In his book From Morality to Metaphysics Angus Ritchie challenges the current orthodoxy in moral philosophy (at least as it is practised by analytical philosophers), which seeks to account for our ethical commitments, whilst disposing of the teleological framework of classical theism. To this end Ritchie argues that contemporary moral theory fails to fulfil two conditions. The first condition is to account for the objectivity of our moral commitments. He notes that most philosophers currently working in ethics wish to defend the objectivity of ethics. Here Ritchie quotes from the experiences of Philippa Foot who found that the moral subjectivity prevalent in Oxford made no sense in the light of the atrocities of Nazi Germany (p.36). To maintain that moral judgements are subjective flew in the face of the objective horror of human suffering. Thus, even accounts of moral judgement which locate their source in purely in human reactions to the world, such as Simon Blackburn's quasi realism, seek to explain why they have the character of objectivity. The second condition which Ritchie argues a theory of moral judgement must fulfil is to account for why our moral judgements are objective. This second condition is particularly pressing for those accounts which ascribe a fully blown objectivity to moral judgements (as opposed to quasi-realism), for the further we move in the direction of objectivity the more difficult it is to explain moral judgements as originating purely in human subjectivity. Here Ritchie argues that any adequate moral theory needs to explain why human beings have the ability to track moral truth, in an analogous manner to the way in which we track other truths (p.42), such as physical truths about the world. Ritchie claims that accounts which fail to explain this capacity for tracking an objective moral order suffer from an explanatory gap.

In response to this challenge Ritchie divides moral theories up into those like Blackburn's which are sophisticated versions of projectivism, and those such as John McDowell's moral objectivity which seek to maintain the full impact of objectivity whilst avoiding the metaphysical commitments of theism. Ritchie argues against the former that they come closer to avoiding the explanatory gap, but at the cost of not providing an adequate account of moral objectivity. Against the latter he argues that they make the commitments of the classical teleological theistic accounts, but refuse to cash out those commitments. Thus, against McDowell's Wittgensteinian inspired line that explanation must come to an end, Ritchie argues that that end is not reached by the mere recognition of objectivity. Nor is an account of how our moral judgments are generated sufficient as an end point of explanation. Ritchie argues that we must distinguish between three things: an account of moral judgements as reliably objective, a historical explanation concerning how they are generated, and an explanation as to why they track the objective moral order (p. 43). It is the third of these which accounts such as McDowell's prefer to pass over in silence. Ritchie argues this silence is not satisfactory, as it is something which is present within our moral practices, rather than an external demand made beyond them (pp.145–6).

So where are we to turn for an explanation of our ability to track an objective moral order? Here Richie argues we have two serious contenders, reductive evolutionary theory (Ritchie voices no objection to evolutionary theory in itself, rather it is the use of such a theory to explain our moral knowledge which he questions), or an alternative in which something beyond the human is ultimately responsible for our tracking abilities. In respect to evolutionary biology Ritchie argues that it is not capable of explaining why we value anything beyond those things which allow us to survive and replicate (p.56). Thus, as an explanation it must either show how all moral judgements in some form derive from our survival instincts, or leave an explanatory gap in respect of those moral judgements which are not concerned with survival and replication. Once evolutionary biology is rejected as an explanation for moral judgement this does not seal the case for classical theism, for other accounts of how we come to track the moral order are also possible. Thus, in his final chapter Ritchie considers the alternatives of axiarchism (moral value as in itself creative) and Neoplatonism. On the ground that our experience of both theoretical and practical reasoning show that imperatives have their origin in intentional agents and not in impersonal value, Ritchie argues that the best explanation for the objective moral order and our ability to track it is classical theism (p.186).

Ritchie is to be applauded for the clarity of this writing and the strength of his arguments. What he is seeking to establish is not that theism in itself can be defended from all attacks, nor that theism is necessary the only explanation for the moral order, but rather that through a process of reflective equilibrium in which we move form singular judgements to systematic accounts and back (p.17), classical theism is the best explanation we have. There is much to praise in Ritchie's account, but I have two major concerns. First, although Ritchie is right to distinguish genealogical accounts from explanatory accounts of moral knowledge, an attention to genealogy is valuable in helping us to see how history and culture have shaped that which we are seeking to explain. The very distinction between subjectivism and objectivism is one which was historically and culturally shaped, and a discussion of how the terms have come to be used as they are in the contemporary debate would help to show what is at stake in the competing claims.

The other major concern I have with the work is that for a book which seeks to take us from morality to metaphysics it has relatively little to say about the latter. The title itself brings to mind Kant's moral proof, and the concern I would have is that in making the case for classical theism Ritchie's argument points to God as a postulate to save our moral knowledge. Moreover, there is an underlying danger of separating the natural and moral orders in a manner which plays them out in dialectical opposition. Here a more general discussion of how metaphysics and morality are related would be welcome, as would an engagement with contemporary natural law theory.