Nationalism in Singapore

The British established Singapore as a trading post in 1819 and it soon became a major port of the entrepôt trade in Southeast Asia. The British colonial authorities opened the island to migrants from all over Asia. As such, there was no ‘Singaporean’ identity as the migrants continued to identify themselves with their ‘motherland’. The British also promoted Singapore as the capital of the Straits Settlements and linked the island economically, politically, and socially with the Malayan hinterland. When the Japanese invaded the island in 1942, the myth of British military invincibility was shattered. After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the British separated Singapore from the rest of Malaya and governed it as a Crown Colony. The first legislative elections were introduced for just six out of 22 Legislative Councillors in 1948. Voting was not compulsory and only those registered as ‘British subjects’ could vote – a mere 2% of the 940,000 residents in the colony. The first General Elections were held in 1955. Citizenship for those born in Singapore was introduced in 1957.

Singapore gained internal self-government in 1959. In June, the PAP won a resounding victory in the polls and the party was given the task of governing the city-state. The PAP promoted a ‘Malayan’ culture which prepared Singapore for the city-state's merger into Malaysia in 1963. Once Singapore seceded from Malaysia and became independent in 1965, however, the PAP encouraged Singaporeans to think of themselves first and foremost as Singaporeans and to look forward to a brighter future. The doom and gloom with the secession from Malaysia and the loss of the hinterland had to be cast aside. In April 1967, the Minister of Culture, S. Rajaratnam wrote that ‘one of the problems for the seventies is how to convert a society of transient immigrants into a community of permanent settlers’. He reminded the populace that ‘Singapore's economy is such that once we slide down the slope there is no question of our ever being able to climb up to the top again’ (Chan and ul Haq, Reference Chan and ul Haq2007: 119–20). Singaporeans – divided according to their race by the British and living in segregated regions in the city centre – now had to discard their diasporic identity and accept a new ‘Singaporean’ identity.

The PAP government's ‘manufactured nationalism’ has been disseminated through public forums, exhibitions, the print and broadcast media, and the school curriculum. The central nationalist message includes the ‘survival’ of the nation against overwhelming odds, the need to be ‘vigilant’ against domestic and outside enemies and the role of the PAP in facilitating each stage of Singapore's national development. In this state-directed nationalism, social and economic policies such as National Service (conscription) were introduced to bring people of different backgrounds together. Breuilly has pointed out how different countries have institutionalized, with Parliament as the focus in English nationalist ideology, empire for Japan and liberty for the French (Breuilly, Reference Breuilly1982). Singapore's ‘manufactured nationalism’ is strongly based on a survivalist discourse.

By the 1980s, that discourse, based on how Singapore overcame the odds to become an East Asian economic powerhouse, was amplified as the PAP government continually reminded Singaporeans that the country's economic success stemmed from its vision of good governance. When Singapore celebrated 25 years of nation building in 1984, its economic success was highlighted. In the 1990s, the concept of a ‘Singaporean’ remained ambiguous. However, since the turn of the twentieth century, Singaporeans appear to have increasingly resisted the PAP's ‘manufactured nationalism’ by cultivating a bottom-up national identity through symbols such as built heritage, food, and even conscription experiences. This ‘popular nationalism’ approximates Anthony Smith and John Armstrong's ‘historical ethno-symbolism’ (Smith, Reference Smith and Leifer2000: 12). It recognizes the importance of history and heritage, including myths, legends, values, and memories. Its emphasis on heritage and culture has been dismissed as a form of ‘negative nationalism’ (Saul, Reference Saul2005) by its detractors.

The PAP's top-down ‘manufactured nationalism’ complements Birch's contention that ‘the essence of nationalism is a belief about the social basis of political authority’ (Birch, Reference Birch2007: 15). Birch notes that in a bid to maintain national unity, governments will promote the language of the governing classes, introduce an integrative and compulsory education, and create symbols of national identity (Birch, Reference Birch2007: 20). However, manufactured nationalism has arguably had limited success primarily because the focus is on the role of the state and the PAP government. Since the 1990s, the PAP government has sponsored a set of communitarian values (such as ‘Asian values’), a Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) in response to the wide use of Singlish (a ‘Singaporean’ form of the English language), and, lately, the uniqueness of the Singaporean diaspora and promotion of a so-called ‘bi-cultural’ Singaporean Chinese (Chng, Reference Chng2003; Chong, Reference Chong2011; Goh, Reference Goh2004; Naruse, Reference Naruse2013; Ortmann, Reference Ortmann2009; Quah, Reference Quah1990; C. Tan, Reference Tan2012). All these policies were designed to cultivate a Singaporean that is able to speak good English and Mandarin (neglecting the identity of the non-Chinese Singaporean) and able to immerse himself/herself in both Chinese and Western (English-speaking) societies. At the launch of the SGEM in April 2000, former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong cautioned younger Singaporeans ‘not [to] take the attitude that Singlish is cool or feel that speaking Singlish makes them more Singaporean’. He insisted that speaking Singlish would ‘hurt the Republic's aim to be a First World economy’ (Nirmala, Reference Nirmala2000). Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew went even further, describing Singlish ‘a debased form’ of the English language that was ‘interesting for linguistic scholars but of no value to the community’ (National Archives of Singapore, volume 13, 2012: 436).

Eight years later, Goh's and Lee's messages appear to have been dissipated. In a SGEM survey, 41% of Singaporeans polled did not see the need to speak ‘proper’ English. The survey found that this ‘blasé attitude’ was ‘especially rampant’ among people in their late twenties (Wong, Reference Wong2008). The PAP's ‘manufactured nationalism’ appears increasingly detached from the realities of everyday life for ordinary Singaporeans who, for instance, accept the usage of Singlish. The influx of foreigners, following the introduction of a liberal immigration policy in the 1990s has contributed to a stronger appreciation of their historical and cultural identity. For example, the demolition of the National Library building in 2005 – a historical landmark for many Singaporeans – sparked a five-year public campaign before the bulldozers moved in (Kwok et al., Reference Kwok1999). The PAP government was seen as cold and calculative, concerned only with economic growth and statistics, but having little regard for built heritage and a lifestyle that Singaporeans treasure. In a move meant to inspire Singaporeans, the government ‘imported’ several table-tennis players from the People's Republic of China (PRC), gave them citizenship, and sent them off to various international tournaments. During the 2012 Olympics, Feng Tianwei won Singapore's first individual medal in 52 years. Instead of jubilation and celebration in Singapore, Feng's victory divided the nation and re-ignited the ‘foreign talent’ debate (Oon, Reference Oon2012). When Singapore swept all the table-tennis team gold medals at the Southeast Asian Games in Myanmar in December 2013, an article in the Myanmarese newspaper headlined ‘the impenetrable great wall of Singapore’ drew attention to the Singapore team comprised entirely of PRC-born players. Instead, Singaporeans chose to celebrate the achievements of two Singapore-born athletes: Mok Ying Ren, who was crowned the marathon champion despite having a cough and a strained thigh, and Saiyidah Aisyah, who clinched the gold medal for rowing after spending ten years training at her own personal expense (Ong, Reference Ong2013).

The campaigns for both GE2011 and PE2011 reflected public frustrations over the PAP government's policy on immigration. With a declining birthrate in Singapore and the government's insistence on attracting talent, immigration was liberalized in a bid to attract foreign professionals that were subsequently classified as ‘foreign talent’. Wealthy foreigners were also encouraged to park their capital in Singapore in exchange for permanent resident status. The government hoped that foreign students would remain in Singapore after their studies and contribute to the talent pool. Blue-collar workers brought into Singapore to do menial tasks were classified as ‘foreign workers’ and they could not apply for permanent residency (Yap, Reference Yap, Teng, Koh and Soon2015). In 1989, the government of then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew proposed that 25,000 people from Hong Kong be allowed to settle down in Singapore after the violence around Tiananmen Square in June. The number of new immigrants increased rapidly over 20 years. By 2010, a total of 175,155 residents in Singapore had come from China, Hong Kong, and Macau (Department of Statistics, 2011: 39). The increased numbers of migrants from China also caused unhappiness in the Malays who saw the process as a ‘sinicisation’ of the country. The government's continued emphasis on the ‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign and the promotion of Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools for greater emphasis on Mandarin had already drawn some suspicions from the Malays. In 1992, then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong sought to soothe these fears by promising to bring in more talented Malays and Indians (The Straits Times [henceforth ST], 1992). Yet, suspicions remained. In 2001, a letter to The Straits Times mentioned that, for the Malays, the Speak Mandarin campaign, SAP schools, and new immigration policies were ‘designed to guarantee Chinese numerical dominance’ that was ‘a pattern of creeping sinicisation’ (Kassim, Reference Kassim2001). The influx of Chinese migrants, however, unsettled the Singaporean Chinese too. Nearly all the local-born Singaporean Chinese had ancestors from Fujian and Guangdong provinces but the new migrants had come from different provinces (mainly in northern China such as Shandong province). The Singaporean Chinese traces his/her ancestry to someone who had left China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and finds it difficult to connect with new migrants from China as ‘descendants of Yan and Huang’ (Yanhuang zisun) (J. Lim, Reference Lim, Chan, Haines and Jonathan2014).Footnote ¹ The introduction of Mandarin announcements on the subway system in Singapore in 2012 was stopped because of public criticism, even from the Singaporean Chinese. Government moves to make Singapore a gateway to China were clearly not welcome even by the Chinese community in Singapore (Nasir and Turner, Reference Nasir and Turner2014). Migration also affected the Singapore Indians. As more non-Tamil-speaking Indians migrated into Singapore, there was genuine concern that Tamil-speaking Indians could be a minority one day (S. Lim, Reference Lim, Teng, Koh and Soon2015). Not surprisingly, questions of national identity would surface whenever there was a discussion on immigration policies. In a discussion on integration and national identity by Nasir and Turner, one of their interviewees insisted that ‘the Singaporean identity exists’ and that immigration would make that identity ‘more and more diluted’ (Nasir and Turner, Reference Nasir and Turner2014: 107–8).

Part of the ‘manufactured nationalism’ agenda of the PAP government is the promotion of Singapore as an international city par excellence. In a speech to the Singapore Press Club in 1972, Minister Rajaratnam said Singapore should re-invent itself as a ‘global city’ by promoting itself as a hub for the international market. Rajaratnam was ahead of his time and Singapore would become an international financial hub by the 1980s. In the 1990s, the government of Singapore began to promote Singapore as an educational hub, drawing in international students by the thousands to study from primary school to polytechnic and university. The remaking of Singapore from a port city dependent on Southeast Asian trade to an international city was matched by the relaxation of immigration restrictions by the PAP government in 1997. Government programs attempted to ‘integrate’ foreign workers into Singapore society, but it became clear that Singaporeans had become uncomfortable with the large numbers of foreigners. In response, the government tried to downplay its ‘manufactured nationalism’ by emphasizing Singapore's status as a city, particularly since the 2011 elections. In 2012, Law and Foreign Affairs Minister, K. Shanmugam, while defending the political system in Singapore, said that critics of Singapore had unfairly judged Singapore. His controversial remark that Singapore is a city and ‘not a country’ provoked debate and criticism among Singaporeans who, unlike the new immigrants, have served National Service (C. N. Seah, Reference Seah2013). The government has also been cautious about the full impact of globalization. While it welcomes the economic aspect of globalization through the MNCs and the creation of specialist hubs for the international market, it is reluctant to accept (if at all) the spread of political, social, and cultural ideas arising from globalization. Considered one of the most globalized economies (MacGillivray, Reference MacGillivray2006: 278), by the late 1990s ‘foreign talent’ from countries such as China, India, and the Philippines were encouraged to relocate to Singapore. As the latter are often cheaper to employ, many Singaporean workers were displaced in the labour market. These cases were not be reported by the local print and broadcast media, which are generally pro-government. It was the social media websites such as The Online Citizen, The Real Singapore, and Temasek Review Emeritus (TRE) that carry these stories.

GE2011 sharpened the focus on immigration, with the opposition calling for a more manageable level of immigration and the PAP dismissing critics of its immigration policies as ‘xenophobic’. It is worth noting that the ‘foreign talent’ policy was initially implemented to arrest the brain drain phenomenon since the late 1980s. Singaporeans who have emigrated have been criticized by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as ‘quitters’ (ST, 2002a). In a survey after that remark, two out of ten Singaporeans admitted that they intended to migrate, with half hoping to settle down in Australia (ST, 2002b). When Lee Hsien Loong became Prime Minister in 2004, however, he took a different approach by building closer ties with Singaporean emigrants. A new Overseas Singaporean Unit (OSU) that reported directly to the Prime Minister's Office was established in 2006. The OSU organizes ‘networking events’ to bring Singaporeans and potential employers together, and conducts feedback sessions and cultural activities (Koh, Reference Koh2006). An annual ‘Singapore Day’ event held in major cities celebrates the cultural distinctiveness of Singapore, which includes cuisine by hawkers from Singapore. The first ‘Singapore Day’ was held in New York in 2007, followed by Melbourne in 2008, London in 2009, Shanghai in 2011, New York in 2012, Sydney in 2013, and London again in 2014.

Impact of the elections

Seven political parties participated in GE2011. The PAP nominated candidates for all 87 seats, and secured a walkover for only one Group Representation Constituency (GRC) on Nomination Day. The National Solidarity Party (NSP) put up 24 candidates, followed by the Workers’ Party (WP) with 23, Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) with 11, Reform Party (RP) with 11, Singapore People's Party (SPP) with seven, and Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) with seven. The opposition parties appeared to be better prepared for GE2011 and all the seats (except one) were straight contests between the PAP and an opposition candidate. GE2011 turned out to be the most significant electoral contest as the PAP faced its toughest challenge. Criticism of PAP policies from the opposition was relentless. The PAP found itself defending its track record for the last two decades before finally highlighting its plans for Singapore's future towards the end of the campaign. While the PAP was expected to win GE2011, it did so with 60% of the valid votes, the lowest percentage since independence in 1965.

Despite winning only 60% of the votes, the PAP won 81 seats and it remains the dominant political party in Singapore politics. However, GE2011 resulted in the emergence of a credible political opposition as the WP captured a five-member GRC and a Single Member Constituency (SMC), giving the party six seats in Parliament – a new political scene which some analysts have hailed as ‘a ‘new normal’ in politics’ (E. K. B. Tan, Reference Tan2012; K. P. Tan, Reference Tan2012). The GRC, once considered to be the ‘citadels of political power’ for the PAP, is now no longer impregnable (Tan and Lee, Reference Tan and Lee2011: 13). PE2011 proved to be another setback for the PAP. Four candidates contested with Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, a former Cabinet minister, formally endorsed by the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC). Dr Tan's endorsement meant that he was informally backed by the PAP, reflective of the ‘PAP-NTUC symbiosis’ (Chew, Reference Chew1991: 32). Tony Tan won with only 35.2% of the vote while Tan Cheng Bock, a former PAP Member of Parliament who threw his support behind the opposition's cause, lost narrowly with 34.85% of the vote. Tan Jee Say, who had resigned from the SDP to contest PE2011, won 25.04% of the vote and Tan Kin Lian garnered just 4.91% of the vote.

Popular nationalist sentiments were expressed strongly during the elections (Ortmann, Reference Ortmann2009). The debate on who is a ‘true’ Singaporean was exemplified by the contrasting reaction of voters towards two GE2011 candidates. On 22 March 2011, Janil Puthucheary, the son of former founding PAP member James Puthucheary, and now nominated by the PAP to be its candidate in GE2011, told The Straits Times:

Janil Puthucheary, however, did not serve National Service. His father had left Singapore in the 1960s and the son, having lived in Singapore since 2001, only became a citizen in 2008. At the time of his interview with The Straits Times, he was 38 years old. All Singapore males, upon completion of their National Service, have to serve as reservists until they are 40 years old (50 years for officers). As a new citizen of only two years, his PAP candidature was viewed with suspicion by the electorate. On the other hand, Dr Chen Show Mao from the WP was born in Taiwan in 1961, arrived in Singapore as a child, studied in Singapore, and became a Singapore citizen in 1986 after serving National Service. He then went abroad for further studies and work. Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen suggested that Chen was not loyal to Singapore as he had been away for about 30 years, an odd remark to make as the PAP had been trying to project positive images of the Singaporean diaspora through the OSU. Chen's presence at election rallies drew huge crowds during the campaign and he was one of five WP candidates elected for Aljunied GRC.

GE2011 marks the first time the contending discourses of nationalism have clashed in Singapore. The government's brand of ‘manufactured nationalism’ did not go down well with the voters. The PAP has subscribed to the belief that Singapore has to welcome foreign investment and ‘talent’ in order to keep the city-state relevant. While the PAP regards Singapore as a ‘global city’, the foreigners who arrive in Singapore may not share that vision. Frequent complaints have been lodged by Singaporeans to the Ministry of Manpower that foreign employers are hiring those from their country of birth and discriminating against Singaporeans (‘Lucky Tan’, 2011). The social media has played an important role here, reporting workplace discrimination against Singaporeans that largely go unreported in the pro-government print and broadcast media. Therefore, while the PAP government has repeatedly promoted the message that Singapore is a homeland and that ‘it's here that we belong’ (exemplified in the lyrics of a national song promoted by the state), it has downplayed the concerns of citizens with regard to immigration policy, social cohesion, and employment. It did not help the PAP when Bloomberg reported that seven out of ten jobs created in Singapore went to non-Singaporeans (Adam and Tan, Reference Adam and Tan2012).

Instructively, criticisms of government policy have been deflected and dismissed as xenophobic. The PAP leadership continues to believe that the reason for their ‘poor’ electoral showing in GE2011 and Dr Tan's narrow victory in PE2011 is a consequence of poor planning – they had planned for an increase in population without taking into account the strain on transport infrastructure and housing. The number of non-Singaporeans has increased dramatically in the last decade from 1.1 million (26.6% of the population) in 2004 to 1.9 million (36.4%) in 2010. At the same time, the number of Singaporeans stood at 3.1 million in 2004 and 3.2 million in 2010 (Singapore Election Watch, 2011). While the government has implemented policies to address discrimination against Singaporeans in the workplace, it has not addressed calls for a ‘Singaporean First’ policy.

Opposition parties had fared poorly in previous General Elections. Between 1965 and 1981, the PAP won all the seats in four General Elections. Its ‘manufactured nationalism’ has attributed socio-economic progress to PAP political dominance. In a speech in April 2006, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asked rhetorically:

The 13 electoral victories by the PAP since 1959 have encouraged PAP leaders to be dismissive of the credibility of the opposition. In a speech to the NTUC in July 1996, Lee Kuan Yew said:

The WP, NSP, and SDP evoked popular nationalist sentiments during the GE2011 campaign. Both the NSP and SDP called for the introduction of a ‘Singaporean First’ policy in the workplace. In other words, job vacancies should be offered to Singaporeans first. In its manifesto, the NSP called for priority for Singaporeans in the workplace and a tighter regulation of foreign employment. It recommended that a quota be imposed for all jobs below S$4,000 a month in order to protect Singaporeans’ employment prospects (National Solidarity Party, 2011). The SDP manifesto called for a ‘Singaporean First Policy’ in addition to the introduction of a minimum wage policy. Its ‘Singaporean First Policy’ would require businesses ‘to demonstrate that the kind of skill that their company requires is not available among Singaporeans before they are allowed to hire a foreign worker’ (Singapore Democratic Party, 2011). The SDP has consistently called for closer examination of the quality of the ‘foreign talent’ migration and their impact on the employment prospects of Singaporeans. As early as 2001, Dr Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of the SDP, had questioned whether ‘foreign talent’ who had migrated to Singapore were in fact better qualified than Singaporeans (Chee, Reference Chee2001). Two years after GE2011, the SDP continues to campaign for the introduction of a ‘Singaporeans First Policy’ and the retention of Singaporean talent (The New Democrat, 2013). In its election manifesto, the WP assured voters that it was not opposed to immigration but that ‘the rate of immigration should not exceed the capacity of the country's infrastructure and the comfort level of the local population’ (The Workers’ Party, 2011). Even the RP, a party formed only three years before GE2011, pledged to introduce reforms to the foreign worker policy ‘to ensure that business gets the skilled labour it needs but that our own citizens come first’. The RP has called for new citizens and permanent residents to serve National Service or pay a lump sum tax (Reform Party, 2011).

The PAP government recognized the ground swell of discontent due to the veracity of online chatter about Singaporeans being dismissed from jobs to make way for cheaper foreign labour. However, they resisted calls for introducing a ‘Singaporean First’ policy as it contradicted ‘manufactured nationalism's projection of Singapore as a ‘global city’. New citizens are more inclined to accept the PAP's ‘manufactured nationalism’ since it is rooted in national symbols, rather than local heritage, customs, and culture. Michael Billig's concept of ‘banal nationalism’ refers to the usage of national symbols and its impact on national identity (Billig, Reference Billig1995). ‘Manufactured nationalism’ serves as a reminder to new citizens and other foreigners that they are living in Singapore, but does not meaningfully integrate them into Singapore society. In Singapore's globalised society, economics appears to have taken precedence over all other aspects of life (Saul, Reference Saul2005: 35). A major drawback of ‘manufactured nationalism’ is the projection of Singapore primarily as an economic entity serving as a nexus for international trade and finance. This is evident from the PAP leadership's statements during the GE2011 campaign. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong argued that the presence of foreigners helped create ‘good jobs’ for Singaporeans (Chua, Reference Chua2011). While the PAP election manifesto promised to manage the flow of immigration and help new citizens integrate into Singapore society, it also called on Singaporeans to uphold a ‘Singapore Spirit’ (which remains undefined) in order to compete internationally (People's Action Party, 2011). In July 2011, at the South Asian Diaspora Convention in Singapore, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated:

Lee Kuan Yew's address to new Indian migrants in Singapore gave the impression that he was not sensitive to Singaporeans’ concerns. In recognition that the latter had been insensitive to Singaporean concerns and in damage control mode, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong advised Singaporeans that ‘we are acting to relieve the pressures [of the influx of foreigners] and make clear we are putting Singaporeans first’. He insisted that ‘whether it is houses, whether it is university, whether it is jobs … we put Singaporeans first but in an open-minded sort of way’ (Singapore Government News, 2011).

In August 2011, what became known as the ‘curry incident’ was reported by the Today newspaper, and spread through dissenting websites such as Temasek Review Emeritus. A mainland Chinese family had complained to the Community Mediation Centre (CMC) about their Singapore Indian neighbours. The mainland Chinese family did not like the smell of the curry and they wanted the CMC to direct their Singapore Indian neighbours not to cook curry. As a solution, the CMC mediator suggested that the Singapore Indian family not cook curry whenever the mainland Chinese family was at home. The Singapore Indian family had suggested that the mainland Chinese family try the curry but apparently the offer was not taken up. A ‘Cook a Pot of Curry’ Day on 21 August was organized on Facebook whereby Singaporeans were encouraged to cook curry – a manifestation of ‘popular nationalism’.

The Population White Paper (PWP) controversially proposed that Singapore's population be increased to 6.9 million by 2030. Introduced less than a year after the PAP's worst electoral performance since 1965, it reinforced the impression that the PAP government continued to care more about economic growth and birth rates than the standard of living of Singaporeans. The PWP's proposal of increasing the population was introduced three days after a by-election in the Punggol East constituency in January 2013. The PAP candidate lost the by-election to a WP candidate. Questions were raised by the opposition parties and the social media on the propriety of the PWP's population policy recommendations. Confronted by public opposition to the PWP, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced that the 6.9 million figure was not a target as the future population depended on ‘Singaporeans of tomorrow and not the Government of today’ (Au Yong, Reference Au Yong2013). The WP opposed the PWP and proposed an alternative population projection of 5.9 million by 2030. S. Iswaran, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Office asserted that the WP alternative would cause the Singapore economy to go into ‘a downward spiral of business closures and job losses’ (Goh, Reference Goh2013). The different approaches by the PAP and WP are evident by the title of their respective papers. The PAP government's PWP is officially A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore, while the WP alternative published a month later is A Dynamic Population for a Sustainable Singapore. While the PAP's manufactured nationalist agenda is strongly economic, the concern of the WP is based on the popular nationalist view that the PWP recommendations will undermine the social fabric of Singaporean society. The hasty passage in Parliament of the PWP aggrieved people more, especially when there was very little debate within the chamber on the impact of the PWP. One dissenting website noted that ‘it [the PAP government] still thinks that its policies are right, and it is only the way in which such policies are communicated to us that is an issue’ (Xu, Reference Xu2011). Nicole Seah, an NSP candidate in GE2011, wrote that ‘the values of the White Paper currently appear to be – Money. GDP Growth. Corporations … But is this the kind of Singapore we want?’ (N. Seah, Reference Seah2013). On 15 February 2013, a protest was organized at Hong Lim Park, the only venue in Singapore where mass protests could be organized. An estimated 5,000 people turned up to voice their frustration with the PWP. Critics of the PWP have been dismissed by the PAP as xenophobic, prompting a blogger to complain that the ‘xenophobia label [has been] used to attack opponents of bad policies’ (‘Lucky Tan’, 2013).

In September 2011, less than a month after PE2011, the PAP government announced plans to build an eight-lane highway that will cut across Bukit Brown Cemetery, a burial ground of many early Chinese pioneers of Singapore. Non-government organizations such as the Singapore Heritage Society (SHS) and the Nature Society Singapore (NSS) called for a review of the plan but the government continued with plans for the highway, expected to be completed by the end of 2017. To counter the public outcry, the government attempted to have the Botanic Gardens listed as a heritage site by the United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Not to be outdone, two individuals, Catherine Lim and Claire Leow, managed to secure Bukit Brown Cemetery in the 2014 World Monument Watch as a cultural site under the threat of development. They have also called for both the Botanic Garden and the Bukit Brown Cemetery to be listed as a single UNESCO heritage site as they are only a few streets apart. The campaign to preserve Bukit Brown Cemetery has galvanized Singaporeans from all walks of life. There are now even calls to save the hawker centres in Singapore as part of Singapore's national heritage (Yap, Reference Yap2013). The NSS also announced its opposition to the Cross Island rail line cutting through nature reserves and proposed an alternate route to the Land Transport Authority (Neo, Reference Neo2013). These are more than just the work of non-government organizations – ordinary citizens are finding various outlets in the print and social media to lament the loss of Singapore's heritage and way of life.

About the author

Jason Lim is Senior Lecturer in Asian History in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry at the University of Wollongong in Australia. He worked in the National Archives of Singapore before joining the Department of History at the National University of Singapore as a Postdoctoral Fellow from 2008 to 2010. His research interests include the history and politics of Singapore, the modern history of China and the social history of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.