As a leading Tocqueville scholar and the English translator of the milestone critical edition of Democracy in America (Liberty Fund, 2010), James T. Schleifer now undertakes to offer an updated, comprehensive introduction to the French thinker's life and works in his new book Tocqueville. Schleifer's previous studies are renowned for drawing upon Tocqueville's many unpublished manuscripts, letters, and working drafts, along with the major published texts, in the portrayal of Tocqueville's life trajectory and intellectual development. This dynamic and contextual interpretative approach is followed in the new work. The brief but pointed sketch of Tocqueville's biography in the first chapter presents a very intriguing story: a French aristocrat whose family had suffered bitterly in the democratic revolution became in the end one of the most important theorists and advocates of modern democracy.

“Democracy on the march” (23) was the principal theme in Tocqueville's theorizing. It means that the hierarchical social relations of feudal aristocracy were being replaced by an increasing equality in modern society, which would trigger huge transformations in power relations, cultural norms, and individual psychology. As Schleifer's discussion of Tocqueville's intellectual context reveals, Tocqueville's vision of democracy benefited much from his famous predecessors (Pascal, Rousseau, Montesquieu, of whose writings he “read a bit every day”) and his contemporaries (for example, the French Doctrinaires). But what marks Tocqueville's genius originality is his systematic and profound analysis of the consequences of modern democracy and his admirable suggestions to deal with this new historical phenomenon (analyzed by Schleifer in chapters 3–5).

Schleifer incisively distinguishes between the two dimensions of Tocqueville's concept of liberty (see chapter 3). Like many theorists of modern liberalism, Tocqueville enumerated an array of civil and political rights which he regarded as the necessary preconditions of freedom. The right to vote, freedom of expression, and the rights of civil and political association compose a package of what Tocqueville called “modern liberty” (47). But what distinguishes Tocqueville from his contemporary theorists was his emphasis on the practice of liberty. For Tocqueville, the legal regulations and institutional arrangements would be hollow and meaningless if people could not put those rights to actual use. The modern democratic social condition, as Tocqueville noted, was a hotbed for the pathology of individualism, which led to people's dependence on the government, whose power was increasingly centralized. As governmental power ultimately becomes unlimited and tutelary, it leads to a new form of tyranny—the “democratic despotism” (73)—which softens and tames people's will. “To preserve liberty in the age of equality” (141) and to evade the danger of “democratic despotism,” Tocqueville urged citizens to use their individual rights and be actively engaged in civic life and public affairs, especially at the local and intermediate levels.

The practice of liberty, for Tocqueville, was essentially intended to make a society inhabited by free souls. Schleifer emphasizes this soul-forming project set forth by Tocqueville “the moralist” (35). For Tocqueville, liberty was essentially a moral force moderating the excess of democracy's potentially harmful inclinations. The “beautiful definition of liberty” (50) for him lay in a state of psychological orderliness and moral self-restraint. This is why Tocqueville stressed the indispensable role of religion in preserving liberty in the democratic age. Religion could lead democratic men to look beyond their individualistic, self-indulgent pursuits and to pursue a higher purpose in life. This moral dimension of Tocqueville's theory of liberty reflects his preference for moderation, a principle that appears repeatedly in Schleifer's discussion. However, Tocqueville the moralist's aspiration for the “greatness” of mind also led to his somewhat surprising pursuit of national pride by means of imperial wars (97). His principle of moderation thus appears paradoxical.

This moralist vein has produced many conservative readings of Tocqueville's thought. But Schleifer wants to warn us against some libertarian (mis)readings of Tocqueville (see chapter 6). Focusing on the trend of equality in Democracy, Tocqueville has often been criticized for ignoring the serious problem of economic inequality in modern times. In opposition to such readings, Schleifer points out that Tocqueville had fully recognized industrialization as a social force independent of marching democracy in causing socioeconomic inequalities. The focus on the leveling of social status in his debut book was more a strategy of argumentation than the result of a lack of knowledge. After he published the first volume of Democracy and entered political life during the July Monarchy, Tocqueville the politician, as Schleifer notes, paid special attention to the problem of poverty and worked diligently to promote public charity. While cautioning against the danger of a centralizing government, Tocqueville also called for rigorous activity on the part of the government in aiding the poor through carefully devised legal efforts. For Tocqueville, the extreme economic inequality and the dire state of the poor majority would make formal democratic rights meaningless and give rise to serious social upheavals. But unlike the socialists, Tocqueville always defended the right of property. He wanted the government to be an effective helper rather than an all-caring master (116). It is an important merit of Schleifer's book to shed fresh light on the image of Tocqueville as a moderate social reformer. But it should not be forgotten that Tocqueville has also been acclaimed as an advocate of civil society, whose insights have been resorted to by many contemporary political scientists in their empirical studies. For Tocqueville, social reform was not just about implementing government policies, but was to be realized through the daily cooperation and coordination of all members of society.

In the final part of the book, Schleifer offers an informative account of Tocqueville's growing reception in the West as well as in some non-Western countries (e.g., Japan and China), which illustrates Tocqueville's continuing relevance to our time. Building on Schleifer's discussion, I believe that the meaning of Tocqueville's theory in political practice deserves more in-depth reflection in today's context of multiculturalism and globalization. For example, we may ask: Is the liberal value Tocqueville advocates universally valid for the entire human community? How could the model of modern (Western) democracy successfully adapt to and take root in non-Western and non-Christian contexts? Tocqueville's moralist postulates indeed pose some theoretical challenges to a broader application of his political analysis, but we can undoubtedly learn much from his sincere pursuit of liberty and human dignity. Today, the road of democratization seems no less bumpy than in Tocqueville's time. But as Schleifer points out, Tocqueville the “political man” never lost hope for human liberty in his theoretical reflections and political strivings, even though the French political situation grew ever darker up until the end of his life.

Tocqueville's theory of democracy and liberty is essentially a theory of human responsibility for directing our future to better ends. Having the insight and courage to face the difficulties with modern democracy is always a lesson to be learned from Tocqueville. Meticulously and concisely written by a top expert, Schleifer's Tocqueville will prove to be rewarding reading for the general audience and a useful reference for specialists.