At first glance, Paul Kahn’s new study belongs to the growing genre of “books about books,” those guides that are supposed to explain crucial, classical or contemporary texts, and make them more accessible to beginners and a broader reading public. After all, the titles of the treatise and of the four chapters comprising it follow to the letter the layout of Carl Schmitt’s 1922 book. The author is adamant, however, that his work is not meant to be an exegesis of the original Political Theology; rather, Kahn points out, “the conversation with him [with Schmitt] is about us; it is not about him.” (8) Such one-sidedness of the conversation should put the reader on guard. Whenever scholars interpret a text, the interpretation is also about them, no matter how hard they might try to cut themselves out of the picture, as it were. The tricky art of hermeneutics requires the interpreters to become aware of how they ineluctably smuggle their interests and concerns into the interpreted material at every step of the way and to maintain the spirit of a conversation with the text alive, at once transforming and being transformed by it. Otherwise, the subject matter at hand would turn into nothing but a foil for what its readers wanted to say in any case, before encountering and rigorously engaging with the text. This is the danger Kahn’s approach is unable to mitigate: it remains to be seen to what extent Schmitt’s political theology, as a pretext for conversing about “us” (the collective subject in question refers to the contemporary American polity), turns into a blank screen for projecting “our” desires, fears, or ideas.
The most blatant example of such projection is the meaning Kahn bestows on political theology. More often than not, he treats it as interchangeable with sacrifice (7, 19, 22), which he associates with the revolutionary tradition and contrasts to liberal political theory with its emphasis on the contractual foundations of the political. The result is a neat dichotomy between will and reason, the dichotomy that is crucial for the rest of the book. If the conversation is exclusively about “us,” it matters little that Schmitt does not mention sacrifice at all in his Political Theology. In fact, one could say that Kahn expands the limits of the original term, drawing the reader’s attention to what the German jurist neglected in his own theory. But the problem lies elsewhere. Kahn fails to take into account the way political theology extends to the so-called secular phenomena and, thereby, disrupts the neat demarcations between faith and reason, sacrifice and contract, and so forth. Contracts are, perhaps, only the secularized versions of sacred covenants that structure the narratives of Old and New Testaments alike. Political theology is at its sharpest when it discerns the residues of the theological in the fully secularized. And, conversely, it reverts to theological politics when it discovers un-sublimated religious discourse and institutions at the heart of the political. It is true that, from the perspective of political theology, “secularization…never won” (26), but solely in the sense that its confrontation with religion was never a simple standoff, since secularization is the underside of Christianity.
For Kahn, the opposition between faith and reason in politics takes the geopolitical form of the contrast between the United States and the European Union. As he puts it, “There is no political theology appropriate for the institutions of the European Union: it is politics as a fully secularized practice of reason.” (16) Putting aside the question of whether such a politics is at all possible and, if so, whether it would retain any remnants whatsoever of the theological heritage, we now understand the rationale for locating the subject of political theology in the United States. Schmitt’s thought, in Kahn’s rendition, must leave Europe and traverse the Atlantic, because there, on the other side of the ocean, political theology still thrives thanks to the incomplete secularization of the public sphere. It is, however, rather contentious to consider the European project as fully secularized—not only because it is the ideological expression of Christian eschatology on the basis of Kantian “perpetual peace” but also because, more recently, the crypto-theological rhetoric of sacrifices surrounding economic austerity measures has been on the ascendance. Political theology can perfectly accommodate even the most rationally-inclined politics, given that reason itself is predicated on a peculiar kind of faith—the faith in reason—which falls outside the purview of Kahn’s dualistic theoretical construction.
The one time when the author disparages dichotomous thinking he does so in a markedly non-Schmittian fashion. “The choice is never between law and nonlaw,” he writes. “The law will be affirmed whichever way the decision comes out.” (80) Or, again, “The sovereign decides outside of law for the sake of law.” (50) This is, indeed, correct in the case of the judicial system, including the decisions of constitutional courts. But what about those purely political decisions that cannot be framed within existing laws but that, instead, divorce legality from legitimacy and decide on the form of the constitution: republican or monarchical; democratic or non-democratic? What if the decision is so singular as to be non-generalizable, let alone foundational for a new political regime, which may not affirm the “rule of law”? Schmittian sovereignty as a decision on the exception cannot be so easily circumscribed to a system of legality as the ultimate point of reference for sovereignty.
Much confusion could be avoided, were Kahn to supplement his references to Political Theology with a reading of Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory and, to a lesser extent, Legality and Legitimacy where these issues loom large. To say that the “Constitution is not just a product of revolution; it is the inner truth of revolution” (47) is misleading not only because constitutions are not always born of revolutions but also because, as Schmitt makes clear in the two books I have just mentioned, a formal constitution may, at the same time, express and betray, enunciate and extinguish the revolutionary impulse. In this instance, the framework of political theology proves insufficient for understanding the logic of the political, because the force of the revolution is not purely positive, as it is in the case of divine creation, but already carries the seeds of its own destruction. While God’s existence is one and the same as His essence, the privileging of political existence over essence (of which Kahn is acutely aware) means that whatever separates from the living force of revolutionary action and turns into its product (e.g., the constitution) runs the risk of becoming essentialized and de-vitalized. As soon as it is objectively revealed, the “inner truth” flips into a shameless lie.
More seriously still, the subject of the decision and, therefore, of sovereignty in Kahn’s book is murky. Of course, a certain measure of indeterminacy always haunts the question of competence—“Who decides?”—which, as Schmitt persistently reminds us, cannot be settled once and for all. Kahn wants to “depersonalize the sovereign” by extending the designation from “a natural person” to a “collective agent or an institution.” (39) For Schmitt, on the other hand, the sovereignty of institutions is a chimera, a smoke screen that conceals the decision-making power of specific individuals who pretend that this power is diffused in an impersonal context. Rather than address this problem, Kahn gets further bogged down in it, when he attributes to states the capacity to decide: “The sovereign decision is…the act of state willing its own existence.” (50) But the state, as such, does not act and has no will; to think that it does is to personalize its bureaucratic machinery on the model of Baroque representations (discussed in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes), to undermine the possibilities of political existence, and to undercut everything that is promising in Schmitt’s political philosophy.
Kahn seems to be unaware that Schmitt’s concept of the political precedes the state. Opting for a rendition of depersonalized sovereignty in institutional terms, Kahn writes: “Politics is not literary criticism. We are not debating the meaning of a text; we are asserting the authority of the state to bring one meaning rather than another into the world.” (85) The question of competence has been settled even before being raised: the state has the authority to decide on the meaning of political existence. Or rather, is it the case that this question has not been settled at all, only displaced and deferred, since it is still unclear precisely who is granted the right to interpret and, by extension, to decide in the name of the state? Whose will trumps all other wills? Which collective or individual subject is granted the exclusive right to construct the world through acts of legal or political perception (79) at the expense of other possible world-constructions?
When Kahn shifts the emphasis to the problem of political will, he signals his desire to follow a promising direction for research. Given that, for him, political theology should be “a kind of phenomenology of the political” (21), one would expect a phenomenological analysis of political will, examining its specific constitution, intentionality, or modes of fulfillment. And yet, the rest of the book does not live up to this promise. Throughout, Kahn treats the concept of will in a strictly metaphysical fashion, as though it were a noumenal entity absolutely divorced from reason and allied with freedom, understood as something “uncaused.” (62, 90, 92) Such a mystifying approach admits of no phenomenological analysis, which, alternatively, defines the will in terms of consciousness and its intentional matrix, not in terms of free, “uncaused” acts. The heyday of political metaphysics, Kahn’s Political Theology veers toward the noumenal and the inexplicable in its depiction of sovereign subjectivity: “What the subject brings to the decision is beyond words—it is “nothing”—from the juridical point of view.” (83) Although Schmitt, too, finds in the sovereign decision the political analog of the theological creatio ex nihilo, to assert that it is “beyond words”—a sort of ineffable presence—is to consign it to the very “thoughtlessness,” to which Kahn objects in the conclusion of his book. (157)
