On very rare occasions, a book emerges at precisely the right political moment. This is one of those occasions. It is difficult to imagine a more important time for the publication of America Abroad. After I had read the first chapter, my first impulse was to send a copy of this book to friends preparing to take up positions on President Donald Trump’s National Security Council staff. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth provide a much-needed correction to the ill-informed debate about the standing of the United States in the world order and the overwhelming benefits of remaining deeply invested in the maintenance of that order.

The argument proceeds in a well-organized series of steps that lay out the current preponderance of American power, the durability of the U.S. advantage in the face of China’s rise, and the logic and evidence in support of a grand strategy of deep engagement. The reason for beginning with the distribution of power is to show that the United States remains dominant in the international system despite China’s increasing economic power. Brooks and Wohlforth convincingly argue that economic power is one of many relevant forms of power, and even if China surpasses the United States in GDP, it will still not be poised to seriously challenge American preponderance. The U.S. advantage in technology suggests that there is a qualitative gap that will be difficult and time consuming for China to overcome. For example, not only does the United States continue to spend much more than China on national defense, but it has also been investing huge sums over decades to research, develop, and field high-technology weapons systems. Even if China reaches parity in pure military expenditures, it will be playing catch-up for decades before it can actually match U.S. military capacity. Thus, while China is in a league of its own among secondary powers, it is still not in the same league as the United States. In the authors’ typology, China has transitioned from Great Power to Emerging Potential Superpower, but still has to traverse through the stage of Potential Superpower before finally reaching the status of Superpower. This, according to Brooks and Wohlforth, will take a “very long time” (p. 62).

The copious data (12 tables and 13 figures) and expert analysis of the contemporary foundation of national power in Chapters 2 and 3 thoroughly debunk the notion that the United States should make any kind of major change in its economic, political, or military strategies. However, the comparison with China in Chapter 3 tends toward emphasizing China’s weaknesses and U.S. strengths, rather than comprehensively evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of both countries. The analysis would be stronger if the authors addressed arguments about weaknesses in the U.S. economy.

In the second part of the book (Chapters 4–11), Brooks and Wohlforth introduce and evaluate a grand strategy they call “deep engagement” and inconsistently compare and contrast this approach with the alternative strategies of “deep engagement plus” and retrenchment (pp. 73–74). The three core elements of deep engagement are “managing the security environment, fostering economic globalization, and sustaining institutionalized cooperation on key problems” (p. 80). The authors explain how these pillars of grand strategy emerged as solutions to specific Cold War problems and endured in the post–Cold War period because they provided the United States powerful tools of global influence. The end of the Cold War did not eliminate all global problems or threats and, in fact, created new problems and threats. It would therefore be foolish of the United States to throw away its “complex relationships of influence that allowed it to shape the strategic environment to facilitate highly effective balancing against Soviet power” (p. 78).

The alternatives to deep engagement are not well developed. Deep engagement plus includes the three core elements of deep engagement plus the “add-ons” of promoting democracy, human rights, and “other liberal values” (p. 73). Retrenchment is something of a moving target; Brooks and Wohlforth do not settle on a specific version to evaluate but instead reference different versions elaborated by scholars like Barry Posen, Eugene Gholz, Daniel Press, Stephen Walt, Chistopher Layne, and others. One possible approach for a “comprehensive assessment” (p. 80) of the grand strategy of deep engagement would be to identify and fully describe the three strategy options, develop a set of criteria to evaluate the three options, and then subject each option to an equal and symmetrical analysis based on those criteria. Brooks and Wohlforth take a different path, however, one that this reviewer finds to be less rigorous than the comparative method. They test the projected outcomes of the strategy against the relevant findings in the international relations literature.

This is a reasonable approach, but by eschewing the comparative dimension, they lose some analytical leverage. Moreover, the most compelling chapters are the ones that do the most comparison (Chapters 7 and 8). In these chapters, Brooks and Wohlforth take on the arguments of retrenchment advocates to show that the security and economic costs of deep engagement are much lower than critics allege. Deep engagement is not significantly more costly than more restrained options and is unlikely to foster hegemonic decline. Furthermore, the United States is unlikely to face balancing of either the hard or soft variety, entrapment by weaker allies, or an especially high risk of “temptation” to pursue expansive objectives like human rights promotion.

Chapters 5–6 and 9–10 describe and assess the security, economic, and institutional logic of deep engagement. U.S. security engagement dampens regional security dilemmas and allows the United States to obtain “a more favorable strategic environment” (p. 90). By assuring allies and deterring adversaries, the United States can dampen the harshest imperatives of the anarchical international system. More generally, U.S. leadership provides the hegemonic stability necessary for institutionalized cooperation and continuing economic globalization, both of which provide extensive and unique benefits to the United States.

One clear strength of America Abroad, beyond its well-developed central argument, is the theoretical synthesis of realism and liberal institutionalism. It is not that the authors are necessarily breaking new ground (all of their arguments build on existing literature, including their own previous work), but I have not encountered a clearer, more functional synthesis of realism and liberalism elsewhere in the literature. It should be noted, however, that some liberals will object to the instrumentalist interpretation that sees international institutions as elements of American influence rather than restraints on American power.

Once clear weakness is the superficial treatment of deep engagement plus. The authors spend just two pages (pp. 82–83) comparing the two forms of deep engagement and their central critique of deep engagement plus is that the add-on considerations have not been “constant nor defining elements of US grand strategy” (p. 83). First, if the only criterion for judging an effective grand strategy is continuity, then there is no point in even thinking about strategy, we know we will always do whatever we have done before. Second, it is disputable that democracy promotion has been a less constant part of the U.S. foreign policy tradition than core objectives of deep engagement like free trade. Arguably the United States has pursued democracy promotion in various forms since the creation of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. (There also seems to be a contradiction when later in the book we learn that Americans have a “basic pro-democracy disposition” [p. 148].) Third, it is questionable whether deep engagement will really work without the add-ons of deep engagement plus. To some extent, the ability of the United States to form effective, durable alliances and create and maintain legitimate institutions is based on American values and promotion of those values through word and deed.