Debates about the war on terror have often—and for good reasons—stressed its most explicit violent sides: the invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the detainment of unlawful combatants at Guantanamo, extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists, extrajudicial killings, and the use of torture during interrogations. By contrast, this book focuses on the less dramatic initiatives for managing the risk of terrorism through case studies about counterterrorist initiatives in the financial sector, the aviation industry, and the management of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Yee-Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh refer to these forms of risk governance as the “other” war on terror and suggest that they may balance the more military policies by institutionalizing a widely supported system of global governance related to the management of terrorism. Drawing on Ulrich Beck's thesis that a common and shared global horizon of risk could lead to more cosmopolitan and inclusive forms of global governance, the authors ask to which degree global counterterrorist activities empower and legitimize global regimes of governance that bring together a wide range of state and nonstate actors.
Concretely, Heng and McDonagh focus on three initiatives: the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an attempt at managing the risk of terrorist financing through global standard setting and capacity building; the informal U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims at preventing the risk of proliferation of WMDs; and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) which provides risk-based cooperation in the field of aviation security in the aftermath of 9/11. The FATF, PSI, and IATA illustrate new forms of collective action that entrench global standards, benchmarks, and best practice schemes of risk management and the identification of threats and vulnerabilities. They point out that risk governance introduces different layers of security that seek to make it more difficult for terrorists to operate in their environment. For example, the FATF targets “suspected” money trails with the aim of filtering out undesired forms of financial circulation from “normal” transactions. Similarly, the IATA defines standard of risk to be used for the profiling of persons and categorizes them in terms of their likelihood to be associated with terrorist objectives and activities.
The authors point out that rather than a global cosmopolis based on equality and transnational cooperation, these initiatives have entrenched inequality and undermined freedom. For example, developing nations have questioned the legitimacy of the FATF, which introduces standards that are largely formulated by Western states and which marginalize and criminalize financial realities in non-Western parts of the world. Discursive associations among terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, wire transfers, and Islamic banking (hawala) have contributed to a criminalization and exclusion of selected groups and activities—such as Islamic charitable foundations—often based on ethnic and racial categories (pp. 69–70). Similarly, the PSI allows for the intervention and inspection of ships sailing on the high seas, potentially undermining international law provisions that interdict the boarding of ships on the high seas that are not under a state's jurisdiction (p. 105). As the authors conclude, the PSI appears not so much a cosmopolitan framework as “another tool of Western and perhaps more specifically US power in the world, established to address distinctly Western security concerns rather than the cosmopolitan recognition of global risks” (p. 106).
The case studies are the most compelling part of the book and convincingly show how a global assemblage of practices, actors, institutions, and discourses have been formed around the notion of terrorism risk in the diverging fields of finance, security, and aviation. However, the conceptual framework built around Beck's notion of “risk-cosmopolitanism” is more problematic. For Beck, cosmopolitanism is a process of radical political transformation that emerges out of the awareness that certain global risks can no longer be rationally managed and, therefore, calls for a radical questioning of expert knowledge. However, for reasons that are not entirely obvious, the authors have dropped this normative aspect of Beck's work. Instead, they reduce the question of cosmopolitanism to one “of how a risk-based form of global governance can emerge” (p. 32). Unfortunately, they thereby end up conflating the normative notion of risk-cosmopolitanism with the mere empirical existence of global risk governance. Global governance, as a result, seems to be good and desirable by definition.
Nevertheless, as the authors' critical discussion of these initiatives brings out, the FTFA, PSI, and IATA are a far cry from cosmopolitan principles or the kind of radical politics Beck had in mind. In fact, the case studies in this book largely show that the FATF, PSI, and IATA are not so much part of an “other” war on terror as a continuation of the same war by other means. It is therefore odd that Heng and McDonagh, all the evidence to the contrary, try to hold on to the “good” essence of global governance. Thus, even if the FATF is seen as having a “negative impact on civil liberties and democratic accountability,” they add that it nevertheless “is a leading example of how the language and techniques of risk have been installed and institutionalized as a cornerstone of global counter-terrorist financing standards” (p. 78). Elsewhere, they are willing to set aside the “stumbling blocks” of the “infringement of civil liberties, discrimination and exclusion” in order to evaluate the effectiveness of FATF as a global risk management exercise (p. 70).
In their optimism, the authors also downplay the insights from other studies on risk—including the work of Louise Amoore, Marieke de Goede and Mark Salter—that show how the war on terror has strengthened a regime based on exclusive forms of risk governance in all sorts of domains, including the ones discussed in this book. It is unclear exactly why, but Heng and McDonagh are unwilling to take the insights from these studies and their case studies to their logical conclusion: If one wants to find principles of global cosmopolitanism, the war on terror is not the place to go and look for them. Unwilling to give up the hope for a “happy ending” (p. 154), it is more telling in this regard that they give Donald Rumsfeld (pp. 157–58)—who has been called many things but never a cosmopolitan—the final say in the book.
