Alexis de Tocqueville predicted in Democracy in America that Roman Catholicism would one day become the dominant religion in the United States. That was seemingly one of the brilliant Frenchman's weaker forecasts. Manlio Graziano, a professor of geopolitics at several distinguished European universities, might beg to differ that Tocqueville was so off the mark after all. The argument that drives his In Rome We Trust (a translation from the original Italian version) is that having long been the single largest church in terms of sheer number of adherents in the nation, the Catholic Church has now become the most important in political terms. His evidence for this bold thesis is that Catholics have been elected (Joe Biden in 2008 as the nation's first Catholic vice president) and, especially, appointed to more high-ranking positions in the United States government than ever before, including during the presidency of Barack Obama. This was despite Obama's high-profile disagreements with traditional Catholic teachings on abortion and same-sex marriage. The number of Catholics in the Congress, in the president's cabinet, on the Supreme Court, and in key posts such as the director of the CIA and leading positions in the military, has reached an all-time high in the early twenty-first century. This remarkable phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed by the public; Graziano sets out to explain its development and significance.
He devotes much of In Rome We Trust to a tightly written, dispassionate and unsentimental account of American Catholic political history, one backed by substantial research. He notes that the considerable literature on this subject (and the paucity on the related question of the relationship between the United States and the Catholic Church) has been written almost entirely by American Catholic scholars. For their work, he expresses gratitude and respect. As a European observer of these questions, however, he seeks to provide a “fresh” and “external” approach, one guided by the field of geopolitics (3).
Historians of American Catholicism have been somewhat defensive in their approach to their subject, seeking to avoid triumphalism and also not seeing their work integrated into the dominant narratives of American history as much they would like. Graziano, however, has no hesitation in making his claims.
Catholics indeed have been a minor presence at best in the higher echelons of the nation's political leadership for most of the nation's history. They were overwhelmingly working class until after World War II, as Graziano rightfully emphasizes, and this, as well as public antipathy to their religion, slowed their political ascent in the United States. Influential priest Fr. John Ryan lamented in the 1920s the absence of an educated Catholic lay political leadership class in the country. Even Al Smith, who in 1928 became the first Catholic to be nominated by a major party for president, had not had the opportunity to go to school beyond the sixth grade. Graziano understands the 1930s as a significant moment in this history, when Catholics were not only a critical part of Franklin Roosevelt's winning coalition (most Catholics had been Democrats since the founding of the party in the 1830s) but were appointed to key roles in the federal government.
After World War II, many of the Catholic laity (including veterans aided by the GI Bill) began to move into the middle-class neighborhoods in the cities and suburbs as the economy boomed. The apparent triumphant climax of American Catholic political history with the election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 is something less than that for Graziano. Kennedy's decided secularism and determined support for the separation of church and state, often criticized by more conservative Catholics in recent years, ironically slowed the political progress of Catholics in the United States, Graziano contends. Yet he admits that without Kennedy's overcoming centuries of anti-Catholicism on American shores in gaining the highest office in the land, much of the Catholic political ascendancy that Graziano emphasizes would have occurred later in the history of the United States. Graziano instead emphasizes the importance of Ronald Reagan (whose father was a Catholic), who restored official US relations to the papacy after a 117-year suspension and drew many Catholics away from the Democrats—a trend that began as early as the 1950s before Kennedy temporarily reversed it—and George W. Bush, who aligned himself with the program of American Catholic bishops.
A second theme that Graziano develops is how Rome and the United States have long had a wary relationship; the anti-Catholicism of the colonial era did not fully dissipate until the twentieth century. To the Catholic leadership in Rome, early America and the subsequent democratic republic were an exotic place, peopled and led by Protestants, one that did not lose its status as a Catholic missionary territory until 1908. The Catholic Church has never seen the United States in the way that Abraham Lincoln did when he claimed during the agony of the Civil War that it was “the last best, hope of earth.” This tension was often manifest in global politics. When the United States shed its traditional isolationism and announced itself as a global power by entering World War I, Secretary of State Robert Lansing denounced the Catholic Church, “whose objectives are openly in contrast to the democratic ideals of America” (27). Even at the outset of the Cold War, with both Rome and Washington presumably sharing a determined opposition to Communism, some leading Catholic prelates, steeped in their church's precapitalist origins, found American materialism only slight more palatable than its Soviet counterpart. Even John Paul II, presumably an important American ally in the Cold War, was never given the opportunity to speak to a joint session of the Congress on his visits to the United States. In 2015, however, Pope Francis was accorded that honor. What had changed? Graziano rejects the notion that modernity and postmodernity inevitably lead to a general secularization of society and culture. He offers in its place desecularization, which the Catholic Church as a global institution is prepared to organize. American Catholics indeed may be slightly surprised by Graziano's dismissal of the declinist model for the church in their country. Where other commentators (see Philip Lawler, The Faithful Departed: The Collapse of Boston's Catholic Culture [Encounter Books, 2010]) point to a shortage of priests, the struggle of many womens’ religious orders to attract young noviates, and waves of parish closings and mergers, Graziano sees instead continuity, stability, and even vibrancy within the Catholic Church in the United States. He approvingly quotes Charles Morris's claim that “like no other generation in the history of the Church, active American Catholics are educated, literate, informed and interested in their religion” (157). Graziano argues that the post–World War II boom in vocations and the creation of new parishes in the United States was a historical anomaly.
Graziano does accept the premise that the United States has entered a period of economic and hence geopolitical decline, but as he writes, the Catholic Church, as “the most authoritative, and the most flexible, provider of moral principles,” is uniquely positioned to make that waning more orderly (12). Graziano emphasizes the advantages that Catholics have in comparison to evangelical Christians. Catholics have a central institution to support, and, if need be, defend them, in the public square. Theirs will be the political religion of the future, not that of evangelicals, per Tocqueville.
Some of In Rome We Trust is in the realm of prediction. Many traditional and liberal Protestants may well have lingering reservations about a national political leadership that is increasingly comprised of Catholics. There is no doubt that more secular-minded Americans do, and will, oppose this new reality. If Graziano is correct, two distinct entities with a global presence, one whose adherents believe will survive until the end of human history itself, the other assumed to have a more contingent role in human affairs, are converging in the new millennium. The results promise to be momentous.
