The sixth round of Six-Party Talks that started in March 2007 replicated previous sets of negotiations. Talks were sporadic at best. Despite the agreement reached during the fifth round (February 2005) – e.g., the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), normalization of Japan – DPRK relations, and economic assistanceFootnote 1 – the US presidential elections in November 2008 added an element of uncertainty, with North Korea launching yet another missile in April 2009, followed by the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, by what appears to be a North Korean torpedo. In short, the numerous Six-Party Talks hosted by China failed to halt North Korea's nuclear ambitions. If anything, it was the DPRK that benefited from them: status quo is preserved while its nuclear programme continues, despite a rebuke from its only remaining ally, China.
Pyongyang's intransigence continues, while Sino-American relations display typical Realpolitik: the familiar exchange of words over American arms sale to Taiwan, along with President Barack Obama's audience with Dalai Lama in February 2010 eliciting renewed criticisms from Beijing. Above all, China's flexing of its naval muscles in the South China Sea and beyond adds relevance to balance of power considerations in the Asia-Pacific region. Their mutual scepticisms seem to endorse the view that Realpolitik remains the modus operandi in Northeast Asia, with Realism prevailing as the conceptual tool for interpreting Sino-American relationship.
Despite this, it is striking to note China's willingness to remain an ‘honest broker’ in the Six-Party framework by admonishing Kim Jong-il to be less obsessed with the purported American ‘enmity’.Footnote 2 It seems as if the North Korean nuclear issue acts as an informal Sino-American platform for dialogue despite the sensitive bilateral relationship. Put differently, the North Korean nuclear crisis seems to precipitate a rare convergence of mutual interests between Washington and Beijing in which the Korean Peninsula represents inherent risks once Realpolitik is taken to its logical conclusion. In short, the convergence of language into a ‘nuclear free Korean Peninsula’ by the parties involved, but particularly between the US and China, denotes the mutually perceived need to prevent worst-case scenarios from materializing.
How are we to conceptualize the emergence of such a common language amidst the larger Sino-American balance of power in Northeast Asia? After having repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, and again in late 2002,Footnote 3 North Korea uses its nuclear programme as a bargaining chip to blackmail the US and its allies, not to mention China. Yet, this compels Washington and Beijing to utter similar-sounding pronouncements such that the common narrative of a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ signifies convergence of the two governments’ regional anxieties, that the pursuit of balance of power potentially threatens the stability of Northeast Asia. Realism as a theoretical tool might help explain some of this, but the balance of power calculations alone cannot account for the emergence of a common language. This demonstrates that balance of power needs to be understood in a nuanced way: while Realpolitik is still relevant, the capacity for Washington and Beijing to share a common language within this particular context also needs to be taken seriously. As such, the current diplomatic context encourages an additional Constructivist reading on top of the familiar Realist explanation in which we need to explore the emergent intersubjectivity. This article aims to explore the convergence of language through which the US and China have come to utilize this crisis as a forum for pronouncing shared anxieties.
This article is divided into five sections. The first section provides a very brief overview of the North Korean nuclear crisis that led to the emergence of a common language. The second section provides an account of how language needs to be taken seriously. Given the importance of perceptions in international relations (IR), diplomatic relations can be recast as a macro-level exchange of symbols. If balance of power is a social construct,Footnote 4 then its intersubjective framework should be analysed so that the inherent ambiguities of phrases such as ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ can also be appreciated. The third section recasts the narratives of ‘nuclear-free’ as a language borne of socialization throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis. This shared language provides a forum for both the US and China, along with Japan and South Korea, to indicate to one another that they can at least send signals that might mitigate a crisis, a precious commodity given Sino-American tensions elsewhere. The fourth section analyses the various uses of ‘nuclear-free’ narratives, mainly by both Washington and Beijing, but also referring to Tokyo and Seoul as well, paying close attention to the language through which governments ‘talk about’ nuclear weapons and regional security in Northeast Asia. Finally, the fifth section discusses the need for recasting ‘nuclear-free’ narratives as a common language, suggesting that the Sino-American balance of power requires a more nuanced assessment.
A brief background
Historically, the Korean Peninsula is considered the powder keg of Northeast Asia, and conventional wisdom considers balance of power as the modus operandi for engagement in the region.Footnote 5 Christopher Hughes argues that the crisis emerged after North Korea repeatedly refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to monitor its nuclear processing plant at Yongbyon throughout the mid-1990s, providing circumstantial evidence that Pyongyang continued with a clandestine nuclear programme.Footnote 6 President George Bush (senior) stated in November 1991 that DPRK's alleged nuclear activity constituted a threat to regional security,Footnote 7 and ‘by late 1992 . . . the IAEA had determined that North Korea had not fully declared its pre-1992 plutonium productions’.Footnote 8 Despite its sympathy towards the DPRK, China appreciated that the nuclear allegation was potentially destabilizing. As Ming Liu argues:
China's response toward the nuclear issue is clear. It represents not only a damage to North Korea's development and survival, but also a major problem for China's relations with the US and its diplomacy in the international community. At most, it is a grave threat to Chinese long-term security interests. China's Foreign Ministry described Pyongyang's action as dangerous adventurism aimed at obtaining US concessions. Some radical views even maintained that this is also an attempt to blackmail China.Footnote 9
As such, China's involvement in the North Korean nuclear dispute is symptomatic of the larger framework of balance of power in Northeast Asia.
China and North Korea became aware of the imperative for regime survival following the fall of Berlin Wall. To that extent, Beijing's reluctance to persuade Pyongyang to forgo its nuclear programme was understandable; and the Realpolitik inclination within the Chinese leadership identified with North Korean nuclear calculations. For an impecunious state, the weapons of mass destruction are ‘the only means of attack’ available to it.Footnote 10 This zero-sum consideration suggested that once Pyongyang went nuclear, other states, notably Japan, would follow suit, thereby precipitating a regional arms race. Such fears intensified following the launch of a North Korean Taepodong missile across Japan in August 1998.Footnote 11 A Realpolitik reading of Chinese foreign policy suggests that the perceived need to balance power against the American alliance compelled China to bankroll North Korea in order to sustain it as a buffer zone.
Both the US and China were reluctant to take decisive measures against North Korea, resulting in the October 1994 Framework Agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. It was agreed that, in exchange for North Korea freezing its nuclear programme, the regime was to be granted ‘nuclear technology and energy supplies estimated to cost US$4 billion in total over a five-year period’.Footnote 12 While the Agreement was primarily a bilateral arrangement between the US and DPRK, allies on both sides were enlisted to help. As The Economist puts it, ‘America, Japan, and China all have an interest in avoiding another crisis in the region whether triggered by a sudden increase in the flow of North Korean refugees or by another rocket-propelled raspberry from its unpredictable regime.’Footnote 13 China assumed the role of a broker, leading to a four-party meeting in April 1996, involving the two Koreas, the US, and China, providing a forum not only for them to try to iron out differences, but also an opportunity for Beijing and Washington to engage in bilateral negotiations on wider issues.Footnote 14 In other words, the nuclear issue represented a double coincidence of wants between the US and China over Northeast Asian security in general, such that the mid-1990s marked a period of delicate balance of power between the two states. As for Beijing, it was felt necessary to adopt a cautious approach, hoping that neither Washington nor Pyongyang would walk away from the fragile negotiations.
Gary Samore notes that the admission by North Korea in October 2002 that ‘it was pursuing a secret [uranium] enrichment programme took Washington by surprise’.Footnote 15 Following the revelation, the first round of Six-Party Talks began in Beijing in August 2003 to forestall a potential downward spiral, with North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT by the end of the year.Footnote 16 It is within this context that the second Six-Party Talks were held in February 2004 without any discernible outcome, followed by another round of Six-Party Talks in July 2005, only to re-affirm a ‘denuclearized’ Korean Peninsula as nothing more than a participants' dream.Footnote 17
A communiqué was finally agreed following the end of the seventh round of talks in September 2005. In it, the participants reluctantly ‘agreed to recognise the right of North Korea to develop a peaceful nuclear programme, reiterating the hopes for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’.Footnote 18 A change in tactic by the Bush administration meant that the US finally acquiesced to a series of bilateral talks with the DPRK. However, Pyongyang remained defiant, detonating a nuclear device in October 2006, eliciting a furious response from China. In an uncharacteristically strong language, Renmin Ribao stated that ‘the DPRK ignored [the] universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test on 9 October. The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it’.Footnote 19
Tensions mounted over the Korean Peninsula in April 2009 when North Korea launched further missiles, claiming them to be ‘experimental communications satellite[s]’.Footnote 20 The March 2010 Cheonan incident also revealed differences in the way Washington and Beijing approached Pyongyang, underlining their contrasting perceptions of the nuclear issue. For the US, it was a brazen act of sabotage; but, for China, US hegemony was partly to blame. And it is from these diverse perspectives that ‘nuclear free’ emerges as a convergent language shared by the parties within the Six-Party framework. Herein lies the ambiguity of the phrase and its peculiarity.
Rivalry and common language
The balance of power explanation seems relevant in explaining Sino-American rivalry: the very instance of a nuclear standoff over the Korean Peninsula can be explained away by it, and the recurrence of diplomatic and trade disputes seem to vindicate Realist perspectives. Indeed, balance of power considerations can be readily identified. On the one hand, there is the US alliance with its nuclear umbrella stretching to the border with North Korea. On the other hand, China poses a regional counter-weight as another nuclear power with a rising military, especially naval, presence in South China Sea and beyond.Footnote 21 Despite calls for a ‘nuclear-free’ Korean Peninsula, nuclear weapons proliferate in and around the region, such that it is tempting to cast away the language of ‘nuclear-free’ as a mere lip-service. Yet, Beijing and Washington are also careful not to escalate the friction. Alexander Wendt suggests that balance of power is a social construct:Footnote 22 any given social context is a product of socialization by the parties involved, with language playing an important role in it − and balance of power as a particular relationship is no exception. ‘Power’ is relational, and ‘balance’ implies a cautious interaction between the actors involved. Put differently, power as a social concept means we need to be mindful of the ‘psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised’, including those engaged in balance of power dynamics.Footnote 23 Hence, we need to be aware of the inherent exchange of signifiers, since it constitutes the intersubjective dimensions of balance of power in which the aim is not just about ‘frustrat[ing] the threatened preponderance of others, but [recognizing] the responsibility not to upset the balance itself’.Footnote 24 An exploration into such intangibles is what is amiss with the current Realpolitik depiction of Northeast Asia. The penchant for straight-forward balance of power assumptions prevents us from considering how a context can gradually change over time, as participants realize the inherent dangers of the status quo and seek to ameliorate some of its worst excesses while the over-arching context of rivalry remains intact.
Hence, what we need is a nuanced reading of balance of power as a social relationship in which language constitutes a crucial factor. There is the temptation to enlist balance of power as the sole explanation for the North Korean crisis; but it is striking that the phrase ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ is frequently reiterated by the parties involved, regardless of whether they know exactly what the other means by the phrase. It seems that the participants in the Six-Party talks possess different perceptions of the crisis. As Judith Kornberg and John Faust note, Washington and Tokyo consider Pyongyang to be a ‘rogue’, whereas Beijing ‘cannot allow North Korea to become isolated and abandoned’.Footnote 25 Moreover, Seoul's shift from Sunshine Policy to a more aggressive posture under Lee Myung-bak indicates growing South Korean frustration at North Korean intransigence. Yet, the language converges into ‘nuclear free’. Julie Gilson argues that the US did pay attention to Chinese concerns over Washington's aggressive tactics against North Korea,Footnote 26 and that China is beginning ‘to show a willingness to promote joint leadership’ on the matter.Footnote 27 The meeting between Chinese and American officials in March 2010 suggests this cautious balance: US State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, states that ‘we are focusing on the future of important issues that we can work on together’, while Zhao Qizheng of China People's Political Consultative Conference argues that ‘two drivers [the US and China] must consult with each other to drive the car’.Footnote 28 Hence, we see a convergence into a common signifier, despite the divergent national interests.
Thus, on the one hand, the balance of power dynamics are resilient. Despite Pyongyang's defiance, Beijing remains its steadfast ally, with Hu Jintao telling Kim Jong-il in October 2006 that the bilateral friendship is the ‘common treasure of both nations’.Footnote 29 The American nuclear umbrella remains relevant as well. Ruan Zongze suggests that the US has steadily strengthened ‘existing relations with its allies in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan’, buttressing its counter-weight against China.Footnote 30 On the other hand, it is within this context that both Beijing and Washington seemingly share a willingness to sustain the moribund Six-Party framework, as if there is a double coincidence of wants between the US and China over the benefits of protracted, if not hopeless, negotiations despite North Korean defiance. Pyongyang's pledge never to return to the Talks seems to have hardened both the American and Chinese resolve to keep on talking for the time being.
While it is perfectly reasonable to expect the parties to maintain conversation while balance of power remains the predominant mode of interaction, the fact remains that the US and China are both reiterating the narrative of ‘nuclear-free’ to the extent that this common phrase seems to mean much more than what it implies on the surface. To be sure, Sino-American rivalry poses a counterweight to the convergence of language over North Korea. Hence, this ambivalence – balance of power, on the one hand, and convergence, on the other – acts as a ‘precondition’ through which an ambiguous language gains potency, precisely because such ambiguities can be construed to mean anything, while a semblance of uniformity is maintained.Footnote 31 This is particularly the case when the perceptions differ between and among the stakeholders. Furthermore, Seoul's emergent ‘inter-Korean national identity’ entails domestic debates on how best to interact with both the US and North Korea; Footnote 32 and Tokyo's insistence on retribution for abductees is tempered through its alliance with – and reliance on – the US, mindful of the repercussions of Japan's military intentions.Footnote 33 The interests of participants vary, but their convergent language suggests that they are willing to send out a common message to Pyongyang – and to one another – that a military confrontation needs to be ruled out in the immediate future.
Hence, balance of power as a toolkit for explaining international politics in Northeast Asia needs a nuanced reading. Appreciating Sino-American differences in material capabilities are useful, but their use of language also needs exploration. This is why language needs to be taken seriously. Even if both Beijing and Washington consider denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to be an impossibility, they nonetheless regurgitate ‘nuclear free’ in their official pronouncements. This begs the question of why this remains the case if the situation is hopeless. Perhaps ‘nuclear free’ is devoid of its literal meaning; but the utterance of this phrase by both the US and China seems to suggest that it entails an altogether different signal that both sides are willing to use the Six-Party framework as a precious vehicle of dialogue, precisely because the relationship is fraught with conflicts. It seems obvious that the parties want to avoid a nuclear arms race − because it is ‘obvious’ to them that a convergent language of ‘nuclear free’ can emerge even under the prevailing conditions of balance of power. In short, Realpolitik in Northeast Asia is a particular social relationship that requires using the language of ‘nuclear free’ to forestall its logical conclusion.
‘Nuclear-free’ narratives and mutual anxiety
Superficially, the balance of power dynamics persist as China enhances its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Part of this can be explained through domestic factors. On the one hand, Wang Jusheng asserts that ‘a “healthy great power mentality” is influencing [Chinese] policy makers’,Footnote 34 while Minxin Pei argues that there is a perception within China that ‘the west has unfairly sided with Japan’ in the territorial disputes, and the leadership finds itself in an ‘impossible’ situation ‘bolstering its nationalist credentials while maintaining a flexible foreign policy’.Footnote 35 The People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) Rear Admiral, Yin Dunping, says, ‘[i]t is important to accelerate and improve the navy's abilities to cross the ocean [to] escort, rescue and evacuate Chinese nationals abroad, maintain peace, and a variety of other military task’.Footnote 36 On the other hand, the US Admiral, Michael Mullen, suggests that China is ‘very focused on the US navy and our bases in that part of the world’.Footnote 37 Furthermore, President Obama points out the latent zero-sum mentality within Sino-American policy circles, stating that ‘some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think that there is something to fear in a rising China’.Footnote 38 As Michael Yahuda observes, the US approach to China partly reflects domestic disagreements between the Administration and the Congress. He suggests that President Bush (senior) sought to engage Beijing soon after Tiananmen, while the Congress pushed to isolate China.Footnote 39 While President Bill Clinton's first term saw Democratic control of the Congress during which Most Favoured Nation talks were pursued with Beijing, soon afterwards North Korea ‘intervened’, leading to Clinton's climb-down;Footnote 40 and the 1994 Framework Agreement was perceived in Congress as ‘giving in to blackmail’.Footnote 41 The succeeding Bush administration witnessed another internal division, this time inside the Administration itself. Pentagon felt there was no point in negotiating with North Korea, while others felt the risks for conflict were too high,Footnote 42 leading to a debate as to whether China had any influence on North Korea.Footnote 43
As such, the Sino-American rivalry partly reflects the internal struggles within their respective policy-making circles in deciphering mutual intentions, potentially precipitating a downward-spiral of scepticisms; the bilateral focus on military capabilities and the manifestation of mutual scepticisms show that Cold War atmospherics are alive. It is within such uncertainties that the ambiguous language of ‘nuclear free’ provides the optimal tool available to mitigate the potentials for wrong signals to be exchanged. Hence, the precondition for the emergence of the phrase lies in uncertainty and domestic debates. The motives in Washington and Beijing differ; but the precariousness of the nuclear crisis makes the indeterminate phrase the optimal language of choice. It is as if the symbolic nature of nuclear weapons and overall balance of power have mutated from being a tool of security into a vehicle of potential danger.
The threat posed by nuclear weapons is real for the actors involved, but what the nuclear weapons mean to them is also crucial in appreciating their shared anxieties. Wendt's characterization provides one perspective. He argues that ‘[f]ive hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones because of the shared understandings that underpin them’.Footnote 44 To be sure, nuclear weapons remain deadly and that is one of the primary reasons why states value them. Yet, it is also the case that danger can boomerang-back on to nuclear powers themselves in the form of a downward spiral of threat perceptions – effectively the security dilemma.Footnote 45 Nuclear weapons lose their efficacy as symbols of national security, and, instead, re-emerge as potential drivers of insecurity, prompting a reconstruction of the intersubjective structure through which nuclear weapons are portrayed. Needless to say, both China and the US rely on them; but once proliferation of nuclear weapons reaches a certain point, the sense of enhanced security diminishes, superseded by the uncertainties of a potential arms race as other players also seek to enhance their sense of security.Footnote 46 As such, Sino-American anxieties over each other's intentions in Northeast Asia that fuelled nuclear proliferation in the first place evolved into their mutual concern about what might happen if North Korea is left unchecked.
This depiction of nuclear weapons as danger is shared by other parties as well. The Japanese government's October 2006 reaction to the statement by MP Nakagawa Shoichi represents Japan's ambivalence towards nuclear weapons. Nakagawa responded to North Korean nuclear testing by stating that ‘there is reason to think that nuclear weapons can be a deterrent’.Footnote 47 In response, the then-prime minister, Abe Shinzo, reiterated Japan's non-nuclear policy, while the Director of Japan Defence Agency, Kyuma Fumio, added: ‘we are sending out a wrong message by debating to what extent we should possess nuclear weapons. Debates are fine; but we must be careful.’Footnote 48 Threats from North Korea reignited Japan's domestic debate on nuclear weapons; but Tokyo's official response was to reiterate the importance of Six-Party Talks, with the Diet resolution calling for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.Footnote 49
The South Korean government's shift away from the Sunshine Policy reflects a certain rethink in response to Pyongyang's provocations. However, Cho argues that the Sunshine Policy was ‘not simply South Korea's tactical engagement demanche of coping with the on-going North Korean problems, but is the state-driven identity project reconfiguring the existing mapping of collective identity in Northeast Asia’.Footnote 50 As such, Seoul's preference remains the same: stability on the Korean Peninsula. Cho also considers the Sunshine Policy to enshrine domestic sources of conflict, whereby ‘Korean nationalists argue for peace and unification while the proponents of the South Korea–US alliance argue for stability and security’.Footnote 51 Seen in this light, Seoul's reaction to the sinking of Cheonan reflects South Korean ambivalence towards international response to North Korea. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Shin Kak-soo, told the United Nations General Assembly in September 2010 that South Korea aspires to ‘build “three communities”’, including ‘a “peace community” to ensure security and peace on the Korean peninsula’, adding that ‘without North Korea's forgoing its nuclear weapons program, no sustainable peace could be achieved on the Korean peninsula and beyond’. To mark a break from the Sunshine Policy, Shin emphasized the Lee administration's Grand Bargain, urging North Korea to ‘make the right choice’.Footnote 52 But in response to the Cheonan incident, Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan told a news conference in March 2011 that Seoul is bracing for further North Korean provocation, quoting President Lee urging Pyongyang to ‘join the new wave of peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia’.Footnote 53 We can see Seoul's mounting frustration with Pyongyang, but the default position so far is to reiterate the familiar language of ‘nuclear free’.
Thus, the narratives of denuclearization denote the existence of mutual fears about nuclear proliferation in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula; and the Six-Party framework presents itself as a platform upon which the parties settle on the ambiguous language of ‘nuclear free’, despite their domestic debates. Simultaneously, this is an Agent – Structure issue in practice.Footnote 54 Agents reproduce the balance of power structure in Northeast Asia; but there is nothing to prevent the structure from imparting contradictions between the agents’ understandings of the status quo, on the one hand, and their desire for a more accommodating environment, on the other. Moreover, the international environment precipitates domestic debates, only for the dominant coalition to reiterate ‘nuclear free’ as an optimal language through which further diplomatic negotiations take place. The preponderance of Sino-American balance of power created a particular context within which Pyongyang justifies its nuclear programme, which in turn precipitates a new international environment that Beijing, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul find dangerous.
David Campbell argues that ‘[d]anger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat’,Footnote 55 to the extent that ‘[a]nything can be a risk’.Footnote 56 The centrepiece of debate within Six-Party Talks entails the US arguing that a North Korean nuclear programme threatens the stability of Northeast Asia, something to which Beijing tacitly agrees, on the one hand, while the DPRK emphasizes that it is designed as a defensive posture vis-à-vis the US, on the other. Yet, it must be recognized that both arguments pay lip-service to the recognition that denuclearization is a necessity.Footnote 57 While Washington seems intent on punishing North Korea, China seems to consider both the US and North Korea culpable. It is significant that these two discrete starting points result in the convergence of their respective approaches into a common language of ‘nuclear free’ to the extent that it becomes obvious for both Washington and Beijing to exercise caution with respect to Pyongyang.Footnote 58 The Obama administration seems particularly intent on sending out the ‘right’ signals, with President Obama stating that ‘[t]he relationship between the US and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world . . . That is the responsibility that together we bear’,Footnote 59 casting the bilateral relationship as ‘partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity’.Footnote 60 Whatever the meaning of ‘nuclear free Korean Peninsula’, it has been reified into a language through which China and the US preserve dialogue while animosities continue elsewhere.
To be sure, a Constructivist reading of the standoff does not predict an amicable outcome. Realists such as David Jones and Michael Smith quote Alastair Iain Johnston in deriding Constructivism's ‘mythic “story about path dependence and mutual constitution” between the purported identity construction in East Asia on the one hand, and the reality of East Asian regionalism on the other’.Footnote 61 Yet, the narrative of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ exists. A penchant for balance of power considerations treats the narratives of ‘nuclear-free’ as mere lip-service, but this only begs the question of why they bother with such a language. Rather, how the language converges into a common signifier needs to be taken seriously. While the interests of the stakeholders differ, it is a puzzle to see the parties uttering very similar narratives. Thus, only by appreciating the potentials for the emergence of a common platform can we make sense of this coincidence. The crucial point is that the Sino-American balance of power and the associated sensitivities are real; but it is within these structural confines that a co-ordinated language emerges. This is one more reason why we need to delve into the very language upon which the Sino-American balance of power is constructed
Jutta Weldes et al. argue that ‘[a]ctors and their insecurities are naturalized in the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the interstate system, can be taken for granted’.Footnote 62 The North Korean nuclear crisis is an end product of this taken-for-grantedness: nuclear weapons were taken for granted as enhancing security. The problem emerges once such an assumption boomerangs back to re-emerge as the very source of regional insecurity already made volatile as a result of other conflicts. This reified danger and the perceived need to ameliorate it partly explains China's penchant for performing the role of an honest broker.Footnote 63 Also, it is plausible to suggest that the realization of the status quo as risky and unsustainable compelled the US to claim in July 2005 that it has ‘no intention to attack or invade [DPRK]’, enticing North Korea to agree to the longer-term goal of ‘denuclearization of Korean peninsula’.Footnote 64 In the previous rounds, similar acknowledgements to the limits of balance of power were made. China recognized the potentials for an arms race in Northeast Asia in April 2000,Footnote 65 and North Korea announced in February 2004 that all it wanted was a ‘security assurance’ – something they still desire.Footnote 66 As Roy argues, Beijing understands that DPRK's nuclear programme can potentially hurt itself, rather than strengthen its national interest in the longer run.Footnote 67 Pre-9/11, Norman Levin notes that Beijing played a ‘generally constructive role in supporting efforts to draw North Korea into the world community’.Footnote 68 The irony is that, following 9/11, Pyongyang's stance effectively brought together rivals, inadvertently encouraging a convergence of language between the US and China in this particular crisis. Hence, while a Realist theorizing would have predicted an arms race in Northeast Asia, the result is that the major actors are applying brakes on this purportedly dangerous momentum.Footnote 69
‘Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as a common language
The language of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as a familiar signifier is most apparent in the October 1994 Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue between the US and the DPRK. While the bulk of the document focuses on the technicalities of providing North Korea with light-water reactors (LWRs), there are numerous references to the idea of creating a ‘nuclear-free’ peninsula. The second paragraph of the Preamble refers to ‘the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the US and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula’, and that the parties have ‘decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue’. After discussing the technical details of LWR provision, Paragraph III stipulates that:
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
1. The US will provide formal assurance to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.
2. The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North – South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
3. The DPRK will engage in North – South dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such a dialogue.
The Agreed Framework implies a tacit compact between the US and DPRK that a nuclear standoff somehow needs to be ameliorated. China, too, seems to appreciate that the vague language of ‘nuclear-free’ can be leveraged to send a signal that a multi-party framework needs to be preserved. On the one hand, Beijing's stance is that developing states have the right to pursue a safe nuclear programme;Footnote 70 but, on the other hand, the Chinese foreign ministry had to point out in January 2003 – after Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT – that ‘we hope to continue to safeguard the universality of the NPT and will continue to work for the peaceful solution of the nuclear question of the DPRK’.Footnote 71 As Yong Deng argues, the nuclear crisis is a ‘“political issue” for China whose resolution required seriously addressing Pyongyang's legitimate demands’.Footnote 72
Even if ‘nuclear-free’ is a lip-service, it nevertheless occupies an important place within the Six-Party framework. The Joint Statement at the fourth round in September 2005 states that they were held ‘for the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula’ to promote ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’.Footnote 73 The then-Vice President Hu Jintao reiterated similar sentiments. In May 2002, he stated that the ‘aim of China's foreign policy is to safeguard world peace’ and that ‘it is in the common interests of China and the US to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula’.Footnote 74 At the close of the fifth round of talks in February 2007, the participants reiterated their commitment towards ‘a major and solid stride . . . towards the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula’.Footnote 75 Within the larger framework of regional security in Northeast Asia, Hu noted in May 2002 that, ‘for various reasons, China and the US do not see eye to eye on some issues. Yet we can, through dialogue on an equal footing, increase our understanding, expand areas of agreement, and generally reduce our differences’.Footnote 76 Victor Cha argues that China's goal is ‘non-confrontational solution and a “cherishing” of the Agreed Framework’.Footnote 77 The narratives of denuclearization have become a convenient tool for the stakeholders to reassure one another of their intentions – or non-intentions – in light of their mutual misgivings. This denotes a set of emerging parameters within which the North Korean nuclear issue is to be framed; and in turn both the US and China are beginning to leverage the North Korean crisis into a valuable forum for informal dialogue.
To be sure, the convergence of language coincides with enhanced rivalry. On the one hand, we see different reactions to North Korean provocations, especially after March 2010. Zbigniew Brzezinski observes that the US is becoming anxious about the loss of its influence in the region, while China is becoming more assertive.Footnote 78 As such, when the main concern is bilateral relations, the focus is on balance of power. But as Brzezinski warns, ‘[the US] approach to China should not be adversarial. It is not in America's nor China's interest to create massive popular hostility’.Footnote 79 Thus, once the attention shifts to North Korea, the only viable alternative remains a convergence in language. From the Chinese perspective, rather than seeing the US exploit the nuclear crisis into a tool for isolating North Korea, Beijing prefers ‘turning the talks into a more-or-less genuine multilateral mechanism’.Footnote 80 Yahuda adds that ‘Chinese interests, of course, were by no means altruistic, but there was enough of an overlap with those of the United States’.Footnote 81 In a similar vein, David Shambaugh argues that China, along with the US, ‘share a common desire for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region’,Footnote 82 making it easier for the US and China to employ similar language, with Ruan Zongze adding that despite the strengthening of US–Japan alliance, both Beijing and Washington are trying to allay mutual fears.Footnote 83
The utility of ‘nuclear free’ rests not on whether the phrase has a clear definition upon which the parties can agree. Rather, it is context-dependent. When the US alliance and China train their gaze upon one another, the relationship becomes a straightforward balance of power as evinced through the US reaction to PLAN expansion; but once they shift their attention on to the Korean Peninsula, ‘nuclear free’ becomes a language through which their mutual anxieties converge. To be sure, it is tempting to dismiss ‘nuclear free’ as a lip-service, particularly following the Cheonan incident in which the US was frustrated with China's reluctance to censure North Korea. As Yahuda observes, Beijing's reaction led to Washington thinking that the Chinese ‘could not be relied upon as a partner’.Footnote 84 Despite this, the US response remains laden with ambiguities. The Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Crowley, told journalists in May 2010 that ‘this kind of provocative act cannot be tolerated and there will clearly be consequences for North Korea’, adding ‘there will be a strong and appropriate international response’.Footnote 85 Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a joint statement among China, Japan, and South Korea in May 2010, stating that the three governments ‘take note of the situation’, only to reiterate their shared view that a ‘denuclearized Korean Peninsula would greatly contribute to enduring peace’.Footnote 86 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Qin Gang, briefed journalists in June 2010 that, ‘fundamentally, China proceeds from safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in dealing with the Cheonan incident, and we still continue to do so’.Footnote 87 Hence, the ‘nuclear free’ might act as a cover for potential disagreements. Still, it is significant that the Sino-American response to North Korea results in the convergence of language.
Dovetailing of the Sino-American language
Hence, ‘nuclear free’ lacks a definitive meaning. Yet, it is striking that the participants to the Six-Party Talks invoke this language despite their varying concerns. Likewise, once the Sino-American gaze turns on to the Korean Peninsula, the phrase emerges as a language with which the anxieties in Washington and Beijing converge. Put differently, the context within which the Sino-American rivalry is sustained determines whether the language of a ‘nuclear free Korean Peninsula’ acquires any utility. While Sino-American relations evoke an image of a zero-sum game, the nuclear standoff as one manifestation of this rivalry is ensconced within the common language of ‘nuclear free’. Beijing's acknowledgment of US concerns over an alleged uranium enrichment programme during February 2004 indicates that China is keen to exploit the phrase.Footnote 88 As Alastair Iain Johnston puts it, ‘China's leaders prefer the geopolitical status quo’,Footnote 89 and hence shares an interest with the US and Japan in ‘supporting the institutions designed to (restrain) North Korea’ from tipping the nuclear balance.Footnote 90 Adam Ward also argues that, ‘Washington and Beijing both view Pyongyang as a menace to regional security, and they share a commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.’Footnote 91 Effectively, the ambiguous language of denuclearization is a product of this particular, Realpolitik, socialization process.
The possibilities for convergence are enhanced by Chinese perceptions of North Korea. Gregory Moore argues that China is interested in dissuading North Korea from ‘advancing its long-range missiles and nuclear weapons programs because they have great potential to threaten some of China's most fundamental interests – namely, regional stability, and possibly even China's economic modernization program’.Footnote 92 Here, while Beijing is keen to deflect criticisms away from Pyongyang, it is equally anxious of the implications of regional instability, particularly along its own borders with the DPRK. As the Renmin Ribao reported in January 2003, ‘it is not improbable that China may be confronted with nuclear blackmail [from North Korea] over some issue one day’.Footnote 93 This explains why China seeks to remain a ‘trustworthy mediator’ to the extent that it ‘cannot allow North Korea to become isolated and abandoned’.Footnote 94 Beijing's interests converged with both Seoul's insistence on diplomatic solutions to the nuclear crisis,Footnote 95 on the one hand, and with Japan's realization that it can only influence the Six-Party framework by deferring to the US.Footnote 96 As Sung-Joo Han notes, ‘[i]n the short- to medium-term, China has the most to gain diplomatically from improved relations between North and South Korea’, and that ‘[i]t is a great irony that Korea today represents the principal strategic area where Chinese and US interests coincide and the two countries cooperate’.Footnote 97
This is the case even amid the transition from a Clintonian ‘strategic partnership’ to ‘strategic competition’ under the Bush administration, and then on to the Obama administration's enthusiasm for closer bilateral relations. Indeed, the US finds it expedient to exploit China's self-professed role as an honest broker. Ward notes that ‘Beijing secured US participation in the talks by arguing that these would, through China's participation, be multilateral than bilateral as Pyongyang had insisted’.Footnote 98 The intersubjective context provided by the backdrop of 9/11, as well as the North Korean nuclear programme, made dialogue between Washington and Beijing less cumbersome, since their shared threat perception made the two aware that only through the shared language of ‘nuclear free’ can the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons be addressed.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated in November 2000 that China ‘has always been devoted to peace and stability on the [Korean] peninsula’ and it is ‘willing to continue to play a constructive role for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula’.Footnote 99 Furthermore, Qin Gam, the spokesperson for the Chinese delegation to the fifth round, noted in July 2005 that ‘since the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is complicated, it is normal for parties concerned to have different stances . . . The heads of six delegations also agreed to “fish together”.’Footnote 100 In highlighting the linkage between the nuclear crisis and the need for wider Sino-American dialogue, Premier Wen Jiabao argued in September 2008 that the US and China:
may not see eye to eye on certain issues. This is nothing terrible. As long as we engage in dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual respect, we will be able to gradually dispel misgivings and enhance mutual trust.Footnote 101
The Obama administration follows a similar line of argument, with Hillary Clinton stating in an interview to a Japanese journalist in February 2009 that ‘the six-party talks are a good forum’, adding that ‘Japan, China, and the United States have a lot of concerns in common’, leaving open the possibility of a ‘trilateral dialogue’.Footnote 102 In another interview to CNN, she argues that ‘North Korea can be either of those [“tyrannical unpredictable country” or “a country that has the ability to act rationally”]’.Footnote 103The New York Times quotes her as saying that ‘the most immediate issue is to continue the disarmament of their nuclear facilities and to get a complete and verifiable agreement as to the end of their nuclear program’, but adding that ‘North Korea is on China's border, and I want to understand better what the Chinese believe is doable’.Footnote 104
As such, the North Korean nuclear issue is emblematic of contemporary balance of power in Northeast Asia: that both Beijing and Washington remain weary of one another on the wider issues of security in Northeast Asia; but where their mutual anxieties and interests coincide, balance of power reproduces a particular intersubjectivity to prevent the relationship from going beyond the tipping point. In other words, balance of power is not just about the tangible effects of differences in material capabilities, but it also involves the deployment of intangibles such as language and symbols. Hence, the Sino-American balance of power is one form of a social relationship based around a particular normative framework.
The concerted efforts at bringing North Korea back into the multi-party framework exemplify the emergence of a common forum for Sino-American conversation. In essence, Washington and Beijing, along with Tokyo and Seoul, are comfortable in using a shared language to entice Pyongyang back into negotiations.Footnote 105 On the one hand, Pyongyang's efforts at driving a wedge through the alliance after the July 2005 meeting had exposed an inherent fragility in the Six-Party framework; but on the other hand, it also revealed that the actors are still intent on reiterating the language of denuclearization amidst North Korean defiance.Footnote 106 The perseverance of this new signifier in light of difficulties and challenges is a good indication of its resilience.
Nuclear crisis as a precious intersubjective context
The emergence of ‘nuclear-free’ as a common language and the Six-Party framework as a convenient forum for the US and China does not indicate an advent of regional rapprochement. Indeed, participants to the Six-Party framework remain wary of one another. For instance, Japan's National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) is nervously observing developments. The 2009 Higashi-Ajia senryaku gaikan (East Asian Strategic Review) suggests that the final days of Bush administration recast China as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ spanning political, economic, and strategic areas. It argues that China remains a potential threat to the US, but this in turn encourages the view that a better line of communication needs to be maintained, evidenced by the US–China memorandum of understanding in March 2008 establishing a hotline.Footnote 107 Furthermore, NIDS observes that the Chinese leadership insists on a ‘peaceful rise’;Footnote 108 and refers to Hu Jintao's statement in January 2008 stipulating that China is ‘determined to contribute towards a harmonious world’.Footnote 109 As if to underline its intentions, the PLAN invited USS Fitzgerald belonging to the US Seventh Fleet to the port city of Qingdao in April 2009 as part of China's 60th anniversary celebrations.Footnote 110
The March 2010 Cheonan incident also reveals ambivalence in Sino-South Korean relations. Yahuda notes that Beijing alienated Seoul:
having delayed by a month sending their condolences for the deaths of forty-six sailors, continuously called for restraint and the maintenance of stability, but refused either to examine the report of the inspection team or to condemn the North.Footnote 111
In a May 2010 meeting between Wen Jiabao and Lee Myong-bak, the South Korean president ‘hoped China will play an important role in pushing forward a proper handling of the incident, and in safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula’, hoping for an explicit reference to North Korea that is tantamount to a Chinese censure.Footnote 112 Wen responded by stating that ‘China will make a judgement in an “objective and fair manner” and take its position on the basis of facts concerning the incident’, reiterating China's commitment ‘to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula’, thereby refusing to make the connection between the incident and Pyongyang.Footnote 113 Wen further added that all parties ‘take a long-term perspective, promote the process of the Six-Party Talks in a bid to resolve the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula’ – without mentioning North Korea by name. For Beijing, the onus was on Seoul to ‘properly handle the warship sinking incident’.Footnote 114
Differences persist; but there are also signs that the coincidence of mutual interests is present. Ruan captures this ambivalence well, arguing that:
For the foreseeable future, the China–US relationship will generally remain stable – yet also uncertain in some areas. China consistently adheres to seeking cooperation on the issues of common concern while maintaining different views from the world's sole superpower in some areas of dispute.Footnote 115
President Obama admits to this ambivalence. In November 2009, he stated that:
The rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations. . .. I know there are many who question how the United States perceives China's emergence. But in an inter-connected world, power does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another. Cultivating spheres of co-operation – not competing spheres of influence – will lead to progress in the Asia-Pacific.Footnote 116
This inherent optimism within the Obama administration is reiterated in other pronouncements. Secretary of State Clinton pointed out that:
We are asking our partners to help dissuade all nations from facilitating, directly or indirectly, North Korea's attempts to enhance and proliferate its nuclear and missile technologies.Footnote 117
In a similar vein, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Qin Gang, responded to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 in June 2009 by suggesting that:
China wishes to reiterate that to bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, oppose nuclear proliferation and safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is in the common interests of all parties.Footnote 118
President Hu underlined this in November 2009, when he stated that:
Given our differences in national conditions, it is only normal that our two sides may disagree on some issues, [but] what is important is to respect and accommodate each other's core interests and major concerns.Footnote 119
This seems unattainable given Pyongyang's intransigence, but the Sino-American conviction that balance of power is the primary mode of interaction makes it all the more significant that the language of nuclear crisis is converging.
The common concerns shared by Beijing and Washington seem to have dovetailed nicely into a convergence of mutual anxieties; and that the North Korean nuclear issue emerged as a convenient forum within which the stakeholders in the Six-Party framework reiterate similar-sounding aspirations, while the familiar balance of power dynamics are played out elsewhere. The exact meaning of the phrase, ‘nuclear free’ is difficult – if not impossible – to determine; and the implications are context-dependent. Pyongyang's continued defiance remains their primary concern; yet, the US and Chinese efforts at reassuring one another over their non-intention to escalate the crisis lend themselves to the argument that the North Korean nuclear issue as a product of Sino-American balance of power nevertheless requires a nuanced reading of Realpolitik as a form of intersubjectivity. ‘Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as a condition remains a distant dream; but as a normative framework, it provides a significant scope for permitting two rivals to co-ordinate their pronouncements with a scope for certain spill-overs into other aspects of their relationship in the Asia-Pacific region.
Conclusion
The two main regional players in Northeast Asia – the US and China – both seem intent on preserving the momentum that emerged following a series of negotiations over Pyongyang's nuclear allegations, despite its continuing defiance after the sinking of Cheonan in March 2010. The multilateral framework involving six states is suspended at the time of writing; and it remains uncertain whether the Six-Party framework is still alive. Looking back, the September 2005 agreement with North Korea in which Pyongyang signalled that it might be ready to consider dismantling its nuclear programme turns out to be premature.Footnote 120 Yet, the November 2005 meeting that adjourned no sooner than it had convened bought time for China to ‘save face’ and maintain some semblance of integrity. It shows that China is still steadfast on its self-proclaimed role as an honest broker determined to preserve the discussions by urging the hermit kingdom to subscribe to the current multilateral framework in future rounds,Footnote 121 despite Beijing's reluctance to censure North Korea. Yet, the significance of the North Korean issue lies not only in its potential to upset the status quo in Northeast Asia, but also in the way the narratives of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ emerged as a common language for the parties to signal one another that they share mutual anxieties. This is a significant departure from the conventional wisdom of Realpolitik, suggesting that the region survived to become the sole remaining battlefront of the Cold War.Footnote 122
This is not to deny that the balance of power considerations need to be discarded. Indeed, China's naval strategy suggests that it is an increasingly useful conceptual tool for explaining the current developments in Northeast Asia.Footnote 123 Balance of power explanations are still relevant, but when we turn our attention to the language of ‘nuclear free Korean Peninsula’, we also witness the seeming convergence of mutual anxieties between Washington and Beijing. Hence, we can observe both the US and China reiterating the phrase as a convenient signifier to signal that the status quo is potentially detrimental. And this seems to be replicated in Tokyo and Seoul, despite their discrete interests. This indicates the dovetailing of mutual anxieties in and around the Korean Peninsula, constituting a forum for them to engage in reassuring one another of their non-intentions in escalating the crisis, and to exploit the existing line of communication to avert unnecessary conflict.
The proponents of the security community must await the current arrangement to evolve into a more formalized institution capable of identifying common threats and reacting in a co-ordinated fashion; and define exactly what is meant by ‘nuclear-free’ Korean Peninsula. It is context-dependent, and it might not materialize in the end. The current arrangement falls well short of collective identity formation allowing participants to engage with one another with full confidence. The North Korean missile tests in July 2006 and April 2009 seem to have delayed further progress, if not presaging an end to the multilateral framework. The nuclear test in October 2006 proved to be a significant breach of trust between Pyongyang and Beijing, with the latter calling it a ‘brazen act’ that ignores the longstanding opposition by international communityFootnote 124 – an ‘unusually harsh words from North Korea's biggest provider of aid and its only friend’.Footnote 125 But the way in which the international community keeps on addressing this concern suggests that a focus on the collusion of Sino-American language is still a relevant mode of analysis over what the parties are trying to achieve.Footnote 126 While pessimism lingers following repeated assertion by Pyongyang that it will never return to the Six-Party Talks, once the gaze is turned on to the emerging intersubjective framework between the US and China, unfettered pessimism seems less justifiable. Sino-American balance of power lingers; but informal lines of communication also remain open for the time being; and when it comes to North Korea, they seem comfortable enough in sharing this language, however unrealizable the objective might be. An introspection into the way participants at the multilateral talks behaved suggests an emergence of a forum in which the parties agree on the importance of a co-ordinated approach to North Korea by shunting aside old rivalries, however temporary that might be.
The implications are significant. The seemingly Realpolitik outlook of international relations in Northeast Asia nevertheless instantiates an emergence of a common normative framework. Put differently, balance of power needs to be recast as a form of macro-level social relations in which common language needs to be taken seriously if we are to adequately appreciate its ramifications. It is all too tempting to treat the US and China as rivals: their interests diverge on many fronts, but they are also keen not to push their differences too far.Footnote 127 No doubt this is astute bargaining. Yet, it is equally necessary to explore their reproduction of a particular intersubjective framework. As such, this mode of analysis lends itself to taking ambiguities seriously, enabling us to observe the subtleties of informal institutional structures in East Asia. There is no indication of how long China will stick to its role as an honest broker; but its current adherence to it is noteworthy. Such is the significance of the manner in which governments around the Asia-Pacific region, including the US, are behaving today that warrants an infusion of Constructivist nuance into the prevailing Realpolitik considerations.
About the author
Taku Tamaki is a Lecturer (Asst. Professor) in International Relations in the Department of Politics, History, and International Relations at Loughborough University, United Kingdom. He has published in the areas of International Relations Theory and Japanese foreign policy. His current research interests include analyzing the intersection between International Relations Theory and Social Theory, applying such framework to the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the international dimensions of identity politics in East Asia.
