As the introduction to this special issue shows, in recent years the historiography of neoliberalism has experienced a remarkable expansion. So much so that it has become fundamental for understanding late twentieth-century economic and political history as well as the transformations of contemporary capitalism. While a substantial body of scholarship had already developed before the 2000s, this expansion gained momentum in the aftermath of the Great Recession from 2008.Footnote 1
More recently, scholars have examined neoliberalism in relation to other political families and ideologies. They have connected it to the rise of the contemporary radical right, interpreting them as mutually reinforcing,Footnote 2 and to the decline and transformation of the left.Footnote 3 However, relatively few studies have analysed from a historical perspective the relationship between neoliberalism and Western Europe’s principal centre-left force, social democracy, which was one of the primary targets of neoliberal critique.
This review engages with this relationship, examining some of the most significant recent contributions in English, identifying their main approaches, core arguments and geographical scopes. In doing so, it seeks to systematise this literature, assess how these works explain the relationship between neoliberalism and social democracy. It also aims to contribute to the objective of this special issue, namely to move beyond state-centred narratives on neoliberalism by highlighting works that shed light on the transnational circulation, adaptation and contestation of neoliberal ideas and practices across different political, ideological and institutional contexts. Finally, it tentatively identifies avenues for future research.
First, I will briefly outline, necessarily in a simplified manner, the main interpretative frameworks of the field in which the works that I will analyse here are situated, but which they also transcend in some respects. Overall, histories of neoliberalism tend to share a well-established interpretation regarding its relationship with social democracy: that, to a greater or lesser degree, social democracy underwent a process of neoliberalisation between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, thereby contributing to the consolidation of neoliberalism as a dominant economic paradigm.Footnote 4
On the other hand, scholarship on social democracy, mainly produced by political and social scientists with valuable contributions from historians, has tended to situate the adoption of neoliberal policies by social democratic parties within broader accounts of the transformation of social democracy since the crises of the 1970s, rather than focusing specifically on neoliberalisation.Footnote 5 The tendency in this scholarship is to explain this process of adoption through a set of structural factors.Footnote 6
Thus, the adoption of neoliberal policies is often framed as a constrained strategic response to the reconfiguration of the political economy of advanced capitalism. The abandonment of the Bretton Woods system and the economic crises of the 1970s undermined the growth conditions that had previously sustained redistributive policies, while accelerating capital mobility and intensifying international competition.Footnote 7 At the same time, the sociological and cultural transformation of social democracy’s electoral base, marked by the decline of the industrial working class and the post-1968 fragmentation of left constituencies, with the subsequent effects on electoral competition and growing importance of the middle class, altered the representational framework on which these parties operated.Footnote 8 These shifts contributed to, and were reinforced by, the consolidation of an elite consensus around the necessity of market-oriented reforms. Furthermore, international institutional constraints, especially those associated with European integration, such as the monetary discipline embedded in the European Monetary System, and the decision-making procedures that require agreements among the (European Community [EC]/EU) member states, were also key factors shaping social democratic responses. In addition, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the disappearance of the fear that its mere existence had instilled in the forces of the right, further weakened the preconditions on which social democracy had thrived.
In this context, the adoption of privatisation, deregulation and, in some cases, austerity by social democratic governments and parties appears as a recalibration of social democratic strategies under conditions of structural constraint.Footnote 9 In this sense, the neoliberalisation of social democracy is interpreted as an adaptive transformation,Footnote 10 that led social democracy to assume the role of buffering the harsher social consequences of neoliberal change while nevertheless embracing neoliberalism.Footnote 11 To better understand the historiographical interventions made by the works analysed below, it is worth noting that, while this is, overall, a compelling interpretation, it leaves little room for contingency and for considering alternatives that, while plausible at the time, were ultimately not realised or only partially realised.
This interpretation has been accompanied by a more critical counter-narrative, however. Often emerging from the left, it has not always been systematically formulated in scholarly terms, but it has circulated widely in political debates and public discourse since the 1980s. From this perspective, the transformation of social democracy is understood as a betrayal of its traditional values and policy commitments, or as the result of deliberate political choices that moved it away from them. This view has been reinforced by the fact that social democracy’s perceived capitulation followed a period of radicalisation in the 1970s, when alternative paths, beyond both capitalism and Soviet-style communism, appeared plausible.
A recent example of how widespread and politically powerful this interpretation is was provided by the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, at the Global Progressive Mobilisation summit held in Barcelona on 16–17 April 2026. There, he blamed the leaders of the progressive forces around the world for having made ‘the crucial mistake’ of not opposing neoliberalism in the past, ‘… many among us adopted it. Leftist governments abandoned public policies in the name of governability. We became the system’.Footnote 12 From this perspective, the shift was not structurally inevitable, but rather the outcome of political agency.Footnote 13
The reasons for the neoliberalisation of social democracy and the extent to which social democratic parties adapted to, internalised or resisted neoliberalism remain important and contested questions in the historiography. The works analysed here, published between 2016 and 2025, address these questions in a nuanced manner and do not fully align with any of the above-mentioned general interpretations. While they largely accept the overarching narrative of constraint described above, they also highlight the agency of social democrats, the alternatives they proposed and fought for, and the hybrid and uneven processes through which neoliberalism was adopted and resisted. In doing so, they also move away, albeit to varying degrees, from the thesis of the betrayal of social democracy.
Taken together, they offer important insights. First, they show that, despite the difficulty of defining what constitutes neoliberalisation, this issue can be grasped by examining specific concepts or policy areas through which the relationship between neoliberalism and social democracy can be observed. A key distinction emerges between understanding neoliberalism as an economic and political ideology, something that social democracy did not adopt, and understanding it as a common sense,Footnote 14 or a set of economic and social policies adapted to local contexts, in which case social democracy can be said to have partially neoliberalised for having adopted and implemented some policies that we commonly understand as neoliberal, such as deregulation, monetary discipline and labour market flexibilisation. Second, the works reviewed suggest that social democracy only partially adopted neoliberal tenets. To a great extent it accepted the predominance of markets, competition and monetarism, but important areas of resistance persisted across factions, individual actors and specific policy domains such as education and health, as well as in efforts to maintain a significant role for the state in the management of the economy. Understanding how particular forms of neoliberalism became hegemonic requires attention to local contexts and actors. Third, these works tend to focus on the British and Nordic cases (especially Sweden), which are often treated as paradigmaticFootnote 15 and are now relatively well understood, while also engaging with other cases such as France and Spain. Despite this focus, they consistently show – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – the fundamentally transnational character of the neoliberalisation of social democracy. Fourth, they show that the roots of the neoliberalisation of social democracy lie not only in the successful diffusion of neoliberal ideas and policies, but also in the traditions and ideological developments of the left itself. Finally, they emphasise the role of party elites, who, influenced by experts (chiefly economists trained in neoliberal frameworks), and under conditions of structural constraint, were key to explaining the adoption of neoliberal policies by the parties of the centre-left.
I would also suggest that these works point to a broader implication: by rejecting teleological explanations of the neoliberalisation of social democracy, by showing that viable alternatives existed, and that contingency and internal struggles within the left played a significant role in shaping its trajectory, they remind us of the need to consider social democracy (and neoliberalism) as a historically evolving and open-ended ideological formation.
Why, How and to What Extent Did Social Democracy Neoliberalise?
Globalisation as well as international and institutional constraints affected Western European social democratic parties, as we have seen. Among these factors, the EC has received increasing historiographical attention. By examining the ideas and attempts of socialist and social democratic parties to construct a ‘Social Europe’ from the 1960s to the 1980s, the book Social Europe, the Road Not Taken. The Left and European Integration in the Long 1970s, by Aurélie Andry, deepens our understanding of the importance of European integration for explaining the neoliberalisation of the left.Footnote 16 This book does not directly address the question of how and why social democracy neoliberalised, but it shows how the main alternative fought for by European social democrats at the EC level failed, thereby opening the way for neoliberalisation. Rather than treating neoliberalisation as inevitable, or as the result of a straightforward ideological conversion or betrayal, Andry interprets it as the outcome of a contingent political struggle that the left ultimately lost. From this perspective, the ‘long 1970s’ (roughly from 1968 to 1985) emerge as a period of open-ended contestation.
Drawing on primary sources from the historical archives of several social democratic parties and trade unions, as well as the historical archives of EU institutions, Andry shows that during the long 1970s social democratic parties were the key part of a broader transnational socialist project, alongside trade unions and other actors of the left, that aimed to build a socialist Europe (there were several versions of this project, but they broadly coincided in the attempt to expand forms of economic democracy, a coordinated redistributive political economy and the democratisation of the European institutions) capable of reshaping the trajectory of European integration beyond its primarily market-oriented logic. One of the main reasons for the failure of this project was that social democracy itself remained internally divided over how far it should go in challenging capitalism.Footnote 17 Moreover, other factors also contributed to the derailment of efforts to construct a genuinely socialist ‘Social Europe’, including the institutional constraints of the EC, the weak transnational coordination among left-wing actors and strong opposition from conservative political and economic forces. However, Andry specifically highlights:
the incapacity of the advocates of ‘social Europe’ to build organic connection with the rank-and-file, with their supporters, and with grassroots movements, and to build widespread transnational popular support for an alternative project is not only the main reason why ‘social Europe’ failed; it is also a piece of the puzzle that allows a better grasp of the transformation of social democracy in Europe and the paradigm shift to neoliberal capitalism from the late 1970s onwards.Footnote 18
Thus, Andry suggests that failure of the left to take advantage of the window of opportunity opened in the 1970s was a relevant factor in the consolidation of a predominantly neoliberal EC, and in social democracy’s subsequent accommodation to neoliberalism. This paradigm shift is not explored in detail in her book, yet it is likely not to have been straightforward, since, although the EC became predominantly neoliberal from the 1980s onwards, it never became exclusively so.Footnote 19
The significance of Andry’s work lies not only in its empirical reconstruction. Her work, together with some of the studies analysed below, aligns with a broader historiographical trend that takes into account alternative ideas, policies and projects that did not fully materialise but which, when properly considered, help challenge teleological narratives. In doing so, it invites a more critical reassessment of the emergence and consolidation of neoliberalism, highlighting the importance of political choices, structural factors and historical contingency.
This work demonstrates that European social democrats perceived the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s as exceeding the capacities of individual nation-states, and that they sought to organise a common response. It also highlights the value of approaching the history of European social democracy from a transnational perspective. By contrast, the literature that more directly examines the mechanisms through which neoliberal ideas entered social democratic parties and governments, while often sensitive to transnational dynamics and exchanges, has tended to focus primarily on national case studies and their comparison. Political and social scientists such as Johanna Bockman, Stephanie Mudge and Cornel Ban made key contributions to this line of inquiry in the 2010s. They highlighted three especially relevant points. First, that the neoliberalisation of the left did not only occur through exogenous factors, but also emerged from internal debates, and that neoliberalism, to some extent, developed through contact and exchange with socialism.Footnote 20 Second, that economists and other experts played a central role in facilitating the adoption of market-oriented ideas by leaders of European social democracy. Third, that understanding how neoliberalism, and which variants of it, became hegemonic requires taking into account the local contexts in which it was adopted and the agency and competences of local actors in shaping its adaptation.
Stephanie Mudge’s book, Leftism Reinvented. Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism,Footnote 21 interprets the transformation of the left by tracing the long-term evolution of centre-left parties (the British Labour Party, the German Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of the United States) and the changing role of party experts within them. Drawing on political sociology and intellectual history, she argues that the neoliberalisation of these parties, the adoption of a ‘neoliberal ethic’, was the result of the shift in the internal composition of these parties, especially the change in the profile and task of economic experts. Mudge identifies two profound transformations of the socialist movements in the twentieth century that she calls ‘reinventions’: ‘first, from socialist to economic leftism …, second from economistic to neoliberalized leftism …’.Footnote 22 This leads her to interpret the neoliberalisation of social democracy as a significant rupture with previous traditions, what she calls ‘an important departure in the trajectory of Western leftism’.Footnote 23
She shows how early socialist movements were shaped by activists, journalists and agitators with limited academic training. After 1945, however, economists with academic backgrounds came to occupy a central role, contributing to the construction and management of the post-war Keynesian order. From the 1980s onwards, economic experts increasingly acted as conduits for market-oriented ideas. Mudge identifies the rise of what she terms ‘transnational, finance-oriented economists’,Footnote 24 who, unlike the previous generation, were no longer primarily linked to academia, but instead maintained close ties to domestic and international financial institutions and transnational policy networks. These experts advised governments to defer to market mechanisms, thereby contributing to the neoliberalisation of left parties. At the same time, as the gap widened between their market-centred concerns and those of left parties’ constituencies, other kinds of experts proliferated within these parties, particularly specialists in public relations and electoral strategy, whose role was to bridge this representative gap.
Mudge’s focus is not primarily on measuring policies or considering alternative ideas or projects, but rather on analysing changes in political discourse, expert cultures and the sociological composition of left parties. This deliberate choice has provided important insights into the intellectual and political history of social democracy, notably by offering a sociological explanation of ideological change and highlighting the centrality of experts and expertise within the left. However, the focus on the relations between party elites and experts tends to leave less clearly specified how ideas were translated into concrete policies. Moreover, despite the richness and diversity of sources used in this book, the relatively limited use of party archives makes it difficult to observe the intra-party dynamics and conflicts that the neoliberalisation of social democracy might have caused. These are issues that have been addressed more specifically by some of the works analysed below.
Cornel Ban’s book, Ruling Ideas. How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local,Footnote 25 is another major contribution to understanding how and why social democracy neoliberalised, while also highlighting the importance of international entanglements and transnational connections from the perspective of Southern Europe. Published in 2016, the book compares Spain and Romania, examining how neoliberal ideas were imported and subsequently reinterpreted within distinct local contexts. While taking external influences seriously, Ban also emphasises the role of domestic actors and institutions in reshaping these ideas and practices. Attentive to the flexibility of economic theories and their openness to adaptation, he analyses how neoliberalism became hegemonic in both countries from the 1970s to the 2000s. His argument is that neoliberalism is shaped through local reinterpretations that reflect domestic intellectual traditions as well as national and transnational struggles, thereby producing hybrid forms. These forms range from ‘embedded neoliberalism’, which seeks to moderate the social effects of markets (as it happened in Spain), to ‘disembedded neoliberalism’, which does not (as it happened in Romania).Footnote 26 In doing so, Ban challenges homogenising and diffusionist accounts of neoliberalism.
Considering the thematic and chronological focus of this review article, as well as space constraints, the Romanian case can only be addressed briefly. Suffice it to note that Romania’s turn towards neoliberalism occurred later than Spain’s, beginning in the late 1990s, and followed a rather different trajectory: after initially resisting neoliberal ideas, a particularly radical version of neoliberalism was adopted. This transformation was promoted by a heterogeneous coalition of actors, many of whom were not professional economists, and occurred largely outside the traditions of Western European social democracy.
By contrast, Ban’s analysis of the Spanish case is particularly relevant for the purposes of this review, because Spain’s adoption of embedded neoliberalism occurred largely under socialist governments (1982–96), illustrating how social democratic actors both adopted and reshaped neoliberal ideas. A crucial role in this process was played by economic experts who moved between the research service of the Bank of Spain, prestigious Anglo-American academic institutions (Oxford, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and government. Being part of transnational intellectual networks and debates since Franco’s years, these actors ‘did not engage in a process of copying and pasting’.Footnote 27 Instead, they contributed to the development of a form of neoliberalism combined with socially oriented policies, in the specific context of democratic consolidation and Spain’s European integration.
While these experts fit, to an important extent, Mudge’s characterisation of the party expert that emerged in the 1980s, their profiles were more complex in the Spanish context, as Ban shows. Their trajectories were often hybrid, combining characteristics associated with earlier types of experts, including academic careers, party involvement and experience in technocratic economic institutions.
To this must be added the party’s transnational connections from the early years of the transition to democracy, particularly its links with German social democracy.Footnote 28 These contacts, and the support provided by German actors, facilitated early exposure to ordoliberal ideas, which give an important role to the state as regulator ensuring that markets can operate properly. This had a dual effect for the Spanish socialists: on the one hand, it discouraged the adoption of a more radical, Marxist-oriented economic stance; on the other, it also prevented the embrace of a more radical version of neoliberalism. As a result, although Spain’s neoliberal conversion led by the socialists was relatively rapid, it produced a form of embedded neoliberalism: a hybrid that combined macroeconomic orthodoxy, deregulation and privatisation with commitments to progressive taxation, robust public services and broad public investment strategies.
This opens a fresh, nuanced interpretation of both the recent past and the present of neoliberalism in Spain. As more recent scholarship has shown, although the Spanish state has pursued neoliberal policies in various domains since the 1980s, notably labour policy, its fiscal policy has remained at odds with core neoliberal prescriptions, and political elites have not fully abandoned the principle of progressive taxation. The concept of neoliberalism, therefore, risks providing an overly reductive account of the recent trajectory of Spanish social democracy and the Spanish state.Footnote 29
In the 2020s, historians have built on the insights of these works. However, whereas political scientists have analysed how the neoliberal paradigm penetrated social democracy, often tending to interpret the transformation of the centre-left as consolidated, historians, without avoiding these questions, are placing a greater emphasis on contingency, internal debates and conflicts within centre-left parties, temporality and alternative paths, thereby challenging teleological interpretations, as already seen in the case of Andry’s work.
A contribution that addresses the relationship between neoliberalism and social democracy in the Nordic countries is Ilkka Kärrylä’s Democracy and the Economy in Finland and Sweden since 1960: A Nordic Perspective on Neoliberalism.Footnote 30 The book focuses on economic democracy in the Nordic countries and, by doing so, it also examines the neoliberalisationFootnote 31 of Sweden and Finland during a period of social democratic political dominance. Using a conceptual history approach, its point of departure is that neoliberal conceptions, particularly those that treat democracy and the economy as separate spheres, have become increasingly dominant, thereby undermining earlier notions of economic democracy, which the book seeks to recover and analyse. Kärrylä adopts a more critical perspective by challenging the view that the Nordic countries remained relatively resistant to neoliberalisation due to the persistence of strong welfare states. Instead, he highlights the significant conceptual and policy changes that Sweden and Finland have undergone since the 1970s. Kärrylä argues that the range of possible meanings attached to economic democracy narrowed significantly since the end of the 1970s, as this change ‘undermined especially one traditional element of economic democracy: State-led democratic steering of the economy’,Footnote 32 marking a decisive moment in the redefinition of the relationship between democracy and the economy in the Nordic context.
Kärrylä’s analysis shows how, as social democratic parties confronted the constraints imposed by an increasingly internationalised capitalism, earlier ambitions of economic democracy were gradually reformulated rather than simply abandoned. This transformation was neither abrupt nor reducible to external economic pressures alone. Faced with inflation, financial internationalisation and the perceived limits of national economic management, social democrats increasingly came to regard market efficiency, international competitiveness and democratic governance as distinct spheres. At the same time, electoral considerations and changing ideological assumptions reinforced the perception that more explicitly socialist policies were no longer economically or politically viable. The result was not a straightforward embrace of neoliberalism, but a gradual adaptation that loosened political control over capital and contributed, often unintentionally, to the consolidation of global capitalism and to policy orientations later associated with the ‘Third Way’. Although the concept of enterprise democracy did not completely disappear from leftist rhetoric, its meaning narrowed and ended up referring to the existing practices of codetermination and cooperation.
While Sweden often functioned as a key reference point, particularly in debates on economic democracy, Kärrylä shows how Finnish actors both drew lessons from Swedish experiences and developed their own responses to similar structural and ideological challenges, resulting in trajectories that were interconnected but not identical, with Finnish actors revising their economic views already in 1977, earlier than their Swedish counterparts. This suggests forms of entanglement that cannot be reduced to simple models of policy transfer or diffusion.Footnote 33 Moreover, these debates were not exclusive to the Nordic countries. Similar discussions emerged across Western European social democratic movements, taking different forms such as workers’ self-management, industrial democracy or autogestion.Footnote 34 The coexistence of parallel debates, shared concerns and mutual references across national contexts points to the need for more genuinely transnational and entangled histories of the relationship between social democracy and neoliberalism at the European level.
The most recent book analysed here, The Rise and Fall of Swedish Social Democracy by Kjell Östberg,Footnote 35 offers a concise but comprehensive account of the Swedish social democratic movement from its origins to the present. His long-term perspective highlights an idea that seems to be obvious, but that is often overlooked: that the trajectory of Swedish social democracy remains open-ended rather than definitively settled. Regarding the relationship between Swedish social democracy and neoliberalism, addressed directly in the last chapter and the conclusion, Kjell Östberg builds primarily on the existing literature. This enables him to synthesise recent historiographical contributions into a coherent narrative while also putting forward his own interpretative claims. First, neoliberal ideas entered social democratic leadership circles through a new generation of economists and policy experts who gained prominence after Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP’s) electoral defeat of 1976 and were supported by Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt (1983–90); a group that came to be known as the ‘chancellery right’.Footnote 36 Second, although many leaders, most notably Olof Palme, had adopted a radical discourse prior to the 1980s, they consistently sought to keep more far-reaching left-wing solutions to the crises of the 1970s at bay, most notably the Meidner Plan,Footnote 37 remaining open instead to alternatives that did not entail a rupture with capitalism or a slowdown in economic growth. Third, while neoliberal ideas penetrated SAP, it did not adopt neoliberalism tout court.Footnote 38
Thus, despite devaluing the Swedish krona, adopting austerity measures to combat inflation and loosening regulations on capital flows in the 1980s, SAP, and chiefly Olof Palme, resisted going too far in dismantling the welfare state through privatisation. However, two distinct but complementary logics within the party facilitated the partial adoption of neoliberal policies. On the one hand, Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt argued that the party needed to modernise and incorporate new economic ideas. On the other hand, Palme himself supported the adoption of a revised economic policy suited to new international constraints and informed by expert advice, with the aim of restoring economic growth and thereby enabling a return to the redistributive social democracy of the 1960s and 1970s. In this sense, the reforms of the 1980s were conceived less as a rupture with social democratic principles than as a temporary adjustment, a sacrifice intended to recover earlier achievements rather than to redefine them. However, this latest accommodation to capitalism, implemented at a moment when alternative paths may still have been available, ultimately contributed to worsening conditions in the 1990s, when a new economic crisis prompted deeper austerity measures and made it far more difficult to preserve the gains of the postwar social democratic model (and after Palme had been assassinated). While this story is not entirely new, by situating it within the broader historical trajectory of the SAP, Östberg highlights the contingent nature of social democratic development.
The final book examined is a recent work on the ideological transformation of the Labour Party, often considered the paradigmatic centre-left party in its adaptation to neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Colm Murphy’s Futures of Socialism: ‘Modernisation’, the Labour Party, and the British Left, 1973–1997 Footnote 39 examines how the idea of ‘modernisation’ was conceived, contested and mobilised within Labour as a framework for understanding the origins, directions and legacies of the transformation of British socialism and social democracy. Murphy demonstrates that modernisation was not exclusive to the group later identified as the ‘modernisers’, led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, as mainstream narratives of the Labour Party’s recent past have assumed, but was also advocated by a wide range of actors on the left, both inside and outside the party, who proposed different solutions to a shared set of perceived problems.
At the core of the debates on modernisation was Labour’s difficulty in responding to the perceived challenges of the period, including the rise of multinationals and globalisation, deindustrialisation, the transformation of the working class and the rise of post-1968 social movements. Murphy reconstructs a series of alternative projects advanced in the 1980s, many of which were also framed in terms of ‘modernisation’, thereby providing a key context for understanding the eventual emergence of New Labour.
Thus, in the 1970s, ‘modernisation’ on the left often centred on different proposals, such as the Alternative Economic Strategy, which advocated import controls, nationalisations and strong state intervention. Stuart Holland, a Labour politician with a strong academic background, having studied History and earned a doctorate in Economics, was its main advocate. His thinking evolved towards the argument that globalisation and the rise of multinational corporations undermined nationally based Keynesianism, leading him to identify the EC as a potential counterweight. Others emphasised the democratisation of economic power through worker participation and ownership, while feminist perspectives and anti-racist perspectives were also introduced as modern. However, these ideas soon broadened and moderated to include the decentralisation of power to consumers, community groups, local authorities and cooperatives. Another approach, which was interesting for New Labour, was focused on ‘human capital’, stressing the relevance of education and training in a globalised competitive society.
New Labour selectively drew on these debates. As a result, Murphy argues that, despite adopting market-oriented policies and acknowledging that some New Labour ideas were influenced by neoliberal thinkers, New Labour did not simply capitulate to neoliberalism. On the one hand, state intervention in the economy remained important to its approach, and on the other, its programme also emerged from debates internal to the British left that had already taken shape in the early 1970s (some even in the mid-1960s), rather than from a simple importation of neoliberal ideology. This interpretation complicates accounts such as Mudge’s, which see New Labour as a major departure in the trajectory of the left. It is also interesting to put Murphy’s work in dialogue with Andry’s work, because the two studies complement each other. While Andry reconstructs the broader European context in which projects such as the Alternative Economic Strategy emerged, Murphy’s book examines an important part of the political and intellectual aftermath of the defeat of those alternatives. This observation helps me to point to the need for more connected histories of European social democracy, a point developed further below.
Conclusion
Taken together, all these works point to the need to rethink the temporalities of social democracy’s transformation.Footnote 40 While the fact that they occurred between the 1970s and the 1990s is clear, change happened unevenly, rather than through a single rupture. This calls for a more nuanced assessment of narratives that emphasise either the inevitability of neoliberalisation or its character as a betrayal. Instead, the evidence highlights contingency, internal struggles and alternative proposals. Regarding the latter, most of the recent literature has shown how important it is to take seriously the alternative projects that were articulated at the time, rather than dismissing them as marginal or irrelevant. Finally, the neoliberalisation of social democracy cannot be understood as entirely exogenous (without minimising the great relevance of international factors and actors), as some of its intellectual and policy origins lay within the left itself and its national traditions and political cultures.
These works can also contribute, although indirectly, to the historiography of neoliberalism in several ways. Most notably, they help to decentre neoliberalism by showing that it did not arrive nor was implemented as a coherent,Footnote 41 ready-made package imposed from outside, but was instead shaped through interaction with social democratic actors. In this sense, neoliberalism appears less as an external force that imposes itself and more as a relational process, co-produced through political negotiation, adaptation and contestation. These works foreground the role of social democracy itself in redefining, reshaping and enabling neoliberal policies. As such, these studies open a more complex understanding of neoliberalism as historically contingent and embedded in broader political and intellectual traditions and struggles.
And yet, I would argue that the fact that Western European social democracy did adapt to and was influenced by neoliberalism points to the need for more explicitly transnational and entangled histories of this process.Footnote 42 Comparative national accounts, while very valuable, are insufficient to capture the circulation of ideas, the role of shared expert networks and the cross-border exchanges so common in the social democrat family that shaped policy transformations. Entangled approaches would allow us to better understand how similar challenges were interpreted differently across contexts, how actors learned from one another and how European and global frameworks defined and influenced national choices. Developing such histories seems important not only for refining our understanding of social democracy’s transformation, but also for situating it within a broader history of neoliberalism in Europe. Another issue highlighted by these works that deserves deeper exploration is the reactions, adoption and adaptation to neoliberalism by the broader social democratic family, including trade unions, rank and file and youth sections of the parties. If an important factor explaining the adaptation of social democracy to neoliberalism was the democratic deficit within social democratic parties, this is an issue that needs to be seriously considered.
Funding statement
This work was supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Ramón y Cajal program, Grant RYC2023-045927-I. It was funded by MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and the FSE+.
