Introduction
This contribution examines the complex dynamics of interactions, rivalries, and the shifting balance of domination and resistance between the emirs of Mecca and the sultanic authorities of the region during the AH seventh/eighth–thirteenth/fourteenth CE centuries. More precisely, this study aims to demonstrate that these interactions underwent a gradual transformation, evolving from direct intervention by regional powers in Mecca to more indirect and eventually coercive forms of control. As the holy city of the ḥajj and ʿumra pilgrimages, Mecca was not only a spiritual centre but also a major intellectual hub that attracted scholars from across the Islamic world. Its proximity to the port of Jeddah further enhanced its status as a key node in Red Sea commercial networks. These features made it a coveted prize for regional powers—most notably the ʿAbbāsids (132–656/750–1258), the Ayyūbids (567–648/1171–1250), Rasūlid (626–858/1229–1454), and later the Mamlūks (648–923/1250–1517)—who sought to assert their religious and political legitimacy through control of the city.Footnote 1 In this context, the strategy of controlling Mecca was less a matter of permanent occupation than of managing a delicate balance between direct or seasonal intervention, negotiation, and accommodation with local political authorities. This study seeks to explore the modalities of governance over Mecca, the negotiation of authority between local emirs and sultanic powers, and the various strategies of resistance or accommodation employed in response to external interference.
Since the third–fourth/ninth–tenth centuries, Mecca was governed by families of sharifs, descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through his daughter Fāṭima, his cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī, and their son al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī. Three major branches of the Ḥasanid lineage successively held power in the Holy City: the Jaʿfarids (357–453/968–1061), the Banū Hāwāshim (453–597/1061–1201), and the Banū Qatāda (597–1343/1201–1924).Footnote 2 This paper focuses on the latter dynasty, the Banū Qatāda, who constituted a powerful sharifian lineage whose members combined local legitimacy—derived from their prophetic descent—with a form of political and geographical insulation that enabled them to maintain semi-independent control over the Holy City, while pragmatically managing relations with regional powers. Their eponymous ancestor, Qatāda b. Idrīs (r. 597–617/1201–1221), a sharif originally from Yanbuʿ, seized power in Mecca by force, overthrowing the emir Mukthīr b. ʿĪsā b. Fulayṭa (d. 600/1204) in 597/1201.Footnote 3 The power of the Banū Qatāda was grounded in familial and dynastic logics. Indeed, only members of this sharifian lineage could inherit or seize power, often with the support of regional sultanic authorities who sought to impose a compliant candidate of their choice.Footnote 4 The ruler of Mecca bore the title of emir (amīr) and acted as a primus inter pares within the circle of sharifs. The title of sharīf (pl. ashrāf), however, was a broadly shared honorific borne by all descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad across the Islamic worldFootnote 5 and was thus used by all members of the Banū Qatāda.Footnote 6
These Meccan emirs were known for their adherence to Zaydī Shiʿism and actively supported Zaydī imams of Yemen, whose names were mentioned in the Friday sermons (khuṭba) in the Sacred Mosque from the seventh/thirteenth century until the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century.Footnote 7 However, increasing tensions with the Mamlūk and Rasūlid authorities, coupled with the growing influence of Sunni legal-religious elites within the city, contributed to a shift in religious alignment. A decisive turning point occurred in the mid eighth/fourteenth century when emir of Mecca ʿAjlān b. Rumaytha (d. 777/1376) formally embraced Shāfiʿī Sunnism. To this should be added the observations of John Meloy, who has shown how the Meccan juridico-religious elite played a crucial role in establishing the ideological dominance of the Mamlūk Sultanate in the Ḥijāz, particularly in the process of the Sunnisation of sharifian power. Nevertheless, Zaydism did not entirely disappear from Mecca and continued to persist in certain familial networks and scholarly circles.Footnote 8
The history of the sharifs from the Banū Qatāda Dynasty in the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries has been extensively documented by local historians, foremost among them the renowned Mālikī qāḍī Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Fāsī (d. 832/1429). His work, entitled al-ʿIqd al-thamīn fī taʾrīkh al-balad al-amīn, a biographical dictionary whose wide circulation contributed to shaping a history of Meccan residents, constitutes the most important source for this study. The text is composed of entries of varying length that provide valuable data on local notables (aʿyān), including the ruling sharifian families, their internal and external networks of alliance, and the social and political events that took place within the urban context of Mecca. Al-Fāsī is also the author of a chronological-thematic chronicle of Mecca, entitled Shifāʾ al-gharām bi-akhbār al-balad al-Ḥarām (The healing of passion concerning the Accounts of the Sacred City), consisting of 40 chapters, in which he devotes chapter 37 to the city’s governors and chapter 38 to incidents that occurred during the pilgrimage.
He was followed by several members of the distinguished Banū Fahd family, prominent historians and librarians in Mecca, among whom Najm al-Dīn b. Fahd (d. 885/1480) and his son ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Fahd (d. 922/1516) stand out in particular. Like al-Fāsī, from whom he drew inspiration, Najm al-Dīn b. Fahd was the author of al-Durr al-kamīn bi-dhayl al-ʿIqd al-thamīn fī tārīkh al-balad al-amīn (The hidden pearl, appendix to the Precious necklace containing the history of the Secure City), a continuation of al-Fāsī’s biographical dictionary, comprising approximately 1,700 entries devoted to the lives of Meccan residents and notable figures. He also composed a major chronicle of Mecca entitled Itḥāf al-warā bi-akhbār Umm al-Qurā (The gifts of mortals: reports about Mecca), which covers events from year 1 of the Hijra up to his death in 885/1480.Footnote 9 His son, ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Fahd, another prolific author, continued his father’s work by composing his own historical writings, including a chronicle (Bulūgh al-qirā fī dhayl itḥāf al-warā bi-akhbār Umm al-Qurā (Access to hospitality, appendix to The gifts of mortals: reports about Mecca)). He also authored a chronicle devoted specifically to the rulers of Mecca, Ghāyat al-marām bi-akhbār salṭanat al-balad al-Ḥarām (The ultimate aim concerning the accounts of the sultanate of the Sacred City), which traces the history of Meccan governance from the beginnings of Islam up to the reign of the emir Barakāt b. Muḥammad, to whom the work was dedicated.Footnote 10
All contributed to the development of a rich Meccan historiographical tradition, marked by both scholarly rigour and a deep understanding of the political, religious, and social dynamics of the Holy City. The perspective adopted in this contribution seeks to build upon the information provided by these Meccan historians, while critically cross-referencing it with other types of sources: Syro-EgyptianFootnote 11 and YemeniFootnote 12 chronicles and biographical dictionaries, as well as travel narratives, most notably that of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 769 or 778/1368 or 1377). This cross-analysis of sources allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the interactions between Meccan political elites and those of the broader region.
Numerous studies have been devoted to the Banū Qatāda, some following a strictly chronological approach to the reigns of individual emirs,Footnote 13 while others adopt broader perspectives—economic, commercial, anthropological, and socio-political—that help illuminate both the internal dynamics of sharifian rule, local elites and their interactions with external actors, notably the major Muslim powers of the region, while also considering Mecca as a hub of multivalent interactions.Footnote 14 Given the legitimising power of the ḥajj for caliphs and sultans, the constant fear of civil strife (fitna), and the imperative to preserve both prosperity and security in Mecca, the emirate’s authority, the sharifian houses, and the broader socio-political forces of the region were subject to close scrutiny by powerful regional authorities. From the seventh/thirteenth century to 922/1517, these powers included the ʿAbbāsids, the Ayyūbids, the Rasūlids, and the Mamlūks, each exerting varying degrees of influence over Mecca and its surrounding region depending on the political circumstances.Footnote 15 Although Éric Vallet has shown that the Rasūlid sultans did indeed appoint Yemeni governors to administer the Holy City on their behalf,Footnote 16 John Meloy has demonstrated that the Mamlūks of Cairo were equally involved in this competition for control over the ‘best land’, despite the political instability caused by local disputes, while also analysing the mechanisms of resistance employed by local sharifs and emirs against these foreign powers.Footnote 17 The Ilkhānid authority, under the leadership of influential rulers such as Abū Saʿīd (d. 736/1335), exerted a more episodic yet nonetheless significant influence, particularly during certain phases of geopolitical rivalries in the eighth/fourteenth century.Footnote 18 Direct assertion of control over Mecca was rare. John Meloy supports the hypothesis of a ‘seasonal’ domination by the regional powers.Footnote 19 While the dispatch of sultanic representatives could, at times, be an effective tool for reasserting authority at the local level, it almost invariably led to tensions with the Meccan emirs and sharifs. Episodes of fitna often resulted from rivalries between local emirs and those appointed from outside. Paradoxically, attempts by distant sultanic powers to ‘restore order’ frequently led to greater disorder, thereby revealing the limited grip these powers actually had over the city’s internal dynamics. These tensions are already observable in the seventh/thirteenth century, when attemps at direct rule repeatedly failed.
This article demonstrates that regional powers tended to favour indirect forms of intervention. One such method was to exploit the voluntary or strategic relocation of ambitious sharifs and deposed emirs from Mecca to their own capitals, offering them patronage in exchange for political allegiance. From the early eighth/fourteenth century onwards, this strategy became increasingly central, as networks of mobility and patronage provided more flexible means of influence. Beyond these forms of voluntary mobility, the imprisonment and subsequent release of emirs also played a central role in this strategy of remote control over the Meccan emirate, especially during the eighth/fourteenth century. By the eighth/fourteenth century, these coercive mechanisms had become more systematic, marking a new phase in the relationship between Cairo and Mecca.
This raises the questions: How were these different modes of intervention manifested at both the regional and local levels? What does this reveal about the changing and evolving nature of sultanic control over Mecca? This study will examine, first, the intensification of local surveillance through the dispatch of sultanic envoys; second, the exercise of political control over the sharifs outside Mecca; and finally, the political use of the ‘imprisonment-release’ mechanism as a means for sultans to assert tutelage over the emirate. Taken together, these three axes demonstrate a gradual and coherent evolution from direct intervention to indirect control and finally to coercive governance of the emirate by the sultanate, thereby offering a more dynamic understanding of Meccan political history in the late medieval period.
Attempt at direct rule: between political failure and local resistance
This section demonstrates that in the seventh/thirteenth century, efforts by regional powers to govern Mecca directly, characterised by the appointment of foreign governors, repeatedly ended in failure. The surveillance of Meccan clans took a tangible form through the presence of representatives of the sultans in the Holy City, especially during the pilgrimage season. The appointment of a permanent governor (amīr Makka) by a sultan in Mecca was a recurrent phenomenon during the seventh/thirteenth century.
The Ayyūbid and later the Rasūlid overlords imposed a direct government over the Meccan emirate by appointing governors from among their ranks who exercised full authority over the city, practically eclipsing the presence of the local emir.Footnote 20 Despite the installation of a governor (nāʾib), regional sultans ensured the continued presence of an emir from the sharifian family of the Banū Qatāda branch, who acted as an intermediary of their authority among the local socio-political forces. During their conflicts with the Ayyūbids of Egypt, between 629/1231 and 637/1240, the Rasūlid sultans systematically confirmed Rājiḥ b. Qatāda (d. 654/1255)Footnote 21 as Ḥasanid emir of Mecca, resulting in the support of local tribes and clans that allied themselves with the armies of the Yemeni rulers.Footnote 22 This sharifian emir thus governed in the name of the sultan of Yemen and had, to a certain extent, lost his autonomy in managing the city, as he shared power with a Yemeni emir. In this context, the hostility of the Meccan emir was directed against the governors of the Ayyūbid sultan of Egypt and Syria, rather than against his counterparts from the southern Arabian Peninsula, with whom he shared power during certain periods of the year.
However, this system quickly generated resistance among local sharifian elites, who perceived these appointments as a threat to their autonomy. The bellicose nature of the local sharifs, coupled with their desire for political autonomy, made them hostile to the presence of ‘foreign’ governors. These representatives (nuwwāb), coming from distant regions, often maintained poor relations with the local political elites, and power struggles arose from their interactions—struggles that could only be resolved through war (ḥarb) or fitna, which would tip the balance of power in favour of one of the two sides through victory.Footnote 23 Relations between these ‘foreign’ governors and the Meccan sharifs were conflictual, and the Banū Ḥasan challenged this new mode of direct governance by taking up arms to reclaim their position as masters of the Holy City. One of the first instances of such resistance occurred in 648/1250, when the sharif Abū Saʿd (d. 651/1253) arrested the Rasūlid governor Ibn al-Musayyib and seized his possessions as the latter attempted to flee to Iraq. The action initiated by Abū Saʿd restored the sharifian lineage to power.Footnote 24 This initial episode set a precedent that eventually encouraged other sharifs to revolt. Indeed, on 4 Muḥarram 653/13 February 1255, Abū Numayy (d. 701/1301) and Idrīs b. Qatāda (d. 669/1271), supported by the Banū Ḥusayn of Medina, fought against another governor from Yemen, Ibn Birṭās. According to Meccan and Yemeni historians, the violent confrontation—which saw blood shed within the confines of the Sanctuary up to the Ḥijr—led to the capture of Ibn Birṭās and the joint seizure of power by Abū Numayy and his uncle Idrīs.Footnote 25
This failure of the Rasūlid attempt to install permanent governors had lasting effects, and the Mamlūks displayed little inclination to pursue such a policy. In 667/1269, after his pilgrimage, al-Ẓāhir Baybars (r. 658–676/1260–1277) appointed the emir ʿIzz al-Dīn Marwān al-Ẓāhirī as amīr Makka, associating him in power with the two emirs Idrīs b. Qatāda and Abū Numayy. Al-Fāsī reports that the collaboration was short-lived, as Marwān was expelled from Mecca as early as 668/1270.Footnote 26 These events clearly illustrate the structural failure of attempts at direct domination.
The symbolism of a sultan appointing a governor to the Holy City—other than a member of the local sharifian elite—was significant. It implied the representation, assertion, and effective involvement of a foreign power in the internal affairs of the emirate and a direct imposition of tutelage. For the Banū Qatāda, this constituted an affront, as Mecca was their domain, which they intended to preserve and maintain in relative autonomy from the various ruling powers.Footnote 27 Expelling the sultan’s nuwwāb thus became part of a natural and political process aimed at asserting the emirate’s autonomy—an effort in continuity with the broader pattern of the contest for the emiral throne.Footnote 28
More frequent were the forms of rivalry seasonally imposed on the sharifian clans by the arrival of the amīr al-ḥajj—who also bore the title amīr al-Ḥaramayn (commander of the two sanctuaries)Footnote 29 and was appointed by the caliph and the sultans to Mecca to lead the pilgrimage caravans under their authority.Footnote 30 This rivalry was, in principle, discernible through the terminology used in Meccan sources. Indeed, terminological analysis sheds further light on the complex relationships between local emirs and their foreign counterparts who were present in Mecca during the major pilgrimage season, from the eighth to the twelfth of the lunar month of Dhū al-Ḥijja. Ibn Fahd uses the terms munāfara and tanāfur in his account—words whose various meanings convey aversion, mutual antipathy, repulsion, conflict, and disagreement among the parties involved, also indicating discord.Footnote 31 Al-Fāsī mentions another Arabic term, muʿādāt, to express feelings of opposition, hostility, animosity, and enmity between individuals.Footnote 32
The arrival of the amīr al-ḥajj, accompanied by a garrison of soldiers, indeed provoked immediate suspicion on the part of the Meccan emir. His fears of a threat to his power were not unfounded, as the movement of a large foreign army within or near the Holy City, its sanctuary, and even its mosque was hardly reassuring. Keika Ota explains that political changes in Mecca often occurred during the ḥajj season. When the sultan decided to arrest, depose, or even assassinate a Ḥasanid emir—as was the case with the assassination of the Meccan emir Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ʿAjlān (d. 788/1386), orchestrated by al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (d. 801/1399)Footnote 33—he entrusted the amīr al-ḥajj with the execution of his decisions.Footnote 34 As a result, this mission, which became a latent function of the protector of the pilgrim caravans, regularly generated disputes with the Meccan authorities. To quote ʿAbd Allāh ʿAnqāwī, the amīr al-ḥajj was an instrument of Mamlūk policy to control the Holy Cities, and his presence in Mecca contributed to persistent tensions and mutual mistrust with the Ḥasanid emirs.Footnote 35
According to al-Fāsī, Emir Abū Numayy was particularly wary of his seasonal guests during the pilgrimage, as he believed they sought to undermine his power. Already in 653/1256, he quarrelled with the amīr of the Iraqi caravan, and tensions were only defused thanks to the intervention of the Lord of Kerak, al-Nāṣir Dāwūd b. al-Muʿaẓẓam ʿĪsā (d. 654/1256), who was present at the pilgrimage that year.Footnote 36 The same Meccan emir appears again in 683/1284 and 689/1291 in renewed tensions with the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian caravans. The hostility and suspicion between these actors are clearly evident in the sources. In 683/1284, Abū Numayy received in audience ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Bāshiqardī, the representative of the Egyptian caravan, and later, in 689/1291, Emir Abiyya, representing the Syrian caravan. Following these meetings, it is reported that the Meccan emir decided to close the gates of the Sanctuary (Ḥaram), thereby preventing pilgrims and soldiers from entering. This gesture by Abū Numayy was far from trivial, as al-Fāsī notes. It stemmed from the muʿādāt—the enmity—between him and the Emirs of the Pilgrimage (umarāʾ al-ḥajj) to Mecca, as well as with the Banū ʿUqba emirs who had arrived with the Egypto-Syrian caravan. Abū Numayy suspected they intended to depose him.Footnote 37
When the Meccan emir himself was not directly involved in the tensions, it was members of his political and military entourage—such as the military leaders (quwwād) or black slave-soldiers (ʿabīd)—who positioned themselves as rivals to the amīr al-ḥajj. Ibn Fahd notes, for the year 797/1395, that ‘on the day of the watering [siyāqa] in Mecca, fear spread in the Masjid al-Ḥarām due to a discord [munāfara] between the Quwwād al-ʾUmaraʾ and the Aleppine amīr al-ḥajj Ibn Zayn, and a fitna broke out’.Footnote 38 This example illustrates the increasingly prominent role played by the emir’s clients and their new position in local political and military life. The continuation of the episode, as narrated by Ibn Fahd, reveals that pilgrims were looted by the quwwād, without any mention of the Meccan emir’s involvement.Footnote 39 It is likely that these actors at the time enjoyed greater autonomy, allowing them to assert themselves by force over the pilgrims—circumstances that undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of a tumultuous relationship with the amīr al-ḥajj.
These attempts at the direct domination of the Emirate of Mecca through the appointment of a representative of the sultan did not always meet with success. On the contrary, they often created an atmosphere of instability and tension with the local sharifian elites. The recurring failures during the pilgrimage season reveal the limits of permanent direct control over Mecca in the seventh/thirteenth century. This failure helps explain the emergence of alternative strategies of control in the eighth/fourteenth century. Consequently, the sultans shifted their strategy, taking advantage of the mobility of the sharifs who had left Mecca to seek fortune in major regional capitals. By offering them favours and rewards, they sought to win their sympathy and secure their loyalty.
The sharifs beyond Mecca: geographical mobilities, social advancement, and remote control
During the eighth/fourteenth century, the sultans came to rely increasingly on the mobility of sharifian elites. This section explores this transitional phase towards indirect control.
Historiography has thus far shown that manifestations of the sultans’ patronage of Mecca included, in particular, the regular dispatch of a palanquin (maḥmal), the veil (kiswa) covering the Kaʿba, the proclamation of the Friday sermon (khuṭba) in their names, the circulation of their coinage, as well as the distribution of alms and gifts to local elites.Footnote 40 However, interactions between the sultans and the emirs of Mecca were not limited to these manifestations of patronage alone, nor, as has been demonstrated above, to attempts at the direct administration of the city through a governor or the amīr al-ḥajj. It is also necessary to consider the direct relationships established at the sultanic courts during the presence of members of the sharifian families—whether the reigning emir, a claimant to power, or a deposed emir. When the socio-political, military, and economic situation in Mecca became unstable due to rivalries and disruptions in the dynamics of emiral power, some emirs and members of their families voluntarily chose to emigrate to major regional capitals in order to enter the service of sultans, seeking their patronage as well as access to enhanced resources and networks of influence. However, these departures were not always decided by an emir or his rival. In times of conflict, flight (or forced exile) was often the preferred option for reaching the rulers of Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, or other regions,Footnote 41 with the aim of securing their support by presenting them with an account of the emirate’s situation tailored to the visitor’s interests. The underlying reality is that, willingly or not, the sultanates continued to exert a strong attraction on the Meccan emiral and sharifian families, who sought in their patronage a solution to their struggles. The sultans maintained their control over a network of political actors circulating between Mecca and the major capitals of the region, where these actors settled either temporarily or permanently. This attraction demonstrates a shift from territorial domination to influence exercised through patronage networks.
When circumstances were required, some sharifs left the Holy City in search of fortune elsewhere. Many sought opportunities in major Islamic cities—particularly in Iraq, Yemen, or Egypt—and their expatriations sometimes led to highly favorable outcomes. Leaving Mecca could mean embracing a promising career in the service of the great sultanates of the region. Such was the case for several sharifs who resided in Iraq. Under the reign of the Ilkhanid sultan Ghāzān b. Arghūn (r. 694–703/1295–1304), Iraq became a major space of opportunity for Meccan sharifs, who were integrated into provincial networks of patronage and administration. The most striking examples are provided by several sharifs who entered Ilkhanid service in Iraq and benefited from extensive patronage from the Mongol rulers. Among them were the two sons of the emir of Mecca Abī Numayy (d. 701/1301), the sharif ʿAḍud al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Numayy (d. 778/1376)Footnote 42 and his brother, the sharif ʿIzz al-Dīn Zayd II b. Abī Numayy (d. 777/1375).Footnote 43
Concerning the sharif ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Numayy, his father, in anger, exiled him to Yemen, where he was imprisoned, probably in Zabīd.Footnote 44 Although the governor initially treated him with consideration, his attempted escape and the suspicion he aroused eventually led to his return to Mecca. The emir Abū Numayy then assigned him revenues from Meccan waqf properties and sent him as an envoy to Iraq. He travelled to the court of the sultan Ghāzān b. Arghūn with numerous gifts and precious offerings. The sultan, in turn, received him with honour and granted him substantial favours. He was awarded a valuable land grant (iqṭāʾ) in the district of al-Ḥilla,Footnote 45 which included several important villages, where he exercised effective authority until his death.Footnote 46 This appointment reflects the Ghāzān b. Arghūn’s strategy of incorporating external elites into the fiscal and administrative structures of Iraq through land grants and delegated authority. However, soon after obtaining this iqṭāʾ, he became involved in conflict with local groups, notably the Banū Ḥasan, the Banū Dāwūd, and their allies, around 696/1297. This tension escalated into armed confrontation, during which ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Numayy led a military expedition and plundered their possessions in al-Ḥilla.Footnote 47
Two years later, in 698/1299, his brother ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥusayn Zayn II b. Abī Numayy also travelled to Iraq, where he was received by Sultan Ghāzān b. Arghūn. He was honoured and generously endowed with gifts, received substantial financial benefactions, and was granted an iqṭāʾ estate at al-Ḥilla, where he later died.Footnote 48 In addition, he was appointed naqīb Footnote 49 at al-Ṭāhiriyya in Iraq, an office combining administrative and honorific responsibilities, probably as head of the ashrāf of al-Ḥilla.Footnote 50 He was renowned for his excellent character and personal modesty. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī records that he visited him in the library (khizānat al-kutub) of the Mustanṣiriyya madrasa.Footnote 51 Ibn al-Fuwaṭī further reports that his teacher Fakhr al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Aʿraj al-Ḥusaynī dedicated to him, in 699/1299–1300, the work entitled Jawhar al-qilāda fī nasab Banī Qatāda (The jewel necklace on the genealogy of the Banū Qatāda), prefacing it with a panegyric in verse.Footnote 52
The sharif Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ḥasanī (d. 703/1303) also travelled twice to Iraq and accompanied his two cousins during their missions to the court of Sultan Ghāzān b. Arghūn. The sultan received him with distinction and granted him generous favours, including an iqṭāʾ estate intended for him and his descendants. Fakhr al-Dīn was not only a political actor but also maintained close ties with scholarly circles. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī records his presence in the library of the Mustanṣiriyya madrasa, one of the principal centres of learning in Baghdad.Footnote 53
After Ghazan, Sultan Öljeytü (r. 703–716/1304–1316) likewise displayed a keen interest in the affairs of the Ḥijāz. The reception accorded to the sharif Ḥumayḍa b. Abī Numayy at the Ilkhanid court provided him with an opportunity to secure a valuable political intermediary in Mecca. Against the backdrop of the succession disputes following the death of Abū Numayy, Ḥumayḍa b. Abī Numayy (d. 720/1320) came into conflict with his brother Rumaytha b. Abī Numayy (d. 746/1346) and travelled to Iraq in 716/1316, where he entered the service of the Mongol ruler.Footnote 54 The chroniclers report that Öljeytü showered him with favours, bestowed great honours upon him, and distinguished him with various marks of esteem. The sultan placed an army at his disposal and planned an expedition to restore Ḥumayḍa b. Abī Numayy to power in Mecca, reportedly assigning him a force of 1,000 cavalry under the command of the emir Ṭālib al-Dalanqadī.Footnote 55 However, Öljeytü’s death in 716/1316 led to the disbandment of the Mongol army, although Ḥumayḍa b. Abī Numayy subsequently regained power in Mecca in 717/1317 with the support of a small group of Mongols. As Charles Melville has shown, this initiative formed part of the Ilkhanids’ Ḥijāz policy, through which they sought to maintain their influence in the region in the context of their rivalry with the Mamluk sultans. This influence is reflected in a number of politico-religious and symbolic practices, including the proclamation of the Friday sermon (khuṭba) in the name of Öljeytü’s successor, Sultan Abū Saʿīd (r. 716–736/1316–1335), in 718/1318, as well as the dispatch of Iraqi pilgrimage caravans, the covering of the Kaʿba (kiswa), and charitable donations (ṣadaqāt), in addition to the regular contacts maintained between the sharifs of Mecca and the Ilkhanid court.Footnote 56
Under the reign of the Ilkhanid sultan Abū Saʿīd, Meccan sharifs continued to be present at the court and to benefit from Ilkhanid favour, although within a context of increasing provincial autonomy and political fragmentation. Aḥmad b. Rumaytha (d. 742/1342),Footnote 57 who, according to al-Fāsī, visited the court of Abū Saʿīd on two occasions, enjoyed considerable favour and had become the lord (ṣāḥib) or king (malik) of al-Ḥilla and several other localities.Footnote 58 In 728/1328, he performed the pilgrimage together with other Iraqi dignitaries, accompanied by his own supporters and retainers, among whom was his cousin Muḥammad b. ʿUṭayfa (d. 751/1351).Footnote 59 This pilgrimage enabled Aḥmad b. Rumaytha to play a decisive role in securing the recognition and legitimisation of the Iraqi sultan Abū Saʿīd in Mecca. According to Ibn ʿAnaba, he distributed generous alms to the inhabitants of Mecca as well as to the mujāwirūn and required that coins be minted in Abū Saʿīd’s name, imposing their use in commercial transactions throughout the pilgrimage season. Another significant demonstration of this symbolic supremacy was that he and his entourage succeeded in placing the Iraqi pilgrimage palanquin (maḥmal) above that of the Mamluk sultan on Mount ʿArafa.Footnote 60 That same year, the Friday khuṭba was delivered in the name of the Iraqi sultan both in Mecca and at ʿArafa.Footnote 61 Upon his return to Iraq, Abū Saʿīd, pleased with these achievements, bestowed honours upon Aḥmad b. Rumaytha before appointing him to a high-ranking office and entrusting him with the supervision of the affairs of the Bedouins of Iraq. He continued to exercise his authority over al-Ḥilla, where he was praised by the local population for his effective governance. His influence steadily grew, and he attracted the support of numerous followers until the death of Sultan Abū Saʿīd.Footnote 62 However, Aḥmad b. Rumaytha’s story ended tragically. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa reports: ‘The new Iraqi sultan, Ḥasan, defeated him, captured him, put him to death, and seized his wealth and treasures.’Footnote 63
In the aftermath of Abū Saʿīd’s death and the fragmentation of Ilkhanid authority, relations between Iraq and Mecca became more unstable, particularly regarding pilgrimage routes and diplomatic exchanges.Footnote 64 Following the execution of Aḥmad b. Rumaytha, the Iraqi pilgrimage caravan ceased to reach Mecca during the reign of Rumatha b. Abī Numayy (r. 701–746/1301–1346). Diplomatic relations were later restored under his son ‘Ajlān b. Rumaytha (r. 746–761/1346–1360), who dispatched his son Khurṣ b. ʿAjlān (d. 760/1358) and his servant Ḥasan al-Turkī as envoys to negotiate peace with Shaykh Ḥasan, the ruler of Iraq.Footnote 65 According to al-Fāsī, the sharif Khurṣ b. ʿAjlān—who periodically held the office of deputy (naʾīb) of the emir of Mecca during his father ʿAjlān’s absences—travelled to Iraq, where he acquired wealth and achieved a comfortable position (ḥāla jamīla).Footnote 66 The precise date of these events is not provided, but it took place during the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century, prior to his death in 760/1358 and during the reign of his father ʿAjlān b. Rumaytha (r. 746–774/1345–1372). Strengthened by his newfound prestige, he returned to Mecca with great pomp, adopting a haughty attitude, behaving like an emir, and having his fanfare play as he passed. This display created tensions between him, his father, and his uncle (co-emir).Footnote 67
Despite these internal disputes in Mecca, relations between the local authorities and Iraq remained stable. A subsequent embassy led by the sharif Mubārak b. Rumaytha was received favourably by the sultan Uways b. Hasan (r. 757–776/1356–1374), who honoured him and granted him several favours.Footnote 68 Others, like him, went to Iraq but did not find the same success, encountering misfortunes that led to their downfall. Mubārak b. Thaqaba b. Rumaytha travelled to Iraq, where he died horribly after being severely mauled by dogs in 798/1396.Footnote 69 Another of his cousins, the sharif Muḥammad b. Sayf b. Abī Numayy, also yielded to Iraq’s appeal in hopes of earning a living. His experience was marked by hardship, bringing no gain during his time abroad. He died in Mecca in Jumādā I 826/April 1423 and was buried in al-Maʿlā at the age of 70.Footnote 70
These trajectories illuminate the careers of sharifs in Iraq, where they could attain positions of authority and prestige beyond Mecca while serving as privileged intermediaries within the political structures of the Ilkhanid and Jalayirid states.
Further south lay Yemen, a territory that attracted an even greater number of sharifs seeking positions at the courts of the Ayyūbid and later the Rasūlid sultans. Already in the first half of the seventh/thirteenth century, the chronicler Ibn Ḥātim reports the presence of the sharif Rājiḥ b. Qatāda in the orbit of the Ayyūbid sultan of Yemen.Footnote 71 He appeared at the court of the Ayyūbid sultan al-Malik al-Masʿūd (d. 626/1229), who treated him generously. In 619/1319, al-Malik al-Masʿūd granted him lordship over Ḥalī b. Yaqūb, al-Sirrayn, and half of the locality of al-Mikhlāf.Footnote 72 Ibn Ḥātim notes that his brother ʿAlī b. Qatāda married an important Yemeni woman named Umm Quṭb al-Dīn, before returning permanently to Mecca. This alliance may have played a role in the Yemeni authorities’ support of Rājiḥ’s political claims.Footnote 73
The presence of emirs and sharifs in the Rasūlid Sultanate continued throughout the eighth/fourteenth century. However, some ambiguity in the texts may cause confusion. For instance, in 736/1336, Rumaytha (d. 746/1346) and his brother ʿUṭayfa (d. 743/1343) relinquished power by handing over their positions to their sons. They chose to go ‘into the valleys towards Yemen’ (ilā nāḥiyat al-yaman), which could mean they went to regions south of Mecca (but not necessarily to the powerful Rasūlid neighbour), or that they indeed joined the Yemeni Sultanate.Footnote 74 The situation is clearer in the case of Thaqaba b. Rumaytha (d. 762/1361), who, having lost power in Mecca and being relegated to the simple rank of sharif, went to the court of the Rasūlid sultan and served the powerful al-Mujāhid ʿAlī (d. 764/1363) in 751/1351, as reported by al-Khazrājī.Footnote 75 He was accompanied by several other sharifs, including his brothers Sanad b. Rumaytha (d. 763/1361) and Mughāmis b. Rumaytha (d. 761/1360), who left the Holy City to the emir ʿAjlān b. Rumaytha, supported at the time by the Mamlūk sultans. This was a voluntary decision by these sharifs to serve the ruler of Yemen, who in turn offered them protection, comfort, and wealth. He invited them to join his various caravans during his pilgrimages, provoking the suspicion of the ruler of Mecca and that of the Mamlūk sultan represented by his pilgrimage emirs.
As early as 784/1382, other sharifs left the Holy City to serve the sultan of Yemen, though they sometimes met tragic ends. For example, the sharifs ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Mukhīṭ and Jukhaydib b. Liḥaf b. Rājiḥ (d. 785/1383) travelled to Yemen in 784/1382 with a group of sharifs. They served al-Ashrāf ʿIsmāʿīl b. al-ʿAbbās (r. 778–803/1377–1400), before abandoning him to return to Mecca. On their way, they stopped at al-Mahālib, the capital of one of the major wādīs in Yemeni Tihāma, took possession of the locality, and governed it. They then proceeded to Ḥaraḍ, where they were met and fought by the emir Bahādir al-Shamsī. ʿAbd al-Karīm and other sharifs were killed; the remaining sharifs returned to Mecca.Footnote 76 In the same vein, Shumayla b. Muḥammad b. Ḥāzim (d. 819/1416) entered Yemen during the reign of al-Nāṣir b. al-Ashraf (r. 803–827/1400–1424) and obtained wealth (dunyā) before his death in Muḥarram 819/March 1416 and was buried at the age of 60.Footnote 77
Egypt was the preferred destination of the Meccan sharifs within a political context shaped by the rise and consolidation of Mamlūk power from the mid seventh/thirteenth century to the eighth/fourteenth century. From the time of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars and al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (r. 678–689/1280–1290), the Mamlūks became involved in the internal affairs of the Ḥijāzī emirates and played an active role in the appointment of local governors, who in turn acknowledged their authority.Footnote 78 Thus, travelling to Cairo became essential for members of the sharifian family who were the only ones to officially claim the reality of political power. Ambitious sharifs had always used this political strategy to gain the support of the powerful protectorate. However, from the 730s/1330s onwards, when they sought to seize the emirate for the first time, it was common for them to go to Cairo, taking the risk of being imprisoned or dying on the journey. According to al-Fāsī, the daring sharif ʿAlī b. Thaqaba went to the Mamlūk sultan’s territory with the ambition to take control of Meccan power. He was arrested in Alexandria and died there in 770/1368 following an attack by the Franks (firānj).Footnote 79
Similarly, the sharif Mubārak b. Muḥammad b. ʿUṭayfa went to Cairo in 797/1395 with the emir Ḥasan b. ʿAjlān (d. 829/1426), the ruler of Mecca. Both were imprisoned, and after a time, Emir Ḥasan was released and took power in Mecca from his brother ʿAlī b. ʿAjlān (d. 797/1395) by the end of that year. Mubārak remained in prison in Cairo and was later transferred to Alexandria along with ʿInān b. Mughāmis (d. 805/1402), ʿAlī b. Mubārak (d. 815/1412), and Jammāz b. Hiba, the ruler of Medina. This group was imprisoned in Alexandria for a time. The members were released individually, with Mubārak being the last. His continued imprisonment was likely due to his being a real threat to the stability of Emir Ḥasan b. ʿAjlān’s rule. According to al-Fāsī, he died shortly after his imprisonment at the end of 809/1407 outside Cairo.Footnote 80
It emerges from al-Fāsī that one of the objectives of leaving for Egypt was to acquire wealth. The sharif Shumayla b. Muḥammad b. Ḥāzim is thus described as a wealthy man, who had obtained a significant booty when he served Sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq.Footnote 81 Similarly, after the death of Thaqaba b. Rumaytha in 762/1361, the sharif Mubārak b. Rumaytha gained wealth and power when he went to Cairo to serve the powerful Mamlūk emir Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī al-Naṣirī al-Khāṣṣakī (d. 768/1366).Footnote 82 According to al-Fāsī, Mubārak was a close ally of Emir ʿAjlān b. Rumaytha but betrayed him when he attempted to take control of Mecca. In Cairo, he requested from Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī goods, one of his daughters in marriage, and assistance to become the new master of Mecca. Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī accepted all of his requests. Al-Fāsī highlights that Mubārak travelled to Egypt twice to meet Yalbughā; the first time, he journeyed for 12 days, and the second time, for 14 days. This sharif became an important figure in the emirate, enjoying prestige among the people and ruling the locality of Arḍ Khālid.Footnote 83 By the eighth/fourteenth century, Cairo had emerged as the centre of political power and the regulation of Meccan affairs through the management of sharifian elites.
The mobility of the sharifs of the Ḥijāz constitutes an essential vector for connecting the various regions of the medieval Islamic world. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa thus reports their presence on the island of Sawākīn, off the Red Sea coast. Upon his arrival, the sultan of this island was a certain Zayd II, son of the emir of Mecca, Abū Numayy, which proves the close ties between the Meccan power and this strategic area.Footnote 84 The island of Sawākīn served as a maritime and commercial relay between the two shores of the Red Sea, notably through marital alliances between the sharifs and the local Beja tribes.Footnote 85 These relationships persisted throughout the eighth/fourteenth century: according to al-Fāsī, the sharif Mubārak b. ʿUṭayfa (d. 751/1351) is said to have established a personal power on the island after conquering it in 738/1338. Although he died as a martyr in a conflict with the local tribes, he is said to have left a son, who was black and likely born from a union with a woman from the island—suggesting the possible continuation of this sharifian settlement.Footnote 86
Meanwhile, other sharifs from the Ḥijāz had travelled vast distances to reach Kilwa, thus integrating the Swahili coast into the transregional networks of Islam. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa informs us that he encountered, in addition to the sharifs from Iraq, those from Medina and Mecca.Footnote 87 Their movement attests to the spiritual and political influence of the Ḥijāz to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. In Kilwa, they were honoured by Sultan Abū al-Muẓaffar Ḥasan, who granted them a share of the spoils from military campaigns, in recognition of their prophetic descent. Their presence allowed the ruler to strengthen his religious legitimacy, while embedding the city in a spiritual network linking the holy cities, East Africa, and the Muslim world of the Indian Ocean. These broader patterns of mobility highlight the integration of Meccan sharifs into a vast transregional network, thereby reinforcing forms of indirect control.
Through these circulations, the sharifs appear as key figures in diplomacy, contributing to the articulation of a plural and mobile Islamic space, bridging the territories and powers of the Near and Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. They gained social promotions outside Mecca and consequently became the political intermediaries of their benefactors. This transitional phase reflects a shift from direct intervention to indirect forms of control, grounded in mobility, patronage, and the integration of sharifian elites into regional power structures. However, these indirect mechanisms were ultimately complemented by more coercive strategies aimed at regulating political competition more directly.
From arrest to release in Egypt: processes and methods
In the eighth/fourteenth century, Mamlūk control, initiated under the reign of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (d. 741/1341), became progressively institutionalised through coercive practices focused on the arrest and release of Meccan sharifs at the discretion of the rulers of Egypt and Syria.
Starting from the early decades of the eighth/fourteenth century, the control of sharifian factions increasingly relied on the management of their entry into—and release from—Egyptian prisons and detention centres. Imprisonment became a political instrument employed by the sultan to exclude an emir from the political scene or to bring him under the authority of the sultanate. This was, however, a delicate instrument to wield. The arrest of a sharif or an emir was rarely a straightforward matter, not least because of the significant distance separating Mecca from Cairo. Several months could pass between the submission of a complaint to the sultan and the actual arrest. Once released by the sultan, a sharif or emir could emerge as a renewed source of conflict and destabilisation within the emirate. Unlike earlier forms of control, this system was based on the coercive, remote management of political actors.
The path towards arrest
The arrest of a sharif or an emir was by no means automatic. It followed a structured process, beginning with the submission of a complaint to the sultan, followed by a summons, and culminating—if warranted—in the imprisonment of the individual in question.
The complaint to the Mamlūk sultan
The complaint (shakwā in Arabic, derived from the verb shakā ‘he complained’ or yashkū ‘he complains’), served as a formal means by which an individual or a collective expressed to an authority the injustices or abuses they claimed to have suffered at the hands of another in medieval Meccan Arabic sources.Footnote 88 The content of the complaints addressed to the sultan by Meccan petitioners typically revolved around acts of pillaging, unjustified attacks, the refusal to pay an annual stipend, or arbitrary arrests carried out by the emir or members of the dominant Banū Ḥasan faction. The complaint thus enabled individuals to present their grievances—either orally or in writing—to the sultan, thereby initiating a form of judicial recourse or arbitration.Footnote 89
Petitions could be submitted individually or collectively; when expressed orally, the presence of the complainant at the sultan’s court was often required. Most of these complaints originated from sharifian circles, which were themselves deeply involved in Mecca’s internecine power struggles. Throughout the eighth/fourteenth century, sources consistently attest to the presence of sharifian delegations at the Egyptian court, sent to denounce offenses and abuses endured in Mecca. For instance, in 701/1301, the sharifs ʿUṭayfa and Abū al-Ghayth escaped from their prison in Mecca and travelled to Egypt, where they lodged a complaint before Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn concerning the mistreatment they had suffered at the hands of their brothers Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha.Footnote 90 Similarly, in 786/1384, ʿInān b. Mughāmis and members of the Banū Thaqaba arrived in Egypt and addressed a petition to Sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq, accusing the emir Aḥmad b. ʿAjlān of withholding from them their allotted share—amounting to one quarter—of the revenues of the emirate.Footnote 91
On the other hand, when a complaint was submitted in writing, it carried even greater official weight and became part of the diplomatic correspondence exchanged between two rulers. In almost all cases, this written complaint required a formal response from the sultan, delivered by a messenger (rasūl), who was expected to settle the dispute between the competing Ḥasanid clans. For instance, Abū Numayy wrote to the Mamlūk sultan Baybars to inform him that he had deposed his uncle Idrīs b. Qatāda due to the latter’s alliance with the ruler of Yemen. In response, the sultan recognised Abū Numayy as emir of Mecca and sent him an official decree of investiture.Footnote 92 The dispatch of this decree clearly served as a political and diplomatic gesture on the part of the suzerain power, aimed at supporting a loyal emir.
In the year 789/1387, Emir ʿInān b. Mughāmis sent a letter to Sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq in which he apologised for not participating in the ceremonial procession of the sultanic palanquin (maḥmal), claiming he feared being assassinated by the Āl ʿAjlān. ʿInān used the opportunity to complain about this rival group, whom he accused of spreading insecurity along the roads of the emirate. The Mamlūk sultan replied, ‘You are in your territory, do what must be done.’Footnote 93 This brief response demonstrates both a degree of autonomy granted to the emir and an implicit expectation on the part of the sultan that the territory be governed effectively, regardless of the methods employed.
The sharifs of Mecca were not the only ones to lodge complaints about the conduct of local emirs. Mamlūk emirs present in the Holy City who returned from their pilgrimage often reported on the political situation in Mecca to the sultan, submitting grievances that were sometimes relayed from the local population suffering under the emirate’s abuses. According to Ibn Fahd, in the year 704/1304, Emir Buralghī al-Ashrafī informed Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn of the violence exercised by the emirs ʿUṭayfa and Abū al-Ghayth and their ʿabīd against the individuals who resided in Mecca in the vicinity of the Sacred Mosque (mujāwirūn). The sultan responded by ordering their arrest and imprisonment in Cairo.Footnote 94
Such complaints significantly influenced the image of the emir of Mecca in the eyes of the Mamlūk sultan. Their effect was even more pronounced when delivered during a sultanic pilgrimage. The chronicler Ibn Fahd notes, for instance, that in the year 712/1312, the mujāwirūn and pilgrims addressed Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn with grievances against emirs Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha. The complaints became so numerous that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad deposed the two emirs and appointed Abū al-Ghayth in their place.Footnote 95 During the sultan’s second pilgrimage in 719/1319, the mujāwirūn and merchants (al-tujjār) directly requested that the sultan leave behind a garrison of Mamlūks to prevent Sharif Ḥumayḍa from returning and sowing disorder.Footnote 96
The complaint process thus underscored the role of the sultan as protector of both the pilgrims and the local population. Yet its effects were often short-lived, justifying only limited and temporary interventions on the part of the sultan, who rarely went as far as to station a permanent garrison. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad preferred instead to manage the situation by alternately imprisoning the various contenders for the emirate. Complaints thus served to trigger the intervention of the sultanic authorities from Cairo.
Summons and arrest
Once the complaint had been registered and processed in Cairo, the emir would receive a letter or a decree summoning him to the sultan’s court. An envoy (rasūl or najjāb) was dispatched to Mecca to deliver the summons. For instance, in 752/1352, the co-emirs Thaqaba and ʿAjlān received a decree from the Mamlūk sultan ordering them to travel to Cairo following acts of aggression committed against ships in Jeddah.Footnote 97 Similarly, when Sultan Barqūq learned of the plundering of pilgrims in 793/1391, he sent an envoy with a letter informing co-emirs ʿAlī b. ʿAjlān and ʿInān b. Mughāmis of their dismissal and their summons to Cairo.Footnote 98 Refusal to comply with the summons systematically resulted in the emir’s dismissal and the appointment of another, invested in Egypt and escorted back to Mecca by a garrison of Mamlūk soldiers.Footnote 99
At times, no formal summons was issued. A complaint of serious misconduct was sufficient to justify an arrest, and Mamlūk emirs stationed in Mecca were tasked with enforcing the sultan’s orders. For example, the four co-emirs Ḥumayḍa, Rumaytha, ʿUṭayfa, and Abū al-Ghayth were successively arrested in Mecca between 701/1301 and 710/1310. Such actions often took place during the highly visible setting of the ḥajj, when high-ranking Mamlūk emirs, accompanied by imposing garrisons, escorted the pilgrimage caravan.Footnote 100 In 754/1352, Emir Thaqaba was arrested during the ḥajj season by Emir ʿUmar Shāh and replaced in power by his brother ʿAjlān.Footnote 101
The Mamlūk sultan employed calculated strategies, often disguising political summons as formal court invitations extended to the emir of Mecca. However, such official journeys could quickly turn into ordeals. For instance, the trip undertaken by Emir ʿAjlān to Cairo—accompanied by his sons Aḥmad and Kubaysh and several retainers—ended in their arrest upon arrival in 760–761/1358–1359, despite the apparent cordiality of the sultan’s invitation.Footnote 102 The sultan also took advantage of the presence in Egypt of ambitious sharifs who rivalled the ruling emir, using the occasion to imprison them. In 770/1368, when Sharif ʿAlī b. Thaqaba travelled to Egypt to seek the sultan’s support in claiming authority over Mecca, he was detained in Alexandria, where he ultimately died.Footnote 103 When the sultan bore particular animosity towards a sharif, he would summon him to Cairo with flattering pretexts, only to arrest him. Such was the fate of Emir ʿInān b. Mughāmis, who responded to a Mamlūk summons in 794/1392 and was subsequently imprisoned.Footnote 104
Once arrested and imprisoned in Cairo or Alexandria, the sensitive question of the duration of detention arose. The Mamlūk authorities did not determine this duration in advance. A deposed emir or sharif could remain imprisoned for weeks, months, or years, with release dependent solely on an official decision by the sultan—or in rare cases, escape. It is important to emphasise that the primary purpose of these arrests was not to imprison the Meccan emirs until their deaths. Only two emirs died in captivity: ʿUṭayfa in 743/1343 at Qubaybāt prison outside Cairo,Footnote 105 and ʿInān after a long incarceration in Alexandria.Footnote 106
Throughout the eighth/fourteenth century, no consistent rule governed the length of imprisonment. Durations varied from one emir to another and were influenced by political circumstances in both Mecca and Egypt. For example, emirs Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha remained in prison for approximately three years, from 701/1301 to 704/1304,Footnote 107 before being released by Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who hoped their return would stabilise the political crisis in Mecca. Thaqaba, his brothers, and their cousin Muḥammad b. ʿUṭayfa were imprisoned in Cairo for two years, from 746/1346 to 748/1348, in order to avoid a fratricidal conflict.Footnote 108 Similarly, although Sultan al-Ḥasan b. al-Nāṣir was deeply angered by Emir ʿAjlān and his son Aḥmad, they and their entourage were imprisoned only for a few months, from 760/1359 to 761/1360, and were released following the sultan’s assassination.Footnote 109
In such cases, imprisonment served less to radically alter Meccan politics than to temporarily reassert indirect control. Longer imprisonments, however, signalled an intention to permanently exclude a political actor, usually as a result of perceived treachery. This was the case for ʿUṭayfa, who remained imprisoned for around six years, from 737/1337 until his death in 743/1343.Footnote 110 Similarly, ʿInān b. Mughāmis spent approximately ten years in prison, from 794–795/1392–1393 to 804/1402.Footnote 111
As a tool for the Mamlūk regime to manage Meccan elites in a differentiated way, staggered imprisonment was also practised, particularly when several sharifs were arrested simultaneously. In such cases, one sharif or emir could be released well before his fellow detainees—an intentional tactic by the sultan to influence factional competition. Al-Fāsī reports, for example, that the sharifs Ḥasan b. ʿAjlān and Mubārak b. Muḥammad were imprisoned in Cairo in 797/1395 but that the former was immediately released and invested with emirate power in Mecca,Footnote 112 while the latter, Mubārak, remained in detention. It is reasonable to believe that the Mamlūk authorities aimed to shield Emir Ḥasan b. ʿAjlān from political conflict by releasing him without his potential rival. Moreover, the most influential sharifs, whose presence threatened to undermine the Mamlūk sultans’ strategy for controlling the two Holy Cities, were removed from the Cairene capital and transferred to a prison in Alexandria.Footnote 113
Sources offer little concrete detail about the actual conditions of detention. The main sites of incarceration in Egypt were the Burj of the Citadel (Qalʿat al-Jabal) in Cairo and the fortress of Alexandria.Footnote 114 Emir ʿAjlān b. Rumaytha, his sons Aḥmad and Kubaysh, as well as several close companions, were imprisoned in 761–762/1359–1360 in the Burj al-Qalʿa on the orders of the Mamlūk sultan al-Ḥasan b. al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn.Footnote 115 Another example is Sultan Barqūq’s imprisonment of Emir ʿInān b. Mughāmis at Burj al-Qalʿa before his transfer to Alexandria, where he remained from 795/1393 until his death in 797/1395.Footnote 116 It should be noted that emirs could be moved from one prison to another depending on the sultan’s decisions. Arrests became increasingly systematic and politically instrumentalised throughout the eighth/fourteenth century. Instead of imposing fixed penalties, the duration of the sharifs’ detention reflected a flexible approach to managing political competition.
Release
The release of an emir or a sharif was entirely at the discretion of the sultan. He held all authority in determining whether an emir’s reign in Mecca should continue. The sultan’s decision was final, and when he chose to release a sharif from prison, he would receive him in audience, offer gifts, and symbolically restore his authority.Footnote 117 Al-Maqrīzī provides the following account of the release of two Meccan sharifs at the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century:
Emir Burlughī Ashrafī, arriving from the Ḥijāz, complained about the lack of respect inspired by the two sharifs Abū al-Ghayth and ʿUtayfa, and about the numerous abuses committed by the black slave-soldiers [ʿabīd] against the men who were in retreat [mujāwirūn] in Mecca. The two sharifs Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha were brought out of prison and taken to an audience with the sultan, who rewarded them with bonnets [kalaftān] made of gold fabric [zarkash]. Ḥumayḍa only agreed to wear these ornaments after a long resistance and when he was threatened with being sent back to prison. The two sharifs took their place above all the emirs; after which they went to occupy the lodgings that had been assigned to them, where they were offered everything they might need. The emirs gave them gifts; and they were granted pensions, daily rations, and clothing. Both mounted horses, in the company of the sultan, and went to the Maydān, where Ḥumayḍa played a game of ball with the prince.Footnote 118
This detailed narrative offers critical insight into the socio-political setting surrounding the release of Meccan sharifs. The conduct of the reigning emirs, criticised by Emir Burlughī Ashrafī in his petition to the sultan, triggered the process that led to the release of Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha. As al-Maqrīzī shows, their release was abrupt: the sultan not only received them in person but also restored their status as emirs, symbolically marked by their seating ‘above all other emirs’. Furthermore, the event took on the air of celebration. The emirs were showered with gifts and supplies, and playing ball with the sultan served to reintegrate them into the emiral hierarchy of the empire. This case is not isolated, but it is particularly well described by the Mamlūk chronicler, highlighting how the fate of the sharifs depended on the political context in Mecca—and above all, on the sultan’s decision regarding their release.
The release of one sharif at the expense of another was a calculated risk by the sultan, as this strategic choice allowed him to bolster his symbolic and political capital by appointing a new emir who would publicly acknowledge Mamlūk suzerainty at the heart of Islam. The formal release of a sharif from prison was a significant political act that posed a threat to the current ruling emir. At the same time, it served the strategic interests of Mamlūk oversight. When the sultan decided to release a sharif, he also appointed him to the emirate and entrusted him with the instruments of power. With the help of his dīwān and emissaries, the sultan would inform the sitting emir of his removal and announce the investiture of a new one. This official procedure institutionalised the authority of the emir now recognised by the Mamlūk suzerain.
Between 701/1301 and 704/1304, for instance, the four Meccan emirs—organised in pairs, Ḥumayḍa with Rumaytha and ʿUṭayfa with Abū al-Ghayth—were successively imprisoned, released, and reappointed to power in Mecca according to the will of the Mamlūk sultan.Footnote 119 In this way, the sultanate retained firm control over the emirate, and the position of any given emir remained precarious, subject to the decisions of the overlord. The released pretenders would return to Mecca endowed with new legitimacy, sometimes accompanied by Mamlūk military forces. For example, after his release, Sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq chose to free Sharif ʿInān b. Mughāmis in 792/1390 and recognised him as a co-ruler alongside Emir ʿAlī b. ʿAjlān. He was sent back to Mecca accompanied by a representative charged with overseeing the political transition ordained by the sultan.Footnote 120
The liberation of a powerful rival was never well received and often provoked tensions that pushed the ruling emir to directly oppose the sultan’s decision. For the lord of the Ḥaram, such opposition was expressed through a refusal to allow his enemy, along with the delegation sent from Cairo, to enter the city in a triumphal procession. This was the case, for example, in 752/1352, when Sharif Thaqaba was appointed by the Mamlūk sultan to the emirate in place of his brother ʿAjlān. The latter forbade both his brother Thaqaba and the pilgrimage caravan from entering Mecca. The Mamlūk emir al-Majdī negotiated a reconciliation between the two brothers, which was based on a power-sharing agreement and the payment of 70,000 dirhams from ʿAjlān to Thaqaba.Footnote 121
However, such moments of tension did not always end with the conclusion of an agreement between rivals. The sultan’s decision was imposed by force, as the liberated sharif enjoyed the support of a significant garrison of Mamlūk soldiers. The arrival of this military force instilled great fear in the deposed emir, who would surrender the city to his rival. In 703–704/1303–1304, when the emirs Ḥumayḍa and Rumaytha were released from prison, appointed, and sent back to Mecca, they were preceded by the emir of the pilgrimage and vice-sultan Salār, who was accompanied by 30 emirs and their men.Footnote 122
Finally, the escape of a sharif or a group of sharifs from Egyptian prisons also had detrimental consequences for the ruling emir. The fugitives would inevitably return to claim power in Mecca. For instance, in 756/1356, Sharif Thaqaba, along with his brothers Sanad and Mughāmis, and their cousin Muḥammad b. ʿUṭayfa, escaped from prison in Egypt and arrived at Nakhla on the seventeenth of Ramaḍān of that year. Emir ʿAjlān was then in Khayf Banū Shadīd, and upon learning of the fugitives’ arrival in the valley, he immediately returned to Mecca to preserve his authority, engaging in battles during which Thaqaba’s men were killed and the latter survived and fled.Footnote 123
The act of release therefore served as a key political instrument, enabling the sultan to reshape the balance of power in Mecca. This system exemplifies a form of indirect but coercive control, through which the Mamlūk sultan governed Meccan politics remotely.
Conclusion
Throughout most of the eighth/fourteenth century, the Mamlūk sultanic authorities redoubled their efforts to reinforce their position and control over the sharifian families. This control materialised through contact with certain sharifs and emirs seeking political, economic, and military support—aid that only the sultan could provide in exchange for their allegiance. These sharifs became genuine intermediaries of sultanic power once they rose to authority in Mecca. However, in the face of local factional resistance, surveillance intensified to avoid losing control over the emirate. The dispatch of representatives became essential in monitoring the local emirs and reporting their actions to the central authority. The latter would then take the necessary measures to sanction the Meccan emirate’s leadership. Imprisonment was the most commonly employed instrument to maintain pressure on the political elites of the emirate. The growing use of this practice nonetheless reveals the limitations of this ‘carceral management’ of the emirate, which never fully succeeded in supplanting what remained, throughout the period, the principal driving force of Meccan political life: the factional dynamics structured around the major sharifian households.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on research conducted as part of my doctoral dissertation on the socio-political history of the emirs of Mecca (thirteenth–fourteenth century). I would like to thank the reviewers of this article for their constructive feedback.
Conflicts of interest
None.
