If the traditional debate in epistemology draws the line correctly, there is a distinction between justification on grounds internal to an agent, and justification on grounds external to an agent. It is often thought that if one is an externalist, one foreswears norms and values in an account of epistemic justification, and if one believes epistemic obligations are the route to justification, one locates justification internal to an agent. Externalism is all about causes and mechanistic explanations of justification, while internalism can make sure that those who are justified in their beliefs are in the right. Littlejohn’s Justification and the Truth-Connection suggests that the traditional picture (where to draw the line between internalism and externalism) is mistaken. The option Littlejohn prefers is a deontological externalism: an account that locates epistemic norms of justification outside of the agent.
Justification, according to Littlejohn, is a defense that shows that one’s epistemic position is right, and this can only happen if one’s beliefs are true. Belief aims at truth, not knowledge.
In chapter 1, Littlejohn surveys the terrain in the internalism-externalism debate via the case of individuals in cultural isolation who apparently meet epistemic obligations with the limited information to which they have access. Such cases undermine internalism, but the inference that they impugn deontological accounts is mistaken for obligation does not entail internalism. The debate between externalists and internalists is quite independent of the question of the deontological foundations of justification. By the end of the chapter, Littlejohn believes he has shown that even if we concede that personal justification (S is justified in believing p) is internalist, it is an independent question as to whether doxastic justification (S’s belief that p is justified) is externalist. These two varieties of justification, along with propositional justification (S has or there is a justification to believe that p) are incorrectly conflated.
In chapter 2, Littlejohn broaches the analogies between value in ethics and epistemology. He considers consequentialist accounts of epistemic justification in both rule and act forms, but rejects them as they rest on a totalizing assumption that total intrinsic value determines deontic status. In epistemology, this amounts to the notion that justification collapses into truth. This is wrong for there can be cases when our beliefs are true but not warranted by the evidence. In contrast, we ought rather to be concerned with epistemic worth: the formation of beliefs on the basis of the evidence. This is an internalist notion that is not incompatible with externalism.
In chapter 3, Littlejohn argues against two versions of internalism (Evidential and Supervenience), and for the claim that our justification consists of facts, excluding attitudes or false propositions one rationally accepts. This comes down to three related theses: strong propositionalism (all evidence consists of propositions), FactivityE (if p is a justifying reason to believe, p is true), and that immediate, non-inferential knowledge suffices for evidence.
In chapter 4, Littlejohn derives FactivityJ (you cannot justifiably believe p unless p is true) from FactivityE via a criticism of Disjunctivism. Disjunctivism is the view that the psychological states corresponding to perceptual knowledge and hallucination are distinct. Accordingly, what is distinctive, in the case of perceptual knowledge, is that one’s beliefs are based on a factive mental state. This makes Disjunctivism out to be unorthodox internalism, on Littlejohn’s account. The problem with Disjunctivism is that it rests upon the idea that “if you cannot know whether q non-inferentially then q cannot make any difference to your justificatory status” (141). I shall call this ‘tunnel.’ The counterexample to this is the case of the wrongly convicted, innocent on the basis of limited evidence. Disjunctivism excuses the miscarriage of justice, but Littlejohn disagrees: “[i]t seems rather intuitive that something is owed to this person no matter how carefully the trial was conducted” (142). Littlejohn believes that this shows that tunnel is wrong and that relying on factive mental states is not sufficient for justification: our justified beliefs also have to be true for them to be justified. It is a myth that there can be false justified beliefs.
In Chapter 5, Littlejohn attempts to secure the truth requirement for justification via an analysis of assertion. He maintains TNW (one should not assert p unless p is true) and JA (one’s assertion that p is true is warranted if and only if one justifiably believes that p) are compatible, and together entail FactivityJ: one cannot justifiably believe p unless p is true. Littlejohn defends JA and TNW as compatible with ethical encroachment: there may be ethical considerations that override warranted assertion.
Chapter 6 brings in the topic of practical beliefs and action to make a case for FactivityJ. Chapter 7, the wrap up chapter, explores the implications of the truth-connection account.
There is much in this book that is worth taking seriously. Littlejohn helps his case by a judicious review of the literature and standard form presentation of his arguments. Ironically, the book relies heavily on appeals to intuitions and cases, neither of which are externalist. The distinction between personal justification, and doxastic justification may justify what seems to be an internalist-personal account of doxastic justification.
Littlejohn, at times, wants to draw a sharp line between ethical and epistemic norms to protect the connection between warrant, truth and justification against possible moral defeaters (160-1). But this does not suit the evidence that he sites. The case of the miscarriage of justice that purportedly shows the error of Disjunctivism is as much a moral failing as an epistemic failing. If it were only an epistemic failing, Disjunctivism may not seem so egregious. Disjunctivism would deliver a truth connection (between the limited evidence and the verdict) but not the one that is just. If we want the just verdict, we see why it must also be true. If the just verdict is evidence that belief aims at truth, it is mediated via the requirement that the belief in question must be just. Justice does not always warrant that what we say is true, and it gives reason to believe what is false: even if someone is guilty, it was just for us to falsely believe his or her innocence (in the absence of contrary evidence) until his or her guilt is established. True, in this case it seems that we did not know that the individual was innocent. But Littlejohn’s point is that we were not justified in this assumption. That seems false, if “[j]ustifications show that you were in the right” as Littlejohn holds (4). Littlejohn might qualify that justification is only supposed to show that we were epistemically in the right in our belief: it is not supposed to show that we were right in our belief without qualification. But then the Disjunctivist is in the position to claim that in the carefully conducted trial that wrongfully convicts someone via tunnel, the judgment was epistemically in the right, though it may not have been just. This would accord with the intuition that something is owed to the defendant (justice), without having to dislodge Disjunctivism.
In closing, I note that though I have reservations about the contention of Justification and the Truth-Connection, it makes an inspiring contribution to philosophical debates about justification. It is a short book that covers the breadth of the internalism-externalism debate and provides a case for a novel position. It is well worth reading.
