We're doing it wrong. American Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Greve has two broad aims in his new study of the development of constitutional federalism in the United States. First, he hopes to show us that we have not correctly understood how federalism works and how it has changed over time. Second, he seeks to demonstrate that the current federal system is at odds with the historical design and undermines rather than realizes the primary virtues of having a federal system of government. In pursuing these twin aims, he is not afraid to delve into the complex details and rarely examined byways of the constitutional law of federalism, and he makes these trips worthwhile by offering an array of insights into the structure of constitutional law and operations of federalism that scholars, at least, would be remiss to ignore.
The standard narrative on the history of American federalism is one of the growth of central government power at the expense of the states. This New Deal narrative has been reinforced by politicians from Herbert Hoover to Rick Perry and by constitutional scholars from the 1930s to the present. “Federalism,” in these broad terms, is best understood as working on a sliding scale of centralization versus decentralization. The more power that the national government has, the less power that is available to the states. “States' rights” means denying power to the national government and “returning” power to state and local government. The language of the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution contributes to this view, suggesting a static bundle of governmental powers which are either in the hands of the national government or reserved to the states. The evolution of federalism has thus consisted of the movement of powers from one government to the other, or more specifically the movement of powers from the states to the national government.
Greve argues that this image of federalism is wrong. Deploying a public choice framework to help understand how political institutions interact with one another, Greve argues that we should not think of federalism as being about the allocation of amounts of government power. Rather, we should think of federalism as being about how government exercises power, the quality and character of government power. Contra many conservatives, Greve contends that the problem with modern federalism is not that the national government does too much and the states too little, but that both governments are doing the wrong things and have perverted federal forms to facilitate the pursuit of problematic political ends. According to Greve, the states are in fact more powerful at the beginning of the twenty-first century than they were at the beginning of the twentieth century. As he reasonably notes, the New Deal “was not a revolution in favor of central government but a revolution in favor of government at all levels” (182), and state governments supported rather than opposed the innovations of the New Deal. Conservative reformers, therefore, should not be concerned with empowering states. They should focus their efforts on recasting what states do and restoring effective constraints on all government.
In particular, Greve wants us to focus less on centralization versus decentralization and focus more on competitive federalism versus cartelized federalism. The nineteenth-century Constitution maintained a system of competitive federalism; the contemporary Constitution is characterized by cartels. Competitive federalism reduces the monopoly power of government by putting various political units in competition with one another for resources and citizens. In this model, the state and national governments have distinct areas of responsibility, with states focused on providing goods and services that primarily affect their internal, but mobile, population and that can be funded through local revenues. By contrast, cartel federalism encourages the central government to reduce competition among the states over taxes and regulatory and distributive policies, while empowering states to “tax citizens in excess of the cost of providing public services” (4).
Greve elaborates his overarching ideas about constitutionalism and federalism in three chapters, where he positions himself as centrally concerned with constitutional design with a particular application to the case of the United States. In three subsequent sections, Greve examines how the American federal system has operated in the early nineteenth century, the turn of the twentieth century, and the post–New Deal period. In each of these periods, he explores three broad facets of federalism: commerce and economic regulation, private law governing economic interactions, and fiscal institutions and policies. The case law of the US Supreme Court provides much of the fodder for the discussion, but Greve also ranges across other legal, political, and intellectual materials to help flesh out the changing shape of federalism. Greve concludes that the modern federal system inverts the traditional structure, not simply by creating a big government at the top but by nationalizing policies that ought to be localized while decentralizing policies that ought to be nationalized. Of particular concern for him is that this results in a political system capable of providing benefits that it is not willing or able to adequately fund.
Greve's perspective is often quite helpful. Especially when analyzing cases in the nineteenth century, the logic of competitive federalism proves useful for understanding the development of judicial doctrines. Just as Ken Kersch's Constructing Civil Liberties (Cambridge University Press, 2004) forced us to rethink how we discuss and teach some canonical cases on individual rights, so Greve's book will alter how we teach many federalism cases.
Greve is a contrarian, and his approach to federalism is at odds not only with the Progressives and their heirs but also with many modern conservatives. Greve has little interest in originalism, and he is deeply critical of the Rehnquist Court's concern with “states qua states.” For Greve, the federal structure is supposed to be a mechanism for disciplining the states, not for protecting their dignity or status. The goal is not “states' rights,” but state competition. Police powers, the traditional doctrine of state authority favored by many proponents of decentralization, is, for Greve, often just an excuse that allows state governments to impose extraterritorial costs on the national polity while exploiting their own citizens. But the wide-ranging scope of national powers under the commerce, taxation, and spending clauses often frees the state governments from having to make difficult political choices and subsidizes unsustainable policies. Greve has little use for defenses of federalism that focus on the alleged responsiveness of local governments or the heterogeneous preferences of the national populace. State power is limited by the ability of citizens to “vote with their feet,” and competitive federalism creates a political marketplace that limits the ability of any government to exploit a captured populace.
Much of this will be familiar. Political scholars of “intergovernmental relations” have long debated the qualitative character of the American federal system and the transition from a system of dual, competitive federalism to something else. Legal scholars of economic regulations are quite familiar with the details of the dormant commerce clause, preemption doctrine, and the status of the federal common law. But Greve is right that the sliding scale of more or less power is a common way that federalism is discussed in both political and legal circles. Ronald Reagan's suggestion that federalism meant “putting the states more and more in charge” resonates, but is misleading. Moreover, Greve is generally persuasive in showing how the competitive federalism framework can help us make sense of both the constitutional text and early judicial doctrine and political practices. Even so, there are some unresolved ambiguities in the project. It is not always clear whether the idea of competitive federalism is one that puts states in competition with one another or one that sustains an efficient national marketplace. The idea of cartel federalism is less well developed. Although he gets the basic point across, there are few bright lines that can help us distinguish between policies that are consistent with competitive federalism and those that are not. The book often focuses on the idea that states themselves create cartels under the modern system, that the system is too responsive to the interests of state politicians, but many of the policies identified seem more substantially driven by the preferences of voters and interest groups than those of state government officials. The more subtle variations in federal relations over the past hundred years that have preoccupied federalism scholars largely fly under the radar of Greve's dichotomous schema, and whether the model of state cartels better accounts for modern federalism and the dysfunctions of contemporary politics than alternative models is not explored in depth. Nonetheless, The Upside-Down Constitution rewards careful reading and poses interesting challenges to conservative legal scholars in particular.
