2.1. Goodin’s Account

Of the two accounts, Goodin’s implies the widest scope for our duties to the disadvantaged (as we will see below, Sample’s ‘come-what-may’ duties are already restricted to a sub-domain of disadvantage). According to Goodin, we exploit a person when we unfairly make use of one of their attributes and, he claims, exploitation in general involves ‘playing for advantage[-as-gain] in situations where it is inappropriate to do so. . .[it] consists in playing games of strategy in circumstances which render them somehow inappropriate’ (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 184, emphasis in original). Furthermore, all cases where playing for strategy is inappropriate are ‘manifestations of one particular kind of wrong’, namely, a failure to honour the moral norm of ‘protecting the vulnerable. . .regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability’ (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 187). Thus, for Goodin, exploitation occurs when we use others’ vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves some form of benefit in games of strategy, no matter the source of these vulnerabilities.

Taken at face value, Goodin’s norm of protecting the vulnerable seems to make exploitation pervasive. It appears to render exploitative any transaction in which one transactor uses his or her advantage for gain. This seems odd, since (i) nearly all economic transactions involve unequal bargaining power and (ii) unequal bargaining power, ordinarily, seems to be a form of vulnerability. Yet, (iii) many ‘ordinary’ transactions do not appear unfair. It seems that Goodin should provide an explanation of this oddness. He might either address (iii), showing why we should consider most transactions unfair, or provide a response to (ii), explaining why the conception of vulnerability that he has in mind is narrower than our ordinary notion of vulnerability and thus explaining why mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient for his notion of vulnerability. That is, though he claims that any form of vulnerability is potentially exploitable, perhaps Goodin’s account of vulnerability is less inclusive then our ordinary conception.

Goodin provides an account of vulnerability in his book Protecting the Vulnerable, where he writes

Thus, for Goodin, B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B. The scope of this conception of vulnerability does not appear narrower than the scope of vulnerability in ordinary use. In lieu of a restriction of the scope of vulnerability, Goodin must provide a convincing argument for why we should believe most transactions are exploitative. And indeed, Goodin does provide such an argument, albeit one that I will argue is not fully convincing. However, before considering Goodin’s defence of his relatively expansive conception of exploitation (in section 4.2) I want to consider the come-what-may duties that appear in Sample’s account and an outline of the problems these duties create for both accounts.

2.2. Sample’s Account

According to Sample’s account of ‘exploitation as degradation’, exploitation involves ‘interacting with another being for the sake of advantage[-as-gain] in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 57). She claims these failures of respect take three general forms. We can fail to show proper respect for – degrade – the value of another by:

1. D1 ‘Taking advantage[-as-use] of an injustice done to him.’

2. D2 ‘Neglecting what is necessary for that person’s well-being or flourishing.’

3. D3 ‘Treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that person’s being that ought not to be commodified’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 57, lettering added).

The first form of degradation, D1, involves disadvantage caused by historical injustice: ‘If a person is in a weaker bargaining position because of a past injustice, we stand to gain disproportionately in virtue of that injustice’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 82). For example, if C steals B’s wallet and A uses the disadvantage created by this theft to gain more than he otherwise would have in a transaction with B, A exploits B.

The second form of degradation involves a form of disadvantage that is ahistorical. Here Sample claims that well-being or flourishing are best captured by what she variously calls ‘basic needs’ and ‘capabilities’.Footnote ⁷

She argues that transactions can be degrading when ‘the [impoverished] capabilities of our interactors are ignored in the pursuit of our own advantage[-as-gain]’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 81).Footnote ⁸ Though these first two forms of degradation often coincide, neither implies the other. While B’s basic needs may be unmet because of a past injustice committed by another person, D2 implies that failing to properly consider B’s basic needs may generate exploitation even when the reason B’s basic needs are not unmet does not involve a past injustice. Note that the existence of D2 as a separate source of exploitation-generating degradation requires cases that fall within the scope of D2 and outside the scope of D1.

Finally, Sample’s D3 implies that the exchange of certain goods may be intrinsically degrading. Here too there may be overlap with the first and second forms of degradation. Prostitution is often considered a paradigmatic example of this third form of transaction. When A pays for sex with B, B may transact only because she has been previously unjustly disadvantaged. A may also fail to give proper weight to B’s well-being or flourishing. But Sample’s inclusion of this ‘anti-commodification condition’ as a separate condition implies that even if D1 and D2 are not satisfied, the transaction may be exploitative. Again, in order for D3 to operate as a separate source of degradation, there must be cases of D3 that do not fall within the scope of either of the first two domains.

Like Goodin’s account, Sample’s account faces some ‘face value’ difficulties, in particular, a version of what Rawls calls the ‘priority problem’ (Rawls Reference Rawls1971: §8). The presence of separate degradation-generating principles means that it is theoretically possible for these principles to conflict. If these principles also conflict in practice, then absent either a single principle to guide action or a weighting between the three forms of degradation, Sample’s account of exploitation appears to provide conflicting guides to action. However, unlike the prima facie problem of scope for Goodin’s account, Sample’s priority problem is not caused by the presence of a come-what-may duty. Nevertheless, as we will see, the inclusion of a come-what-may duty causes its own problems for Sample.

Come-what-may duties enter Sample’s account through her inclusion of the basic needs condition, D2. She claims that when A transacts with B and fails to ensure B’s basic needs are satisfied, he degrades and exploits her. Conditions like D2 are threshold conditions; conditions that claim exploitation occurs when B’s post transaction outcome falls below a certain threshold level.Footnote ⁹ In Sample’s case, B is exploited when, post-transaction, her basic needs remain unmet. Threshold conditions, when not embedded as a subset of more restrictive conditions like D1, generate come-what-may duties. When B’s basic needs are unmet pre-transaction, if A chooses to transact with B, then he must satisfy the constraints implied by D2 and this is so regardless of the reason that B’s pre-transaction basic needs were unmet.Footnote ¹⁰

In the next section I present a case that exemplifies the over-demandingness problem for Goodin’s account and that forces a conflict of duties for Sample’s account. I show that both problems can be resolved by abandoning the broad come-what-may duties contained in each account. However, before doing so I want to briefly comment on Sample’s non-commodification condition, D3.

The arguments that follow pertain to the problems that arise from Sample’s inclusion of cases that lie in D2, but not D1. D3 is excluded from the criticism because, without denying that they may be degrading or disrespectful, I am unconvinced transactions falling only within Sample’s D3 are exploitative. When A buys sex from B, if the transaction is degrading for only the reason that sex ought not be commodified, then it seems that both A and B are degraded by the transaction. Neither is relatively disadvantaged with respect to the other. Yet, if exploitation involves taking unfair advantage-as-use of another’s vulnerability, then it must be the case that one of A or B is relatively disadvantaged. While it seems natural to say that A – the buyer – is the advantaged party in cases of prostitution, the belief that A is unfairly advantaged is likely due to our belief that it is unfair (for reasons stemming from either D1 or D2) that B is in a position in which she must sell her services as a prostitute. If neither D1 nor D2 hold and A and B are equals in terms of power, resources, etc., and B is not disadvantaged through past injustice, it is not clear that either party is relatively disadvantaged.Footnote ¹¹ If neither is relatively disadvantaged, there can be no exploitation. Indeed Sample makes just this point when she writes, ‘I reject the idea that a person could be exploited if no vulnerability is made use of’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 83). She claims that when D1 and D2 are not violated but a person ‘nonetheless chooses to transact in a way that would violate a putative restriction on exchange, [they are] not exploited. . .however, [they] may be degraded if the appropriate case against commodification can be made’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 83). These arguments, along with Sample’s own claims, indicate that D3 is not a separate source of exploitation, but rather falls within D1 and D2. Its inclusion as a separate form of degradation plays only a rhetorical role.

3.1. The Sequential Game Case

Consider the following sequential game, Γ₁.

Stage 1. Consider the following two lotteries, L ₁ and L ₂. Suppose that A is presented with a choice between the lotteries, but B is (for whatever reason) committed to L ₂.

• L ₁ ( $p=\frac{1}{2},\ \$100$ ; 1 − p, $0)

• L ₂ (p = 1, $50)

Stage 2. A and B face each other in the labour market. The wealthier is the employer, the less wealthy the employee. If they are equally wealthy they may work cooperatively, splitting revenue equally. Suppose the values for revenue, wages, and profit are as follows: R = $11, ω = $5, π = 6. The revenue from cooperating is $\frac{\$11}{2}$ , or $5.50. Finally, suppose the following constraint, embodying Sample’s particular approach to D2, holds:

1. BN If a player chooses to transact with another, then both players’ outcomes must be ⩾ $10. Suppose $10 is what is necessary for an individual’s well-being.

Constraint BN operationalizes Sample’s D2, the claim that we degrade others when we neglect what is necessary for their well-being. Sample argues that ‘if we can interact with persons so that their basic needs are taken into account through the transaction, we ought to’ (Sample Reference Sample2003: 75). Thus, employers should pay their employees enough to ensure their basic needs are met. In Γ₁, this amount is set at $10, but the problem that the case presents does not depend on the particular value given to BN.Footnote ¹²

In the strategic form of Γ₁ shown in Figure 1 below, ‘A’ and ‘B’ denote the players, ‘0’ a chance node, and ‘C’, ‘W’, and ‘E’ represent the options ‘cooperate’, ‘work for’, and ‘employ’ respectively.

Figure 1.

Γ₁ in Extended Form

When B is committed to L ₂, which lottery should A (rationally) choose? We can answer this question using backward induction. First, consider the bottom branch of Figure 1, supposing A chooses L ₂. In this case, the players will be equally wealthy, each receiving $50. They may choose to form a cooperative venture or refrain from cooperating, but clearly it is in the interest of each to cooperate, so the outcome of A choosing L ₂ is ($55.50, $55.50).Footnote ¹³

Suppose A chooses L ₁. Then, there are two equiprobable possibilities: either A will win the lottery, or A will lose the lottery. Suppose A loses. Then after the lottery A will be poorest. He can choose to work for B or to remain unemployed and B can choose whether to employ A, but it is in the interest of both to choose employment. Since post-lottery A has $0, BN holds. B must pay A $10 in wages, but she may keep $1 for herself. The outcome of a lottery loss is thus ($10, $51). Suppose A wins the lottery. Here A is the wealthiest player. And again, it is rational for both players to choose employment. This time A is the employer and, since both players’ holdings are greater than $10, BN doesn’t apply. A will pay B $5, keeping $6 for himself in profits. Thus, the outcome of a lottery win is ($106, $55). Since a lottery win and a lottery loss are both equally likely, the expected value of choosing L ₁ is $\frac{1}{2}$ the outcome of a win and $\frac{1}{2}$ the outcome of a loss, or ($58, $53). Since the expected value of L ₁ is greater for A than the expected value of L ₂, A will rationally choose L ₁.

Now consider a variation of Γ₁ where BN is absent. Without BN, the outcome of A choosing L ₁, losing the lottery, choosing work, and B choosing employ changes to ($5, $56), making the expected value of L ₁ ($55.50, $55.50). Thus, if BN does not hold, the expected value for both A and B of A’s choice of either L ₁ and L ₂ is equivalent. The tables in Figure 2 summarize the expected value of each lottery for A and B with, and without, BN. When BN holds, if A chooses L ₁, A does better and B worse. In particular, A gains $2.50 of expected value at B’s expense. With BN in place, A has an incentive to choose L ₁ over L ₂. Without BN the outcomes for each player are the same regardless of whether A chooses L ₁ or L ₂. With these facts in mind, let us return to the two accounts of exploitation outlined above, this time beginning with Sample’s account.

Figure 2.

Expected values in Γ₁ with and without BN

3.2. Sample’s Self-Frustration Problem

Consider Γ₁ in the context of Sample’s account. According to Sample, if A chooses L ₁ and loses, then if B chooses to employ A, but does not respect BN, B exploits A. When B fails to ensure A’s basic needs are met when she interacts with him, B engages in the form of degradation specified by D2, and thus exploits A.

However, pre-theoretically it also seems natural to say that the reverse is true, that is, A exploits B. There are two senses in which A extracts benefits from B in Γ₁. First, A gains ex ante from BN – at B’s expense – through the increase in expected value that BN gives to A’s choice of L ₁. Second, when A chooses L ₁, loses, and then works for B, he receives ex post benefits in the form of the BN subsidy: his wages increase from $5 without the subsidy to $10 with the subsidy.

If either of these gains are also unfair, then in a pre-theoretical sense, A exploits B. Note that because A receives these benefits at separate times, the locus of the exploitative act (assuming the gains are, in fact, unfair) depends on whether the ex post or ex ante perspective is adopted. This leaves us with three questions:

• Which perspective on gain – ex post or ex ante – is morally relevant for exploitation?

• Are the gains received in either perspective unfair?

• If so, is the resulting exploitation problematic for Sample’s account?

3.3. Goodin’s Over-demandingness Problem

I now turn my attention to the problems Γ₁ creates for Goodin’s account. Recall that for Goodin exploitation involves a failure to respect the duty to protect the vulnerable, ‘regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability’ (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 187). We exploit others when we use their vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves some form of benefit in a game of strategy. The vulnerable are ‘those whose interests are strongly affected by our actions and choices’ (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 191). Further, Goodin argues that the responsibility to protect the vulnerable falls upon ‘whoever has the “last clear chance” to prevent harm. . .regardless of the causal history up to that point‘ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 129).

According to Goodin then, if A chooses L ₁, loses, and decides to work for B, A is vulnerable to B. If B fails to protect A when she transacts with him, she exploits him by failing to honour the moral norm of protecting the vulnerable. On Goodin’s account, determining whether B has protected A is less straightforward because, unlike Sample, Goodin does not appeal to a particular baseline (such as basic needs) by which we can judge whether B has discharged her duty to protect A. Nevertheless, Goodin is clear that A’s vulnerability places some constraints on B; she cannot simply ignore A’s plight. In the absence of an explicit protection criteria, I will assume these constraints are captured by the level stipulated by the BN condition, though in section four I will consider alternative operationalizations of what it means for persons to ‘protect’ others. Using the BN constraint as a baseline for B’s protection of the vulnerable A, it follows that when B does not respect the BN constraint, B exploits A.

This will strike those who are convinced by my prior claims about the fairness of A’s gains as the wrong result. Rather than B exploiting A, it seems that A exploits B. A case involving a spiteful A who hoped to lose the lottery in order to worsen B’s outcome makes an even stronger case for the claim that it is A who exploits B. However, Goodin’s position not only entails that B exploits A when she fails to subsidize him, it also entails that A exploits B in Γ₁ when he chooses L ₁. If, as Goodin claims, the vulnerable are those whose interests are affected by our choices, then B is vulnerable to A with respect to A’s choice of L ₁, since A’s potential loss will negatively affect B’s interests. Goodin’s account allows us to claim that when A chooses L ₁, A exploits B.Footnote ¹⁹

Though it is possible to conclude from Goodin’s account that A exploits B and that B exploits A, his account is not self-frustrating. The account implies only that A exploits B when he chooses L ₁ and that B exploits A at a later time, when she fails to subsidize him. Since these acts are temporally distinct and not mutually exclusive, Goodin’s account avoids the self-frustration problem.

Nevertheless, there is something odd about the application of Goodin’s account to the case. When A loses the lottery and works for B, A is vulnerable to B because he is now impoverished – this kind of vulnerability is fairly ‘typical’ in cases of exploitation. However, B’s vulnerability to A’s choice of L ₁ is an odder sort. It is a vulnerability that is itself created by Goodin’s come-what-may duty to protect the vulnerable. Since B must constrain his actions towards A if A loses the lottery, this obligation makes him vulnerable to A’s choice of the risky lottery. And were A to choose the certain option (L ₂), B would not be required to constrain his actions towards A because A would not be vulnerable to B. Thus, it is the presence of the unconditional duty to protect (here operationalized as BN) that generates B’s vulnerability. So, although Goodin’s account is not strictly self-frustrating, it is self-undermining. It prohibits an act (A’s choosing L ₁) because a possible outcome of this act (A’s loss) implies an obligation (BN) that the theory, at an earlier stage, repudiates. That a theory is self-undermining is not necessarily a reason for abandoning it, though in Goodin’s case it erodes support for an obligation that is already suspect.

Setting this issue aside though, the primary problem for Goodin’s account is that it is over-demanding in the way that Sample’s account would have been, had it implied A’s choice of L ₁ was impermissible. As with Sample’s account, the features of Goodin’s account that make A’s choice of L ₁ exploitation apply also to any case in which A faces a gamble between a choice that offers him an attractive outcome and one that leaves him vulnerable to B. For even in the case of the prudent lottery L ₃, B is vulnerable to A’s choice. If A chooses L ₃ and loses, then Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable regardless of the source of their vulnerabilities requires that B constrain herself when transacting with A. Since B is vulnerable to A, then according to Goodin, A has a duty to do ‘whatever [he] can to prevent anyone (ourselves or others) from taking unfair advantage of [B’s] vulnerabilities’ (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 189). Thus, A must refrain from choosing the (very prudential) lottery L ₃. Indeed, in many cases quite reasonable and morally uncontroversial actions (driving, hunting, playing sport) carry very small probabilities of catastrophic vulnerable outcomes that oblige others to do whatever they can to help us and, thus make these others vulnerable to our choices. Not only is the prohibition of these prudent risks over-demanding, the self-undermining property of the account means that this prohibition is motivated by the obligation to avoid a consequence that Goodin’s own theory obliges.

4.1. Abandoning Self-caused Disadvantage

If exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then in order for A to exploit B, A must have some kind of relative advantage over B; that is, B must be relatively disadvantaged compared with A. In a broad sense, there are three possible sources of disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because of her own actions (self-caused disadvantage), the actions of others (other-caused disadvantage), or a natural event involving no human action (natural disadvantage). Though there are three historical sources of disadvantage, there are many different manifestations of disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because she lacks material goods, because she is malnourished, because she has stronger (or weaker) preferences than A, and so on. The states of disadvantage in S1 that generate duties to others can be limited by restricting the historical sources of disadvantage, by restricting the manifestations of disadvantage, or by restricting both.

Goodin’s account limits neither the sources, nor the manifestations of disadvantage. His claim that exploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable ‘regardless of the particular source’ of their vulnerability is an explicit rejection of limits on the sources of vulnerability (Goodin Reference Goodin and Reeve1987: 187). That Goodin also places no limits on vulnerability’s manifestations follows from his account of vulnerability. As we saw above, Goodin claims that B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B. Goodin’s account of exploitation places no explicit limits on x. Exploitation involves a failure to protect others from any manifestation of vulnerability. Unlike Goodin, Sample does provide a restriction on the manifestations of disadvantage. Her D2 condition restricts the exploitable manifestations of disadvantage to cases in which a persons’ basic needs are unmet. However, Sample does not limit the sources of disadvantage and her restriction on the manifestations of disadvantage does not succeed in avoiding the self-frustration problem.

Perhaps the most obvious solution to both self-frustration and over-demandingness is to omit self-caused disadvantage as a possible source of exploitation. If self-caused disadvantage did not generate obligations, then in Γ₁ B would not be required to provide A with some form of subsidy and thus, would not be vulnerable to A’s choice of L ₁. If B is not vulnerable to A’s choice of L ₁, then on Goodin’s account A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the risky option. And when A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the risky option, the over-demandingness objection disappears.

Similarly, Sample’s claim that disrespect may be caused by a failure to ensure a transactor’s basic needs are met, regardless of the reason that they are unmet, includes self-caused disadvantage as a form of exploitable disadvantage. In the context of Sample’s account, B’s failure to subsidize A in Γ₁ is a case of exploitation because B degrades A by failing to ensure his basic needs are met when she transacts with him. Recall that self-frustration involves the following conflicting claims:

1. F1 B exploits A if she fails to provide A with the BN subsidy.

2. F2 When A chooses the risky option, loses, but nevertheless accepts the subsidy from B, A exploits B.

If self-caused disadvantage is excluded as a form of exploitable disadvantage, then F1 is false. B is not obliged to respect the BN constraint when A is responsible for his basic needs going unmet. In this case, B does not exploit A when she fails to subsidize him and the conflict between F1 and F2 disappears.

4.2. Defending Come-what-may Duties

Goodin acknowledges that the ‘main alternative to assigning responsibility for protecting the vulnerable to those people to whom they are vulnerable’ is to modify S1 by omitting self-caused disadvantage, that is, in Goodin’s own words, ‘to assign responsibility for the task of getting people out of a jam to those who were causally responsible for getting them into that jam in the first place’ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 125). Thus, if people are vulnerable to themselves, then they are responsible for protecting themselves.

However, Goodin raises two interrelated objections to this solution, which provide a defence, not only of the come-what-may duties in his account, but also of Sample’s D2. First, he notes, that ‘ “causal responsibility” is not the unambiguous, technical term it seems. The ascription of causal responsibility for an outcome represents. . .the conclusion of a moral argument, not the premise of one’ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 126). Second, he argues that ‘causal responsibility and task responsibility [the substantive responsibility to aid] really are quite distinct notions. They merge in their practical implications only in those (possibly rare) circumstances wherein those who were, in the past, in a position to cause harm will, in the future, remain in a position to provide help’ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 127). As an illustration Goodin offers the following case: ‘a speedboat racing past two sailboats produces a wake that, after a minute or two, causes one to capsize. The responsibility for helping the capsized crew surely rests with the crew of the other sailboat still afloat, rather than with the speedboat that is by now long gone’ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 126).

Though these claims are (mostly) unobjectionable, they do not establish the conclusion Goodin wishes to defend. Consider the first. It is true that establishing causal responsibility is difficult and depends on moral claims about the scope of responsibility, but it is not true that it is never clear which parties are causally responsible for others’ vulnerabilities – indeed, an implication of the boating case is that the motorboat is causally responsible for the capsizing. Goodin’s second claim is also largely true. Suppose that B is disadvantaged because of a past theft and that the thief is now dead. Clearly the thief, though causally responsible, cannot be responsible for protecting B’s vulnerability when she transacts with A. This responsibility devolves, presumably, to A. However, one can object to Goodin’s claim that responsibility to aid varies directly with ability to aid. Of course, at the limit – when the causally responsible has, one way or another, departed – they cannot be responsible for the task of aiding. But when both the causally responsible and a third party are able to aid, it seems objectionable to claim that the responsibility for aiding falls on the third party if they are better able to aid. This brings us to the primary problem with Goodin’s argument. The difficulty of establishing causal responsibility and the separateness of task responsibility do not entail that when causal responsibilities can be established and those causally responsible are present they are not responsible for the task of aid, even if others are better able to aid. I doubt many would argue with Goodin’s claims in cases where causal responsiblity cannot be determined, or where they are unavailable to provide aid. If anyone should aid in these cases, who else could aid the vulnerable but the person they are now interacting with? However, though Goodin’s principle might provide a heuristic that tells us what we already know about cases involving the two difficulties he outlines, he does not provide an argument for the general adoption of his principle in uncomplicated cases.

Nevertheless, this does not establish that A must bear responsibility for his choice of L ₁ in Γ₁. In Γ₁ although he is causally responsible for his condition, A is unable to aid himself. While the difficulty involved in finding the causally responsible party does not apply to Γ₁, Goodin’s second difficulty does apply. In Γ₁ the causally responsible is not in a position to provide aid. So while Goodin’s principle may be objectionable when neither of these problems arises, it may still be attractive in the case of Γ₁; over-demandingness notwithstanding. Marc Fleurbaey writes about a similar case of Bert the motorcyclist who is fully responsible for head injuries he sustains while riding his motorbike recklessly. Bert’s life can be saved only through a costly operation that Bert, who is uninsured, cannot afford. Like A, Bert is causally responsible for his situation, but he is unable to aid himself (Fleurbaey Reference Fleurbaey1995: 40).Footnote ²¹ Though Fleurbaey grants that Bert bears full responsibility for his injury, he argues few ‘would agree with the “no transfer” verdict’ that holding Bert responsible would mandate (Fleurbaey Reference Fleurbaey1995: 40). Goodin agrees, arguing ‘[o]nce all their opportunities for self-help have passed. . .the situation is beyond their control. Others, however, may still be able to act so as to avert harm to them. To suggest that those others should (or even that they may) stand idly by and watch people reap the bitter fruits of their own improvidence is surely absurd’ (Goodin Reference Goodin1986: 129, emphasis in original).

These objections to the ‘no transfer verdict’ in the cases where vulnerabilities are self-caused and where the vulnerable cannot aid themselves are versions of what Zofia Stemplowska has called the ‘unacceptable outcomes objection’ to luck (i.e. responsibility-sensitive) egalitarianism which claims that ‘the luck egalitarian embrace of responsibility implausibly justifies leaving people without assistance in thoroughly bad situations if they are responsible for bringing them about’ (Stemplowska Reference Stemplowska2009: 251). Stemplowska believes the objection should be resisted. She reminds us that it ‘applies only to situations in which a person is responsible for his or her disadvantage due to his or her conduct unreasonably privileging his or her interests over those of others. . .and there are enough resources equally to assist others who find themselves in similar situations’ (Stemplowska Reference Stemplowska2009: 252). Stemplowska notes that in such cases, the resources used to rescue Bert (or A) could also be ‘used by others on their own pursuits’ (Stemplowska Reference Stemplowska2009: 253). She concludes that to say the disadvantaged’s claim on resources always wins is to endorse the implausible view that they have a claim of justice even in spiteful cases, where they become disadvantaged ‘on purpose’ (Stemplowska Reference Stemplowska2009: 253).

With a number of positions in the air, it is perhaps best to pause for a moment to take stock. In section three I outlined two problems for Sample’s and Goodin’s come-what-may duties. So far in the present section I have suggested that modifying S1 by eliminating self-caused disadvantage from the sources of disadvantage that generate exploitation can solve both of these problems. I have also outlined Goodin’s response that, since ascribing causal responsibility can be difficult, and since the causally responsible party cannot always aid the disadvantaged, the duty of aid should fall on those to whom the disadvantaged are vulnerable. I argued that Goodin’s principle seems incorrect for many cases. When we can locate the causally responsible and they can aid, they, and not the person to whom the disadvantaged are vulnerable, should be responsible for aiding the disadvantaged. Nevertheless, this is not the case for Γ₁. There the causally responsible are the vulnerable and as such, they are unable to provide themselves with aid. The final paragraphs of this section have considered whether persons in B’s position are, as Goodin and Fleurbaey claim, or are not, as Stemplowska argues, obliged to aid A. If Stemplowska is correct that there is no duty to aid in cases of self-caused disadvantage, then both self-frustration and over-demandingness can be avoided by excluding self-caused disadvantage from S1. However, there is another solution that does not require an answer to the unacceptable outcomes objection.

4.3. Abandoning Exploitation Ascriptions

We can accept Goodin’s principle that those best able to aid the disadvantaged are obliged to do so and avoid over-demandingness and self-frustration if we reject the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge duties to the disadvantaged amounts to exploitation. Suppose that though A chose L ₁, he lost the lottery, and his basic needs are now unmet. Let us also grant Fleurbaey and Goodin the claim that B is obliged to provide A with some form of subsidy (BN) as aid. Though this concession means that B must aid A, it does not also entail that the proper classification of his failure to do so is appropriately called ‘exploitation’. We may claim that B is obliged to subsidize A despite the fact that when she subsidizes A she allows him to treat her unfairly. We do not need to abandon the intuition that what A does is unfair in order to claim that B is obliged to provide aid. B’s helping A may be grounded in something other than a concern for fairness.

However, if B’s obligations to A are grounded in something other than fairness, then Goodin’s and Sample’s obligations of aid cannot be based on concerns about exploitation – at least insofar as exploitation is a matter of ‘taking unfair advantage’ (as both they and I presuppose). To put the point another way, if we want to maintain unconstrained forms of the claim in S1 that certain states of disadvantage generate duties to aid, then we must abandon the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge these duties involves unfairness, and by extension, exploitation. B may be obliged to aid A, but not in the name of exploitation.

Applying this insight to Goodin’s account, we may say B is obliged to provide A with BN, not because BN is owed to A as a matter of fairness. Rather, if we agree with Goodin that there is such an obligation, this obligation is justified by an appeal to a concern for A’s welfare. Similarly, for Sample, we no longer need to maintain the counterintuitive claim in F1 that B takes unfair advantage of A if she fails to ensure his basic needs are met when she transacts with him. Instead we can claim that if B fails to meet A’s basic needs, she fails to treat him with respect, even though, in so respecting A, she allows A to exploit her. Since both accounts’ obligations to aid can be grounded in concerns other than fairness, there is no need to use the concept of exploitation to explain the obligation, especially since there is a cost to each theory for doing so: self-frustration and over-demandingness.

Nevertheless, this solution has its own problems. The most serious is that if the goal is to provide an analysis of the concept of exploitation, then abandoning S2 is no solution at all. Abandoning S2 involves abandoning the claim that a failure to discharge duties to the vulnerable in cases like Γ₁ is exploitation. If this failure does not amount to exploitation, then the attempt to analyse the concept in these terms fails. However, if the goal is instead to give an account of our duties to others when we engage in mutually beneficial transactions with them, the S2 solution may be attractive (though the wrongdoing must be relabelled).

Note that even if the goal is the latter, there are reasons to be sceptical about abandoning S2. If Goodin and Sample’s obligations to aid are intended to fall within the domain of justice, then, since performing the just act in Γ₁ would require B to allow A to take unfair advantage of her, exploitation (as taking unfair advantage) must be only pro tanto unjust. It cannot be unjust from an all-things-considered perspective. In this case exploitation (and by extension fairness) are values that can be traded off against considerations such as welfare, and this, in turn, implies that justice for Sample and Goodin involves more than – and sometimes even undermines – fairness.Footnote ²² On the other hand, if the obligation is not intended to fall within some other domain of morality, then either the obligation trumps the obligations of justice, which is also undesirable, or it is trumped by the obligations of justice, and as such, is impotent.