Joined by their pursuit of the causal mechanisms that drive institutional and organizational change, these authors provide a window on the promise and perils of life on a research frontier. John Campbell details the shortcomings of institutionalist theory in the face of institutional change, using the empirical case of globalization for largely illustrative purposes. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore aim to put the “organization” back into the study of international organizations, using three case studies to locate the roots of mission creep not in the demands of states but in the bureaucratic cultures of organizations themselves. These books share the claim that current institutional and organizational theories fail to incorporate the ways in which ideas determine change and stability.
Campbell moves easily among the three new institutionalisms—rational choice, organizational, and historical—arguing that despite their differences, three shared problems obstruct their progress in explaining institutional change: failure to specify the meaning of institutions; failure to identify the mechanisms that underlie the concepts of path dependence and diffusion; and failure to incorporate ideas, beyond the idea of self-interest. These three areas are the subjects of the core chapters in Institutional Change and Globalization, and they are extremely worthwhile reading for anyone interested in these problems.
We cannot explain institutional change if we cannot operationalize it empirically. This is a frequent source of misunderstanding between, for example, rational choice institutionalists focused on institutions as strategic equilibria and historical institutionalists concerned with the regular behavior induced by existing political institutions. Campbell argues that the prerequisite to resolving such conflicts is to identify the different dimensions of an institution, as well as the time frame over which change is observed. Underlining this point raises the fundamental question of whether it is informal institutions that determine change in formal institutions or vice versa (Pepper D. Culpepper, “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism, World Politics 57 [January 2005]: 173–99).
Similarly, although institutionalists have clearly specified mechanisms of persistence, they have often failed to specify the mechanisms that account for changes in the same institutions, falling back on the deus ex machina of the exogenous shock. Scholars such as Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen have made similar observations, but their preferred analytical strategy is to chart the various types of evolutionary changes. Campbell urges instead a focus on the mechanism at work during the key moment of institutional change: “the search process … whereby actors figure out evolutionary or revolutionary changes to make in their institutions” (pp. 68–69). Identifying the important actors and the process by which they craft solutions to the problems confronting their institutions is the central explanatory goal in Campbell's enterprise, and the two causal mechanisms he identifies are bricolage and translation. Bricolage is the process by which actors “craft new institutional solutions by recombining elements in their repertoire” (p. 69); translation is the process by which actors take new ideational elements and combine them with existing institutional practices.
Concentrating on such mechanisms naturally leads to a set of propositions about the role of ideas in institutional change. Ideas can be either cognitive or normative, and Campbell suggests a further distinction between ideas that sit in the foreground (programs and frames) and those that remain in the background (paradigms and public sentiments). This latter distinction seems difficult to sustain: While the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in Britain was certainly a change of paradigm, it is clear that the Conservatives under Thatcher put the paradigm shift to monetarism at the forefront of their political campaign (Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” Comparative Politics 25: 275–96). In the normative category, particular frames are likely to be more or less successful to the extent that they draw on widely shared public sentiments. Indeed, to follow the thrust of the mechanisms of both bricolage and translation, the more important variation in ideas we may want to track are the extent to which they are coordinative—that is, dependent for their effect on what actors think about what others think. We should expect different dynamics where institutional change involves a move from one coordinative equilibrium to another and where this is not the case.
Where Campbell's explanatory footing is much surer is in his strongly argued defense of the importance of agency in making ideas stick: “[I]deas do not emerge spontaneously or become influential without actors, and so it is important to situate these actors and theorize their roles vis-à-vis ideas in any account of institutional change” (p. 100). His review of the ways in which different sorts of brokers champion ideas thoughtfully synthesizes much of the existing literature on how ideas came to matter. Although the book's empirical work on globalization is itself cursory, Campbell lays out demanding empirical standards for institutionalist research to meet in order to answer the big questions of institutional change that top its agenda.
In Rules for the World, Barnett and Finnemore take aim at an object they find understudied in international relations: international organizations (IOs) qua organizations. Such IOs are assumed by many current theories to be either a tool of state interests or a functional instrument by which states solve their problems of cooperation. The authors' contribution is not so much to study neglected IOs—see the vast literature on the European Union—but to develop a theoretical approach that combines a Weberian understanding of the rationalizing tendencies of bureaucracies with a constructivist insight into the power of information. Disputing the tattered claim that IOs gain their power from information asymmetries—that is, knowing more than their member states—Barnett and Finnemore argue that IOs instead “are often the actors to whom we defer when it comes to defining meanings, norms of good behavior, the nature of social actors, and categories of legitimate action in the world. IOs are often the actors empowered to decide if there is a problem at all, what kind of problem it is, and whose responsibility it is to solve it” (p. 7). Their answer to that last question, frequently, is “IOs.”
The role of bureaucratic rules is central in this theoretical framework. Bureaucrats owe their position to their expertise, and they see the world through the lens of a bureaucratic culture. These bureaucratic rules are especially important in explaining organizational action and inaction—and over time, how organizations change—in the face of uncertainty. The mechanism here is one that Barnett and Finnemore call translation: Faced with uncertainty, “bureaucrats will act creatively as they rearrange old organizational notions and import or invent new ones to solve pressing policy problems” (p. 19). Such movement is most clearly on display in their case study of the International Monetary Fund, whose goals moved from dealing with balance-of-payment crises to the domestic sources of such crises—including “good governance rules”—that seem far removed from its initial policy mandate. The monetary focus of the Fund's construction of balance-of-payment crises pinned the burden of adjustment on deficit states, but such an outcome was not inevitable, as their carefully argued counterfactual suggests: “[O]ne obvious direction that the Fund's work could have taken would have been to expand Fund influence over surplus states in some way as a means of promoting systemic adjustment” (p. 55). This may sound outlandish to our IMF-influenced ears today, but for the fact that the IMF announced in April 2006 that it was embarking on exactly such a systemic approach that would include multilateral surveillance.
Whether or not this policy change will have teeth depends on how the richest IMF member states respond. And it is at this point that Barnett and Finnemore flinch before what they call the statist challenge: Is not the direction of bureaucratic change fundamentally hemmed in by the definition of state interests? As the authors themselves observe (p. 14), there are “obvious and widely accepted statist explanations for the behavior of IOs” in the case of the IMF, as with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Security Council in Rwanda, their other cases of mission creep (and mission retreat). Indeed, in the Rwandan case, their evidence on the importance of the Somalia “framing” effect is very compelling as to why the UN shied away from intervention despite clear evidence from UN personnel on the ground that a genocidal conflict was under way. Yet it is likely that the “Blackhawk Down” effect of Somalia was even more important in driving the behavior of member states of the Security Council, and notably that of the United States. While there is fertile ground here for ideational explanation, pointing the primary finger at the bureaucratic culture of the UN would need to be supported by much more evidence of the willingness of states to intervene, had the UN bureaucracy acted differently.
These two books make bold and creative arguments about the factors that drive institutional and organizational change. The causal mechanisms through which actors build and reconstitute their worldviews are at the root of how each book tries to explain change. Each shows that ideas play an especially important role when uncertainty is high, and actors are consequently open to new ideas. Clarifying the ways in which new ideas spread and the role of entrepreneurs and organizations in pushing these ideas, as these authors stress, are the sine qua non of a successful social scientific account of institutional change. Yet showing that ideas beyond self-interest matter for ultimate outcomes also requires showing that alternative hypotheses based on self-interest cannot explain the outcomes observed. The payoff of research on this frontier can be high, as these books show. The continued challenge they pose for others doing similar work is to deploy sophisticated and creative ways that demonstrate how ideational mechanisms provide superior explanatory leverage to those scholars instinctively skeptical of them.
