The Perceived Failure of Traditional IOs

First, the perceived failure of intergovernmental organizations to effectively achieve their goals triggered a search for new institutional models. With their universal consensus requirements, bureaucratic demands, and failure to produce results, intergovernmental organizations were perceived as inefficient and ineffective, leading to a loss of confidence. Also, the rise of neoliberal ideas encouraged the search for more effective institutions. For example, the loss of confidence in the WHO's effectiveness in improving childhood vaccination were among the main drivers behind GAVI's establishment.

Private Actors and Effectiveness

Second, there was a growing sense that cooperation with private actors was necessary to tackle global problems. Private actors—be they multinational companies, industry associations, civil society, or NGOs—provide resources, often in the form of expertise and knowledge that governments lack and depend on. The private sector's technical and scientific expertise is needed for standard-setting, and their inclusion also increases compliance with and implementation of policies. Civil society organizations are plugged in locally, allowing for better local input, ownership, and ultimately better policies and their implementation (rather than “top-down” imposition of policies). Thus, in contrast to intergovernmental organizations, partnerships are perceived as improving capacity, ownership, implementation, and consensus among governmental and private actors, leading to more effective management of global problems.

Democratic Legitimacy

Finally, thanks to the inclusion of stakeholders who are affected by international policies, partnerships are perceived as boosting democratic legitimacy. Individuals have traditionally been considered subsumed within the states, and it has been the state's obligation to represent its citizens at the international level, say by “diplomatic protection” principles. However, this is an idealized and unrealistic view of governments. In practice, governments often do not properly represent their citizens; in fact, their interests on international matters are often conflicted rather than aligned (think say of a developing country wishing to receive assistance from the World Bank for a development project that will require population resettlement). Thus, the inclusion of stakeholders in partnerships improves the democratic responsiveness of the governing body toward those governed. For example, the World Commission on Dams, a partnership that set environmental and social policies for dam construction projects, included communities directly affected by dam projects, which, arguably, improved its democratic legitimacy. Similarly, ICANN's openness to the community at large, and the Global Fund and GAVI's openness to civil society, arguably make them more democratic than their multilateral peers.

Thanks to developing country membership, partnerships are also perceived as more democratic toward developing countries. Many intergovernmental organizations are formally universal, yet de facto governed by a “club” of developed countries. By giving developing countries a seat at the table, partnerships are, arguably, more responsive to the interests of those affected, leading to greater democratic legitimacy.

Imbalanced Participation and Hidden Power Asymmetries

While partnerships have the promise of being “democratic” and leveling out power inequalities—and they have certainly done so to some extent—power asymmetries within partnerships remain. The partnership model, in itself, is not a guarantee of equal participation of diverse stakeholders. Power asymmetry between commercial and noncommercial and between developed versus developing countries remains. This asymmetry introduces the risk of “information” or “representational capture”; that is, capture that occurs subtly through imbalance in the representation of competing information and interests. In such cases, the partnership is more likely to adopt an industry or developed country friendly point of view if those are the only, or the primary, people from whom it hears. This may lead to decisions that prioritize their interests over the interests of the weaker stakeholders or over the public interest.

Imbalanced participation and power asymmetries between commercial and public interests, or between developed and developing countries, come in various forms. Asymmetry may be obvious, such as when different stakeholders have different amounts of seats. The more complex yet prevalent situation is when different sectors have equal seats, yet inequalities are caused by capacity gaps. Developing countries and civil society simply may not have the resources or the expertise needed to participate effectively. As a result, the ideas that inform, and ultimately shape, decisions originate from high-income countries or their industries.

Risks of Business Sector Engagement

More specifically, collaboration with the business sector introduces a set of risks that have largely been ignored. Under the guise of democratic governance, partnerships that include the business sector (which is very often the case) introduce risks of conflicts of interest, undue influence on policy making, or granting certain businesses a competitive advantage over excluded businesses. Moreover, the partnership model, perceived as more democratic, grants a false impression of legitimacy—behind which business actors can hide, enabling them to whitewash their brand or product, while influencing policy and the agenda in line with their business interests. The private sector may try to manipulate the partnership's agenda to fit its special interests, as has been the case in IMPACT, under the guise of combatting counterfeit drugs, where the pharmaceutical industry has been advancing its IP enforcement agenda. Other partnerships in fields as diverse as investment, the Internet, and food have been similarly criticized for being industry influenced. A legal framework for managing collaboration with the private sector and the involved risk has yet to be developed.

To conclude, the multistakeholder model in of itself is not sufficient in safeguarding deliberation from power and wealth, and in fact introduces the risk of advancing corporate interests at the cost of the global public interest. Partnerships have many advantages. But, if unmanaged, they risk being a facade for corporatism, undermining the public interest in the public goods that they regulate.

Judging by the prevailing partnership narrative (e.g., in the context of the SDGs where partnerships are promoted), this problem has not received sufficient attention. Most partnerships run their business free of any constraints on these issues. Inspiration for dealing with this problem can be found in the WHO's recently released “Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors” (FENSA), which sets policies for managing the risks associated with private sector engagement. An online, publicly available register of nonstate actors engaging with the WHO is intended to improve transparency, though only time will tell whether this framework will mitigate undue influence of the private sector. Somewhat addressing these concerns, the Global Fund and ICANN have also introduced new conflicts-of-interest policies.

Finally, a question from the audience: How do we determine which stakeholders should have a seat on a partnership? My response: there are two main guiding criteria. First, speaking to the democratic purpose of partnerships, we should ask: Who are the most affected stakeholders? Second, speaking to the effectiveness of partnerships, we should ask: Who are the stakeholders who can contribute most to the partnership? Although more nuance would be required in the actual application of these criteria, they set out a basic framework when approaching member selection.

To conclude, for partnerships to keep their democratic promise, and to prevent partnerships from falling prey to corporate interests under a democratic pretense, better partnership regulation is needed.