This excellent book explores the protection of personal identity and freedom through human rights law. It opens with a powerful statement of the importance of a sense of self and the challenges to that sense of self posed by modern life:
‘A sense of one’s own personal identity is crucial to human beings. Without a sense of identity, the self can disintegrate, be lost, obscured and vulnerable. Indeed modern selfhood – encapsulating some idea of what it means to be my own person, to be me or for you to be you – has recently been described as “flexible, fractured, fragmented, decentred and brittle…”. Lack of self, a sense of selflessness, can be experienced as incapacity, objecthood and “otherhood”, damaging and unfair’ (p. 1, quoting Elliott, Reference Elliott2001, p. 2).
This might suggest that Jill Marshall sees identity in an atomised sense, but it is clear she does not. She later explains that she sees a sense of self as intimately connected to relationships with others.
After an introductory chapter, the book is divided into four parts. The first part (chapters 2 and 3) explores different conceptions of personal freedom. The author, having recognised the importance of the notion of selfhood and outlined the attacks on it, examines how human rights law can be used to protect it. She acknowledges that the relationship between autonomy and human rights is complex. As she points out, there is considerable debate over whether we have human rights because we are autonomous or whether we are able to be autonomous because we have human rights. Marshall helpfully separates out two versions of freedom. The first she describes as self-determination or self-creation: ‘becoming the person you want to be – evolving and changing in line with your choices, self-constituting’ (p. 16). The second is a version of autonomy as self-realisation or self-description. Both of these are important aspects of freedom, although, as the author points out, the precise extent to which external forces can impede freedom is unclear. In particular, there is the difficulty of knowing whether an individual’s choices genuinely represent his or her own real interests or whether they reflect pressures from outside the self. This leads us to the discussion over positive and negative freedoms for individuals: negative freedom being protection from outside intervention, and positive being claims to assistance from the state and other people. These reflect a wider dispute over the nature of the self. As Marshall explains, there are two different conceptions of the person:
‘One is innately separate, individualistic, unconnected, rights oriented, even antagonistic, as seen in the negative version of freedom. The other is innately connected, communitarian, even selfless, concerned with responsibility, as seen in the positive version’ (p. 16).
She argues that these different conceptions of the self will affect which kinds of human rights one might wish to promote and what role they should play.
Part Two (chapters 4 and 5) focuses specifically on issues around privacy and personal autonomy. Chapter 4 contains an impressive consideration of alternative definitions of privacy. The author acknowledges that thinking of autonomy and interdependence as opposites creates difficulties. She rejects a negative conception of rights because she links positive freedom to the social formation of the individual. Indeed, the interconnection between the individual and the social is key to freedom. We need to respect individuals and recognise the social view of humanity. Rights therefore have a greater role than simply ensuring that we are left alone. They need to recognise and enable interconnection.
Chapter 5 considers the role of the European Court of Human Rights in developing an approach to personal autonomy. The author’s interpretation of the case-law is that the courts have accepted that development of personal identity ‘is intricately linked to, even dependent on, individuals’ relationships with other autonomous beings and the wider environment in which they are situated’ (p. 85). This means that Article 8 has been used in a way that recognises that relations with other people are important to one’s personal autonomy. However, the author is disappointed in the Court’s failure to recognise the role that animals and environmental factors can play in autonomy formation.
Part Three of the book explores notions surrounding personal identity. Chapter 6 explores conceptions of identity. Marshall suggests three characteristics which are crucial to ‘perhaps everyone’s identity’: ‘sex, knowledge and understanding of one’s origins and past experiences, and one’s religious or other belief system’ (p. 5). Identity, Marshall claims, is largely created by social forces. She sees individuals’ ideas about themselves as only making sense when viewed in the social network of which they are an element.
Chapter 7 explores notions of sexual identity. Marshall regards a person’s gender and sexuality as key to his or her identity. She then outlines some of the leading cases on age of consent, group same-sex sexual activity, adoption, transsexual people and the military. It is rather disappointing that this chapter does little more than set out the case-law in this area. More could have been done to consider the construction of sexual identity revealed in the court judgments. Indeed, a consideration of the treatment of intersex people might have assisted a more radical challenge to the constructions of sexual identity set out in the chapter.
Chapter 8 explores the case-law on access to information, and in particular the rights of children to access to information about their genetic origins. The trends in the case-law are explained and the author sets out the law well. However, there is little critical analysis of the right to know one’s genetic origins. The discussion in chapter 2 could have been well used to consider the extent to which such claims represent genuine desires or are social constructions. Further, although the clash between the rights of children and donors is well brought out, there are wider interests that can be raised. The impact on rates of donation and the resulting lack of provision for infertile couples is not explored sufficiently.
Chapter 9 explores religious identity, and in particular the Islamic headscarf issue. Marshall is sympathetic to rights claims based on religion and belief. She argues: ‘The importance of beliefs and conscience to one’s identity cannot be overstated for these enable a person to live by a set of rules and values of fundamental worth to that person’ (p. 140). She accepts that the state may have a legitimate interest in restraining beliefs with serious antisocial consequences. However, she is not convinced that Article 9 has been successful in protecting people’s religious beliefs. The heart of the error in the courts’ approach as she sees it is that religion is not recognised as crucial for some people’s identity. This means it is undervalued. She contrasts the approach to Article 9 with that to Article 8, where the links between autonomy and identity are constantly forged. Her complaint is made with specific reference to the case-law on Islamic headscarves. The example is particularly pertinent because it brings together a number of the themes of the book. She is especially critical of the claim that sex equality justifies the banning of the headscarf in schools. She argues that ‘the principle of sexual equality does not provide a justification for prohibiting a woman from following a freely adopted practice’ (p. 156). Of course, as the author accepts, the assumption in her argument is that the wearing of the headscarf is freely adopted. Her criticism of the European Court of Human Rights is that it too readily assumed it was not. She argues:
‘The jurisprudence fails to see that upholding a form of equality that acknowledges differences amongst people, including their cultural identity and religious beliefs, rather than insisting they are somehow the same, is also a conception of equality: indeed some would say a more meaningful one’ (p. 156).
She makes a helpful analogy to the feminist sameness/difference debates that were particularly prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. She emphasises the danger of assuming that individuals from non-Western or minority groups are driven by cultural dictates to behave in certain ways rather than accepting these choices as their own. The argument is well made. How easy it is to assume that because people do not behave as we would expect or want them to that they must in some way not be acting freely. She sees the headscarves case-law as involving the forcing of women to conform to standards with which they may not agree in the name of gender equality.
The fourth part of the book considers questions of person integrity. As the author accepts, this is a somewhat elusive concept, especially when issues such as psychological integrity are examined. Chapter 10 considers the notion of integrity. Marshall explores the law’s protection from physical intrusions, as well as the treatment of disability, medical interventions and death. This chapter is primarily a summary of the courts’ approach, lacking sophisticated analysis of the kind found in other chapters.
This book provides an outstanding analysis of the conceptions of autonomy and selfhood. Marshall presents the differing views in a clear and fair way. Throughout the book, she recognises the benefits of seeking a middle road between the different understandings, acknowledging the role of both the social and individual in conceptions of autonomy and self. There were two main concerns I had with the book. First, there were places where I thought the author’s disagreement with the findings of fact led her to unfair criticism of the courts. For example, the author is critical of the decisions in Pretty Footnote 1 and Laskey,Footnote 2 which she regards as failing to consider the importance of the nature of the activities in question to those involved (p. 161). She sees these cases as revealing ‘the protection of the majority rather than focussing on the nature of human rights as a protector of individuals, often against the opposition of the moral majority’ (p. 202). That does not really represent what the courts were seeking to do in these cases. They made no claim to base their decision on imposing the view of the moral majority. The decisions were primarily based on protection of vulnerable groups. In Pretty, for example, the court thought there was a clash between the interests of those wishing to die and the interests of those who did not wish to die but might be pressurised or manipulated into the wish to do so. It may well be that the court was wrong to decide that there were such vulnerable people or that their interests were given too much weight. But to characterise the decision as the court imposing the views of the moral majority is rather unfair. Similarly, her attack on the headscarves case as failing to protect personal freedom appropriately may in fact rest on whether the courts were right to think that the scarf was worn involuntarily or not. While the author may disagree with the court’s finding of fact (or rather willingness to assume a fact without proof), that is not the same as saying that its conception of autonomy was improper. It would have been interesting to know how the author thought these cases should have been decided on the assumption that the court was correct in assuming that there were many cases of women wearing the headscarf involuntarily.
Second, the value of social interaction and relationships was presented in terms of their value in creating personal identity. For example, Marshall argues that religious practices are of great value because they play a role in individual identity. However, most religions are more than an aspect of personal identity: they create a community who perceive themselves as having a group identity; hence the perception among many groups that a wrong done to one member is a wrong done to all those sharing that faith. The faith community itself can have power and influence that it can exercise (for good or ill) on its members and others. So, the value (or lack thereof) of a religion lies not simply in its role in individual identity, but also in the creation of a community, sometimes a powerful one.
This book is an excellent analysis of many complex ideas. The notion of self; what it means to be free; our understanding of autonomy; and the role of rights are all examined in depth. Jill Marshall provides a fair and thorough explanation of the views of others. There are places where she could have been more explicit in her opinions. Indeed, sometimes it is not until the end of the chapter that her particular approach becomes apparent. However, the overview of the competing themes and claims of others allows the reader to journey with the author on the route by which she reached her conclusion. Marshall’s conclusion is one many will agree with:
‘The protection of the privacy of the individual extending beyond acts of interference by a government to encompass a requirement of positive action from them to prevent and deal with any violations by private actors is also an important development in this area. There is a need to deal with securing the necessary opportunities and means to enable people to exercise effectively the freedom to express and develop their personalities. The right to personality implies the widest possible freedom of choice and the minimum of coerced choices for individuals. Living in a society this means that all need to have these rights secured. However the tendency to view equality as some form of Principle to which all have to conform in sameness and uniformity is to be avoided’ (p. 205).
