Edward Barbier is an environmental and resource economist who has written extensively on the relationship between natural resources and economic development. In Scarcity and Frontiers, Barbier parlays this contemporary expertise into a sweeping global narrative, extending from the Agricultural Transition (10,000BC to 3,000BC) beyond the Contemporary Era (1950 to the present) into the impending Age of Ecological Scarcity. The reader cannot but marvel at the scope and range of this extraordinary historical synthesis.
As a point of full disclosure, it should be noted that Barbier opens his introductory chapter with a quotation from an article coauthored by this reviewer, lamenting the neglect of “resource development” in economic history and the habit of viewing natural resources as “the last of the exogenous factors” (Paul David and Gavin Wright, “Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance.” Industrial and Corporate Change 6 [1987]: 204). This is one way to interpret the broad themes of Scarcity and Frontiers. Barbier argues that natural resources have shaped the course of economic development in every historical epoch, but they have not been fixed by nature, and their role has been anything but passive. Instead, progress has been defined and measured by human efforts to develop and extend scarce resources, first through migration or conquest; then through trade across “ecological frontiers;” eventually, by investment and innovation in transportation networks and in locating and extracting valuable minerals—the new “vertical frontier” of the “Golden Age of Resource-Based Development” (1870–1914). The subsequent “Age of Dislocation” (1914–1950) culminated in global warfare, marked by aggressive efforts by “mineral ‘have-not’” nations to seize and control resources that were deemed essential for both industrial and military strength (pp. 517–19).
One should not suppose that Barbier advances a “one-trick” theory of economic history, in which natural resources somehow explain all major developments and resolve all debates in our field. To the contrary, the interpretations offered for such phenomena as the “great divergence” between Europe and Asia (pp. 273–76) or the Atlantic Economy triangular trade pattern (pp. 309–32) are eclectic and balanced, invoking cultural, political, and institutional factors drawn from an impressive survey of the secondary literature. Barbier's unifying claim is the broader proposition that natural resources were central at each historical phase.
Because the key terms are defined broadly, it can be difficult at times to identify what is distinctive about the book's interpretation. Paul David and I were at pains to distinguish minerals from farm land and forests, protesting that the economic convention of lumping all of these under the heading “land” blurs important analytical and historical distinctions. North America was always farmland-abundant relative to Europe, but U.S. mineral abundance emerged historically across the nineteenth century as the result of identifiable economic and institutional developments. Because he stresses the elements of commonality across epochs, these types of distinctions are not central in Barbier's discussion. But he does emphasize that U.S. mineral growth during the golden age was only the most prominent and successful case in a vast worldwide process of extending resource frontiers both horizontally and vertically.
Working through these lengthy chapters requires some patience on the part of the reader. But the payoff to this investment arrives in Chapter 9, which addresses the contrast between the successes of resource-based development during the golden age and the often subpar performance of resource-based economies in the Contemporary Era (1950 to the present). Although the expansion of cropland at the expense of forests appears to be merely an extension of long-term trends (pp. 572–75), in the modern period these trends are not driven by new technologies and expanding markets, but by the migration of poor rural people onto marginal, ecologically fragile lands. Deforestation in tropical regions, typically at the behest of governments and powerful special interests, exacerbates the vulnerability of these populations (pp. 605–11). Barbier calls this the “frontier expansion hypothesis” (pp. 600–11), extending a line of argument from his earlier writings (e.g., Natural Resources and Economic Development: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Mineral extraction offers a possible escape route for some countries. But low transportation costs mean that minerals no longer provide a “naturally protected comparative advantage” for industrial development (p. 564), and these sectors often operate as isolated enclaves with little spillover value or linkages to the rest of the economy.
Barbier acknowledges that there are successful examples of resource-based development in recent decades, noting Brazil, China, India, and Russia, and among smaller countries Malaysia, Thailand, and Botswana (pp. 611–29)—Australia, Chile, and Norway are oddly neglected in this section. These exceptions are sufficient to show that performance problems are not intrinsic to the resources themselves, but reside instead in the capacity of societies to manage their resource potential prudently, promoting development while protecting the environment, while channeling rents into socially productive investments in the broader economy. One might have hoped for a more precise delineation of the institutional and cultural configurations that have fostered successful resource-based development in the remote as well as the more recent past. One would like to know in particular whether there are examples of countries whose resource-policy regimes have been successfully reformed, either through indigenous processes or through the actions of international agencies. Such examples would help to assess the prospects for the ambitious policy agenda sketched in the book's final chapter, which confronts the dual challenge of promoting economic development while simultaneously responding to the imminence of global ecological scarcity.
