In America’s Battle for Media Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform, Victor Pickard examines the history of media regulations in the United States. Pickard provides a rich detailing of the policymakers, activists, and debates that drove media policy for the last hundred years. The great value of this work lies not just in its consideration of enacted policies, but also in its consideration of the many policy alternatives not taken, and the arguments for and against those forsaken alternatives.
Why is the American media what it is today? Contemporary media critics lambaste the entertainment media’s lowbrow offerings as well the sensationalized coverage provided by the news media. Pickard shows that many contemporary criticisms have long historical roots and that many attempts have been made to remedy through policy what some see as a media environment poisoned by commercial interests and unable to serve democratic needs. Pickard’s historical analysis connects the arguments of policymakers to our media’s historical and contemporary content.
Undergirding much of Pickard’s analysis are a series of normative questions, which by their very nature are difficult to answer without exposing our own values and ideologies. Pickard is up front with his ideological leanings and this honesty allows readers to understand the framing of the work. With this said, there are many questions left unanswered, perhaps because they can’t really be answered in any definitive way. For example, what is the ideal role of media in a democratic society? What should entertainment look like? What should journalists report and how? What information should people be exposed to? If the government is going to legislate media content, what should that legislation look like? And, what should the resultant content look like?
No doubt, critics often answer the latter question with answers such as, “better,” or “more informative.” But in truth, news decisions are very difficult to legislate in democracies. What exactly is it that people need to know? How could any government body pass a rule that says what should be reported (and consequently not reported) on a daily basis? How could a commission decide what entertainment is worthy of production (and consequently what is not)? The answer is that they can’t, without largely becoming Orwellian. So, as Pickard shows, even the more radical policy proposals leave more questions unanswered than answered, and therefore have largely been rather banal (p. 98). In many ways, debates over media policy are really just a mask for ideological debates about power, specifically who should have it and what should they do with it.
Pickard brings to light many of the arguments made by those who favor more government regulation of media—many of these arguments are predicated on the notion that the airwaves “belong to the people,” rather than to the media outlets who broadcast on them (p. 41). This remains an oft-heard premise, but is rarely considered fully. Do “the people” own the airwaves? Who conferred such ownership and when did this happen? It is pretty clear from Pickard’s analysis that “the people,” for the sake of such arguments, really means the government.
How we conceive of media then becomes of utmost importance. Is media “private property” or is it a “public good” (p. 56)? If the former, then regulation is unnecessary, unwarranted, and intrusive. If the latter, then regulation by government naturally follows.
Herein lies the crux of the policy history as laid out by Pickard: On one end there are those who want more government control over all aspects of society, perhaps because they believe that business and that commercial interests are inherently corrupt, or that individuals are inherently corrupt, and that government is required to ensure proper living for individuals and proper functioning for society (p. 44). Specifically in terms of media, these reformers want to decide what people should see, hear, and know. If only people had the right information, and knew the right things, society could reach its full potential. If only the information environment could be controlled by the right people for the right purposes.
On the other end of these debates are those who see government power as inherently corrupting (or corruptible). They rely on arguments founded on the First Amendment, and claim that giving power to the government to control information is dangerous and likely to be abused. The wrong people will eventually replace the right people and use the media for the wrong purposes.
Of course, there are no angels in the policy debates detailed by Pickard. Interested parties all have a personal stake. Those who want reforms are those who stand to gain politically from those reforms. Those who resist reforms are often those who stand to lose financially from them.
One factor that drives reformers throughout the book is their insistence on controlling what others see and hear, and consequently, what they know. Despite all of the failings of the commercial media, of which I concur are many, it is rather authoritarian in my estimation to desire to dictate the thoughts of others by controlling their information environments. Corporate libertarianism, as described by Pickard, allows media outlets to craft their product (their content) so that consumers get what they want. If outlets did not meet consumer demand, they would go out of business. A direct competitor is not even needed, since people do not have to listen to the radio, watch television, read papers, or consume any other form of media if they choose not to. This in itself should trump all competing arguments. However, reformers argue that (1) people do not get what they want, but grin and bear it anyway, (2) people get what they want, but don’t know that currently unavailable alternatives could be better, or (3) policymakers should decide what people get regardless of what they want (people want the wrong things).
Reformers justify intervention because they claim there is a market failure in the media (p. 215). This argument is predicated on the idea that media is a public good that must meet requirements other than meeting consumer demands and incurring profits for producers. Most people—even the corporate libertarians—would agree that news media is at least partially a public good and that it is a necessity for democracy to function. I also conjecture that most people would agree that our current news environment does not fully meet whatever obligations it has to society. The question is, then, should the government step in to ensure that the media is independent of commercial interests. One’s answer, again, depends on whether they are willing to sacrifice independence from government for independence from business. Who does one fear more?
As a practical matter, market demands have a powerful impact on our media. There is clearly a distorting effect and the complaints about that effect, which Pickard details, are quite amusing (p. 26). Depending largely on one’s point of view, of course, the effects of market forces can be either good or bad. But again, this all comes back to how we view media—as a commodity or as a public good (p. 213).
America’s Battle for Media Democracy is thoroughly researched and very detailed. It is a must-read for any scholar of political communication and it fills an important gap in the literature. As Pickard points out, most of the history he uncovers has been ignored by other scholars. The descriptions of the players, their arguments, and their actions are fascinating and enlightening. I strongly recommend America’s Battle for Media Democracy to any media scholar interested in the structural causes of media content.
