describes the Ming's arguments about Yuan history, its justifications for rebellion, and its claims about the proper relationship between the Ming and Yuan. Chapter 6 focuses on the precarious nature of these relations in practice, in particular on the Ming court's uneasy patronage of members of the Yuan ruling house. When these relationships failed, Robinson writes, “the eruption of chaos, violence, fear, and uncertainty at the dynasty's center undercut the Ming court's carefully crafted Chinggisid narrative” (p. 186).

Parts three and four turn outward again to trace the use of these rhetorical strategies and patrimonial politics to influence other states, both in the broader Chinggisid fold and in the non-Chinggisid states of East Asia. Chapter 7 follows Zhu Yuanzhang's “Letters to the Great Khan,” attempting to persuade post-Daidu khans to accept a status as “ruler of a single region.” Chapter 8 and 9 trace Zhu Yuanzhang's attempts to cultivate the rulers of Yunnan, Mongolia, and Central Asia and of Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

Ming China and Its Allies picks up the story of Ming-Mongol relations in the reigns of Zhu Di through Zhu Qizhen (ca. 1402–64). Robinson demonstrates that Ming emperors continued to exert power through a Eurasian paradigm that was often marginalized in China—one that included rulers’ personal leadership of military expeditions. He interprets these steppe campaigns—including Zhu Qizhen's capture in 1449, known as the Tumu Incident—as well within the bounds of Eurasian norms rather than exceptional flights of imperial fancy.

This book is roughly split between two emperors, Zhu Di (the Yongle emperor) and Zhu Qizhen (Emperor Yingzong), whose careers marked the height of Ming steppe campaigns. Chapter 1 begins with Zhu Di, from his time as prince of Yan through his first northern campaigns in 1410. It focuses on Zhu Di's missives to other rulers, including the Great Khan of the eastern Mongols and the courts of Chosǒn, the Oirats, and Central Asia. Chapter 2 describes the efforts of Zhu Di's ministers to come to terms with the emperor's own close connections with his Mongolian officers, as well as with the physical and symbolic remnants of the Great Yuan court.

Chapter 3 is the bridge between the two halves of the book, highlighting the careers of two “Mongol Nobles at the Ming Court” between the 1420s and the 1450s. It shows how Mongolian leaders recruited to the Ming court became increasingly integrated into the Ming military, until their ethnic status drew them into purges in the wake of the Tumu Incident. Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 turn to the careers of Zhu Qizhen, and his Oirat counterpart Esen. Chapter 4 addresses how these two rulers each claimed forms of Chinggisid legacy, while chapter 5 traces how they used these claims to compete for the loyalty of key borderland communities, including the “Seven Guards” in the west and the “Three Guards” in the east.

Since his 1999 article on “Politics, Force and Ethnicity in Ming China,” Robinson has written widely on Ming martiality, court display, and the particular role of the Mongols.Footnote ¹ In addition to his own past work, this builds on the work of other scholars of Mongol Eurasia, including Thomas Allsen (to whom Ming China and Its Allies is dedicated), Christopher Atwood, and Hodong Kim; of Ming relations with Inner Asia, including Morris Rossabi and Henry Serruys; and of the institutional and intellectual roots of the Ming in the Yuan, most notably, John Dardess. In the Shadow of the Mongol Empire reaches deep into scholarship on other Mongol successor states, including the Timurid Empire, Moghul Khanate, and Golden Horde, while Ming China and Its Allies builds on broader research on Eurasian patronage and diplomacy. In addition to English-language works, Robinson deploys his mastery of scholarship written in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.

Robinson's source base is equally diverse. Both books rest principally on documents from the Ming court, including the Shlilu and other collections of imperial correspondence, as well as the records of other Eurasian courts. Robinson also uses objects, art, and architecture, although these are referenced in the text rather than included as images. Collectively, he deploys this array of sources to demonstrate that the familiar narratives of the decline of the Yuan and the rise of the Ming were intentionally crafted by the Ming court, and only tell part of the story. While Ming sources remain the most abundant and most detailed sources of evidence, other voices, however fragmentary, are necessary to question this record.

Robinson's translations of extensive diplomatic correspondence are quite useful. However, there is some inconsistency in the use of important terms: zhongguo 中國 is sometimes translated as “Central State” and other times as “China;”Footnote ² hu 胡 is sometimes “barbarian,” and other times “northern horsemen;”Footnote ³ yi 夷 is variously “barbarian,” “foreigner,” “outlander,” and just “Yi.”Footnote ⁴ While Robinson assiduously provides transcriptions of terms from other languages, there is almost no Chinese transcribed in the body text, nor is there a glossary to clarify these translation decisions. It may have been better to leave terms such as hu 胡 untranslated, as Robinson did in other recent work.Footnote ⁵ There is also a curious tendency to consistently refer to even the rump of the Yuan state as “Great Yuan” (Da Yuan), while the Ming—which also called itself a “Great State” (Da Ming)—is almost always just “Ming.”Footnote ⁶

Ultimately, Robinson's argument that the early Ming court must be understood as a court is quite compelling, as is the context he provides of eastern Eurasian politics still dominated by Mongol pedigree and Mongolian personnel. Both books present a range of evidence in support of this thesis, which should become foundational to the study of the early Ming. Ming China and Its Allies presents the clearer case of the two books, but they are probably best read together. The books are most suitable for advanced graduate students and scholars who are already aware of the outlines of Ming—and eastern Eurasian—history in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.