This book is a massive (662 pages) series of twenty-five studies by well-known, liberal Hungarian scholars about the short-comings of the Viktor Orbán-led Hungarian government. It is an abbreviated version of a previously published three-volume work by Bálint Magyar, co-editor of this volume with Julia Vásárhelyi. Mr. Bálint is identified as a sociologist, a liberal politician, and one of the founding members of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). He served twice as Minister of Education in previous governments. When searching for an apt description of the current Orbán regime, Mr. Bálint characterized it as a “ … Post-communist Mafia State” (x).
Rejecting other frameworks to describe the existing Orbán regime, such as dictatorial, authoritarian, or illiberal democracy, consecutive included essays have accepted the Mafia State paradigm. Unlike the traditional (Sicilian) mafia which spreads its tentacles underground, in the case of Hungary it has been operating in the open. After the disastrous failure of the previous center-left government, Fidesz (the Alliance of Young Democrats, later known as Hungarian Civic Alliance), gained two-thirds of the parliamentary seats at the 2010 elections, thus becoming a supermajority. The same supermajority was retained after the 2014 elections, thus giving Viktor Orbán control of practically all the institutions of the country.
The ensuing studies zeroed in on how the Orbán government had subverted the previously existing checks and balances of the multi-party democratic system. The 1989 Constitution, which had been written after long and detailed negotiations, was rewritten in 2O11 by the Orbán regime as the Fundamental Law. All power was concentrated in the hands of the “godfather,” the head of the State Mafia, that is, Viktor Orbán. The Fundamental Law effectively eliminated local governments, abolished the Supreme Court, and eradicated citizens’ rights to turn to the Constitutional Court. The right to social welfare was also cancelled, just to list some more of the negative aspects of the newly-enacted law. Having unhindered control of the legislature, laws were passed for the benefit of the Mafia State and its supporters, the “family.” All the key positions have been filled by loyal members of the “family.” All areas of politics, the economy, society, culture, and education were shaped as a pyramid and came under the Mafia's control.
Hungary has been a member of the European Union since 2004. The Orbán-sponsored undemocratic laws have been criticized by the EU, and Hungary was even threatened with sanctions. Orbán, at times, has made minor concessions to avoid losing European Union funding. Back home, however, Orbán has been playing up the “threats” to Hungary's sovereignty from Brussels. He has been emphasizing nationalism and giving expression to a Eurosceptic attitude. Not only has Orbán defied Brussels’ request to accept a number of refugees, he had built a barbed-wire fence to prevent refugees from entering Hungary from Croatia.
Even the country's history was not immune to the regime's revisions. Hungary's participation in World War II has been minimized, and the atrocities of the Holocaust were blamed on the Germans, as if Hungary's role in anti-Semitic laws had begun only on October 14, 1944, when the Nazi-supported Arrow Cross Party seized power. The “House of Terror,” a museum which had been opened to depict the country's suffering under the Nazis and the communists, overemphasizes the terror suffered under the Soviet-dominated communist regime.
Only one of the penultimate chapters of the book has addressed the opposition to the Mafia State. None of the writers had explained how Fidesz succeeded in gaining control of two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Apparently, the authors have taken for granted that the readers have been following the country's political developments. How could a group of anticommunist young democrats, mostly university students, the so-called Alliance of Young Democrats, evolve into a dominant political party in full control of all aspects of Hungarian life? There are no explanations for the demise of the post-communist multi-party system. How and why did the parties of the center-right (MDF), the center-left (MSZP), and the progressive (SZDSZ), lose control?
Currently, the Orbán-led mafia has no viable opponents. Attempts had been made to organize a democratic opposition, but they have all fizzled out. A group under the label of Politics Can Be Different (LMP) did surface to oppose Fidesz. It is made up of urban intellectuals and environmentalists, and they have been influenced by European Green Parties. This group has no cohesive program; its efforts have not appeared to effectively challenge the Orbán regime. The extreme right-wing, radical, nationalistic, anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi party Jobbik has been competing against Fidesz and has won twenty-four of the 199 parliamentary seats. Although in some instances the ideologies of Fidesz and Jobbik coincide, Fidesz has been claiming that it has been protecting the country from sliding into extremism.
The aims of these scholarly studies are clear; they are criticizing the mafia-like encroachment of the Orbán regime. However, they do not provide any alternatives or strategies on how to counter the Mafia State.
