David L. Schindler is an eminent figure in the Catholic intellectual world, teaching for many years at the University of Notre Dame. Today, Schindler is editor of Communio while retaining appointments as dean emeritus and Edouard Cardinal Gagnon Professor of Fundamental Theology at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family at the Catholic University of America. Nicholas J. Healy Jr. is his Institute colleague and an assistant professor of philosophy, and together they have produced a book that offers the reader a bit of a puzzle. As a sourcebook, containing a new translation of Dignitatis Humanae, the preliminary schemas for the document, and interpretive essays, Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity is not susceptible to easy summary. Its argument is not narrative. Rather, it is a collection of translated documents and interpretive essays. However, the volume's purpose can be discerned by answering a question its authors raise only glancingly: Why is a new translation necessary?
It is not particularly clear from a comparison of this translation to others that it has struck upon “the structure and tenor” (x) of DH better than any other. For example, while gender-inclusive language was unwelcome in the new English translation of the Roman Missal, this translation renders homines and homini as “men and women.” A passage at No. 2 translates the gerund, quaerendi (which both Abbott and Flannery preserved in gerundial form), as an infinitive. Neither of these is likely to meet the standard of Liturgiam Authenticam. Seen this way, the translation's articulated purpose does not stand up well. However, the goal of the interpretive essays hits nearer the mark: “to defend the inherent reasonableness of this received text of DH in light of the Church's philosophical-theological tradition and in the face of [John Courtney] Murray's criticisms” (58).
Close attention to the words of DH, even to the point of using their own translation, discloses Schindler's and Healy's interpretive method. In that way, Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity offers an awkward hermeneutical performance. Schindler and Healy review the debates of the Council Fathers, study the redactions, and parse the text. This approach would be unsurprising if its object were a statute for regulating air pollution (in which case legislative history, textualism, and originalism are standard interpretive methods), or if its authors intended to argue that “the more History attempts to transcend its own rootedness in historicity… the more clearly it bears the marks of its historical birth” (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [Vintage Books, 1973], 371). Being neither of those, this study is strange for how, as a search for ontological foundations, it lingers on the particular, historically specific activities of men at the Council. That implication is so inevitable that Schindler devotes a paragraph to assuring his reader that “deciphering the authentic meaning of such a text is not a matter of ascertaining the sum of the subjective dispositions and intentions of the Council bishops” (92). The paragraph is set within one-and-a-half pages of doing that very thing. Schindler nearly goes so far as to suggest that a collapsed lung which prevented Murray from attending meetings was a signal of “providence” that “works its positive will not (only) despite, but more fundamentally within and through, the vicissitudes of health problems or even political posturings of members of the Council” (93).
Healy's interpretive essay on the drafting of Dignitatis Humanae traces the development of DH briskly from Pope John's convocation of the Council until the approval of the final text. Healy bookends the description of those events with a quotation from Pope Benedict's 2005 address to the Roman Curia and an attribution of DH as “a surpassing answer” to Wojtyła's concern for “Christian personalism” (233) expressed in a 1959 missive to the Ante-preparatory Commission. The effect is to reinforce what emerges as the main preoccupation of this volume: to assert the authority of Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI as interpreters of the “authentic meaning” of DH against the claims of any other interpreters, chiefly Murray (and more recently, Martin Rhonheimer, whose work also is rebutted by Schindler). That effect is magnified by their inclusion of an appendix, “The Conciliar Interventions of Karol Wojtyła.”
This reviewer is cautious to debate with the authors the substance of their claim that DH should be interpreted in the light of the church's theological-philosophical tradition to place religious freedom on an ontological foundation, as John Paul and Benedict did. It is worth observing, however, that Schindler and Healy's desire to privilege the relatively abstract propositions of philosophy and theology over the juridical (or, we may say, political) approach of Murray and Rhonheimer seems malapropos when it is a political problem—religious pluralism—we are discussing. The separate competence of the prudential order of political life, built on a deep foundation in the church's tradition, is the signal development from and of doctrine that DH represents. It evades the purpose of DH to retreat from the theological description of a modus vivendi that accommodates nonbelievers and their just claims on the civil sphere into objective foundations not shared universally in the human community.
But the larger problem may be seen in what Pope John Paul II sometimes described as examining experiences in the light of “adequate re-reading of… the (ontological) truth of the object” (Angelus, July 18, 1984), and which corresponds in the present volume to Schindler's “authentic meaning” of the received text. For those of us who are believers, there is no question about an ontological foundation of objective truth. Still, the authority to interpret experiences for oneself, rightly or wrongly, essentially is the right to conscience that proceeds from the dignity of persons. That is especially important in the pluralist circumstances of social life. The problem Schindler and Healy cannot elude in their effort to enshrine an “authentic interpretation” of DH lies in their project's incompatibility with those premises of DH.
The Fathers of the Council were wise to speak of a “living tradition whose wealth is poured into the practice and life of the believing and praying Church” (Dei Verbum, 8). Whatever else we can divine about their intentions, we know the Fathers did not intend to suspend even scripture in one “authentic meaning.” They urged us to read scripture through the contingent circumstances in which we are living and in which it was written. If that be true of sacred scripture, we cannot be wrong to apply the same principle to DH. The Council urged us to look to the “signs of the times,” to seek dialogue (a word that recurs forty-five times in the Gonzalez translations of the conciliar documents) among ourselves and with the world because the vagaries of circumstance and perspective are an integral part of the social life to which the church's teaching addresses itself. While Schindler and Healy's reluctance to heed that call is typical of trends that have prevailed in the debates over the Council for three decades, it remains stubbornly true that political problems are not so responsive to theological proofs as they would wish. The juridical approach not only is better suited to political life, but suits better the Council's call to find meaning in “believing,” “praying,” and “living.”
