Introduction
There was a time not very long ago when Pakistan's civil servants could occasionally be motivated to advise the government in accordance with its enlightened self-interest and the national interest. This article explores four such instances from Pakistan's history. The first, from 1952, draws upon a note on Pakistan's internal situation with reference to the rise of religious extremism and the dangers that such trends would expose Pakistan to in the long-term. The second, from 1961, presents a comparative analysis of administrative law in Europe as part of advice sought by the Pakistani government in the context of constitutional reforms. The third, from 1982, comprises a series of summaries for the Cabinet on the need for a broad reorientation of public administration deriving lessons from Pakistan's administrative history. The fourth, two notes submitted together in 2000, examines Pakistan's dysfunctional criminal justice system and provides recommendations for its rehabilitation.
In all four examples a senior civil servant, acting in an executive or advisory capacity, took a position that went against the world-view of the political class/the military leadership/the international donor community of the time. The integrity and wisdom of the position taken was however disregarded by the then ruler/regime. In due course, the diagnosis of the problem and possible prescriptions outlined by the civil servant in question were substantially vindicated in terms of both accuracy and foresight. The importance of these snapshots of past internal debates cannot be underrated in terms of their contemporary relevance, for Pakistan today is facing stubborn religious militancy amidst a generalised breakdown of public services and deteriorating law and order.
The impact of these current trends on Pakistan's beleaguered population is that they collectively reinforce public despair and disillusionment. Terrorist violence, and the military and intelligence operations launched to counter it, have killed thousands and displaced millions without putting a stop to terror attacks. Fuel and food shortages, especially the electricity crisis that has plagued the country since 2007, have created a situation in which life, hard enough for the working and lower middle classes, has become increasingly difficult for the upper-middle and middle classes who were previously insulated to a great extent from widespread poverty and chaos. The ability of the state to maintain law and order in ordinary circumstances and meet extraordinary challenges to its writ has declined precipitously. Recent military operations in the Swat Valley have been successful in driving the militants out but due to the collapse of the civil administration the army has been ordered to garrison and administer the area much to the consternation of both the populace and (in private) military commanders. Without a thorough reorganisation of Pakistan's police force and prosecutorial/investigative agencies the country will continue its slide into criminal anarchy and ‘warlordism’ even as the central government applies the military hammer to problems better confronted with a civilian scalpel.
The purpose of this article is to re-examine failed attempts to provide rational advice to Pakistan's rulers. This re-examination will help determine the validity and continued relevance of the advice and will also explain the failure of the political leadership to take heed. The demoralising impact on the bureaucratic leadershipFootnote 1 of repeated rejection of sound advice, and the consequent adoption of deeply flawed policies that exacerbated Pakistan's crisis of state, is also discussed.
March 1952: Religious Extremism and the Challenge of Internal Stabilisation
The claim that Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam is validated by the political strategy adopted by the All-India Muslim League (AIML) from 1940 to 1947. In its efforts to unite the Muslims of India on a common platform with the object of demanding a radically greater measure of provincial autonomy and constitutional safeguards for Muslims within India, or, failing that, an independent country, the AIML employed religious symbols and propaganda.Footnote 2 The AIML leadership did not take into serious consideration the implications of this rhetoric, even though the communal polarisation of India, heightened by the imminence of British imperial withdrawal, was electorally vindicated in the 1946 elections. The AIML swept to victory in the Muslim constituencies and garnered over 80% of the popular vote. With the British eager to withdraw and the Indian National Congress (INC) eager to assume power, the stage was set for the communal holocaust of 1947. Perhaps as many as a million died and the partition process displaced millions more, with the areas awarded to Pakistan suffering a proportionately greater upheaval.Footnote 3
Subsequent to the emergence of Pakistan out of the communally partitioned territories of a fallen empire a debate began about the relationship between Islam and the state. The westernised Muslims, who had led the Pakistan movement regarded an industrialised nation-state, governed through parliamentary institutions modelled on those prevalent in Britain, as the long-term goal, found themselves in a difficult position once they became the rulers of a new state. If they rejected giving Islam a prominent role in the new state their earlier use of Islam as an instrument of mass mobilisation would be exposed as a cynical exercise in power politics. If the westernised Muslims tried to formulate a constitution that incorporated Islamic provisions they would be exposed to the traditionalists’ charge that public representatives were not technically qualified to interpret Islam and were only using religion to give their secular aspirations a religious veneer. Making substantive concessions to the traditionalists and bringing them into the power structure would however, only lead to demands for greater Islamisation and risk plunging the country into sectarian warfare. Pakistan's declared raison d'être was then, as it is now, in conflict with its actual raison d'état.
On 11 August 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's Quaid-i-Azam (Great or Supreme Leader) and first governor general, recoiling from the horrors of escalating communal violence, stated in his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that an individual's religion was no business of the state and that every effort had to be made to overcome the real problems and divisions that Pakistan would soon have to confront.Footnote 4 Jinnah's prestige and the public's confidence in his leadership were so great that many feel that he alone could have led Pakistan towards a satisfactory and legitimate resolution of the debate on the relationship between Islam and the state. Jinnah's death in September 1948 however, emboldened the traditionalists and reduced the Muslim League leadership to apologetics and appeasement on this issue.
The Muslim League's decline as a ruling party and the numerous internal fissures that were revealed led the country's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, to move an Objectives Resolution (March 1949) which committed the government to framing a constitution that would be in accordance with the sources of Islamic tradition.Footnote 5 This resolution had the effect of alienating the minorities (including the substantial Hindu minority in East Bengal), comforting the traditionalists, demoralising the leftists, and ringing alarm bells in Pakistan's liberal-conservative civil service and military officer corps. It singularly failed to accelerate constitution-making or to strengthen the Muslim League. Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in October 1951 resulted in the then governor general, Khwaja Nazimuddin, becoming prime minister and the then finance minister, Ghulam Mohammad, assuming the office of governor general. Nazimuddin's premiership soon saw the escalation of sectarian tensions with the traditionalists demanding, among other things, that members of the Ahmediya sect be declared non-Muslims and Pakistan be made an Islamic State within which the ulema would wield decisive power.Footnote 6 Nazimuddin and the provincial political leadership, especially chief minister Daultana of the Punjab, supported and encouraged the agitation for short-term political benefit.
G. Ahmad, then Secretary Interior, States and Frontier Regions, was deeply worried by the path that the political class had chosen. On 14 March 1952, he submitted a note to the prime minister on the “Internal Situation”.Footnote 7 The note started by unequivocally warning the prime minister that public confidence in the competence of the government had reached an all-time low.Footnote 8 Political tensions and parochialism were increasing alarmingly though they had yet to boil over into a major law and order problem.Footnote 9 The party discipline of the Muslim League had reached an advanced state of decay with serious internal rivalries paralysing the party machine.Footnote 10 Rather than performing their real functions – making policy and explaining and defending it in public – most of the elected representatives were focused on securing personal and familial material advantage and creating a nuisance value by exploiting the “supposed grievances” of the electorate.Footnote 11 Provincial chief ministers, in particular, seemed oblivious to the interest of the state and were acting “in almost arrogant disregard” of the central government.Footnote 12 The only positive development was that the back of the communist movement had been broken with the Communist party reduced to “a state of supine inactivity” by police measures and intelligence.Footnote 13
While the utopian aspirations of the left had been checked, those on the religious right-wing were not dealt with and thus created problems for the country. Public apprehension and confusion stemmed not only from the agitation of religious fundamentalists but also from “the parrot-like repetition by politicians of the slogan that Pakistan is an Islamic State”.Footnote 14 The politicians’ lack of moral courage and continued use of religious rhetoric for short-term political gain was “fraught with considerable danger”:
The feeling is wide-spread among the intelligent section of the people that talk of an Islamic State on the part of the politicians is a convenient device to keep themselves in power; and that the politicians are banking on reactionary forces for political support, even if this leads to the country degenerating into the primitive levels of certain countries in the Middle East.Footnote 15
While religious fundamentalists had made Pakistan “a happy hunting ground”, it appeared that the government, at the highest levels, was “pandering to orthodoxy”.Footnote 16 Ahmad thus warned that the political class was exciting expectations that were highly subjective, divisive and consequently “impossible to fulfill”.Footnote 17 The policy recommendation was that the prime minister should ensure that there be “less talk of Islamic ideology and no encouragement whatever of orthodoxy in any shape or form”.Footnote 18
Ahmad's advice boiled down to two main prescriptions. One was that the politicians in government had to stop treating the state as a source of personal patronage and take their policymaking role seriously. The other was that by employing religious crutches the politicians had only demonstrated their own lameness and risked plunging the country into chaos. The prime minister did not take heed. Between Nazimuddin's insecurities and Daultana's ambitions, the Punjab was soon plunged into sectarian agitation and bloodshed as religious extremists took it upon themselves to resort to “direct action” against the Ahmedis in Lahore and elsewhere. In March 1953 the army moved into Lahore to crush the anti-Ahmedi riots while Daultana's government was dismissed by the governor general. On 17 April 1953, the governor general, together with senior military commanders and civil servants, forced Nazimuddin out of power and established a bureaucratic dictatorship backed by the army, legitimised by a collaborationist judiciary, and supported by a coterie of opportunistic politicians rotated into and out of office at the governor general's pleasure.
February 1961: Administrative Law in Continental Europe, Lessons for Pakistan
The decline and fall of the civilian politicians (1948–53) was followed by a period of rule by civil servants and military officers that took the form of a military regime by 1958. The Ayub Khan military regime (1958–69) set up a number of commissions to examine the problems faced by Pakistan. One of these commissions was charged with advising the government on a new constitution. The Constitution Commission asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare a report on administrative law in Europe.Footnote 19 The Secretary Foreign Affairs in turn entrusted S. K. Dehlavi, then Pakistan's ambassador to Rome, with the preparation of a report on administrative law. Dehlavi was “frankly alarmed” by the breadth of this task and wrote in the report that “this work would have been more appropriately entrusted to a jurist than to an Ambassador”.Footnote 20 Notwithstanding Dehlavi's own reservations about his suitability for the task, the report produced for advising the Constitution Commission has stood the test of time and remains relevant to Pakistan's present predicament.
The basic issue was that with the enormous growth in the responsibilities of executive agencies responsible for development, welfare and conventional activities, bureaucracies and executive legislation had grown exponentially. Even in the United Kingdom, Parliament had delegated law-making powers to executive bodies. In 1920, for instance, 820 Statutory Rules and Orders were passed under the Rules Publications Act, against 82 Acts of Parliament.Footnote 21 The ability of Parliament to supervise the volumes of sub-legislation churned out by executive institutions was limited and perhaps even overwhelmed prior to the post-1945 welfare state reforms. The post-1945 reforms greatly added to the size and strength of public sector service delivery organisations. In response to the loss of Parliamentary control over proliferating executive institutions and bodies, the British were compelled to start setting up administrative tribunals, most of them of a specialised kind, to check the behaviour of the bureaucracy. In effect, the laws of the United Kingdom had become “officialised” and “a system of administrative law in the guise of a great mass of administrative tribunals” had come into existence.Footnote 22
In contrast to the multiple tribunals employed in the United Kingdom, France had a far older and more coherent tradition of administrative law that was a direct consequence of its centuries of accumulated experience of bureaucratic governance. The French Conseil d'État, originally founded by Napoleon Bonaparte, had gradually been able “to impose on the entire field of administrative activity a general control and a closer control of a judicial nature”.Footnote 23 By keeping out of politics, the Conseil d'État had earned the respect and confidence of the citizens and the state. Acting as the conscience of the executive authority, the Conseil d'État's purpose was to ensure that the administration respected the law and avoided, to the greatest extent possible, “arbitrary methods”.Footnote 24
In practical terms the Conseil d'État exercised a check “over the nominations and promotions of government servants and the latter, themselves individually or grouped in associations, look upon it to check nepotism”.Footnote 25 In 1960–61, the Conseil d'État comprised one vice-president, five section presidents, forty-six counsellors of state, forty-nine maitres de requetes, thirty-eight first class auditors and ten second class auditors. In theory, the officers of the Conseil d'État could be transferred or removed by order of the cabinet acting on the advice of the minister of justice.Footnote 26 In practice, however, the prestige of the Conseil d'État was so great that “the right to remove members of the Conseil had not been exercised for a century until recently by De Gaulle in a particular case”.Footnote 27 Prefecture level councils enabled the Conseil d'État at the centre to manage congestion and provide redress in the departments.
The Conseil d'État adopted an “inquisitorial” procedure with junior officers carrying out investigation work.Footnote 28 All inquiries were made in writing though oral testimony was also admissible.Footnote 29 Public hearings and secret deliberations could be undertaken before arriving at major decisions. It was mandated to examine the rationality of decisions made by the executive as well as determine the legality of such decisions as were brought to its notice. It had the freedom to examine the circumstances that led to a decision being made and to require those institutions, or officers, to explain their motifs when accused of irresponsible or illegal behaviour.Footnote 30 A distinction however, was maintained between official responsibility emanating from implementing a decision and personal liability – to confuse the two would serve to paralyse the state machinery. The Conseil d'État did not stand bound by precedent and reinterpreted the law as the needs of state and society changed. It, therefore, when it deemed necessary, exercised the power to annul administrative acts, a power that was the “essence” of the institution's authority and success was:
. . .a court which is willing and able to actually and directly to subject to an effective, and not merely formal, rule of law the executive acting in its most executive capacity, the decision-making executive, the executive exercising a discretionary power.Footnote 31
After examining systems of administrative law in other European countries, Dehlavi argued that the French variant was in principle the best even though operating a fully-fledged Conseil d'État in Pakistan was likely to prove too expensive.Footnote 32 That said, as Pakistan's executive authority expanded its scope and plunged headfirst into development and social policy, there was a clear need to ensure executive integrity and accountability. To this end, Dehlavi recommended that Pakistan set up an administrative court with powers of annulment that could take decisions “binding” upon the executive.Footnote 33
Dehlavi's advice was not implemented at the time when it was given. Ayub Khan's military regime instead framed a constitution (1962) that granted the president almost unlimited powers. The civil service became the linchpin of the entire system – controlling local bodies, planning and executing development projects and jealously guarding its privileged position as the interpreter and executor of the state's will. Although in 1973 administrative tribunals were set up, the arbitrary behaviour of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government (1971–1977), which dismissed thousands of civil servants and just as arbitrarily recruited thousands more, made a mockery of all pretences to maintaining the rule of law within the state apparatus. No one in power seemed to have appreciated the dangers of expanding the scope of executive authority without making provision for the internal accountability of those charged with exercising that authority. Bhutto's government, in particular, further expanded this scope through its nationalisation of industries and services. Had Dehlavi's advice been taken seriously in 1961, and had Ayub Khan possessed the qualities of a real Napoleonic ruler and a Pakistani council of state patterned on the French been set up, a great many excesses may well have been averted. Pakistan's governance might, as a consequence, have retained or improved upon its internal discipline and averted degenerating into a disorganised mass of arbitrary and personalised decisions made by servile and incompetent functionaries in a broader context of institutional paralysis.
June 1982: Reorientating Public Administration and Lessons from Pakistan's History
In 1982 Syed Ijlal Haider Zaidi, Secretary Establishment to the Government of Pakistan, submitted a series of summaries for consideration by the Cabinet. These summaries dealt with the need to rethink the underlying assumptions of post-1947 administrative policy, revitalise the provincial administration and address more technical matters such as secretariat staffing and the quota system.Footnote 34
Zaidi began by advising the sovereign to understand Pakistan's administrative predicament and stop treating law and order and general administration as imperial legacies of the British Raj. This hostile attitude towards the general administration had partly emerged as a result of advice received during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s from the United States of America. Advice from the United States generally ignored South Asia's historical experience of governance and the manifest ways in which the British/Indian pattern of administration drew heavily on Indian practices while modernising them within the framework of the rule of law, meritocracy and institutionalism.Footnote 35 Zaidi drew on the examples of developed countries including France, Germany and Japan (aside from the United States) to drive home the point that there was nothing inherently colonial about elitist national bureaucracies.Footnote 36 Rather than developing rational solutions to its own problems, Pakistan had adopted an “imitative” approach.Footnote 37 This had left Pakistan with a bloated, inefficient, poorly paid and politicised bureaucracy that had lost many of the positive attributes of the British/Indian bureaucracy and acquired many of the habits of a predatory and medieval state apparatus.Footnote 38
The damage done by successive regimes could not be easily reversed but there were certain changes that had to be made if Pakistan's administration was to be salvaged and rehabilitated. First, the arbitrary treatment meted out to civil servants had to be checked. Second, the public ridicule that had been visited on the civil service by the Yahya Khan military regime (1969–71) and the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government (1971–77) had further eroded the integrity and efficiency of the state apparatus, effectively paralysing it.Footnote 39 Civil servants – “likely to be pilloried whatever they do” – had “sunk into apathy and time serving”.Footnote 40 And third, arbitrary treatment and ritual humiliation had combined with diminishing real pay and pensions to foster corruption and mediocrity. In this regard, Zaidi lamented that Pakistan's first pay commission, chaired by Justice Muhammad Munir, had proclaimed as a policy objective that Pakistan's “men of genius” ought to be in the private sector and decided to slash the pays of government officers.Footnote 41 State service was, according to Munir, a “humdrum career” in which “character and the desire to serve honestly for a living” were “more essential than outstanding intellect”.Footnote 42 Zaidi concluded by appealing for a change in Pakistan's philosophy of governance before it was too late to take remedial action:
It is unusual for any government to advertise its preference for the mediocre in government service. Nor has any modern government ever set its pay scales so high to the undertake [sic] the risk from which our first Pay Commission retreated. . . Its obiterdictum unfortunately set the tone for subsequent public policy which failed to anticipate the graver dangers of mediocrity succumbing to greed. The results are all too visible today as a consequence of (i) entrusting authority to ill-paid and indifferent functionaries and (ii) attending the neglect of proper supervision. It can never be to the country's interest to put up with the indifferent and the mediocre for this will ensure neither economy nor efficiency. On the other hand, professional and dedicated persons cannot be attracted to government service unless they are given incentives commensurate with their ability. Pay is an important consideration but prestige and challenging work could make the difference. The solution may well be to encourage elitism, not in one or two cadres alone but in many fields – engineering, agriculture, administration, education and others. Elites in a bureaucracy are dedicated, have the courage to act and can make the system work. This has been the experience in many countries – Britain, France, Germany and Japan. There is nothing “colonial” about it. It is in fact the need of the hour.Footnote 43
General Zia-ul Haq's military regime (1977–88) appreciated the advice and did carry out a number of technical corrections and changes in relation to staffing procedures, training centres and the allocation of posts. However, the Zia regime remained unmoved when it came to the broader intellectual thrust of Zaidi's analysis and exhortations – that is, in an administrative state like Pakistan the quality of the bureaucracy is one of the principal determinants of the quality of governance. Pouring money into development while the general administration was falling apart would not serve a constructive purpose.
But restoring the quality of the bureaucracy to what had prevailed in the 1960s would require more than procedural changes and greater stability. It needed political will, a grasp of South Asian history and the intellectual and moral courage to act rationally even if that entailed going against the fashionable prescriptions handed out by the United States of America and its allies. What made the situation even more urgent was the fact that, due to large-scale economic and military assistance to Pakistan on account of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the financial situation was conducive to thorough reforms in the bureaucracy. Regrettably, the Zia regime did not act to bring about the reorientation that Zaidi proposed. Inertia, banality and the easing of fiscal pressures enabled the government to adopt a policy of least resistance at home even as it radicalised and destabilised Pakistani society for the purpose of supporting the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan.
February 2000: State and Society & the State of Order in Pakistan, Reforming the Criminal Justice System
In October 1999, the Pakistani military overthrew Nawaz Sharif's government. Until August 2008, General Pervez Musharraf was Pakistan's military ruler. Soon after taking over, Musharraf set up a number of commissions to propose reforms in local government, tax administration and policing. Zafar Iqbal Rathore, a retired Police Service of Pakistan officer who had served as Pakistan's Secretary Interior in the mid-1990s, was made the chairman of the focal group on police reforms. In February 2000, Rathore submitted two notes to the then Interior Minister Lt General (retired) Moinuddin Haider.
The first of the two notes, entitled “State and Society in Pakistan”, attempted to advise the government about the historical relationship between rulers and ruled in South Asia. Rathore asserted that South Asian state-society relations were principally “antagonistic” on account of the long succession of arbitrary and capricious rulers and the atomised, caste-bound village society that prevailed in most of the region.Footnote 44 The historical record indicated that “[a]rbitrariness was the norm in decision making” and though it may have been mitigated by the wisdom and character of some outstanding rulers, for the most part the exercise of power was “whimsical and vicious”.Footnote 45 During British rule attempts were made to convert the law of the ruler into the rule of law through the creation of “sub-autonomous institutions within the society, which could lawfully challenge some of the arbitrary orders of the central government”.Footnote 46 The most important of these was “a bureaucracy, recruited and promoted on merit, which was given legal protection against arbitrary removal by the central authority”.Footnote 47
After independence, the state “became more arbitrary and unwise in its decision making”.Footnote 48 As the state lost internal discipline and suffered a steady diminution in its ability to frame and execute policies in accordance with the law, governance “as a national instrument for improving the quality of life of the society” had “collapsed”.Footnote 49 The impact on society of sustained interaction with an increasingly arbitrary and dysfunctional state had exacerbated insecurity as “the core element of the Pakistani character: this asserts itself in an inordinate desire for power, wealth and a longing for miracles”.Footnote 50
The second note, titled “State and Order” analysed the decline of the ability of the Pakistani state to maintain order in society and provided some prescriptions. Rathore observed that since 1947, the rulers “had treated law and order not only as a low priority, but at times with contempt – being the legacy of ‘the colonial state'”.Footnote 51 This “failure of perception” was not confined to the political leadership but extended to the police leadership, which was “unimaginative at the best of times and arbitrary in the bargain”.Footnote 52 Consequently, the system inherited from the British Raj was notionally perpetuated without proper investment in the training, remuneration, organisation, or numerical strength of the criminal justice system.Footnote 53 To make matters worse, the Pakistani elite “massively subverted this outmoded system by large scale arbitrary interference”.Footnote 54 Pakistan's “status quo” was oriented precariously close to “anarchy” and meaningful improvement would require patience and resolution.Footnote 55 In the light of this diagnosis, Rathore's prescription was as follows:
Briefly speaking we have a Criminal Justice System (Police, Jails, Trial Judiciary) which has an outdated legal and institutional framework, staffed mostly by people who are generally recruited, trained, promoted and posted without any reference to merit, and almost entirely by their subservience to people in power. It is imperative that we take steps to improve the quality of the police personnel. Therefore, the first and basic reform which is necessary is to insulate the management of the police from the arbitrary interference of the powerful members of the executive. This can be done by creating a neutral body of eminent persons to manage the police. This body will also undertake accountability of the police.Footnote 56
In other words, throwing money at the problem would not work until and unless police officials were protected against the whimsicality of Pakistan's rulers. If the Musharraf regime was serious about police reform it would begin with this fundamental reform and then think about technical improvement and material inputs. The military government rejected Rathore's advice and instead, following Musharraf's local government reforms and Police Order 2002, the Pakistani police was placed under the control of elected local officials patronised by the military. This had the effect of fracturing the police force and further politicising it. The qualitative decline of the police at a time of escalating terrorist violence badly exposed the inadequacy of the reforms while day-to-day problems related to the maintenance of law and order continued to escalate.
Conclusions
If the advice given by G. Ahmed, Dehlavi, Zaidi and Rathore is examined collectively a pragmatic liberal-conservative perspective emerges. The core elements of this perspective are that Pakistan needs a state that is less arbitrary and more rational. Arbitrariness can be contained if its rulers realise that it is in their enlightened self-interest to exercise power in accordance with the law and tolerate autonomous institutions. Rationality can be increased if the ruling elite focuses on learning from South Asian history and stops (some might argue mindlessly) imitating American, Marxist or religious discourses. Mimetic rhetoric was, and is, no substitute for substantive achievement.
G. Ahmed's dire warning that the combination of political arbitrariness and opportunistic manipulation of religious sentiment for short-term publicity and tactical advantage would lead Pakistan down the path of societal degeneration was almost prophetic in its prescience. Of course, he was merely applying logic and reason to explain to the then government the illogic and irrationality of its behaviour and the likely short-term and long-term consequences if this continued unchecked. It is also a measure of Pakistan's misfortune that since the early 1950s all of its governments have treated the state as a personal estate and all but one (Ayub Khan) insisted on playing political games with the religious sentiments of the people. G. Ahmed's advice is in many respects even more relevant today than it was in March 1952.
Dehlavi's (1961) exposition and analysis of administrative law contain many lessons for Pakistan. To begin with, if there is a country in the developed world whose historical experience of governance offers real lessons for administrative states like Pakistan, it is France. The French effort to adapt the rule of law to a state run by a powerful elitist national bureaucracy may be well worth emulating. Regrettably, the Ayub Khan regime did not take Dehlavi's advice seriously and instead expanded the powers of the bureaucracy without improving its internal accountability. The result was a furious backlash (1969–77) that effectively reduced the civil service to a servile, paraplegic and chaotic condition. Pakistan can, even at this stage, benefit from a Conseil d'État on the French pattern were its political leadership to show a little acumen.
Zaidi's summaries (1982) provide a rare synoptic understanding of the overall need for reform of the principles of Pakistan's administrative structure. The force of the argument that in a bureaucratic state it is the quality of the bureaucracy that substantially determines the quality of governance is compelling. The examples given from other countries support this argument. And yet, nearly thirty years since Zaidi advised Pakistan's rulers to behave in an enlightened and rational manner as regards the state apparatus, and to work towards improving its intellectual and moral quality, no government has internalised or even given a fair hearing to this message.Footnote 57
Rathore's advice (2000) approaches many of the same problems raised by the earlier civil servants but from a more philosophical and historical perspective. The central element of Rathore's advice was that unless the political leadership reduced its arbitrary power over government officials, the state would never be able to maintain order with justice and thus facilitate the grand development objectives senior members of successive governments so enjoyed talking about in public. Other elements included the need to resist the temptation of throwing money at the problem while dealing with it with patience and resolution rather than behaving erratically and dramatically. The Musharraf regime did not take this advice into consideration as it plunged headlong into the devolution of power to local government and under the Police Order 2002 transferred field control of the police to local mayors (nazims) who were themselves beholden to the military for their election. The consequences of these decisions are there for all to see – the general collapse of order in large parts of the country with Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province and Karachi the worst affected. The status quo, previously oriented near anarchy, has crossed the final tipping point in important areas of the country and threatens to engulf others.
At present, the Pakistani bureaucracy, even at the highest levels, has largely stopped advising the political leadership in the light of the national interest and the government's own best interest. The political class relishes the opportunity to humiliate government servants publically and to play to the media gallery from the safety of the Public Accounts Committee or other parliamentary bodies. In their own defence, civil servants confess that it is inadvisable to advise politicians when the reaction is so often negative and leads to the victimisation or marginalisation of the civil servant in question. There can be few better barometers of the decline of a state when moral courage, intellectual honesty and conceptual clarity, as qualities in a servant of the state, come to be regarded as handicaps rather than assets. In order to meet the numerous challenges that it now faces, Pakistan needs, more than ever, a bureaucratic leadership that possess these qualities in abundance.
