Essentialist paradigms just seem to come naturally to Western thinking on Islam and the Middle East. Public discourse on the Muslim world is heavily accented by Samuel Huntington's “clash of civilizations” and Bernard Lewis's account of “what went wrong” in Muslim history. The governing assumptions in Richard Bulliet's essays are that such paradigms exacerbate tensions between the United States and the Muslim world and that they threaten Muslim minorities in Western societies. Therefore, he considers it urgent that we re-envision the historical relationship between Islam and the West to avoid turning the clash of civilizations thesis into self-fulfilling prophecy. The essays at hand pose four large, loosely related questions. Does it make sense to view Middle Eastern Islam and Latin Christendom as components of a common Islamo-Christian civilization rather than as rival civilizations? Why does religion play a significant role in modern Muslim politics? Why did American Middle East specialists fail to predict the Islamic revival? What might the future hold for the Muslim world?
Bulliet argues there can be no clash of civilizations because Latin Christendom and Middle Eastern Islam form a single civilization. His case rests on identifying comparable dynamics of converting populations to monotheistic religions, the emergence of religious specialists (ulema and monks) with institutions of learning (madrasas and monasteries), and the evolution of similar religious forms (Sufi orders and popular devotional movements). Granted that Latin Christendom and Middle Eastern Islam exhibit some similarities, one may object that Bulliet strains to select evidence to fit his framework, for example, by exaggerating the religious character of early European universities. True, the essay format is too brief to do more than sketch a historical overview, but the evidence here makes a stronger case for comparative studies than a civilization based on shared beliefs, values, and traditions.
In the second essay, Bulliet turns Lewis's normative question concerning what went wrong into an empirical one, “What went on?” In either case, how do we account for the contemporary salience of religion in the Muslim world after decades of anticlerical policies? Bulliet suggests that justice has represented a supreme political value in Muslim societies comparable to freedom in the West. When rulers exercised tyrannical powers, the ulema stood up for justice to make them temper their conduct. The modernization of state institutions afforded rulers greater power than ever before, which they wielded to silence and co-opt the ulema. The religious call for justice did not perish but migrated to lay intellectuals forging new discourses invoking Islam.
Why area studies scholars in the United States did not perceive the rumblings of religious dissent becomes evident in Bulliet's review of Middle East studies. In “Looking for Love in All the Wrong Places,” he contends that the Cold War's Russophobic climate inclined scholars to highlight the Islamic world's Westernizers and to overlook the multitudes captured by emergent movements insisting on a central role for Islam in public life. Bulliet advocates a turn away from the pitfalls of imagining that Americans will ever find the Muslim world filled with either angels or demons. That task will require understanding Muslim societies on their own terms rather than viewing them through the filter of Western values and interests. The essay's subtext is polemics between followers of Bernard Lewis and Edward Said (a contest that reached the point of diminishing intellectual return some time ago). Bulliet strives for balance by placing scholars, the objects of their study, and their debates into historical context. It is a noble initiative.
The Muslim world's crisis of religious authority forms the core of perhaps the most compelling essay, “The Edge of the Future.” Authority to speak on religion formerly rested on specialized religious learning associated with ulema and madrasas. However, the ulema's decline, the arrival of the printing press, the spread of mass literacy, and the rise of lay Islamist writers rearranged the landscape of religious discourses. Bulliet suggests that, throughout Islamic history, creative innovation has emerged on the edges of institutional and political power and that, in today's Muslim world, there are a multitude of “edge” situations in Muslim societies and diasporas. He further contends that such innovations take centuries to unfold and that the path from militant jihadism to a pacific, tolerant vision may not become clear in our time.
The concept of civilization is a powerful heuristic device for organizing history but is not a historical artifact. Would Middle East studies be a richer field if we replaced a hostile essentialist paradigm with a benign one? The concept of Islamo-Christian civilization confines Islam to the Middle East, but the “edge of the future” encompasses diasporas. If modern technologies of communications and transportation integrate Muslim communities more tightly than ever, what does this mean for the integrity of Middle Eastern Islamic civilization, the sibling of Latin Christendom? It may well be that the perils of present-minded history, in this instance driven by the commendable aspiration to combat fearsome tendencies, compromise conceptual rigor. Whatever qualms I have, however, these essays, if widely read, would have a salutary effect on public discourse. In the narrower realm of academia, students in upper level undergraduate and graduate courses examining historiography and contemporary scholarship on the Middle East and the Islamic world would benefit from pondering these essays. They emanate from a fair-minded approach to strident debates—written, if you will, from the center.
