If the Arab Spring has so far failed to bring revolution to the Gulf monarchies, still one hopes it may be credited with hastening fundamental change of a different, epistemological sort. Etched in Western imagination as the most outmoded, least dynamic societies of a region long defined precisely by its political and social stagnation, the Arab Gulf states remain a caricature within a caricature, complete with their own mascot in the Gulf “oil shaykh”: the languid, disinterested citizen happy to abandon his country to the rule of princes and Islamic extremists while he revels in a life of luxury and excess made possible by his cut of the nation's oil revenues. Yet the progression of the past eighteen months—which have witnessed popular calls for greater political participation in each of the Arab Gulf states save for Qatar—belies the image of an unchanging region whose politics ebb and flow only with fluctuations in the oil market.
With The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, Sean Foley takes on the worthy task of revising this simplistic and deterministic understanding of life in the Arab Gulf, aiming as he says to “treat the six GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries as normal states that face many of the same social, religious, and economic problems as other states over the past century.” In abandoning the category of the petro-state, Foley is permitted to investigate a wider cross-section of political, social, and technological developments without which, he argues, one “cannot fully understand either past or contemporary realities in the Gulf” (p. 4). Drawing upon diverse sources—including social media, diplomatic correspondence, and, most fruitfully, once-classified reports from the Arabian American Oil Company (now Saudi Aramco)—Foley recasts the modern history of the region as one of exceptions and contradictions that undermine the popular image of Gulf society as uncompromisingly conservative, culturally homogeneous, suspicious of outsiders, and defined inextricably by oil.
Tracing modern Gulf colonial history through the Iranian Revolution, the book begins by challenging the notion that oil rents spared the Arab Gulf states from collapse under the political weight of their anachronistic modes of rule. Instead, Foley argues, it is exactly these traditional institutions—from “sword dances, salons (councils or majlises), markets, hajj pilgrimages and speeches, royal visits to provincial cities, and welfare institutions” (p. 15)—that served to legitimize the authority of Gulf rulers, both by offering venues for the cultivation of patronage networks and by reinforcing the sort of tribal and Islamic values that resonate with ordinary citizens. More generally, says Foley, myriad non-oil factors combined to influence the trajectory of the Gulf during this period: the cosmopolitanism of Gulf port cities; the widespread availability of air conditioning, which facilitated more direct colonial administration; the hajj pilgrimage, whose demand for mass transportation afforded political leverage and popular goodwill to those governments able to provide it; educational and medical facilities established by U.S. missionaries; and the proliferation of radio and mass media.
Under this historical backdrop, the book proceeds chronologically to explore the consequences of two modern transformations: the rise of satellite television as a social and political force in the wake of the first Gulf war and the growing sense of vulnerability among Gulf peoples as a result of their ongoing demographic marginalization and, for Sunni citizens, the post-2003 empowerment of Shiʿa in Iraq and across the Gulf. Foley credits the media revolution with exposing powerful contradictions that would motivate a generation of reformists and terrorists alike. A region blessed with tremendous wealth was shown to conceal crippling poverty, while ruling families claiming inherent political legitimacy were revealed as dependent on foreign powers for their preservation. According to Foley, these internal pressures, combined with the unshackling of Iran following regime change in Iraq and what he views as waning U.S. military influence in the region, have motivated a new cohort of Gulf leaders to offer unprecedented compromises with their citizenries and to forge a stronger regional alliance. Indeed, the GCC, he tells us improbably, is “[d]espite its many problems . . . steadily evolving into an institution akin to the European Union” (p. 154).
The final third of the book steps back (rather awkwardly) from this historical account to examine the changing role of women and other social and political minorities in Gulf society, whose status—with the notable exception of Shiʿa—is judged to be improving. Foley frames both discussions as being connected to the same problem, namely, the region's continued reliance upon migrant laborers to perform work that Gulf nationals are neither inclined nor qualified to do themselves. The empowerment of women in the workforce and in society, says Foley, offers a viable solution to ease this structural dependence on foreigners. He also seeks to illustrate that “the region's long-standing tradition of inclusion, accommodation, and toleration” (p. 257) of non-Arabs, non-Muslims, and other minorities may offer a framework for the integration even of expatriates, including migrant laborers. Here one may hopefully be forgiven for not sharing the author's sanguinity.
In highlighting how the Arab Gulf states have been and continue to be shaped by factors other than their unique political economy, then, Foley's book represents a welcome step in the right direction. Yet, its effectiveness is tempered in the first place by shortcomings in organization and style. In a work of 282 pages, more than 70 (a full 25%) are devoted to endnotes (1,110 in all). Thematic discussions are often dryly summarized with a short declarative sentence followed by an ordinal listing of main points. Foley's writing, colloquial throughout, at times devolves into empty generalization. In describing the demographics of the premodern Gulf, for example, he writes, “In addition, Shia Muslims were important, especially in Bahrain and Kuwait” (p. 17). Or elsewhere: “If the GCC states can maintain stability at home and abroad, their reform programs will make gains that were scarcely imaginable only a few years ago” (p. 155). And indeed in the book's very closing sentences: “Although the Gulf states are facing immense problems, by international standards they are doing very well. They may be angst ridden, but they are also immensely rich” (p. 280).
The more fundamental problem with The Arab Gulf States, however, is the wide disconnect between what it aspires to be and its actual exposition. The resulting theoretical confusion is apparent even prior to opening the book. The back cover announces the work as no less than a basic theoretical critique of the prevailing framework for studying the Arab Gulf, aptly stating the puzzle that all rentier-state theorists must today seek to resolve: “If petroleum buys political legitimacy in the Arab Gulf states, how can we explain the rise of dissent and calls for political reform despite sustained oil revenues?” Yet if this represents a correct statement of the problem, then certainly the solution cannot be, as the title declares, “beyond oil and Islam.” For Islam, rather than being an extraneous feature of the dominant rentier-state hypothesis, in fact represents a large part of what is missing from it. To be sure, one is hard pressed to identify a more central cause of the contemporary “rise of dissent and calls for political reform” in Arab Gulf societies than Islam—or, rather, the role of religious and confessional identity, competition, and conflict in mobilizing ordinary citizens in opposition to and in support of Gulf governments, whether in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or more recently the United Arab Emirates.
In this light, Foley's irregular and often superficial discussion of Gulf Shiʿa is exposed as particularly deficient, not least given his extended treatment of non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities such as Jews, Hindus, and Christians, groups said to be “critical to understanding the politics of the Gulf” (p. 278). In addition to contrasting Gulf Shiʿa with “indigenous Sunni Arab peoples” (p. 8), Foley routinely offers generalizations that, if not necessarily false, mislead and anyway lack the nuance to be instructive. Sunni distrust and enmity toward Shiʿa is remarkable, he notes, given that “Shia and Sunnis in the Gulf speak the same languages and have similar religious and cultural traditions” (p. 252). Yet, in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, Arab Shiʿa speak a distinct dialect of Arabic while across the Gulf many of Iranian origin speak Persian. The accuracy of the second clause turns around one's tolerance for the word “similar.” (Of course, why either likeness would preclude sectarian rivalry or conflict is unclear.) He also writes, for example, that “Bahraini Shia . . . have lacked their own senior religious leaders for years” (p. 139), a statement true only in the sense that American Catholics also lack their own senior religious leaders. Elsewhere, finally, Foley tells us that “Iraqi Shia clerics are Arab and therefore carry an authority among Gulf Arab Shia that is unmatched by their Iranian colleagues” (p. 153). In fact, Iraq's well-known ranking Shiʿi marjaʿ, Ayatallah ʿAli al-Sistani, was born in Mashhad to a family long settled—as its name indicates—in the Iranian region of Sistan.
In short, if the answer contained in The Arab Gulf States is to be found “beyond oil and Islam,” the reader is left wondering what exactly was the question. The first three substantive chapters review the past century of Gulf history while emphasizing themes, episodes, and technologies said to be overlooked in current scholarship. The final two examine the transformative roles of women, expatriates, and other citizens and residents whose growing societal importance is said to challenge the conventional image of the male Sunni Gulf Arab. But in these disparate, sometimes anecdotal, observations the book ultimately fails to erect a coherent analytical framework that would allow it to say more than the obvious: that, while oil and Islam help shape sociopolitical outcomes in the Gulf states, so do many other things—and here are a few of them.
