This quite accessible volume focuses on three groups of rational pleasures: those of learning and knowing; those both of planning how to maximise pleasure and of planning itself; and those of memory and anticipation. Some may be frustrated by W.'s organisation of the chapters, which he has grouped by type of rational pleasure rather than by author or text (e.g. Plato's Philebus is treated in Chapters 2 and 5; Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in Chapters 3 and 7), and the book does not hazard any particularly controversial claims, but it is nevertheless an outstanding reference guide to the pleasures of being rational in antiquity. Since the footnotes are kept to a sane quantity and W.'s analysis is remarkably lucid, the volume will be comprehensible to non-specialists and specialists alike.

After introducing the three general groups of pleasure in Chapter 1, W. turns in the second chapter to two thorny issues in Plato's philosophy: first, how Plato can insist, as he does in the Republic, both that the philosophical life is most pleasant and that learning is rather painful? And second, how can he justify the pleasantness of contemplation, given that he tends to stress pleasure's association with processes, yet contemplation is not necessarily a process? To solve these problems, W. applies to the Republic two necessary conditions from the Philebus for learning to be painful: not only must we notice our lack of knowledge, but we must also believe that we need to know what we do not. If we read these criteria into the Republic, W. argues, we find that learning is not painful per se: it becomes so only when learning is sudden and happens under duress. Learning occurs painlessly in the ideal educational system, where there is an ‘assured, if far from universal, level of success’ (p. 32). Plato would believe contemplating what one has already learned is pleasant, W. continues, because contemplation can involve ‘the bringing to mind of latent knowledge’ (p. 49), the recalling of which is not painful and is a sort of κίνησις. Although W.'s interpretation goes a long way towards making sense of the problem of the philosopher's pleasure in the Republic, I think it is questionable whether the Philebus’ account of pleasure can be so easily imported into the Republic, given that there are some serious differences in the dialogues’ respective descriptions of pleasure, particularly the Philebus’ emphasis on the necessity of perception for pleasure, an emphasis which is noticeably lacking in the Republic. The fact that we must notice our deficiencies in order for our learning to be mixed with pain is, ironically, not something Plato pays much attention to in the Republic, where pleasure and pain are identified with κινήσεις simpliciter; awareness is not much of a factor. This discrepancy between the two accounts has the potential to undermine W.'s reading.

In Chapter 3, W. delves into Aristotle's attempt to solve Plato's problem of how there can be pleasures of both learning and contemplating. W. draws on the Metaphysics, De anima and De memoria to show that Aristotle improves on Plato's account by cleanly separating learning from knowing and by describing the process one undergoes in moving from the former to the latter. In addition, W. argues via careful scrutiny of Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle uses mental pleasures as his main weapon against the view, prevalent in the Academy, that all pleasures are γενέσεις. By associating pleasure with ἐνέργεια rather than with γένεσις or κίνησις, Aristotle can easily account for the pleasantness of contemplation, since contemplation itself is an ἐνέργεια. Given that Aristotle's account of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics has been thoroughly worked over by others, it is refreshing that W. spends time also on the Rhetoric and Poetics. Indeed, the most intriguing claim of the chapter is that these works reveal that Aristotle's classification of intellectual pleasure is more inclusive than Plato's: Aristotle believes we can enjoy not only learning lofty truths but also engaging in the relatively lowly pastimes of being admired (Rhetoric 1.1) and considering mimetic art (Poetics 4), both of which W. argues are linked for Aristotle to the desire for learning. The chapter's obvious weakness is its failure to address Aristotle's account of pleasure in NE Book 7. At stake is whether Aristotle believes pleasure itself is an ἐνέργεια, which is arguably the position of Book 7, or merely accompanies an ἐνέργεια, as seems to be the case in Book 10. Without any justification, W. adopts the latter position and ignores the former, a move which is serious given that it is difficult to see how Aristotle is rebutting the view that pleasure is a γένεσις or κίνησις if he thinks pleasure is merely associated with, rather than identical to, an ἐνέργεια.

Chapter 4 covers pleasures of learning and knowing in Epicurus and Plutarch. W. argues, based almost entirely on Vatican Saying 27, that Epicurus believes knowing and learning are pleasant independently of their usefulness in quelling anxiety and allaying fears about death and the gods. Although Vatican Saying 27 is a clear piece of evidence in favour of W.'s argument, one wonders whether the joy of discovery was very significant to Epicureans, given that they hardly ever mention it. More significant is W.'s analysis of the ways in which Plutarch utilises Platonic material, particularly the Republic, to attack Epicureanism, which itself was an attack on Platonic philosophy, as W. persuasively shows. The chapter also explores Plutarch's own view of pleasures of learning and knowing, which include not only the standard Platonic pleasure of contemplating Forms but also pleasures of ‘literature, history, and the like’ (p. 96). The chapter provides a real sense of the polemical atmosphere among Epicureans and Platonists in antiquity, particularly where W. explores the idea that Plutarch's attack on Epicurus was a sort of payback for Epicurus’ earlier attack on Plato.

The fifth chapter is largely preparation for later chapters on the pleasures of rational planning, memory and anticipation: W. explores the Protagoras’ account of how distortions of perspective affect humans’ ability to maximise pleasure and minimise pain, as well as the Philebus’ notion that such distortions also affect our experiences of pleasure and pain and our thoughts about our future hedonic experiences. This background is put to work in Chapter 6, where W. explores the connections between false anticipatory pleasures and moral character in the Philebus. W. provides an exceptionally clear analysis of the ways in which falsehood applies to pleasures of anticipation in the dialogue, and goes on to consider Socrates’ assertion that false pleasures belong, for the most part, to the wicked. After sensibly rejecting the view that the wicked are more prone to false pleasures because they are utter rubbish at predicting future events, W. argues that bad people lead volatile lives, and as a result they tend to be fickle and unable to anticipate accurately their future attitudes towards future events. In my opinion, this is one of the book's most intriguing parts: Socrates’ point is highly nuanced, and W.'s analysis is likewise so. Chapter 7 presents a brief account of Aristotle on pleasures of memory and expectation. W. shows that Aristotle, like Plato, links such pleasures with different moral characters, particularly in Nicomachean Ethics 9. In addition, W. examines the mechanics of taking pleasure in past pains in Rhetoric 1.11, and the role of ϕαντασία in our pleasurable and painful experiences. The eighth chapter is fairly uncontroversial: W. contrasts the Epicureans and Cyrenaics concerning the pleasures of prudential planning, memory and anticipation. The chapter shows straightforwardly that Epicureans believe we can use reasoning to maximise pleasure for the long term, whereas the Cyrenaics choose to focus on present pleasures. Similarly, Epicureans think pleasures of memory and anticipation are crucial to happiness, whereas Cyrenaics doubt that past enjoyments will produce pleasure in the here and now. What all the philosophers discussed here agree on, as W. shows quite effectively, though somewhat uncontentiously, is that being a rational animal is essential to securing what everyone wants: a pleasant life.