Angelo Codevilla's Advice to War Presidents offers a bold corrective to America's foreign policy “establishment” (xiii), including both Democrats and Republicans, urging them to strictly construe the nation's interests and to do so through the exercise of common sense seasoned in the classical tradition. Codevilla contends that American statesmen, beginning with Woodrow Wilson, abandoned the type of common sense that found its way into such seminal documents as the Monroe Doctrine, which said that “if you want others to leave you alone, it really helps to leave them alone too” (176). Post-Wilsonian statesmen, be they liberal internationalists, so-called realists, or neoconservatives, were all blinded by the corrosive effect of twentieth-century progressive thought. All of these men, Codevilla believes, contributed to America repeatedly winning wars but losing the peace in a world that operates by rules and language at odds with an idealized conception of how the world should work. Codevilla is a feisty writer, and his book is full of provocative side notes focused on the importance of precision in language as well as heeding the wisdom of the past. This book is a warning to statesmen to avoid the delusions of high-blown rhetoric and to use words “according to their ordinary meaning” (26). Codevilla presents a powerful case that America's foreign policy establishment exists within a “narrow transnational community” that has a tendency to “imagine that their own likes and dislikes must trump others' customs, religions, and prejudices” which results in “a halfhearted mixture of pandering and contempt” (52).
Unfortunately, Advice to War Presidents is marred by a sneering tone that detracts from an otherwise serious scholarly effort to dissect the defects of contemporary American foreign policy. “Our statesmen,” a term used repeatedly and disparagingly throughout the book, supported by the “prestige press” (260) and academic poseurs, “imagine themselves as the world's teachers, physicians, or even policemen” (278). Codevilla contends that these statesmen have frittered away American freedom by failing to use American force to bring the nation's enemies to heel. One is struck by the tone of pessimism that permeates this book. Yet is America's track record as dire as Codevilla believes? While America's foreign policy achievements fall short of establishing Codevilla's Pax Americana, the United States has won more conflicts than it has lost. The destruction of Hitler's Germany, the collapse of Soviet Russia, the rise of a westernized albeit authoritarian China, a denuclearized Libya, the operations in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait, a Saddam-free Iraq, and an independent Kosovo are examples of successful American policies of one sort or another. One could also add to this list the fact that what remains of al-Qaeda's leadership can be found cowering in caves under Predator-filled skies in Pakistan, while Iran is in the midst of an upheaval partially fueled by western media and Twitter—all of this hardly seems like an unequivocal legacy of failure.
Oddly, a book with a chapter entitled “Watch Your Axioms” is filled to the brim with them, and unfortunately this is just one of many instances where Codevilla is hoisted with his own petard. Precise language and an understanding of history are vitally important attributes for statesmen and scholars, as Codevilla notes, but he does not always live up to the standards he sets. For instance, Codevilla asserts that everything changed with Woodrow Wilson's crusading impulses, yet American presidents have been meddling in the foreign affairs of other nations since the days of Thomas Jefferson, not strictly out of self-interest but as a means of spreading the “gospel” of democracy.
One hates to nitpick, but then again this is a book full of nitpicking: American covert action did not begin at the “height of American's influence after World War II” (224) but is as old as the nation itself; former counterterrorism official Richard Clarke was never a CIA employee (219); Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was never a UN ambassador (42); Adolf Hitler did not dispatch Rudolph Hess to Great Britain (103); the University of Texas library tower shooting was in 1966 not 1975 (238); criticism of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis is fair game, but one should at least qualify the statement that Kennedy guaranteed “the survival of the Castro regime” (149) by noting that his CIA plotted to kill Castro throughout Kennedy's presidency; claiming that the CIA “made it job number one to discount facts that linked Saddam Hussein's Iraq to anti-American terrorism” (219) is an overstatement at best, as is comparing Vladimir Putin to Adolph Hitler (173). Additionally, Ronald Reagan deserves more credit in this book than he is given for the collapse of the Soviet Union; it was not simply a case of the Evil Empire “self-destructing” (xiii) with Reagan being in the right place at the right time. Reagan's assistance to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, particularly his approval of the use of Stinger missiles, bled the Soviet Union and drove them out of Afghanistan. Lech Walesa and Margaret Thatcher disagree with Codevilla as well, as do a number of former Soviet officials who noted that Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative convinced the Kremlin that it could not compete with the United States.
The book ends with a jarring discussion of the use of tasers by local police departments and the rise of Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (238–40). These topics seem out of place in a book dealing with advice to war presidents. In the end, Codevilla concludes that America's national security entities operate under a veil of secrecy designed to guard their incompetence, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is cited for its poor handling of the anthrax cases of 2001, and which along with the CIA never adequately pursued the links between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the 9/11 attacks. Codevilla also contends that the 9/11 Commission's investigation was compromised by the CIA's “controlling” the commission's staff membership list, and so on (217). Codevilla's book is tarnished by what one could characterize as occasional low blows, particularly when he asserts that the heroic passengers on United Flight 93 who overpowered their highjackers on 9/11 “violated US government policy.” That same U.S. government is honoring these violators with a National Memorial in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. There is no doubt that improvements must be made in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy, and some of Codevilla's suggestions merit attention. Unfortunately these proposals are lost in a torrent of injudicious assertions and occasional inaccuracies.
